Debtor-in-possession financing and the resolution of uncertainty in Chapter 11 reorganizations

This paper investigates the use of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing by firms reorganizing under Chapter 11. A model is developed in which there is asymmetric information between the creditors of a distressed firm and its management. In this context, it is demonstrated that reliance on DIP financing resolves informational asymmetries regarding the true economic value of distressed firms. The model's conclusions are empirically supported in the paper and by results of extant research. The signaling role of DIP financing is evidenced both by the positive stock price reaction to DIP announcements and the fact that firms employing DIP financing have more successful reorganizations.     

Stiffing the creditor: Asset verifiability and bankruptcy

Evidence suggests that asset pledgeability, debt complexity, and control rights of dispersed debt influence financial distress resolution. We model how courts’ imperfect verifiability of assets and valuable control of misaligned creditors shape firms’ debt structure and create coordination problems that determine distress outcomes and financing. A key result is that an increase in verifiability allows financially constrained firms to fund projects by pledging more assets to misaligned creditors, making contract renegotiation in distress times more difficult and increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Since equity receives less in the event of distress, constrained firms choose riskier projects with higher returns. Consistent with our model, bankruptcy filings increase after the U.S. Supreme Court decision imposing a “market test” to assess the value of stockholders’ interest in debtor proposals. The effect is stronger for firms with low asset verifiability. These firms also experienced an increase in recovery rates, debt capacity, and risk-taking. Our findings suggest that reforms improving the verifiability of assets substantially impact credit access. However, our results also point out that improving asset verifiability may be insufficient for constrained firms with aligned creditors. Therefore, complementary reforms that facilitate firms’ access to creditors from different market segments may be necessary.     

Financial distress, bankruptcy law and the business cycle

This paper explores the business cycle implications of financial distress and bankruptcy law. We find that due to the presence of financial imperfections the effect of liquidations on the price of capital goods can generate endogenous fluctuations. We show that a law reform that ‘softens’ bankruptcy law may increase the amplitude of the cycle in the long run. In contrast, a policy of bailing out businesses during the bust or actively managing the interest rate across the cycle could stabilize the economy in the long run. A comprehensive welfare analysis of these policies is provided as well.      

Earnings Management in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

We study the impact of earnings management prior to bankruptcy filing on the passage of firms through Chapter 11. Using data on public US firms, we construct three measures of earnings management: a real activities manipulation measure (abnormal operating cash flows) and two accounting manipulation measures (discretionary accruals and abnormal working capital accruals). We find that, controlling for the impact of factors known to influence earnings management and firm survival in bankruptcy, earnings management prior to bankruptcy significantly reduces the likelihood of Chapter 11 plan confirmation and emergence from Chapter 11. The results are driven primarily by extreme values of earnings management, characterized by one or two standard deviations above or below the mean. The findings are consistent with creditors reacting positively to unduly conservative earnings reports and negatively to overly optimistic earnings reports. We also find that the presence of a Big 4 auditor is associated with a higher incidence of confirmation and switching to a Big 4 auditor before filing increases the incidence of emergence.     

An empirical comparison of bankruptcy models

Four types of bankruptcy prediction models based on financial statement ratios, cash flows, stock returns, and return standard deviations are compared. Based on a sample of bankruptcies from 1980 to 1991, results indicate that no existing model of bankruptcy adequately captures the data. During the last fiscal year preceding bankruptcy, none of the individual models may be excluded without a loss in explanatory power. If considered in isolation, the cash flow model discriminates most consistently two to three years before bankruptcy. By comparison, the ratio model is the best single model during the year immediately preceding bankruptcy. Quasi-jack-knifing procedures suggest that none of the models can reliably predict bankruptcy more than two years in advance.     

Can corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? An empirical analysis

We examine financially distressed firms and document how governance characteristics affect (1) a firm’s ability to avoid bankruptcy and (2) the power of financial/accounting information to predict bankruptcy. Overall, our findings indicate that a distressed firm’s governance characteristics significantly affect its probability of bankruptcy. We find that smaller and more independent boards with a higher ratio of non-inside directors and with larger ownership stakes of inside directors are more effective at avoiding bankruptcy once distress is indicated. These results are consistent with the belief that these types of governance structures induce more effective monitoring. The results are also consistent with the view that the inclusion of governance characteristics enhances the power of financial accounting models in predicting bankruptcy.

