Government sets 2021 marker for EU trade deal

• ▀ We expect the UK and EU to agree an FTA that will take effect on 1 January 2021, two years earlier than we had previously assumed. The earlier introduction of trade barriers will dampen the post-coronavirus recovery.
• ▀ The economic case for delaying the implementation seemed to have been strengthened by the pandemic, which has left firms and the government ill-equipped to adapt. But political considerations have won out.
• ▀ We think a basic trade deal is more likely than not. The terms of the withdrawal agreement mean that failure to agree an FTA would increase frictions on trade between GB and NI. The UK will also be keen to protect vulnerable sectors.

     

The global monetary boom - no cause for panic

• ▀ Global monetary growth has been its fastest for decades over recent months, but we continue to believe inflation risks are lower than many think. A modest inflation overshoot in the coming years is possible but would not be very damaging.
• ▀ While headline money growth figures still look strong, heavy precautionary borrowing by firms in March-April is already starting to unwind in the US and UK. About 80% of the rise in borrowing by large UK firms has been repaid.
• ▀ In addition, tightened lending standards at banks are likely to weigh on future corporate borrowing and money growth. A net 70% of US banks tightened corporate credit standards in the latest Fed survey. Rising loan defaults risk exacerbating this.
• ▀ Heavy government borrowing and accompanying central bank QE have been key drivers of monetary growth and are likely to remain so, notwithstanding a slowdown in the pace of central bank bond purchases. This is the main risk factor those who fear inflation cite.
• ▀ But if credit to the private sector starts to shrink, deficit financing of this sort may be essential to prevent long-term weakness in money, credit, and economic growth. Japan's experience in the 1990s and 2000s is relevant here.
• ▀ Inflation also has room to overshoot current targets, if necessary, given the substantial undershoots of the last decade. This consideration in part explains the recent shift in Federal Reserve thinking towards targeting an average inflation rate over time

     

Why ‘King dollar’ is reigning supreme

• ▀ After a pause in late 2017 and early 2018, the dollar has resumed its rise. Our analysis suggests the long-term factors influencing the dollar are likely to remain supportive in 2020, ebbing only in 2021.
• ▀ Alongside positive interest rate differentials, several key factors explain the recent dollar strength including relatively strong economic growth, a contained external deficit and significant equity market outperformance.
• ▀ Over 2018–2019 US growth has been faster than the rest of the G7, which suffered more downside surprises this year. Meanwhile, the deterioration in the US external deficit was less than expected, despite the Trump fiscal stimulus.
• ▀ The massive improvement in the US oil balance over recent years looks like an important long-term structural support for the dollar. It allows the US to grow faster and have a stronger currency than would otherwise have been the case.
• ▀ The dollar is also supported by its still-dominant position in global financial markets. Recent talk of ‘de-dollarisation’ looks to be largely hype - the dollar's share of cross-border transactions, trade invoicing, and FX reserves is high and either stable or rising.
• ▀ The conditions necessary to create another dollar bear market like that in 2002–2008 may be hard to reproduce. A period of relative underperformance in US stocks is conceivable, but the 2002–2008 period also featured large US basic balance of payments deficits and persistently negative long-term real yield differentials, which look less likely to materialise.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: World growth still seen at just 2.5% in 2020

• ▀ Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.
• ▀ While our view remains that global GDP growth is likely to have softened further around the turn of the year, the decline remains gradual. And latest survey-based measures of activity and sentiment show tentative signs that prospects are beginning to improve, consistent with our long-standing view that the low point for global growth will be in Q1 2020.
• ▀ Just as importantly, the likelihood of the US and China formally signing off a phase one trade deal in mid-January has reduced the chances of a further flare-up in trade tensions between the two economies. However, this has to some degree been offset by the troubling events recently unfolding between the US and Iran.
• ▀ We remain sceptical that the global economy is set for a major growth boost. Any healing in US-China relations may quickly be unwound and a full reversal of the tariffs already implemented remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, some of the associated growth boost is likely to be offset by less policy support. As a result, we have raised our 2020 GDP growth by just 0.1pp in the US but by a more significant 0.3pp in China.
• ▀ Meanwhile, although the ongoing and broad-based monetary policy loosening in both AEs and EMs should start to feed through to growth this year, we doubt this will be a game-changer. Not only is policy loosening at a global level set to be fairly muted, limited spare capacity, the rising stock of global debt and elevated asset prices are likely to reduce the positive impulse from policymakers' actions.

