Contracting with private knowledge of signal quality

We characterize the optimal procurement contract in a setting where a supplier has privileged knowledge of the quality of a public signal about his production costs. The optimal contract exhibits important differences with standard contracts in adverse selection settings. For instance, the contract induces output both above and below first‐best levels. Furthermore, the induced output may not vary with the realized public signal unless the signal quality is sufficiently pronounced. In addition, output may increase as expected costs increase.     

Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs

Optimistic beliefs are a source of nonpecuniary benefits forentrepreneurs that can explain the "Private Equity Puzzle."This paper looks at the effects of entrepreneurial optimismon financial contracting. When the contract space is restrictedto debt, we show the existence of a separating equilibrium inwhich optimists self-select into short-term debt and realistsinto long-term debt. Long-term debt is optimal for a realistentrepreneur as it smooths payoffs across states of nature.Short-term debt is optimal for optimists for two reasons: (i)"bridging the gap in beliefs" by letting the entrepreneur takea bet on his project’s success, and (ii) letting the investorimpose adaptation decisions in bad states. We test our theory on a large data set of French entrepreneurs.First, in agreement with the psychology literature, we findthat biases in beliefs may be (partly) explained by individualcharacteristics and tend to persist over time. Second, as predictedby our model, we find that short-term debt is robustly correlatedwith "optimistic" expectation errors, even controlling for firmrisk and other potential determinants of short-term leverage.     

Contracting with Present-Biased Consumers in Insurance Markets

Present bias challenges consumers with self-control problems when they implement precautionary efforts in insurance markets. To explore how rational insurance companies respond to this bias, this paper analyzes a contract design problem in a monopolistic insurance market with ex ante moral hazard. We consider two types of consumers with this bias: the “naifs”, who do not foresee the present bias and make decisions in a myopic way, and the “sophisticates”, who foresee the bias and incorporate it in the decision process. Relative to the benchmark case where consumers are time-consistent, we show that (i) present bias reduces the monopoly profit, regardless of the consumer type; (ii) present bias can either reduce or increase the coverage of the profit-maximizing insurance contract depending on the extent of the bias; and (iii) when present bias is severe, the insurance company can profitably exploit naifs but not sophisticates. These results still hold when consumers are heterogeneous and their types are unknown to the insurance company.     

Contracting on litigation

Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third‐party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk‐neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction‐cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.     

Optimal rewards in contests

We study all‐pay contests with effort‐dependent rewards under incomplete information. A contestant's value to winning depends not only on his type but also on the effort‐dependent reward chosen by the designer. We analyze which reward is optimal for the designer when his objective is either total effort or highest effort. We find that under certain conditions the optimal reward may either be negative or even decreasing in effort; however, we find no advantage to having multiple rewards.     

Staged-financing contracts with private information

This paper studies the use of incentive contracts in the Bolton–Scharfstein model when some agents in the population are technically constrained from falsifying reports and stealing cash [Bolton, P., Scharfstein, D., 1990. A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. Amer. Econ. Rev. 80, 94–106]. The original Bolton–Scharfstein contract may not be optimal for a large range of parametric values. The optimal contract may induce falsification and stealing in equilibrium and social welfare may be improved. Moreover, the optimal contract does not screen different types of agents. Empirical implications for various types of staged-contracts are discussed.     

Contracting in Peer Networks

We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of their peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals, a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.     

Debt Contracting on Management

Change of management restrictions (CMRs) in loan contracts give lenders explicit ex ante control rights over managerial retention and selection. This paper shows that lenders use CMRs to mitigate risks arising from CEO turnover, especially those related to the loss of human capital and replacement uncertainty, thereby providing evidence that human capital risk affects debt contracting. With a CMR in place, the likelihood of CEO turnover decreases by more than half, and future firm performance improves when retention frictions are important, suggesting that lenders can influence managerial turnover, even outside of default states, and help the borrower retain talent.     

