Upstream mergers,downstream mergers,and secret vertical contracts

In an industry characterized by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream firms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gives the downstream monopolist all the bargaining power) is more welfare detrimental than an upstream merger (which gives the bargaining power to the upstream monopolist). We also show that downstream and upstream mergers have the same effects when contracts are observable.     

Macroeconomic outcomes,collective bargaining and intersectoral productivity differentials: a panel approach

Using a sample of 19 advanced countries from 1990 to 2014 and an Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond linear dynamic GMM estimator along with a bootstrap-based bias correction fixed effects estimator for dynamic panels, the paper examines the macroeconomic impact of collective bargaining structures in a context of varying intersectoral heterogeneity in productivity growth among the exposed and sheltered sectors of the economy. Results show a dampening impact of pattern and centralized bargaining structures on unemployment. However, strong domestic demand is a key precondition for such a favourable effect to materialize. Uncoordinated and centralized bargaining structures are the most efficient in terms of labour cost restraint while industry bargaining moderates labour cost growth as intersectoral productivity differentials widen.     

主动还是被动：企业环保战略与绿色技术创新

以广东地区265家民营企业为样本,从利益相关者理论的视角考察了环保战略对绿色技术创新效益的影响以及企业议价能力与自然环境动荡的权变效应。主要结论包括:①企业制定主动型或被动型环保战略与绿色技术创新外部效益具有U型关系;②企业的议价能力可以正向调节被动型环保战略与绿色技术创新外部绩效的U型关系;③企业所处自然环境的动荡可以正向调节主动型环保战略与绿色技术创新外部绩效的U型关系。     

Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship

This paper investigates the effects of bargaining power on downstream firms’ profits. Consider a vertically related industry consisting of one upstream and two downstream firms, the latter having different marginal costs. Each pair bargains over a linear wholesale price, and then the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. We show that the inefficient downstream firm may benefit from an increase in the bargaining power of the upstream firm. Furthermore, we obtain similar results when each downstream firm trades with its exclusive upstream agent, under non-linear demand function, or when downstream firms compete in price.     

Franchise fee, competition and economic growth

This paper introduces the different kinds of franchise contract bargaining into a macroeconomic model and accordingly researches the relationship between competition and economic growth. In Nash bargaining model/vertical integration we find an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically increasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In bargaining of the right to manage model/vertical non-integration our result shows an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically decreasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In addition, there is an overall negative relationship between the competitive degree of the final goods market and economic growth. Especially, our interesting findings that the pricing rule for intermediate goods firm depends not only on market power but also bargaining power are more general. Therefore, we can further explain the firms' vertical control strategy.     

基础研究与应用研究对地区经济高质量发展的异质性作用——基于“中等收入陷阱风险”视角

当前,内外部环境改变导致经济增速放缓,中国面临陷入“中等收入陷阱”风险,以创新驱动实现经济高质量发展越发重要。以经济效率提升与经济动能转换综合衡量经济高质量发展水平,使用2001—2017年中国省际面板数据,实证检验基础研究与应用研究对中国经济高质量发展的异质性影响。结果发现：①基础研究与应用研究均有利于经济效率提升,只有基础研究显著促进经济动能转换;②东中西部地区收入水平存在差距,基础研究对经济高质量发展存在阶梯式地区异质性影响,即对东部地区经济效率有显著促进作用,对中部地区无显著影响,对西部地区有显著抑制作用,且仅对东部地区经济动能转换具有显著促进作用,但应用研究无显著地区异质性影响;③基础研究存在显著门槛效应,只有达到一定收入水平,基础研究才会促进地区经济高质量发展;④为实现2025年前后顺利跨越“中等收入陷阱”,未来中国基础研究投入年均增幅需保持在［24.7%,29.3%］区间。     