Determinants of bankruptcy regime choice for Canadian public firms

Distressed Canadian public firms usually file for bankruptcy protection under either the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or the more flexible Companies Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). The latter targets reorganization while the BIA focuses on both reorganization and liquidation. This paper examines the factors that enter into the choice of either of these two regimes by bankrupt filing public firms. We document that firms are more likely to file under the CCAA when the global stock market is bullish. Larger firms, more leveraged firms and firms with higher quality bankruptcy trustees are more likely to file under CCAA. The worst performing firms also tend to file under the CCAA. Finally firms in Ontario and Quebec have a tendency to file more frequently under the BIA compared to other provinces.     

Firms’ performance under different bankruptcy systems: a Europe–USA empirical analysis

This study empirically analyses the effect that the bankruptcy law has on firms’ performance based on its financial situation. To do this, we considered the different types of efficiency and their influence on firms’ value. The study was carried out for Germany, Spain, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. We applied System‐GMM estimation to dynamic panel data. The main results show that under creditor‐oriented systems, there is a decrease in the value of both financially distressed firms and those filing for bankruptcy.     

A re-evaluation of auditors’ opinions versus statistical models in bankruptcy prediction

Existent empirical evidence on the relative performance of auditors’ going concern opinions versus statistical models in predicting bankruptcy is mixed. This study attempts to add new reliable evidence on this important issue by conducting the comparison based upon an improved statistical model. The improved statistical model incorporates some new developments advocated by recent bankruptcy prediction research (e.g., Shumway, 2001). First, the following non-traditional variables are added: a composite measure of financial distress, industry failure rate, abnormal stock returns, and market capitalization. Secondly, a hazard model is employed. The prediction ability of the hazard model with incorporation of non-financial-ratio variables is superior to that of auditors’ going concern opinions in the holdout sample. This suggests that a well-developed statistical model could serve as a decision aid for auditors to better make going-concern judgments. Further analyses reveal some evidence that industry failure rate does not have a significant impact upon auditors’ going concern judgments as it should be; auditors could improve their going concern judgments by considering industry-level information in addition to firm-specific information. Finally, we find that auditors’ opinions do have incremental contribution beyond stock-market information and industry failure rate in predicting bankruptcy.

Bad news does not always travel fast: evidence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings

This paper examines the stock price performances of 275 non‐financial, non‐utility U.S. industrial firms that continue trading on the main exchanges after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 1 October 1979 and 17 October 2005. This paper identifies a negative and statistically significant post‐bankruptcy drift that lasts for at least 6 months. This finding adds to the literature showing that the market is unable to process bad public news events in a timely manner. Further analysis suggests that the theoretical model proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) can be used to help explain this market‐pricing anomaly.     

A resolution of the distress risk and leverage puzzles in the cross section of stock returns

We revisit findings that returns are negatively related to financial distress intensity and leverage. These are puzzles under frictionless capital markets assumptions but are consistent with optimizing firms that differ in their exposure to financial distress costs. Firms with high costs choose low leverage to avoid distress, but they retain exposure to the systematic risk of bearing such costs in low states. Empirical results are consistent with this explanation. The return premiums to low leverage and low distress are significant in raw returns, and even stronger in risk-adjusted returns. When in distress, low-leverage firms suffer more than high-leverage firms as measured by a deterioration in accounting operating performance and heightened exposure to systematic risk. The connection between return premiums and distress costs is apparent in subperiod evidence. Both are small or insignificant prior to 1980 and larger and significant thereafter.     

Empirical comparison of hazard models in predicting SMEs failure

This study aims to shed light on the debate concerning the choice between discrete-time and continuous-time hazard models in making bankruptcy or any binary prediction using interval censored data. Building on the theoretical suggestions from various disciplines, we empirically compare widely used discrete-time hazard models (with logit and clog-log links) and the continuous-time Cox Proportional Hazards (CPH) model in predicting bankruptcy and financial distress of the United States Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Consistent with the theoretical arguments, we report that discrete-time hazard models are superior to the continuous-time CPH model in making binary predictions using interval censored data. Moreover, hazard models developed using a failure definition based jointly on bankruptcy laws and firms’ financial health exhibit superior goodness of fit and classification measures, in comparison to models that employ a failure definition based either on bankruptcy laws or firms’ financial health alone.     

Surviving Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: Duration and Payoff?

