The End of a Romance? A Note on the Quantitative Impacts of a ‘Brexit’ from the EU

This study suggests UK equivalent variation (EV) gains of €8.9 billion on withdrawal from the EU budget. Factoring in associated trade facilitation costs from the loss of UK access to the single market, annual UK EV losses could be as high as €14.0 billion, with the EU‐28 facing a corresponding loss of €40.4 billion. Interestingly, the extrapolated UK gain arising from withdrawal from the ‘CAP’ component of the EU budget exceeds estimated lower and upper bound trade facilitation costs exclusively on EU agrofood trade. Accordingly, the UK should realistically remain as an EU member, although continue to lobby for reductions in the CAP budget.     

Re‐evaluating the Harbinson Proposal – Prospects for the EU25: A Note

In this study, we use the Harbinson Proposal and July Framework to compare a ‘likely’ Doha scenario with a realistic baseline. The novelty of this study is that we focus exclusively on the trade‐led welfare impacts in selected EU member states. The important features of this note are the: (i) usage of the latest Global Trade Analysis Project (version 6) data; (ii) focus on EU25 regions incorporating all major Common Agricultural Policy instruments and reforms; and (iii) inclusion of binding tariff overhangs into the Harbinson tariff reductions. Results show the damping effects of tariff‐binding overhangs on welfare outcomes. This and other factors which limit the gains to liberalisation mean that the EU25 only realises 10% of its long‐run welfare gain potential, as defined by complete liberalisation.     

Agricultural trade reform under the Doha Agenda: some key issues*

A successful agreement on agriculture is essential for an overall agreement under the WTO's Doha trade negotiations. Reaching agreement has been difficult, and as of August 2007, much still remains to be done if a successful agreement is to be reached. We consider three of the most controversial areas of the agricultural negotiations: the relative importance of domestic support, market access and export subsidies; three market access issues of sensitive‐product exceptions sought for all countries and, the additional special product exceptions sought for developing countries, the proposed special safeguard mechanism; and the domestic support issue. We show that decisions made on reform in these areas will have a critical influence on whether the negotiations achieve their objectives of promoting trade reform and reducing poverty.     

Green Light for Green Agricultural Policies? An Analysis at Regional and Global Scales

This paper analyses the effects of introducing biodiversity‐targeted ecological focus area (EFA) requirements on all farms with arable land in the EU by quantifying their global, regional, economic and environmental impacts in a mutually consistent way. To capture these impacts, different spatial scales need to be considered – ranging from on‐farm decisions regarding the EFA in the EU, to supply response around the world. In order to address this challenge, we combine the supply side of the CAPRI model, which offers high spatial, farm and policy resolution in the EU, with the GTAP model of global trade and land use. Both models are linked through a multi‐product, restricted‐revenue function for the EU crop sector. The results predict improved environmental status in the high‐yielding regions of the EU. However, output price increases lead to intensification in the more marginal areas of the EU where little or no additional land is taken out of production. The decrease in arable land in the EU is partially compensated by an increase of crop land, as well as increased fertiliser applications, in other regions of the globe. Thus, the improvement of environmental status in the EU comes at the price of global intensification, as well as the loss of forest and grassland areas outside the EU. Overall, we find that every hectare of land that is taken out of production in the EU increases greenhouse gas emissions in the rest of the world by 20.8 tonnes CO₂ equivalent.     

European Agriculture after Brexit: Does Anyone Benefit from the Divorce?

The UK exited the EU on 31 January 2020, with a transition period agreed as part of the Withdrawal Agreement. During this transition period the UK and the EU will decide on their future trading relationship. No matter what form this relationship takes, there will be disturbances to agri‐food markets. This study analyses four different scenarios with increasing barriers to trade, ranging from a very close relationship similar to the European Economic Area to a distant relationship in which the UK and EU trade on Most Favoured Nation terms, using the EU focused global agricultural sector model CAPRI. In the UK, food prices will increase in all scenarios, making consumers in the UK the biggest losers. Only in a free trade agreement scenario does the UK show an unambiguous positive net welfare gain in just the agri‐food sector. In the case of the European Economic Area scenario, which assumes continued access to the single market, the net welfare impact would depend on the size of the UK’s continued contribution to the EU. In the EU, declining food prices would benefit consumers but the sum of the loss in farmers’ incomes and the UK’s EU CAP contribution would be much greater than the consumer’s gain. These impacts in agricultural markets under different future trade arrangements will also be influenced by the UK’s agricultural policy changes in direct payments as well as by possible further UK trade liberalisation after the end of the transition period.     

Logs or permits? Forestry land use decisions in an emissions trading scheme

Negative carbon emissions options are required to meet long-term climate goals in many countries. One way to incentivise these options is by paying farmers for carbon sequestered by forests through an emissions trading scheme (ETS). New Zealand has a comprehensive ETS, which includes incentives for farmers to plant permanent exotic forests. This research uses an economy-wide model, a forestry model and land use change functions to measure the expected proportion of farmers with trees at harvesting age that will change land use from production to permanent forests in New Zealand from 2014 to 2050. We also estimate the impacts on carbon sequestration, the carbon price, gross emissions, GDP and welfare. When there is forestry land use change, the results indicate that the responsiveness of land owners to the carbon price has a measured impact on carbon sequestration. For example, under the fastest land use change scenario, carbon sequestration reaches 29.93 Mt CO₂e by 2050 compared to 23.41 Mt CO₂e in the no land use change scenario (a 28% increase). Even under the slowest land use change scenario, carbon sequestration is 25.89 Mt CO₂e by 2050 (an 11% increase compared with no land use change). This is because, if foresters decide not to switch to permanent forests in 1 year, carbon prices and ultimately incentives to convert to permanent forests will be higher in future years.     

Assessing CAP Reform: Sensitivity of Modelling Decoupled Policies

The European Union reformed farm policy in June 2003 towards the decoupling of farm income support instruments. Available impact studies find that this reform reduces production incentives substantially for beef and to a lesser extent for arable crops. However, these studies assume that the previous reform, under Agenda 2000, already decoupled arable crop direct payments to a considerable extent, while beef premiums were linked more closely to production. Our main objective in this paper is to test the sensitivity of these results to this questionable modelling of Agenda 2000 direct payments, which neglects eligibility rules and land market imperfections. Our analysis reveals that the effects of the reform on both arable crop and beef production are always negative, however the Agenda 2000 direct payments are modelled. On the other hand, we show that, when the eligibility rules and land market imperfections are acknowledged, the production reducing effects may be much larger for arable crops than for beef. Policy implications of these results are noted.