跨国合资的技术偏向性与经济增长

文章将偏向性技术进步理论和基于谈判实力的合作博弈理论相结合,分析了股权结构、谈判实力差异对偏向性技术进步和宏观经济增长的影响。文章得出以下结论:首先,在跨国合资模式下,技术进步具有偏向性,而股权结构和谈判实力对偏向性技术进步具有正向影响。其次,谈判实力对经济增长具有正向促进作用;股权结构与经济增长之间的关系呈现U型曲线,股权结构的不平衡性越强,经济增长速度越快,而合资双方越倾向于平均分享股权,经济增长速度则越慢。最后,股权结构和谈判实力对于跨国合资双方在国际经济中的地位和作用也会产生不同的影响。     

Franchise fee,contract bargaining,and economic growth

This paper combines the industrial organization (IO) theory and the R&D-based endogenous growth theory in a model of a successive imperfect competitive economy. The current study assumes that firms between upstream and downstream industries bargain over both the price of intermediate goods and the franchise fee. Findings show that the intermediate goods firm with a R&D sector charges the price equal to the marginal cost. Economic rent may also be partly transferred into the franchise fee determined by the relative bargaining power. In particular, the traditional double marginalization result, such as in Spengler (1950), does not take place here due to the above-mentioned bargaining scheme. Finally, this work shows that final goods firms in vertically linked industries play an important role in an economic growth model. The more bargaining power the final goods firms have (or the more returns to specialization upstream firms have, or the less substitution elasticity the final goods have), the more the economy grows. However, the consumer preference for diversity seemingly does not affect economic growth rate.     

Union bargaining power, employment, and output in a model of monopolistic competition with wage bargaining

This paper examines the implications of a rise in the bargaining power of workers on the real wage, income distribution, and the levels of employment and output using a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition and worker-owner Nash bargaining at the firm level. It thereby provides optimizing microfoundations to Kalecki's macroeconomic analysis of the positive effect on output of a rise in trade-union power, and contrasts it with the neoclassical view based on the diminishing marginal productivity of labor.     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.     

Quality Bargaining and Intermediate Goods Protection*

This paper offers an explanation for the proposition that removing protection from a firm can induce an improvement in product quality. In a vertically separated industry the quality of the final good is dependent on the quality of the intermediate goods used in its production. This model is used to consider removal of protection from the upstream firm (the supplier) which gives the downstream firm (the assembler) greater bargaining power since the option of turning to a foreign supplier becomes more attractive.     

Wage Indexation, Employment and Inflation

Price versus productivity-indexing is considered in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information and wage bargaining. In a perfectly price-indexed economy, the inflationary bias due to lack of credibility is eliminated. However, productivity-indexing is more appropriate to dampen macroeconomic fluctuations that are caused by real disturbances. We show that productivity-indexing alone guarantees both price and employment stability, provided the government's reputation is good enough and the union's bargaining power is not too strong. This reduces the degree of price indexation as the union becomes weaker and the government's reputation improves. Productivity-indexing is desirable with volatile productivity processes and weak unions.
JEL classification : E 24; E 52     

Optimal Patent Protection in a Two-Sector Economy

This article addresses the issue of optimal patent protection in an economy with a downstream and an upstream sector. The key insight is that higher patent protection in the downstream sector raises the incentives of agents to do R&D in that sector but discourages innovation in the upstream sector because of a market size effect. Hence, higher patent protection in the upstream sector accelerates growth whereas higher patent protection in the downstream sector slows it down. If some innovation is socially desirable, optimal patent protection is necessarily higher in the upstream than in the downstream sector.     

The labor market effects of trade union heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining power of trade unions differs across firms and sectors. Standard models of unionization ignore this pattern by assuming a uniform bargaining strength. In this paper, we incorporate union heterogeneity into a Melitz (2003) type model. Union bargaining power is assumed to be firm-specific and varies with firm productivity. This framework allows us to re-analyze the labor market effects of (i) a symmetric increase in the bargaining power of all unions and (ii) trade liberalization. We show that union heterogeneity unambiguously reduces the negative employment effects of stronger unions. Firm-specific bargaining power creates a link between unionization and the entry and exit of firms, implying a reduction of the unions' expected bargaining power. Moreover, union heterogeneity constitutes an (un)employment effect of trade liberalization. If unions are most powerful in the high-productivity (low-productivity) firms, trade liberalization will increase (decrease) unemployment.     

