Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.     

Trips and tips for negotiation self-defense: Forewarned is forearmed

Continued attention in both the popular and academic press regarding negotiation and the related concepts of influence and persuasion is nothing short of astonishing. The topics on which we focus in this article, however, are rarely—if ever—vetted in such outlets. We venture, with some measure of caution, into the dark side of negotiation: those tactics that may be duplicitous, unethical, and unprincipled. Such tactics provide a quintessential moral hazard, as they are both brutally effective and rarely illegal. It is not our intent to provide a treatise on unsuitable behavior. Rather, our objective is to establish that no one need be victimized by such behaviors, as all of these tactics are avoidable. It is in this spirit that we provide some guidelines on self-defense in a negotiation context to avert and attenuate the consequences of these behaviors.     

Feasible multilateralism and the effects of regionalism

Recent research shows that the GATT/WTO negotiating rules are capable of delivering a politically efficient equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is, however, economically inefficient. Global free trade, in particular, is unattainable even in a fully cooperative world, if governments have political motivations. In such a context, we show that regional trade agreements can help move the world towards a welfare-superior equilibrium. The reason is that, when members of regional trade agreements lower trade barriers against one another, they tend to reduce their multilateral tariffs as well. Once we account for these endogenous changes—and only then—we find that regionalism can raise world welfare even in a fully cooperative (but political) world. Regional integration can, however, harm outsiders.     

Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in — the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction — for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.     

澳大利亚对华反倾销法律政策演变和最新发展

自1996年以来,澳大利亚对华反倾销法律政策不断调整?最初澳大利亚认为中国是“非市场经济国家”．后承认中国为“转型经济国家”。判断转型经济国家的正常价值标准由“价格控制”测试变为“市场条件主导”测试。由于澳大利亚海关法作了最新修正,且中澳正在进行双边自由贸易区谈判,澳大利亚目前正处在是否承认中国完全市场经济地位的分水岭时期。     

Aggregate scale economies, market integration, and optimal welfare state policy

Using a two-sector-two-country model with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, we show that optimal welfare state policy entails positive levels of unemployment benefits under free-trade and capital mobility. In this setting, economic integration does not reduce the revenue raising capacity of governments and thus does not lead to a race-to-the-bottom in social standards. Instead, trade and capital flows interact with welfare state policies in increasing welfare even when each government acts independently (non-cooperatively) in determining its optimal welfare payment. Cooperation is shown to improve upon non-cooperative outcomes by raising both the generosity of the welfare state and aggregate welfare.     

A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Nonlinear Negotiation

Negotiation with multiple interdependent issues is an important problem since much of real-world negotiation falls into this category. This paper examines the problem that, in such domains, agent utility functions are nonlinear, and thereby can create nonconvex Pareto frontiers. This in turn implies that the Nash Bargaining Solution, which has been viewed as the gold standard for identifying a unique optimal negotiation outcome, does not serve that role in nonlinear domains. In nonlinear domains, unlike linear ones, there can be multiple Nash Bargaining Solutions, and all can be sub-optimal with respect to social welfare and fairness. In this paper, we propose a novel negotiation protocol called SFMP (the Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol) that addresses this challenge, enabling secure multilateral negotiations with fair and pareto-optimal outcomes in nonlinear domains. The protocol works by (1) using nonlinear optimization, combined with a Multi-Party protocol, to find the Pareto front without revealing agent’s private utility information, and (2) selecting the agreement from the Pareto set that maximizes a fair division criterion we call approximated fairness. We demonstrate that SFMP is able to find agreements that maximize fairness and social welfare in nonlinear domains, and out-performs (in terms of outcomes and scalability) previously developed nonlinear negotiation protocols.     

Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO

Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process.     

Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem — that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.     

