Pricing of Transport Networks,Redistribution, and Optimal Taxation

The author studies optimal pricing of roads and public transport in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. Individuals are heterogeneous in unobservable earning ability. Optimal transport tariffs depend on time costs of travel and work schedule adjustments (days and hours worked per day) as a response to commuting costs. The author finds that discounts for low‐income individuals are optimal only if the time cost of a trip is small enough. Lower travel time costs facilitate screening; therefore, redistribution provides an additional motive for congestion pricing. Finally, the study investigates the desirability of means‐testing of transport tariffs.     

Intergenerational transfers,demographic transition,and altruism: Problems in developing Asia

This paper develops a three‐period overlapping‐generations model where middle‐aged agents care about not only their own lifetime utility but also their old parents' and children's well‐being. The doubly altruistic agents choose amounts of intergenerational transfers to their old parents and children as well as private savings. The government specifies amounts of public transfers from working adults to the dependents. The model also takes the effects of demographic transition on the burdens of supporting the elderly and children into account. Using 23 countries' data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA ), we estimate the degrees of filial and parental altruism and adjust them for their respective life expectancy and fertility rates. The findings suggest that people in developing countries are more parentally altruistic than those in developed ones while the adjusted degree of filial altruism tends to be low in developing Asia. Our welfare analyses reveal that the developing Asian countries must introduce more comprehensive public welfare programs for the elderly to maximize social welfare. Moreover, their low adjusted degree of filial altruism may trap the developing Asian countries at the low levels of public old‐age support and social welfare as the further demographic transition ensues.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

A market test for natural monopoly in local exchange

Is the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) a natural monopolist? The analysis indicates that the LEC cost function is not supportable: LECs appear to be either nonsustainable natural monopolies or non natural monopolies over the set of services they currently offer. However, recent technological changes suggest that whether LECs are natural monopolies over their current offerings is immaterial for policy making, because competitors are enjoying economies of scope in offering both LEC and non LEC services. Based on these results, deregulation of LECs is discussed in a Type I/Type II error framework.     

Governments in the market for corporate control: Evidence from M&A deals involving state-owned enterprises

Recent evidence suggests that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are increasingly taking over other firms. Such domestic or transborder acquisitions are the reverse of privatizations, where SOEs are the target of private investors. The question we ask is whether, because of the specific objectives and risks faced by governments, SOEs deviate from the benchmark of deals involving private firms on both sides of the merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction. To answer this new research question, we focus on a set of firm-level characteristics of the targets and acquirers involved in the deals. We built an original dataset of 31,479 deals in 138 countries drawing from Zephyr and Orbis (Bureau Van Dijk) data. Empirical results of multinomial logit and OLS models show that deals involving SOEs are clearly different from the benchmark of private–private deals. This is mainly due to the greater assets, higher solvency ratios, broader experience of deals, and closer proximity to targets of the acquirers (both public and private) under public–private, public–public, and private–public deals compared to private–private deals.     

Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

If China’s economy is an example of “state-capitalism,” then its large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could be expected to monopolize key sectors. But previous estimates of industrial concentration, using the Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (HHI), have suggested that the level of industrial concentration—and therefore the potential for the abuse of monopoly power—is very low. These studies have significantly underestimated HHI, since they do not consolidate subsidiary enterprises in Chinese survey data into larger business groups, or according to ultimate ownership. After making these adjustments, a measure of potential HHI shows that large state monopolies remain in oil and gas, electricity, tobacco and, potentially, automobiles. In particular, SOEs supervised by the central government are heavily invested in potentially concentrated industries. But aggregate profits of the state sector are driven more by the portfolio distribution of assets between resources, manufacturing and utilities, rather than industrial concentration within sectors.     

The economic performance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe

This article explores the economic performance of state ownership in the largest non-financial enterprises operating in 13 post-socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period 2007–2013. The largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are selected based on the ‘Coface – 500 Top Companies in CEE’ list in 2013. Of these 500 enterprises, 69 were identified as state-owned. All originated in the socialist period. The majority of them are from Poland and Ukraine. SOEs hold a dominant position in energy supply, the oil and gas sector, and transport. We find that the persistence of state ownership in post-socialist countries is caused by incomplete privatisation and the presence of SOEs within strategic sectors. The economic performance of the largest state-owned companies is, on average, comparable to their private counterparts.     