Quality-oriented growth: a new trend for Chinese firms

ABSTRACT

Based on data from the China Employer-Employee Survey (CEES), this study analyses the actual effect of quality-driven growth on firms’ performances in the economic transition of recent years. The results show positive and significant effects between the firms’ performance and quality-oriented growth, which is defined as a strategy that supports the spirit of greater entrepreneurial innovation, the advancement of input quality, and corporate governance improvement. Using a quality-driven growth mode, firms can effectively relieve the adverse effect of downward macroeconomic growth pressure on performance. This study proposes that China’s macroeconomic policy should shift from demand-oriented management to supply-oriented management, with a particular focus on quality development strategy. Moreover, firms should establish a quality-driven development strategy, facilitating a spirit of entrepreneurial innovation, advancing input quality, and improving corporate governance. This strategy will increase the firm’s performance, and effectively relieve the macroeconomic downward pressure.

Abbreviations: CEES: China Employer-Employee Survey, TFP: Total factor productivity     

Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation?

This study develops an R&D-based growth model with vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or stifles innovation. We analyze the effects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents. We show that patent protection changes the direction of innovation by having asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Calibrating the model and simulating transition dynamics, we find that strengthening the effect of blocking patents stifles vertical innovation and decreases economic growth but increases social welfare due to an increase in horizontal innovation. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.     

Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and Macroeconomic Dynamics

To properly account for the dynamics of the key macroeconomic variables, researchers incorporate various internal propagation mechanisms in their models. In general, these mechanisms implicitly rely on the assumption of a perfect equality between the real wage and the marginal product of labour. This paper features a micro-founded model of a limited-commitment firm, and derive endogenous dynamic labour contracts that produce a different linkage between the real wage and the marginal product of labour. The risk-sharing between the entrepreneur and the worker, both faced with enforcement problems, provides a different type of propagation mechanism. I investigate the dynamic properties of this endogenous rigidity in relation to the initial bargaining power of each agent.      

Offshoring and product innovation

We propose an endogenous growth model with offshoring to investigate its effects on product innovation and growth in the country of origin. Offshoring is associated with reduced feedback from offshored plants to domestic labs as well as coordination problems between the offshored and domestic divisions of firms. Production and transport cost parameters affect the static decision to relocate plants but not R&D. Hence, offshoring may be chosen by firms when it damages the growth rate of their countries of origin. In particular, if offshoring reduces the feedback from plants to labs, it is likely to bring dynamic losses when the countries of origin are large, especially in sectors in which R&D is cheap and product differentiation is strong. It is also likely to slow growth in sectors in which contractual incompleteness gives a strong bargaining power to offshored divisions in intra-firm transactions. We thank Thierry Verdier, an anonymous referee and participants to the Final Conference of the EU funded Research Training Network “Trade, Industrialisation and Development”, held at Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques on 26–27 October 2006, for helpful comments. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from MIUR.     

Downstream mode of competition with upstream market power

In a two-tier oligopoly, where the downstream firms are locked in pair-wise exclusive relationships with their upstream input suppliers, the equilibrium mode of competition in the downstream market is endogenously determined as a renegotiation-proof contract signed between each downstream firm and its exclusive upstream input supplier. We find that the upstream–downstream exclusive relationships credibly sustain the Cournot (Bertrand) mode of competition in the downstream market, when the goods are substitutes (complements). In contrast to previous studies, this result holds irrespectively of the degree of product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power between the upstream and the downstream firm, over the pair-specific input price.