AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE “FIT”BETWEEN STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM DESIGN

This paper was motivated by the limited understanding of the role of accounting vis a vis other information in supporting the needs of management. The paper reports the findings of a study which examined differences in the design parameters of management information systems in firms adopting different strategic priorities. Based on a sample of 49 business unit general managers, the findings indicate that the effectiveness of business units is dependent on a match between the design of the information system and the firm's strategic posture. Information systems which have the characteristics of a broad scope system were found to be more effective in firms employing a strategy of continuous product/market development and innovation (Prospectors) than in firms which were protecting a comparatively narrow and stable product-market (Defenders). The results have important implications for management accountants involved in the design and implementation of management information systems, especially in firms adopting a more innovative strategic posture. In particular, the study sheds light on the role of accounting as part of the “mosaic” of information provided to managers for decision making.     

In name only: Information spillovers among Chinese firms with similar stock names during earnings announcements

We examine whether investors' attention on salient firm characteristics affects information spillovers during corporate earnings announcements. For market participants in China, the stock name is a salient feature of listed companies. We find that the market reaction of non-announcing firms to earnings reports of announcing firms is greater across firms with similar stock names. The incremental information spillovers among similarly named stocks are stronger for larger announcing firms and on days with fewer earnings announcements. The incremental information spillovers between similarly named stocks do not fully reverse in the post-announcement period, consistent with persistent investor behavior predicted by the salience theory. There are also significant return comovements among similarly named stocks. Our findings suggest that investors with limited attention are likely to focus on salient stock names and overestimate the economic connections between similarly name stocks. Our study extends the behavioral finance literature by showing how investors' attention on salient firm features can bias their reaction to unrelated peer disclosures.     

Provision of financial information and its impact on the relationship between executives and venture capital managers: A study of the private equity market in Egypt

This study makes an attempt to further understand the practices of private equity/venture capital (PE/VC) in developing markets. We focus our attention on the relationship between PE/VC firms and the investee companies (ICs) and its development. We investigate the provision of financial and non-financial information and its effects on the development of the relationship between chief executive officers (CEOs) and PE/VC managers in Egypt as one of the developing markets. Data were collected from Egyptian PE/VC firms via semi-structured interviews. Both similarities and differences were found between Egyptian PE/VC in respect of developing the relationships with their ICs. Results show that the provision of timely information allows PE/VC managers to: (i) have a higher degree of trust on CEOs; (ii) be more supportive of the CEO's strategic decisions; and (iii) interact more frequently with the ICs. The origin of the PE/VC firms seems to have an effect on the Egyptian PE/VC firms’ behaviours. International PE/VC firms are also more likely to get involved in every decision at the strategic level of the ICs. The current study provides some implications for both CEOs of the ICs and PE/VC managers. It is important for PE/VC managers to develop and maintain successful relationships with ICs, which will promote a positive image of the PE/VC firms that can be used for marketing purposes, which in turn can be translated into more deals in the future.     

Product market competition,competitive strategy,and analyst coverage

This paper examines how product market competition and strategic interactions among peer firms influence analyst coverage. First, we hypothesize that product market competition increases both the demand and supply of analyst coverage. Using three variations of industry concentration ratios and a firm specific measure of competition, we test and find a positive and significant effect of market competition on analyst coverage. Second, we explore an information transfer channel through which product market affects analyst coverage. We hypothesize that information flows more freely among firms selling similar products. Such information flows lowers analyst information collection and processing costs, which in turn increases analyst coverage. Using product similarity index developed by Hoberg and Phillips (J Polit Econ 124(5):1423–1465, 2016) to capture the effect of information transfer, we find that analyst coverage increases with product similarity. Third we examine the role of competitive strategy in analyst coverage. We split our sample into markets of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We find that the effect of market competition and analyst coverage is more pronounced in markets where firms compete as strategic complements.     