Indirect taxes: A comparative study of Greece and the EEC

Financing ever-growing governmental services in a non-inflationary manner is one of the main problems of public policy for all governments, including those of Greece and the EEC countries. The accession of Greece to the EEC would require tax reforms, especially in indirect taxes, which include tariffs and turnover or value added taxes. A regression analysis for the postwar years indicate that ‘imports’ is a far more important variable in explaining changes in indirect taxes than ‘private consumption’ and ‘inflation’. Such empirical findings may be useful to related policies on public finance of the countries considered, as well as other countries with similar economic problems.     

Influence of policy,operational and market conditions on seaport efficiency in newly emerging economies: the case of Vietnam

ABSTRACT

Located in Southeast Asia as one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world and close to north-south shipping routes, Vietnam’s seaports play a vital role in promoting its international trade and economic growth. And yet, most ports are small and owned by the public sector. Their performance is subject to various factors relating to government policy, operational and market conditions. Although the Government has been trying to improve the sector’s performance through corporatization, its corporatization model is unique in many ways compared with reform models in other countries. This study seeks to analyse the effects of government policy, operational and market conditions among other factors, on Vietnamese seaports’ efficiency. Double-bootstrap data envelopment analysis (DEA) and univariate and multivariate analyses were conducted using the data sample of 41 ports for years 2015 and 2016. The analysis results show that the factors of production, regional location and reform policy had a significant impact on port performance.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

Privatization of state holding corporations

Many countries have privatized part of their state holding corporations in recent years. However, the literature on this issue has analyzed mainly the privatization of uniproduct public firms. We consider a state holding corporation with two plants that may produce complement or substitute goods. Assuming that private firms are more efficient than the state holding corporation we find the following: If the marginal cost of the state corporation is low, it is not privatized either if goods are substitutes or if they are complements. However, if the marginal cost of the state corporation is high the two plants of the state holding corporation are sold to a single private investor if goods are complements, and to different investors if goods are substitutes. If goods are close substitutes and the marginal cost of the state corporation takes an intermediate value only one plant is privatized. We extend the model to consider that firms are equally efficient, that they face quadratic cost functions and that there are n uniplant private firms producing each good. We find two differences with the previous result: The government never privatizes just one plant of the state corporation, and when goods are complements the two plants of the state corporation are sold to different investors if n is high.     

中国国有企业改革：经验、困境与出路*

作为国有企业产权改革主要模式，“混合所有制”改革是否有助于确保国有资产保值增值，是否有助于推动中国经济可持续发展等问题仍存在探讨空间。本文基于对于改革开放以来中国国有企业改革的成就和教训的考察，指出“混合所有制”可以作为竞争性部门国有企业改革的一个过渡形式；对于垄断央企的改革应该充分借鉴国际上自然垄断行业的改革经验，打破行政垄断，推动竞争性框架建立，并切实实现从“管企业”逐步调整为“管资本”，通过改革实现国有资产的保值增值，并为经济创造新的增长点。     

Domestic political competition and pro‐cyclical import protection

Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding overhang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro‐cyclical when high‐tariff interests (e.g. import‐competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low‐tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported intermediate inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger lobbying threat.     

Stranded Costs,Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts

Economic Analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. We describe the stranded cost problem, its magnitude and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. An economic analysis of implicit contracts can clarify whether there should be a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. However, efficient approaches to electricity deregulation should rely on more than analysis of contracts. The politics of deregulation, as reflected in optimal compensation for regulatory "takings" of property, also affects the desirability of stranded cost recovery.     