中美双边工业品增加值贸易隐含碳福利核算与分配问题研究

现代贸易方式不仅导致贸易利益在全球价值链上进行分配,还带来了贸易隐含污染排放在全球贸易网络中的分布。两国之间的贸易利益分配除了表现为贸易经济福利的分配,还表现为贸易隐含碳福利的分配。本文将贸易增加值分解法结合MRIO模型对2000—2014年中美双边工业品贸易增加值所隐含的碳福利分配及影响机制展开深入分析。研究结果表明:(1)在中美双边工业品增加值贸易隐含碳福利分配中,碳福利逆差在中国,碳福利顺差在美国;(2)中美工业品贸易碳福利级差经历了“先扩大,后收窄”的过程,美国次贷危机之后双边碳福利不平衡状况重新呈现扩大趋势;(3)中国碳排放强度下降、价值链地位提升以及对美进口规模扩大都有助于改善碳福利逆差的局面,但美国对中国不断扩大的中间品和最终品需求以及双边复杂的技术关联结构仍是中国碳福利逆差的主导因素;(4)全球价值链的深化可能将导致对出口国加征关税会通过降低进口消费侧排放的方式恶化加征国的贸易隐含碳福利。本文研究的时间范围同时覆盖中国加入WTO以及美国次贷危机两个重要节点,这对于重新审视中美经贸关系新格局下双边贸易隐含碳福利分配构建了一个新的分析视角,为中美未来贸易谈判以及全球碳排放责任认定提供了一个新的解读方向。     

Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations

Negotiation analysis and game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenous preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on and independent of the history of offers made. On the contrary, this paper argues that preferences might be based on attribute-wise reference points changing during the negotiation process. Aversion against losses relative to the reference point determines negotiators’ decisions in the negotiation and after its termination. The emergence and implications of reference points in a negotiation context are motivated, exemplified, and modeled formally. Furthermore, data from an internet experiment on endogenous preferences in bilateral multi-attribute negotiations is presented. The data supports the behavioral model.     

Positive affect and decision frame in negotiation

This study examined decision frame (“gain” vs. “loss”) and negotiator affect (positive vs. control) in a simulated bilateral negotiation where negotiators dealt with a programmed opponent and made offers and counteroffers on three issues that differed in value. Direct comparisons between the gain and loss frame conditions, in the control-affect condition, revealed a replication of the standard frame effect: a loss frame produced fewer concessions than a gain frame. However, an interaction effect indicated that the frame effect reversed in the positive affect condition: under positive affect, a loss frame produced greater concessions than a gain frame. In addition, the data indicated a replication of earlier work showing that positive affect can lead to more integrative agreements in negotiation. The results suggest that positive affect can influence location of a reference point in evaluating prospective outcomes; one implication is that prospect theory can be useful for understanding the effects of affect in bilateral negotiation.     

Impact of the multinational corporation

Efforts to deal with crises in the world economy ignore the real cause—the immense economic power of the multinational corporation. The multinational corporation may harm the economy of the host government by minimizing any negative effects of changes in currency values, and the internationalization of financial institutions has inhibited the host countries' monetary objectives. There is little agreement concerning solutions, either within governments or between governments. The problems will become even more visible. The first steps toward any solution involve a redefinition of business-government relationships and the formulation of a foreign policy that achieves goal congruence.     

双边议价框架内主导零售商买方势力及政府规制取向

在双边议价框架内,外部选择价值决定纵向关系中交易双方各自的议价势力。规模以及作为产品进入市场的"守门人"角色是主导零售商自身所具备的影响外部选择价值的因素,是主导零售商买方势力的主要来源。在对称性寡头竞争的零售市场,主导零售商的买方势力产生有益的"抵消效应",而在非对称性寡头竞争的零售市场,主导零售商的买方势力可能产生有害的"水床效应"。"水床效应"既可能会加剧零售市场垄断化趋势,又可能损害消费者福利。因此,政府规制应高度关注主导零售商的市场兼并行为,高度关注主导零售商剥削中小供应商的行为,高度关注主导零售商过度低价促销行为。     

Regulating the entry of multinational enterprises: Models and practices

This paper examines the policies adopted by host governments to regulate the entry of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The conflict between host governments and MNEs over the choice of entry strategies is demonstrated. The theoretical underpinnings of host governments’ regulations on MNEs’ entry are provided and the restrictive policies adopted by host governments are assessed. In general, prohibiting an MNE to sign a licensing agreement with its own partially owned subsidiary generates a higher level of national welfare. If the size of the host market is large enough to support several efficient plants, encouraging MNEs to license their technologies to several local firms will also increase national welfare.     