Three of the authors previously developed a model to predict the duration of Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the payoff to shareholders ( Partington et al ., 2001 ). This work augments that study using a much larger sample to re-estimate the model and assess its stability. It also provides an opportunity for out-of-sample testing of predictive accuracy. The resulting models are based on Cox's proportional hazards model and the current article points to the need to test two important assumptions underlying the model. First, that the hazards are proportional and, second, that censoring is independent of the event studied. Using the extended data set, all the previously significant accounting variables drop out of the model and only two covariates of the original model remain significant. These are the market wide credit spread and the market capitalization of the firm, both measured immediately prior to the firm's entry to Chapter 11. Receiver operating characteristic curves are then used to assess the predictive accuracy of the original and extended models. The results show that Lachenbruch tests can provide a misleading indication of predictive ability out of sample. Using the Lachenbruch method of in-sample testing, both models show predictive power, but in a true out-of-sample test they fail dismally. The lessons of this work are relevant to better predicting the gains and losses likely to accrue to shareholders of companies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and in similar administrative arrangements in other jurisdictions.     

A theory of loan syndication

We provide a new theory of loan syndication. Bank syndicates control sector risk by downsizing the industry when market demand fails to meet expectations.     

Debtor-in-possession financing

Several recent papers have documented the benefits of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing in the restructuring of firms in Chapter 11. However, the view on benefits is not unanimous and some legal scholars have raised doubts about DIP financing's effects on debt-holders and the possibility of expropriative wealth transfers. In this paper we address this issue by analyzing both stock and bond price data for a comprehensive sample of DIP loans and find significant positive abnormal stock and bond returns at the announcement of DIP loans. Also, we do not find evidence of wealth transfers from junior to senior debt-holders. Further, we examine the DIP loan process in detail and we document important institutional features of DIP loans such as maturity, covenants, fees and interest charges. We find evidence of intense monitoring using covenants. We also find higher fees and charges associated with DIP loans. We argue that overall the results are consistent with the information processing role of financial intermediaries.     

Who hedges more when leverage is endogenous? A testable theory of corporate risk management under general distributional conditions

This paper develops a theory of a firm’s hedging decision with endogenous leverage. In contrast to previous models in the literature, our framework is based on less restrictive distributional assumptions and allows a closed-form analytical solution to the joint optimization problem. Using anecdotal evidence of greater benefits of risk management for firms selling “credence goods” or products that involve long-term relationships, we prove that those optimally leveraged firms, which face more convex indirect bankruptcy cost functions, will choose higher hedge ratios. Moreover, we suggest a new approach to test this relationship empirically.

A nonlinear wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors around Chapter 11 filing

Past literature has assumed that negative stock returns around Chapter 11 filing are solely due to new adverse information about firm value. This paper argues that there is also a nonlinear wealth transfer from shareholders to creditors causing shareholder loss. The magnitude of the wealth transfer can be quantified in a setting where equity is a call option on firm assets as in the Merton (1974) model. The wealth transfer originates from maturity shortening of the call option as a result of Chapter 11 filing. I present a parsimonious model to explain why Chapter 11 can be voluntarily filed by managers acting in the interest of shareholders with the existence of the wealth transfer. The model-predicted stock return has comparable magnitude as observed stock returns around filing, and explains the cross-sectional variation of the latter.     

Consumer durables and risky borrowing: The effects of bankruptcy protection

There exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across U.S. states. This paper exploits cross-state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self-insurance against bad shocks to earnings. The generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth. The gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints, so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small. A more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle. In addition, the optimal level of exemption is positive but low.     

The pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies

The paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis, despite of the potential moral hazard problems. We argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance, especially when the insured institution is insolvent. Applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option, we first derive a closed-form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Then, we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for. The properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk-based pricing scheme.     

Secured and unsecured debt in creditor-friendly bankruptcy

This article develops a continuous-time asset pricing model for valuing corporate securities in the presence of both secured and unsecured debt. We consider a framework where creditors dominate the negotiation process. This is consistent with the increasing influence of creditors in bankruptcy. We show that the unsecured creditors are incentivized to liquidate the firm prematurely relative to the first-best threshold. However, if the firm’s liquidation value is very low, it should complement its secured debt with unsecured debt as a form of insurance to avoid early liquidations. Our results have important implications for the debt structure and the resolution of financial distress of modern firms with substantial intangible assets.