Shareholder activism and firms’ performance

Increasing attention to activist campaigns raises the question of whether they lead to better performance. The impact of different motives, demands, and proposals is still unclear and, sometimes, contradictory. We used a unique dataset of activist campaigns targeting firms in the US from 2002 to 2017 and analysed the impact of activism on firm performance, considering their specific demands. Our results show that firms experience a decline in profitability almost immediately after campaigns, although the effect is unclear in the years subsequent to the intervention. Results also suggest that campaigns primarily focused on demanding a change in strategic direction or obtaining board control intensify the decline in profitability. Seeking board representation is the type of demand that effectively increases target firms’ profitability. Our analysis adds to research on shareholder governance and competitive dynamics by highlighting that the type of demand adopted in campaigns impacts differently on firms’ performance.     

The influence of business strategy on annual report readability

Concerns about the complexity of firm disclosures have prompted regulators to initiate projects to improve the readability of annual reports. We investigate business strategy as a determinant of annual report readability. As business strategy fundamentally determines a firm’s product and market domain, technology, and organizational structure, it influences a firm’s operating complexity, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry. Consequently, business strategy frames the level, wording, and complexity of disclosures. We capture a firm’s business strategy based on the Miles and Snow (1978) strategic typology and measure 10-K readability with Li’s (2008) Fog index. We find that firms pursuing an innovation-oriented prospector strategy have less readable 10-Ks relative to firms pursuing an efficiency-oriented defender strategy. We also find that prospectors display more negative and uncertainty tones while defenders exhibit more litigious tone in their 10-Ks. Our study provides useful insights to policy makers as it suggests that efforts to improve annual report readability may be limited for some firms given that business strategy is a fundamental determinant of readability and pronouncements accommodating different strategic orientations are not feasible.     

Strategic Demand for Insurance

We focus on the corporate demand for insurance under duopoly. We consider the case in which firms purchase insurance in order to enhance their competitiveness. We show that a higher level of corporate insurance makes a firm more aggressive and its competitor less aggressive in the output market (strategic effect). The optimal coverage of insurance is determined by comparing the strategic effect of insurance and the cost of insurance. The optimal coverage is positive if the strategic effect is greater than the cost of insurance. An interesting implication is that a risk‐neutral firm may purchase actuarially unfair insurance. The main strategic effect of insurance comes from the fact that firms purchase insurance before they produce outputs. Insurance makes firms more aggressive due to the limited risk costs of firms.     

Limited investor attention,relative fundamental strength,and the cross-section of stock returns

We explore the underlying reasons for the apparent mispricing of firms based on fundamental information. We document that a relative fundamental strength strategy that buys (sells) firms with strong (weak) fundamentals is highly profitable for up to three years. The results cannot be explained by either price or earnings momentum, are robust to risk adjustments based on standard asset pricing models, and survive a battery of robustness tests. The strategy also works better among small firms, as well as firms with low analyst coverage and a high probability of informed trading. Our empirical findings support the hypotheses of limited investor attention and informed trading.     

Causes and Consequences of Disaggregating Earnings Guidance

Whether managers should provide earnings guidance, especially quarterly guidance, has been a hotly debated policy issue. Influential organizations have urged firms to stop providing earnings guidance to reduce earnings fixation and short‐termism in the capital markets. Little attention has been paid to an alternative proposal: instead of ceasing earnings guidance, companies could provide disaggregated earnings guidance. No archival evidence exists regarding the determinants of disaggregated earnings guidance and its effects on the firm and its information environment. We find that once managers provide guidance, the decision to disaggregate this guidance is primarily driven by demand‐and‐supply factors that exhibit little change from year to year rather than by strategic factors. We find more timely analyst forecast revisions (with no compromise of forecast accuracy), a greater magnitude of revisions, and a larger reduction in analyst disagreement for disaggregating firms than for non‐disaggregating firms. These findings suggest that disaggregation enriches a firm's information environment. We also find that disaggregation helps managers align analyst expectations with their own, but firms are punished by investors for providing multiple performance targets but missing them.     