Determinants of specific trade concerns raised on technical barriers to trade EU versus non-EU

This contribution evaluates determining factors of Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) raised on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) notifications over the period 1995–2011. While multilateral and international agreements bind countries concerning the imposition of tariffs on imports, TBTs have been used as trade policy instruments, which conceal the true motivations of governments. The main legitimate reasons behind the imposition of TBTs are to increase environmental qualities and human health, or to improve market efficiencies. However, in addition to these reasons, governments are also in pursuit of protecting their domestic industries. In fact, this contribution analyses how trade protectionist motives and legitimate public policy objectives induce these specific trade measures. Various effective factors of TBT STC notifications are considered in the econometric analysis using fixed effect Poisson estimation as the main technique, and Poisson GMM as robustness specification. Separate estimations on the European Union block in this study points at the determining factors of TBTs harmonized by heterogeneous member states. Results suggest that bilateral trade and tariffs are one of the forces of TBT STC notifications, acknowledging the protectionist behaviour of authorities. Moreover, countries with high quality of humans’ health-related environmental issues, and low environmental vitalities, are more likely to impose new TBTs. Overall, this study confirms the complex nature of TBT STCs affected by economic, technological, institutional, and health and environmental issues.     

The 2018 US-China trade conflict after forty years of special protection

ABSTRACT

In 2018, the United States suddenly increased tariffs on nearly 50 percent of its imports from China. China immediately responded with tariff retaliation covering more than 70 percent of imports from the United States. This article assesses what happened in 2018 and attempts to explain why. It first constructs new measure of special tariff protection to put the sheer scope and coverage of the 2018 actions into historical context. It then uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. This includes whether China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industrial subsidies, as well as China’s development strategy and system of forcibly acquiring foreign technology, were imposing increasingly large costs on trading partners. Finally, it also examines whether the US strategy to provoke a crisis – which may result in a severely weakened World Trade Organization (WTO) – was deliberate and out of frustration with the institution itself.     

Government efficiency,institutions, and the effects of fiscal consolidation on public debt

We study the evolution of the ratio of public debt to GDP during 132 fiscal episodes in 21 OECD countries in 1981–2008. Our main focus is on debt dynamics during 40 consolidation periods. To define these periods we use data on the evolution of the underlying cyclically adjusted primary balance, and as such avoid biases that may be induced by one-off budgetary measures. The paper brings new evidence on the role of public sector efficiency for the success of fiscal consolidation. First, we confirm that consolidation programs imply a stronger reduction of the public debt ratio when they rely mainly on spending cuts, except public investment. Government wage bill cuts, however, only contribute to lower public debt ratios when public sector efficiency is low. Second, we find that a given consolidation program will be more effective in bringing down debt when it is adopted by a more efficient government apparatus. Third, more efficient governments adopt consolidation programs of better composition. As to other institutions, consolidation policies are more successful when they are accompanied by product market deregulation, and when they are adopted by left-wing governments. By contrast, simultaneous labor market deregulation may be counterproductive during consolidation periods.     

双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择

城市公用事业通常是自然垄断行业,在我国从计划经济向市场经济转轨的过程中,它还具有较强的行政垄断性。我国对自然垄断与行政垄断并存的公用事业的规制改革与西方国家有所不同,应区别两种垄断的不同性质,有针对性地确定改革目标。本文阐述了我国城市公用事业的自然垄断特性,分析了其行政垄断的根源及表现,对双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择提出了一些建议。     

Reconciling Observed Tariffs and the Median Voter Model

Median voter theory applied to trade policy predicts positive tariffs in capital‐abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor‐abundant countries. Negative tariffs are rare, and this paper reconciles the median voter theory with observed protectionism across countries. By considering large countries, I show the optimal tariff is a sum of the median voter component and a positive term of trade component. Positive terms of trade effects raise tariffs in all countries, and can overcome the negative median voter component in labor‐abundant countries. Testing the tariff prediction with cross‐section and panel data from the 1990s, I show the median voter component is negative in labor‐abundant countries and positive in capital‐abundant countries. As expected, terms of trade effects raise tariffs across all countries and are stronger among nonmembers of the WTO.     

The Efficiency Gains from Deregulation

We analyze the efficiency gains from deregulating monopolies using an equilibrium rent seeking model. McCormick, Shughart and Tollison (1984) argue that the initial effort to establish regulation dissipates the monopoly profit, limiting the gain from deregulation to the efficiency cost of monopoly. We establish conditions under which this proposition holds; in particular, the initial rent seekers must fail to anticipate the possibility of deregulation. Additionally, through application of the standard rent seeking model, we establish that the potential welfare gains exceed the cost of achieving deregulation. Our results provide support for policies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economic distortion.