Optimal Entrepreneurial Financial Contracting

This paper studies the optimal financing (capital structure) of entrepreneurial activity in the context of risk-aversion by incorporating the deadweight costs of bankruptcy and taxes. Unlike the extreme debt ratio (corner solution) predicted by scholars using linear models, this paper provides unique interior results for risk-free as well as risky debt, irrespective of corporate taxes. The paper also shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of debt, and the pareto-optimality of one over the other. The important findings of this paper are: (i) the existence of an equilibrium, where the borrowing interest rate is greater than the lending rate, despite the violation of Fisher separation theorem (1930); (ii) wealth plays a critical role in determining the debt ratio and the equilibrium risk-free rate of interest, complementing the De Meza and Webb (1987 and 1999) studies; (iii) an explanation for the preferred stock and income bond puzzles, extending Fooladi et al. (1991) and McConnell and Schlarbaum (1991).     

Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting

We develop an agency model of financial contracting. We derivelong-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal securities,capturing the debt coupon and maturity; the interest rate andlimits on the credit line; inside versus outside equity; dividendpolicy; and capital structure dynamics. The optimal debt-equityratio is history dependent, but debt and credit line terms areindependent of the amount financed and, in some cases, the severityof the agency problem. In our model, the agent can divert cashflows; we also consider settings in which the agent undertakeshidden effort, or can control cash flow risk.     

Information Aggregation via Contracting

When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk-taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting-based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well-known rational expectations equilibrium models.     

Communicating total rewards to the generations

This is the first time in American history that four distinct generations have been in the workforce at the same time. Because employers have finite resources with which to compete for talent, they must understand the generations, what matters most to them and what they can do to motivate different generations of workers. Perhaps surprisingly, the author argues that the generations share in most valuing "soft cost" rewards over "hard dollar cost" items. This article advises employers on how to make their company a great place to work for all generations.     

Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus

We study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financing to a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post single offers involves a loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.     

Risks and rewards of variable-rate debt

Hospital and health system finance leaders should position their organizations to participate in the variable-rate market. To this end, one important step is to establish the right baseline variable-rate exposure target for the organization based on its credit and risk profile. Leaders also should be thoroughly familiar with the available products and understand the circumstances (pricing, terms, and embedded risk) under which the organization would be willing to deploy them within the overall capital structure.     

CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.     

Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting

This paper examines whether fraud allegations affect firms’ contracting with the government. Using a data set of whistleblower allegations brought under the False Claims Act against firms accused of defrauding the government, we find that federal agencies do not reduce the total dollar volume of contracts with accused firms; however, they substitute approximately 14% of the harder‐to‐monitor cost‐plus contracts for fixed‐price contracts. This effect is concentrated in the procurement of services and explained by contract and service substitution. Finally, we find that after the conclusion of the investigation, the government reduces the contract dollar volume by approximately 15% for cases that resulted in a settlement. Our findings indicate that contract‐design changes are used to mitigate uncertainty in suppliers’ reputation.     

Asset Revaluations and Debt Contracting

The research question investigated is: Do managers of Australian firms use upward asset revaluations to reduce debt contracting costs? Prior research, using sample periods from the 1970s and early 1980s, provides evidence that asset revaluations are used to reduce the costs of debt contracting (see Whittred and Chan, 1992; Brown et al., 1992; Cotter and Zimmer, 1995). However, considerable changes to the institutional set-ting have occurred in the past decade. These institutional changes include increased regulation of asset revaluations and disclosures, changes in the macroeconomic environment, and changes in the Australian debt market. Particularly, there has been a shift in emphasis from public to private debt. The relationship between asset revaluations and debt contracting is examined in the current setting, using refined measures of contracting variables. Interestingly, the results of prior research do not replicate in the current setting. In order to further examine the potential impact of changes to the institutional setting, a series of interviews with chief financial officers is undertaken. The conclusion drawn from this additional analysis is that the relatively closer relationship between firms and their bankers in the current institutional setting has caused many firms to choose footnote disclosure of undervalued assets in preference to recognizing an upward asset revaluation in the balance sheet.