Cash holdings and the bargaining power of R&D-intensive targets

Prior literature suggests that R&D-intensive firms hold large amounts of cash due to financing constraints. This paper examines whether such firms could also use cash holdings as a strategic bargaining tool in M&A transactions. Using a large sample of takeover bids announced between 1980 and 2012, we demonstrate that cash holdings positively impact R&D-intensive targets’ takeover premiums and announcement-period abnormal returns. These effects disappear in non-R&D-intensive firms. Controlling for various endogeneity and financing concerns, we also find that R&D-intensive firms build up cash holdings in anticipation of becoming a takeover target. Further analysis indicates that in R&D-intensive firms, such cash holdings are valued highly by the market. Taken together, our findings shed new light on the strategic bargaining role of corporate cash holdings in the outcomes of acquisitions targeting R&D-intensive firms.     

Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination Role

We examine uniform and discretionary regimes for reporting information about firm performance from the perspective of a standard setter, in a setting where the precision of reported information is difficult to verify and the reported information can help coordinate decisions by users of the information. The standard setter's task is to choose a reporting regime to maximize the expected decision value of reported information for all users at all firms. The uniform regime requires all firms to report using the same set of reporting methods regardless of the precision of their information, and the discretionary regime allows firms to freely condition their sets of reporting methods on the precision of their information. We show that when unverifiable information precision varies across firms and users' decisions based on reported information have strong strategic complementarities, a uniform regime can have a beneficial social effect as compared to a discretionary reporting regime. Our analysis generates both normative and positive implications for evaluating the necessity and effectiveness of reporting under standards.     

Getting Attention Through Corporate Philanthropy

This study investigates whether firm donations will attract attention for firms without analyst coverage. We find that: (1) the donations from firms without analyst coverage attract more attention from analysts, (2) donations from firms without analyst coverage improve stock liquidity and institutional holdings at least in the short run, and (3) donations from firms without analyst coverage are positively and significantly related to the future performance of firms compared with those from firms covered by analysts. This study contributes to the understanding of the influence of analysts on firms and the strategic motivations of corporate philanthropy.     

Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge

This paper determines optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy in which firms pay limited attention to aggregate variables. Firms’ inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. This is shown to have strong implications for optimal nominal demand policy. In particular, if firms’ prices are strategic complements and economic shocks display little persistence, monetary policy has strong real effects, making it optimal to stabilize the output gap. Weak complementarities or sufficient shock persistence, however, cause price level stabilization to become increasingly optimal. With persistent shocks, optimal monetary policy shifts from output gap stabilization in initial periods following the shock to price level stabilization in later periods, potentially rationalizing the medium-term approach to price stability adopted by some central banks.     

Evidence on Value Creation in the Financial Services Industries through the Use of Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances

While an extensive body of literature has examined merger, acquisition, and consolidation activity in commercial banks and other financial services firms, little attention has been paid to examining how these institutions use the cooperative activities of joint ventures and strategic alliances to accomplish their growth objectives. We analyze the effects of the use of joint ventures and strategic alliances by a sample of firms in the banking, investment services, and insurance industries. Our results show that commercial banks, investment services firms, and insurance companies experience significant abnormal returns of 0.66% on average when they announce their participation in a joint venture or strategic alliance. These abnormal returns are significantly positive across the four strategic motives of domestic, international, horizontal, and diversifying cooperative activities. Using a matched sample, we also show that our sample firms enjoy significant, positive, abnormal returns for holding periods of six, 12, and 18 months after the announcement of the cooperative activity.     