     

Five ways the pandemic could alter the economy

• ▀ Economic crises are often turning points, and the upheaval triggered by coronavirus may prove one of them. A permanently bigger state and public borrowing, persistently cowed consumers, a more ‘national’ UK economy and the impetus for beneficial reforms are all possibilities.
• ▀ We think the scale of state intervention in the economy to protect public health will increase pressure to do more in aid of other social goals. The austere ‘Treasury view’ of deficits is also likely to wane.
• ▀ Meanwhile, evidence suggests that major economic shocks can exert a decades-long drag on consumers’ desire to spend, giving another reason why higher government borrowing may persist long after the pandemic has faded.
• ▀ Supply-chain vulnerabilities exposed by the virus may crystallise the more ‘UK-first’ approach to economic policy that Brexit ushered in. Although greater protectionism could threaten economic dynamism, the crisis could be the stimulus to structural reform, offering a potential growth upside

     

Don't expect a big lift from central bank policy easing

• ▀ During the current global slowdown, the world's central banks have delivered a broad-based policy easing that has been larger than during the previous two mini-downturns of the current cycle.
• ▀ We expect this to halt the downward momentum in the early part of this year and is a key factor behind our baseline view of no global recession in 2020.
• ▀ But limited further central bank wriggle room or a reluctance to use it adds a question mark over the efficacy of monetary policy and means we doubt it will deliver a big growth bounce, particularly in the advanced economies. In addition, fiscal support is likely to be limited in 2020.

     

Brexit deal and demographics drag on long-term outlook

• ▀ We have revised down our long-term forecast for GDP growth based largely on our expectation that the UK is headed for a much looser relationship with the EU. This will result in damage to trade and lower FDI inflows.
• ▀ We now expect potential output growth to slow to 1.4% a year from 2020–2030 down from 1.6% a year from 2010–2020. In the two decades after 2030 we expect the drag from Brexit-related effects to fade, but weaker contributions in labour supply and human capital will cut output growth to 1.2% a year.
• ▀ Demographics have been a key contributor to potential output growth over the past 30 years. But an ageing population and a more restrictive immigration regime are likely to mean the workforce grows far more slowly in the future.
• ▀ Our long-term growth forecast is weaker than the OBR's and implies that future governments will face a combination of disappointing growth in tax revenues and increasing demands for government spending from an ageing population.

     

Why the surge in savings won't last

• ▀ The coronavirus lockdown caused UK savings to surge. We think the household saving ratio will average over 15% in 2020 - almost twice its long-run average - while the corporate sector is likely to run a hefty financial surplus.
• ▀ Evidence suggests that economic shocks usually push up the desire to save, to the detriment of growth. But the uniqueness of the Covid crisis and its aftereffects could limit the extent of the private sector's increased prudence.
• ▀ Scarred by recent events, consumers may remain thriftier as normality returns. But the short duration of the economic contraction and the windfall nature of lockdown savings mean any long-term rise in savings rates could be modest.
• ▀ Meanwhile, post-pandemic, a more cautious attitude to investment and efforts to repair balance sheets suggest higher saving by firms. But the prospect of weak corporate profit growth will, in our view, offset those forces.

