Chief Executive Officer Incentives,Monitoring, and Corporate Risk Management: Evidence From Insurance Use

Corporate governance and risk management issues have received prominent publicity in recent years following several major company failures such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. While prior studies have examined this issue within the context of derivatives’ trading, little is known regarding the linkage between corporate governance and alternative corporate risk management activities such as insurance. Using a detailed firm survey conducted by the World Bank (2004) , we examine the impacts of various governance monitoring mechanisms and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the corporate insurance decision. Overall, our results suggest that both monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives induce the corporate purchase of property insurance. However, the purchase of property insurance for managerial self‐interest is only prevalent in firms subject to lax monitoring, and the determinants of insurance purchases are more in line with the prediction of the economic theory in firms with strong monitoring. In addition, our study contributes a number of new insights into the determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance.     

Incentive Effects of Community Rating in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Massachusetts Automobile Insurance

Rate regulations in insurance markets often impose cross-subsidies in insurance premiums from low-risk consumers to high-risk consumers. This paper develops the hypothesis that premium cross-subsidies affect risk taking by insurance consumers, and tests this hypothesis by examining the marginal impact of premium subsidies and overcharges on future insurance costs. The empirical analysis uses 1990–2003 rating cell-level data from the Massachusetts automobile insurance market, in which regulation produced large cross-subsidies across cells. Consistent with the hypothesized effects, premium subsidies are found to be significantly related to higher future insurance costs, and the opposite effects are found for premium overcharges.     

Compensation and Board Structure: Evidence From the Insurance Industry

Monitoring by outside board members and incentive compensation provisions in executive pay packages are alternative mechanisms for controlling incentive problems between owners and managers. The control hypothesis suggests that if incentive conflicts vary materially, those firms with more outside directors also should implement a higher degree of pay‐for‐performance sensitivity. Our evidence is consistent with this control hypothesis. We document a relation between board structure and the extent to which executive compensation is tied to performance in mutuals: compensation changes are significantly more sensitive to changes in return on assets when the fraction of outsiders on the board is high.     

The Effect of Tournament Incentives on Financial Restatements: Evidence From China

In this study, we examine the association between tournament incentives and financial restatements in China. Prior research documents that tournament incentives have a positive impact on firm performance. However, an alternative view suggests that tournament incentives can also have detrimental effects on firm performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies for the years 2008–2015, we find that tournament incentives, in the form of large pay disparities, reduce the occurrence of both core and non-core financial restatements. This negative association is more pronounced for SOEs as compared to non-SOEs. We further document that the negative association between tournament incentives and financial restatements is related to CEO turnover, and is stronger if the successor CEO is recruited from within the organization. This research contributes to a better understanding of tournament incentives, as a corporate governance mechanism, in constraining the occurrence of financial restatements in a unique institutional setting where state ownership is pronounced.     

Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market

De Meza and Webb (2001) indicated that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion would demand more insurance and invest in self-protection to reduce risk probability when both the preference type and investment in self-protection are hidden from insurers. They referred to the negative correlation between market insurance and risk type as advantageous selection. However, the relationship between risk type and the degree of risk aversion is debatable in both theoretical and empirical research. This paper therefore proposes that advantageous selection could be supported from another angle by directly examining the relationships that exist among market insurance, self-protection, and risk probability. By focusing on the commercial fire insurance market, information on the purchase of market insurance, investment in self-protection, and fire accident records is hand-collected by means of a unique survey. It is found that firms purchasing market insurance have a greater tendency to channel efforts into self-protection. It is also found that firms expending effort on self-protection are less likely to suffer a fire accident. Furthermore, it is found that firms with commercial fire insurance have less chance of suffering a fire accident than those without such insurance. Each of the above three findings jointly supports the view that advantageous selection could play a critical role in the commercial fire insurance market.     

On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence From the Global Reinsurance Market

In this article, we view the demand for reinsurance as a “special case” of the corporate demand for insurance. We analyze the extent to which reinsurance purchases by the global property–liability insurance industry vary across countries and assess the relative importance of country‐level factors compared with firm‐level factors. Using a data set consisting of 21,814 firm‐year observations from 33 (developed and developing) countries during the period 2000–2012, we find that after controlling for firm‐level factors, country‐level factors have economically as well as statistically significant effects on the demand for reinsurance.     

The Determinants of Private Debt Holdings: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry

Life insurers hold the majority of private debt. Lenders in the private debt market must have the ability to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and to perform ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of private debt holdings in the life insurance industry. The results suggest that larger insurers, insurers with higher financial quality, mutual insurers, publicly traded insurers, insurers facing stringent regulation, and insurers with greater cash holdings are more prevalent lenders in the private debt market.     

Corporate Risks and Property Insurance: Evidence From the People's Republic of China

Using panel data (1997–1999) for 235 publicly listed companies in the People's Republic of China, this study empirically tests the linkage between corporate risks and the decision to purchase property insurance and its financial extent. To achieve these objectives, we first estimate a probit insurance participation decision model and then a fixed‐effects insurance volume decision model with Heckman's sample selection correction. Our results indicate that the managerial decision to purchase property insurance is positively related to company size and insolvency risks. By contrast, the amount of property insurance purchased is positively related to systematic risks but negatively related to insolvency and unsystematic risks and company size. We find that the amount of property insurance used by Chinese companies can also be affected by other factors (e.g., the cash flow constraints). In addition, the decision to purchase property insurance and the financial extent to which it is used varies among Chinese companies according to their geographical location. However, state ownership does not appear to be an important determinant of the purchase of property insurance by Chinese publicly listed companies.     

