Trade policy: Home market effect versus terms-of-trade externality

We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman (1980) trade model, allowing for wage, import and export subsidies/taxes. We study non-cooperative trade policies, first for each individual instrument and then for the situation where all instruments can be set simultaneously, and contrast those with the efficient allocation. We show that in this general context there are four motives for non-cooperative trade policies: the correction of monopolistic distortions; the terms-of-trade manipulation; the delocation motive for protection (home market effect); the fiscal-burden-shifting motive. The Nash equilibrium when all instruments are available is characterized by first-best-level wage subsidies, and inefficient import subsidies and export taxes, which aim at relocating firms to the other economy and improving terms of trade. Thus, the dominating incentives for non-cooperative trade policies are the fiscal-burden-shifting motives and terms-of-trade effects.     

我国国际贸易结构变化对能源消费影响的敏感性分析

本文基于投入产出分析法中影响力系数的研究思想,提出了"能源消费影响力系数"的概念,运用1992年、1997年和2002年投入产出表中的数据,计算了各进出口部门净出口每增加一单位,通过投入产出的连锁反应最终导致我国能源消费总量的增加数量,得出了对我国能源消费具有重要影响的关键性的进出口部门,以及这些部门单位进出口额的变化对我国能源消费的影响程度。其中,在对能源强度的计算中,借鉴了投入产出混合价值模型(Input-output Model in Hybrid Units)的计算方法。     

国际贸易对我国行业间收入分配的影响——基于制造业面板数据的实证分析

本文运用我国1998-2006年27个制造业行业的面板数据对国际贸易的行业间收入分配效应进行了实证研究。研究发现,从总体上看,出口对行业相对工资有正向的上拉作用,进口对行业相对工资有负向的下拉作用。但进出口对不同类型行业的影响程度和方向不同,出口贸易对资本密集型和劳动密集型制造业行业的相对工资均有上拉作用,且对前者的促进作用大于后者;进口贸易对劳动密集型制造业行业的相对工资有下拉作用,而对资本密集型制造业行业的相对工资有上拉作用。基于上述结论,促进出口,提高劳动密集型产品的附加值,适当控制最终消费品等产品的进口,有助于缩小行业收入差距。     

人民币汇率波动的福利效应——基于我国制造业面板数据的实证分析

本文运用1996-2007年我国制造业27个细分行业的贸易和产业数据,根据人民币实际有效汇率(总体汇率)的计算方法构造了制造业分行业的进、出口汇率指标,分别考察了总体汇率、出口汇率、进口汇率对制造业分行业、分部门(劳动密集型、资本密集型和技术密集型三个部门)工人福利的影响及其传导途径。实证研究结果表明:在分行业分析中,三种汇率升值均降低了制造业工人的福利水平;在分部门分析中,由于区分了各部门贸易程度和产业性质存在的差异,汇率升值主要通过出口途径降低了劳动密集型部门工人的福利,主要通过投入品进口途径和制成品进口途径分别提高了资本密集型部门和技术密集型部门工人的福利。最后,本文就长短期内如何调整人民币汇率以促进制造业工人福利改善提出了一些政策建议。     

Lobbying costs and trade policy

We study how endogenous lobbying costs influence trade policies. Although in practice lobbying expenditures far exceed campaign contributions, the literature on the political economy of trade policy has focused on the latter. In this paper we develop a model in which informational lobbying costs play a role in determining the structure of protection. In the model, special interest groups can choose to send a signal to the policymaker regarding some information they possess, and the policymaker observes the signal before setting the trade policies. We find that lobbying expenditures directly affect the equilibrium policies. In order to test the predictions of the model we collected data on lobbying expenditures from the Center for Responsible Politics as well as data on trade and industry characteristic variables for the United States from other sources. We perform a structural estimation of the equilibrium trade policies and find support for our model. The empirical evidence indicates that lobbying expenditures play an important role in explaining the variation of protection across sectors. Moreover, the model leads to considerably lower and more reasonable estimates of the weight that the government places on social welfare relative to political contributions.     