     

Over the cliff edge and on to the rocks below

• ? If Brexit negotiations were to break down, the UK would face a significant increase in trade disruption from March 2019, even if it were able to put some basic trading arrangements in place. In a scenario where key sectors face extra friction, we find that the level of UK GDP would be 2.0% – or £16bn in cash terms – lower at the end of 2020 compared with our baseline. The impact on the remaining EU countries, including Ireland, would be much smaller .
• ? This article focuses on what a cliff‐edge Brexit means for trade costs and prices. This is only part of the equation – such a scenario would also influence supply chains and migration, while there is also potential for policymakers to mitigate some of the negative effects via looser policy.
• ? The notion that the UK could simply walk away from Brexit negotiations and rely on WTO rules to trade with the world is deeply flawed. The UK would need to re‐establish more than 750 very complex international arrangements just to maintain the status quo. We expect only the most critical issues – such as air travel – to be resolved by March 2019. Exporters also face a substantial increase in non‐tariff barriers.
• ? A breakdown in talks would also see both sides levying tariffs on imports from each other from March 2019, raising the cost of importing UK goods into the EU by 3.5% and by 3.1% for goods imported into the UK from the EU. For the UK, this will apply to roughly 60% of its goods exports and imports, but for all EU countries except Ireland the share would be less than 10%.
• ? The additional trade frictions would knock around 1pp a year off UK GDP growth in 2019 and 2020, resulting in a period of very weak growth. And the risks to this scenario are skewed to the downside – a slump in confidence or failure to establish the necessary customs infrastructure in time could easily generate a worse outcome

     

Unemployment will rise,but not as much as many predict

• ▀ Our forecast sees the UK unemployment rate climbing to 6.5% by the end of the year. This would represent the fastest rise in joblessness since records began. But the consensus view of a much bigger jump looks too pessimistic.
• ▀ Labour Force Survey data for H1 2020 puzzled, with employment rising and unemployment flat. But other metrics have been far weaker, suggesting a strong chance that the LFS numbers will ultimately regress. And the end of the furlough scheme is likely to trigger job cuts.
• ▀ On the upside, Office for National Statistics surveys suggest that a majority of furloughed employees have returned to work. And past recessions suggest that this year's scale of job losses some predict are implausibly high.

     

What's in new BoE boss Bailey's in-tray?

• ▀ The new BoE governor takes the job at a time when the economy is struggling to generate momentum. His first big call will be over whether the central bank should continue its divergent stance of resisting calls to loosen policy.
• ▀ With little room to support the economy with interest rate cuts, the next downturn could force the MPC to dive deeper into the use of unconventional monetary policy tools with all the uncertainties and controversies that implies.
• ▀ Governor Bailey will also need to tackle new problems, including the run-down of the BoE's balance sheet, overseeing the financial sector's future post-Brexit, and pressures to address climate change.
• ▀ But with the new governor bound by the BoE's remit, and fiscal and microeconomic policy likely to play a bigger role in stabilising the economy, the economic significance of the position should not be overstated.

     

Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects

• The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis.
• We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening.
• Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late.
• Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling.
• Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions.

     

Brexit — velvet divorce or messy breakup?

• We use a ‘scenario tree’ approach to look at the possible outcomes of the negotiations around the UK's exit from the EU. Given how little common ground there is between the two sides, we find that a relatively loose relationship is the most likely outcome, with the UK set to leave the EU in early‐ 2019.
• The negotiating positions of the UK and EU are diametrically opposed. The UK wants to end the free movement of labour, cease making contributions to the EU budget and regain ‘sovereignty’ from Brussels, while retaining as much access to the single market as possible. But the EU's starting position is that single market access is dependent upon agreeing to the four freedoms and that this is non‐negotiable.
• So far all signs are that the UK will prioritise the ability to control immigration over single market access. Thus remaining a member of the EEA is very unlikely to be viable over the longer‐term – our scenario tree analysis gives it a probability of just 6% – although it may be adopted as an interim step. Remaining part of the customs union is also unlikely (18%) as it will preclude the UK from making FTA with third countries.
• If the EU takes a mercantilist approach, it will have little incentive to come to an agreement with the UK over single market access for services, given the UK's large trade surplus with the EU for these activities, implying that UK firms may face growing non‐tariff barriers after the UK has left the EU. The UK's large deficit on goods trade with the EU gives a better chance of agreeing a FTA for goods, though with any FTA requiring agreement from all 27 EU members, the UK would have to be prepared for lengthy negotiations and make extensive concessions. Therefore, we think that a reversion to WTO rules (37%) is slightly more likely than agreeing a FTA (36%).