Effects of Corporate Diversification: Evidence From the Property–Liability Insurance Industry

Using a sample of property–liability insurers over the period 1995–2004, we develop and test a model that explains performance as a function of line‐of‐business diversification and other correlates. Our results indicate that undiversified insurers consistently outperform diversified insurers. In terms of accounting performance, we find a diversification penalty of at least 1 percent of return on assets or 2 percent of return on equity. These findings are robust to corrections for potential endogeneity bias, alternative risk measures, alternative diversification measures, and an alternative estimation technique. Using a market‐based performance measure (Tobin's Q) we find that the market applies a significant discount to diversified insurers. The existence of a diversification penalty (and diversification discount) provides strong support for the strategic focus hypothesis. We also find that insurance groups underperform unaffiliated insurers and that stock insurers outperform mutuals.     

On the Cost of Adverse Selection in Individual Annuity Markets: Evidence From Singapore

New evidence is presented on the cost of adverse selection in individual annuity markets using Singapore data. The Singapore annuity market is an interesting setting to examine the cost of adverse selection for three reasons. First, unlike many Western countries, the Singapore government provides very limited public financial assistance for retirees. Second, while social security contributions mandated under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) result in a high forced savings rate, a large proportion of CPF savings, are used up for housing. Third, to ensure that retirees have sufficient funds to meet basic needs, individuals who reach age 55 are required to set aside a minimum amount of their CPF savings, which can be withdrawn at age 62. The CPF Board allows various options for investing the minimum sum, but the most attractive option is to purchase an annuity. The institutional setting in Singapore in effect provides insurers with a large captive market for annuities. It is conjectured that this should be reflected in a significantly lower cost of adverse selection for annuities sold in Singapore as compared with other countries. The results herein, using data for CPF‐approved insurers, are strongly consistent with this conjecture. On average, money's worth of annuities is higher than annuities sold to a similar age‐gender mix in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Adverse selection accounts for less than 13 percent of the cost of longevity insurance compared to 30–50 per‐ cent documented in many previous studies. These results suggest that one way to resolve the adverse selection problem is to adopt a universal individual defined contribution pension scheme that mandates or provides strong incentives for retirees to purchase annuities.     

Product Ratings as a Market Reaction to Deregulation: Evidence From the German Insurance Market

This study provides the first investigation of information markets as a reaction to deregulation of product forms in insurance markets. The article studies the case of Germany, where insurance product ratings entered the market after relaxation of product regulation in 1994. The ratings’ potential for enhancing the performance of a deregulated insurance market is analyzed by considering both market structure and governance characteristics of the rating market, since the theoretical literature predicts that both are important determinants of rating outcomes. Data from a unique panel data set containing disability insurance ratings from the three major rating agencies are also examined in light of theoretical predictions. Results suggest that market governance and competition characteristics are favorable for the production of unbiased and informative ratings. Ratings for disability insurance support this interpretation, since the characteristics of the ratings conform to theoretical predictions about ratings in well‐functioning rating markets.     

Flood Hazards, Insurance Rates, and Amenities: Evidence From the Coastal Housing Market

This study employs the hedonic property price method to examine the effects of flood hazard on coastal property values. We utilize Geographic Information System data on National Flood Insurance Program flood zones and residential property sales from Carteret County, North Carolina. Our results indicate that location within a flood zone lowers property value. Price differentials for flood risk and the capitalized value of flood insurance premiums are roughly equivalent—both exhibiting a nonlinear relationship in flood probability. Our results support the conclusion that flood zone designation and insurance premiums convey risk information to potential buyers in the coastal housing market.     

Reinsurance and Capital Structure: Evidence From the United Kingdom Non‐Life Insurance Industry

Using a data set consisting of statutory returns of U.K. non‐life insurers from 1985 to 2002, I find that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and insurers with higher reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt. My results are consistent with the expected bankruptcy costs argument, agency costs theory, risk‐bearing hypothesis, and renting capital hypothesis. I also find that the impact of leverage on reinsurance will be weaker for insurers that use more derivatives than those that use less. Moreover, high levels of derivative use increase the leverage gains attributable to reinsurance.     

The Relationship Between Home Market Performance and Internationalization Decisions: Evidence From German Insurance Groups

This study investigates the relationship between home market performance and the choice of foreign market entry mode using survey data and financial statement data for German insurance groups with property–liability business from 1999 to 2011. We develop a dynamic resource‐based perspective and argue that strategic transformation is a major motive driving the decisions of insurance groups to internationalize their businesses. Additionally, the more rapid the strategic transformation, the more intense is the choice of market entry mode. Furthermore, our findings corroborate the notion that internationalization has a positive effect on home market performance when insurance groups are able to decrease home market dependence by extending the degree of internationalization.     

The Effects of Customer Satisfaction on Company Profitability: Evidence From the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry

Prior literature presents a positive link between customer satisfaction and firms’ financial outcomes, including greater revenue, profitability, and prices. However, few studies approach the topic of customer satisfaction in the insurance industry. Using a unique data set obtained from J.D. Power, we observe customer satisfaction among U.S. auto insurers and link their customer satisfaction rating to insurer profitability metrics. Our results support the notion that greater customer satisfaction leads to reduced expenses and increased profitability. A potential explanation is that more satisfied customers are more likely to remain with an insurance company and refer others to the insurer, reducing customer acquisition expenses.