国际贸易、技术进步对相对工资差距的影响——基于我国制造业数据的实证分析

笔者运用2000-2005年的面板数据模型分析了我国制造业27个细分行业的对外贸易、技术进步等因素对行业相对工资差距的影响,并进一步将27个细分行业按照要素密集度的不同分为三种类型,分别分析了技术密集型、劳动密集型和资本密集型行业的进出口贸易、技术进步等变量对相对工资差距的影响。结论如下:在不考虑制造业行业特征的情形下,行业的对外贸易引起相对工资差距的扩大,行业的技术进步对相对工资差距的影响是不显著的;在将对外贸易分解为进口贸易和出口贸易的情形下,进口贸易引起相对工资差距的扩大,技术进步引起相对工资差距的缩小;在考虑制造业行业特征的情形下,行业要素密集度的不同会导致进、出口贸易和技术进步对相对工资差距产生不同的影响。     

反倾销保护引致的市场转移效应分析——基于中国彩电出口的实证分析

针对特定出口国的反倾销保护会带来两种贸易转移效应:进口国的进口转移效应和出口国的市场转移效应。本文通过简单竞争模型以及统计分析和描绘性分析着重考察了反倾销保护对出口国的市场转移的影响,分析结果表明,欧盟对中国彩电的反倾销保护导致了中国对其彩电出口量的大幅度下降,并进而引起了中国的彩电出口向未提起反倾销诉讼的其他国家(地区)转移,即反倾销保护导致了出口国的市场转移效应。     

World trade patterns and prices: The role of productivity and quality heterogeneity

This paper analyzes the role of product quality and labor efficiency in shaping the trade patterns and trade intensities within and across two groups of countries, the developed and richer North and the developing South. Recent empirical literature identifies two groups of evidence — the product lines evidence on different export strategies and sources of competitiveness across product groups and countries, and the aggregate trade flows evidence on a positive relation between the income per capita and both export and import prices (also conditional on the exporter). We attempt to provide a theoretical background for these findings and focus on the North–South productivity differences in a four country North–South trade model with two dimensions of firm heterogeneity. Differences in the firms' product quality and cost efficiency impose different competitiveness sources when entering more difficult markets and result in the observed export and import prices and consumption bundles across the rich and poor countries.     

Thirlwall's law and the specification of export and import functions

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it proposes general specifications for export and import functions that encompass the contributions of both Kaldorian and Schumpeterian literatures on the determinants of trade performance. Second, the paper provides evidence of the impact of nonprice competitiveness, measured by the growth of relative economic efficiency on export and import growth in different technological sectors. Third, it shows that the magnitude of income elasticities of demand is partially determined by relative economic efficiency.     

Trade policy under firm-level heterogeneity in a small economy

We explore the effect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model of firm-level heterogeneity and product differentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and the demand schedules for its exports (a “small economy”). We first establish that welfare can be decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tariff allows our small economy to deal with two distortions that we identify and thereby reach its first-best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint effect on the other three terms (terms of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tariff improves welfare in spite of the fact that productivity falls.     

进出口贸易对相对工资差距的影响

本文以我国有进行进出口贸易的32个细分行业为研究对象,时间跨度为2002～2009年,采用面板模型实证检验进出口贸易对相对工资差距的影响。实证结论显示:在不考虑行业特征的情形下:第一,行业的进出口贸易总额引起相对工资差距的缩小;第二,在将进出口贸易分解为进口贸易和出口贸易的情形下,出口贸易增加引起相对工资差距的缩小,进口贸易增加引起相对工资差距的扩大;在考虑行业特征的情形下:第一,出口扩大工资差距,进口没有影响。第二,行业要素密集度的不同会导致出口贸易和进口贸易对相对工资差距产生不同的影响。     

Bilateral Trade under Environmental Pressure: Balanced Growth

Based on the advance-retreat course (ARC) model - a growth model under environmental pressure, this paper builds a bilateral import and export trade growth model under environmental pressure. By using the model, the paper analyzes the impacts of innovation on import and export growth, presents a method for computing the optimal levels of imports and exports, derives the limit values of imports and exports, and obtains the limit equilibrium between exports and imports. Finally, a strategy for promoting import and export growth and achieving a bilateral trade balance according to the limit equilibrium is designed. The findings are the following: (i) innovation growth will gradually reduce goods import and export, and services import and export will increase, (ii) the U.S. import–export structure is more reasonable than that of China, and (iii) there is big room for services import and export growth for China.     

Trade, wages, and the political economy of trade protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms

Worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in how trade policy affects wages in many trade models. Yet, most research has focused on how trade policy affects wages by altering the economy-wide returns to a specific worker characteristic (i.e., skill or education) rather than through worker industry affiliation. This paper exploits drastic trade liberalizations in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and industry wage premiums. We relate wage premiums to trade policy in an empirical framework that accounts for the political economy of trade protection. Accounting for time-invariant political economy factors is critical. When we do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, we find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. Allowing for industry fixed effects reverses the result: trade protection increases relative wages. This positive relationship persists when we instrument for tariff changes. Our results are in line with short- and medium-run models of trade where labor is immobile across sectors or, alternatively, with the existence of industry rents that are reduced by trade liberalization. In the context of the current debate on the rising income inequality in developing countries, our findings point to a source of disparity beyond the well-documented rise in the economy-wide skill premium: because tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors employing a high fraction of less-skilled workers, the decrease in the wage premiums in these sectors affected such workers disproportionately.     