     

Government bond yields will remain stuck to the floor

• ▀ The fallout from the pandemic will cement the trend of safe haven bond yields remaining low over the next five years. Any rises will be gradual and limited. We project bond yields will struggle to get much above end-2019 levels by 2024.
• ▀ Despite record issuance by US, UK, German, and Japanese governments, the rise in private sector savings and demand from central banks will keep the flows of demand and supply for safe assets in broad balance. Overall, the world will still suffer a chronic shortage of safe assets, keeping yields depressed.
• ▀ Weak prospects for nominal GDP growth, demographics, and rising inequality in the aftermath of the pandemic all point to low yields. This would also be consistent with historical experience following pandemics.

     

Why deflation may be a bigger risk than inflation

• ▀ Concerns about high inflation in the medium term are in our view overdone. In fact, we think the bigger risk is some economies sliding into deflation, due to the coronavirus pandemic's long-lasting negative impact on demand, which will intensify existing global disinflationary trends.
• ▀ We do not think the recent acceleration of monetary growth will lead to rapid inflation, despite the strong historic relationship between the two. The current monetary growth is taking place in extremely unusual circumstances, which may alter the usual link with inflation, and may also be temporary.
• ▀ Meanwhile, most market-based measures of deflation risk have risen recently – in some cases to historic highs. Some household surveys point to slightly higher inflation, but this may reflect short-term volatility in prices for key goods.
• ▀ A slide into deflation would have a variety of negative consequences, including feeding back into private saving, weakening growth, and potentially raising debt sustainability issues in some economies.

     

Brexit – Customs borders will impose costs and delays

• ? The UK's decision to leave the EU customs union is likely to see physical customs borders being introduced, including in Ireland. This will impose administrative costs and delays, with our modelling suggesting that introducing customs checks would reduce the level of UK GDP in 2030 by between 0.7–1.3%. But there are opportunities for the two sides to limit the damage through cooperation and the UK could also mitigate the costs by agreeing free‐trade agreements (FTA) with third countries.
• ? The UK can take as ‘light‐touch’ an approach to customs checks on imports from the EU as it desires. But it is likely that the EU will introduce customs checks on goods imported from the UK, even if the two sides agree an FTA, to ensure regulatory compliance and that ‘rules of origin’ have been satisfied – this will be particularly important if the UK agrees FTA with countries the EU does not have deals with.
• ? Introducing customs borders would pose some logistical problems, particularly in the Dover Strait where existing infrastructure is limited and there are space constraints. A potential fivefold increase in customs declarations will also pose challenges on the IT front. If the UK and EU are unable to agree transitional arrangements, then the additional infrastructure would need to be up and running in a very short period of time. This risks a period of substantial disruption.
• ? Traders will have to complete additional paperwork – such as export licences and import declarations – but much of this can be dealt with electronically, which should help to limit costs and delays. In addition, if the two sides were to share information then this could help to limit the extent to which risk‐based inspections caused delays.
• ? The Government is effectively calculating that the benefits from agreeing FTA with other countries will outweigh the costs of customs controls on the UK‐EU border. This judgement looks doubtful and, at best, would take many years to bear fruit.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Coronavirus to cut global growth to new lows