Line,line, everywhere a line: Cultural considerations for waiting-line managers

Given the trend of increasing business globalization, management teams of multinational companies have taken steps to better understand consumers, local business partners, and local governments. Local queueing preferences present managers with additional challenges and opportunities in international markets. The world may be ‘flat,’ but it is foolish to believe that all cultures perceive lines and waiting through the same lens. As discussed herein, perceptions regarding waiting and management of queues vary greatly; therefore, managers should adopt different policies and procedures when managing waiting lines across natural and cultural borders. Considering queue management in a global context offers benefits. Thinking globally—and acting locally—can prioritize and clarify important decisions any waiting-line manager has to make.     

Negotiation via the World Wide Web: A Cross-cultural Study of Decision Making

INSPIRE is a Web-based system for the support and conduct of negotiations. The primary uses of the system are training and research. Between July 1996 and April 1997, 281 bilateral negotiations were conducted through the system by managers, engineers and students from over 50 countries. INSPIRE has been used at eight universities and training centers. In research it is being used to study cross-cultural differences in decision making and the use of computer support in negotiation. This paper outlines the system, the negotiation methodology embedded in it, and reports the initial results of the experimental study of the impact of culture on Web-based bilateral negotiation.     

Supporting Interactive Multi-Attribute Electronic Negotiations with ebXML

The inter-organizational character of electronic negotiations raises social, legal, organizational and technical research questions. One of the main weaknesses of electronic negotiation applications today is that they do not sufficiently take into consideration the integration requirements that stem from the latter two of these aspects. Our objective is to design and build an electronic negotiation application that complies with these requirements. A major task within this work is the modeling and specification of the negotiation process and negotiation objects. To meet the integration requirements, the use of standards is essential. In our paper, we apply the ebXML framework to the task of modeling interactive bilateral multi-attribute electronic negotiations. For this purpose, we introduce the negotiation process flow underlying our application scenario. We explain the significance of ebXML for standardized business transaction modeling. We develop ebXML process and object definitions and suggest modifications of and additions to the current ebXML standard. Finally, we discuss the scope and the limitations of our concept and prototype.     

美国2012年双边投资协定范本与中美双边投资协定谈判

本文首先介绍了美国2012年双边投资协定范本修订的主要内容,在此基础上对中美双边投资协定谈判中方应采取的立场进行了分析。本文认为美国2012年双边投资协定范本修订中涉及国家主导型经济体的内容对中方的影响有限。面对目前国际投资协定中准入前国民待遇条款日益增多的形式,本文认为中国应该支持多哈部长宣言第22段倡导的基于肯定清单的准入前国民待遇,以此为基础与美国及其他经济体展开投资自由化谈判。本文最后对中美双边投资协定谈判提出了一系列政策建议。     

Are Iranian consumers poised to “buy American” in a hostile bilateral environment?

The current bilateral relationship between the United States and Iran is fraught with intense political and military tension revolving around the nuclear issue in Iran. Open hostility between the two governments has recently spilled over into national, regional, and global forums. Despite this turmoil, the Iranian consumer is actively engaged in the global marketplace, buying goods from around the world. Our research spotlights Iranian consumers’ attitudes toward importing and buying foreign-made products, with a special focus on American-made products. Our 2006 survey of 902 Iranian consumers suggests that Iranians are very open, but not exclusively so, to the purchase of foreign-made and American-made products. We also found the political-military bilateral tension or animosity between the Iranian and American governments has not transferred to the Iranian consumer. The Iranian consumers’ openness to foreign-made (including American-made) goods, coupled with low consumer animosity vis-à-vis the United States from Iranian consumers, provides an opportunity for American and Western multinational companies to actively compete for and engage with the Iranian consumer in the Iranian marketplace.