The paradox of export-oriented import protection: Reassessing South Korea's trade policy

As an instrument for intervention, import protection can be used to pursue both outward-oriented and inward-oriented trade policies. Although the negative consequence of inward-oriented protection has been well documented, the impact of an outward-oriented import protection policy remains largely unknown. This study investigates the impact of such a policy in the case of South Korea. Empirical data on Korea's import protection, export incentives, output growth, and export performance are compiled and tested in a supply side framework. The findings of this study suggest that the well-documented import protection measure is an integral element of Korea's export-oriented trade policy and that it will be in the self interest of Western business to respond strategically to such outward-oriented protection measures. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

中国服务业外商直接投资与服务贸易的关系——基于VAR模型的实证研究

本文利用VAR模型对中国服务业外商直接投资与服务贸易的关系进行了实证研究,结果表明,只存在服务出口、服务进口分别是服务业外商直接投资的单向Granger原因,服务业外商直接投资并不是服务出口和服务进口的Granger原因。从长期来看,服务业外商直接投资与服务出口、服务进口均是替代关系,短期来看,服务业外商直接投资与服务出口、服务进口是较弱的互补关系。     

Infant industry protection and industrial dynamics

A perennial case for industrial policy is based on the protection of young or emerging industries. Despite a natural association with concepts of life cycles, industrial policy has not been analyzed in the context of an industry life-cycle model. In particular, an important life-cycle characteristic, the potential for very large changes in the rate of net entry, is ignored. In this paper, we demonstrate how the impact of industrial policy depends critically on the entry and exit dynamics within an industry. We construct a model of technology adoption in which the number of firms is endogenous, and derive a set of novel predictions about the effects of protection on firm technology decisions. Specifically, we show that permanent protection can induce earlier adoption, but also decreases the probability that a given firm adopts the new technology. Likewise, we demonstrate that reducing the duration of protection results in faster adoption than permanent protection, but also reduces a given firm's probability of adoption. Finally, we show that, for industries characterized by flexibility in firm numbers, protection does not change the rate of technology adoption but does increase the size and probability of a shakeout (large scale net exit).     

Trade Policy Reforms and the Structure of Protection in Vietnam

This paper examines the current state of the trade policy regime in Vietnam against the backdrop of market‐oriented policy reforms undertaken over the past one‐and‐a‐half decades. The core of the paper is an in‐depth analysis of the structure of protection, focusing on both incentives for import‐competing production and the bias in the incentive structure against export production compared to import‐competing production. It is found that, despite notable reform efforts, the structure of protection in Vietnam is still out of line with that of the major trading nations in the region, in terms of the level and the inter‐industry dispersion of nominal and effective protection rates. There is a clear anti‐export bias in the incentive structure, even though the degree of the bias has considerably declined over the years. There is no evidence to justify the existing protection structure on grounds of infant industry protection or employment generation.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.     

Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation

The structure of protection across sectors has been interpreted as the result of competition among lobbies to influence politicians, but lobbies have been treated as unitary decision makers and little attention has been devoted to the importance of individual firms in this process. This paper builds a model where individual firms determine the amount of resources to allocate to political contributions and shows that, in the presence of a fixed cost of channeling political contributions, it is efficient for a lobby to be formed by the largest firms in a sector. Therefore the size distribution of firms plays an important role: sectors with a higher share of firms above a given size exhibit higher intensity of political activity. This prediction is borne out by the data: industries characterized by higher firm size dispersion obtain a higher level of protection. The model is also tested against the leading ‘Protection for Sale’ paradigm, employing a newly matched data set on firm-level political contributions. The empirical evidence shows that, accounting for individual firm behavior, the model explains a larger fraction of the variation of protection across sectors.     

破解国际物流之瓶颈

国际物流主要是为进出口贸易实现国际运输。其业务范围涉及极广,业务流程长,涉及到出口、远洋运输、进口提货等多个环节,货主常常在报关、安全运输、提单提货等环节遇到陷阱而"卡壳",造成被动局面,要成为国际物流的舵手,时时掌握主动把握局面,关键就是要破解以下几个瓶颈。