• ▀ The rapid spread of coronavirus will weaken China's GDP growth sharply in the short term, causing disruption for the rest of the world. We now expect global GDP growth to slow to just 1.9% y/y in Q1 this year and have lowered our forecast for 2020 as a whole from 2.5% to 2.3%, down from 2.6% in 2019.
• ▀ Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, there had been signs that the worst was over for both world trade and the manufacturing sector. However, this tentative optimism has been dashed by the current disruption.
• ▀ While the near-term impact of the virus is uncertain, the disruption to China will clearly be significant in Q1 – we expect Chinese GDP growth to plunge to just 3.8% y/y. Even though growth there will rebound in Q2 and Q3, it will take time for the loss in activity to be fully recovered and we now expect GDP growth of just 5.4% for 2020 as a whole, a downward revision of 0.6pp from last month.
• ▀ Weaker Chinese imports and tourism and disruption to global supply chains will take a toll on the rest of the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. And the shock will exacerbate the ongoing slowdown in the US and may result in the eurozone barely expanding for a second quarter running in Q1.
• ▀ Weaker oil demand in the short term has prompted us to lower our Brent oil price forecast. We have cut our projection for growth in crude demand in 2020 by 0.2m b/d to 0.9 mb/d and now forecast Brent crude will average $62.4pb in 2020, down from about $65pb in our January forecast.
• ▀ Quarterly global growth is likely to strengthen a little in H2 this year as the disruption fades and firms make up for the lost output earlier in the year and the effect of China's policy response starts to feed through. But for 2020 overall, global growth is now likely to be just 2.3%, 0.2pp weaker than previously assumed as a result of the epidemic.

     

Why the MPC is unlikely to join the negative rate club

• ▀ The economic shock from the coronavirus has warmed up the MPC's long-held coolness toward negative interest rates. But we think there are a number of reasons why such a move is unlikely.
• ▀ While taking rates below zero could lower banks’ funding costs and encourage lending, the net economic effect is ambiguous. Also, ‘sticky’ deposit rates would hit banks’ already strained profitability, risking paradoxical effects.
• ▀ The MPC has better-targeted tools available to it. If the MPC wanted to lower borrowing costs, increasing the generosity of the Term Funding Scheme could deliver the benefits of negative rates while reducing adverse effects. And the present scale of fiscal support reduces the need for looser monetary policy.

     

Brexportgeddon?

• While a major market for UK exports, the EU is not quite as significant as the headline statistics suggest and one which is likely to continue declining in relative importance. The static tariff cost of a worst‐case ‘Brexit’ is estimated to be around ¼% of GDP, a modest sum.
• But the dynamic cost could be higher. And certain industrial sectors look vulnerable, notably aircraft and chemicals where sales to the EU account for over 40% of total (domestic and overseas) demand and EU tariffs are relatively high.
• Moreover, exports to the EU would also face non‐tariff barriers, which would be of particular relevance for the services sector. That services firms export much more to the rest of the world than to the EU suggests that they are well versed in overcoming such barriers. But financial services would face particular risks from Brexit.

     

The short‐term impact of Brexit

• A scenario run on the Oxford Global Model suggests that Brexit would leave the level of UK GDP 1.3ppt lower by Q2 2018 compared with our baseline forecast that the UK votes to stay in the EU. A vote to leave would mainly shock business confidence but consumers would be adversely affected too. Exporters in price‐sensitive sectors would benefit from a weaker exchange rate.
• Market pricing suggests that sterling could initially fall by around 15% before recovering some of its losses, while the heightened uncertainty would also be expected to drive a sharp drop in equity prices in H2 2016.
• Brexit would present something of a dilemma for policymakers. While a weaker pound would cause inflation to initially spike upwards, we would expect the MPC to look through this and cut Bank Rate in order to support activity. And with the UK likely to retain its reputation as a safe haven, this would also see gilt yields stay lower for longer.
• Weaker growth would also put the Chancellor in breach of the fiscal mandate, though we would expect him to plead extenuating circumstances, rather than tighten policy and potentially exacerbate the slowdown.