The effectiveness of chief financial officer board membership in improving corporate investment efficiency

The key roles of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in firm operating performance, corporate strategic choices, and corporate governance have been increasingly emphasized in recent decades. In this study, we empirically investigate the relation between CFO board membership and corporate investment efficiency to determine whether CFO presence on the board reduces firms’ propensity to over- or underinvest. We find that CFO board membership is significantly associated with a decreased level of corporate over- and underinvestment. Further, the positive effects of CFO board membership on corporate investment efficiency are greater for firms with greater information asymmetries. Last but not least, we find that the improved investment efficiency experienced by firms with CFOs on their boards has a positive effect on the firms’ future performance. Overall, we find that CFO board membership is associated with improved investment efficiency and firms’ future profitability. By documenting the real business impact of CFO board membership on investment efficiency and firms’ future performance, we add bricks to the literature on board composition and how it influences firms’ strategic choices and performance. Our findings suggest that having CFOs on boards could benefit firms’ investment practices, which directly relate to corporate strategic performance.

     

Limited attention,statement of cash flow disclosure,and the valuation of accruals

We test for the effect of limited attention on the valuation of accruals by comparing the immediate and long-term market reactions to earnings announcements between a subsample of firms that disclose only the balance sheet with a subsample of firms that disclose both the balance sheet and the statement of cash flows (SCF) in the earnings press release. Information about accruals generally can be inferred from comparative balance sheets, but the availability of the SCF makes accruals more salient and easier to process for investors with limited attention. Controlling for potential additional information and endogeneity of SCF disclosure, we find strong evidence that SCF disclosure enables more efficient pricing of accruals. Further analyses using a proxy for investor sophistication suggest that, when SCF is absent from the earnings press release, less sophisticated investors fail to discount accruals but sophisticated investors do.     

Innovation beyond firm boundaries: Strategic alliances and corporate innovation

In this paper, we empirically analyze how strategic alliances affect the innovation output of the firms forming the alliance. We find a positive effect of R&D-related strategic alliances on corporate innovation, as measured by the quantity and quality of patents filed. This effect is stronger for firms led by CEOs with higher general managerial skills, firms with greater experience from earlier alliances, and firms operating in R&D-intensive industries. Furthermore, the innovation-fostering effect of strategic alliances is more pronounced if alliance partnering firms share a common institutional blockholder or have a higher degree of technological proximity. We also document, for the first time in the literature, a unique contractual mechanism through which firms share the benefits of innovation with their alliance partners, namely, “co-patenting.”     

同行业间避税与企业的战略反应——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文运用2007-2016年中国A股上市公司数据,引入同行业竞争者的股票异常回报作为工具变量,研究同行业竞争者避税行为对企业战略反应的影响。研究发现,相比国有企业,民营企业的同行业竞争者避税行为与企业避税存在战略互补效应,即同行业竞争者的避税行为越激进,企业会选择更加激进的避税策略。探究可能影响这种战略互补效应的机制,结果显示民营企业很可能会模仿同行业领导者等被认为避税行为更有效合理的竞争对手制定避税策略。进一步发现地理距离衰减有利于降低同行业信息收集成本,导致同行业间战略互补反应更显著,即同行业避税政策模仿具有“本土偏好”。本文提供了同行业竞争对企业避税影响的因果关系证据,揭示了同行业竞争者避税行为是企业避税行为的重要影响因素。     

Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market

We consider an oligopoly market where firms offer insurance coverage against a risk characterised by aggregate uncertainty. Firms behave as if they were risk averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a two-stage game where firms choose their internal capital level at stage one and compete on price at stage two. We characterise the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and focus attention on the strategic impact of insurers capital choice. We discuss the model with regard to the insurance industry specificities and regulation.     

The Dog that Did Not Bark: Limited Price Efficiency and Strategic Nondisclosure

Theory posits that investors can rationally infer the implications of strategic nondisclosure for firm value, pressuring managers to disclose information voluntarily. This study documents that the lack of an earnings guidance predicts an abnormal return of −41 basis points around the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement, suggesting that investors do not fully incorporate the implications of nonguidance. Further analyses demonstrate that limitations in price efficiency, driven by investors' limited attention and short-selling constraints, explain the mispricing of nonguidance and are associated with less guidance issuance. Our results collectively highlight limited price efficiency as another friction when studying managers' strategic disclosure decisions.