Partial credit guarantees and SMEs financing

Using data for the Italian Central Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises, the paper analyses the effect of partial credit guarantees on firms’ financing. We show that neglecting heterogeneity in guarantee intensities, namely considering all firms as equally treated, leads to a mis-measurement of the additionality effect. Moreover, we document the existence of non-linear effects, suggesting that coverage ratios below a certain threshold are likely to be ineffective to lessen obstacles faced by firms when seeking external financing funds.     

Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings

Exploiting the first default of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China, we analyze the role of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings. We consider two causes of implicit government guarantees. First, we suggest a “too big to fail” effect by revealing positive associations between credit ratings and issuer size, number of employees and taxes paid. Second, we propose a “government link” effect by showing positive associations between credit ratings and an issuer's state ownership, indicators for SOEs and central SOEs. Importantly, after the first SOE default, both dimensions of implicit government guarantees are weakened when explaining credit rating variations. Extending to analyses of yield spreads, we find that debt pricing relies more on credit ratings after the default event, consistent with bond investors weighing credit ratings more with weakened beliefs in implicit government guarantees. Collectively, our study proposes two dimensions of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings and shows how the initial SOE default significantly changes the role of such guarantees in credit ratings.     

Partial credit guarantees: Principles and practice

Partial credit guarantee schemes have experienced renewed interest from governments keen to promote financial access for small enterprises, not least as a response to the credit crunch in advanced economies. While the market can find uses for partial credit guarantees, the attractions for public policy can be illusory: indeed their most attractive feature for myopic politicians may be the ease with which the true cost of guarantees can be understated, at least at the outset. In practice, the actual fiscal cost of existing schemes has varied widely across countries and has represented a high per dollar subsidy in some cases. Despite the recent application of some innovative techniques, the social benefit of such schemes has proved difficult to estimate, not least because their goals have been vague. Operational design has influenced the cost and apparent effectiveness of different schemes and has also varied widely. Clear and precise goals, against which performance is regularly monitored, realistic pricing verified by consistent and transparent accounting, and attention to the incentive features of operational design, especially for the intermediaries, are among the prerequisites for such schemes to have a good chance of truly achieving improvements in social welfare.     

The effect of credit guarantees on credit availability and delinquency rates

We use new data to examine whether credit guarantees affect economic incentives and whether they affect the credit available to small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). We find that firms that have both guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans are 1.67% more likely to miss payments on their guaranteed loans, but are not more likely to default on these loans. These findings suggest that guarantees affect firms’ incentives to repay loans but not their long-term performance. We also find that firms selected into the guarantee programs are 1.17% more likely to default on their loans compared with similar firms that borrow without guarantees. Since we find evidence that long-term performance is not affected by guarantees, the higher default rates among firms selected into the guarantee programs must be the consequence of adverse selection. We also find that credit guarantees increase the aggregated amount of credit; in particular, one additional dollar of guarantees increases the total credit for SMEs by US$ 0.65.     

Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

Loan commitments and the management of uncertain credit demand

We provide an explanation for loan commitments unrelated to borrower creditworthiness. In our model, banks can use loan commitments to reduce uncertainty regarding their own future funding needs. Given a cost advantage to banks that can acquire such information, there exists an equilibrium demand for commitments by riskneutral firms. The purchase of the loan commitment and the choice of contract terms reveals the buyer's private information regarding future credit needs. In order to ensure the sorting of the a priori indistinguishable applicants according to their private information, we show that a usage fee applied to the commitment holder's unused credit line is necessary.     

Bank capital regulation and credit supply

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.     

Bank asset transparency and credit supply

Review of Accounting Studies - We employ the European Central Bank’s Loan-level Reporting Initiative as a shock to banks’ asset disclosures. We find that after the disclosure...     

Credit derivatives and bank credit supply

Credit derivatives are the latest in a series of innovations that have had a significant impact on credit markets. Using a micro data set of individual corporate loans, this paper explores whether use of credit derivatives is associated with an increase in bank credit supply. We find only limited evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit. The strongest effect is for large term loans—newly negotiated loan extensions to large corporate borrowers, with a largely negative impact on (previously negotiated) commitment lending. Even for large term borrowers, increases in the volume of credit are offset by higher spreads. These findings suggest that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow, accruing mainly to large firms that are likely to be “named credits” in these transactions. Finally, use of credit derivatives appears to be complementary to other forms of hedging by banks, though the banks most active in hedging appear to charge more for additional amounts of credit.     

Loan managers’ trust and credit access for SMEs

Research on relationship lending pays only marginal attention to the role of loan managers’ trust in the managers of SMEs. Trust literature suggests that trust reduces agency costs. Thus, trust is expected to be positively related to the amount of short-term credit granted and negatively related to SMEs’ risk of being credit constrained. Results from six banks characterised by a German culture and three banks characterised by an Italian culture suggest that this is indeed the case: SMEs that enjoy a high level of trust from loan managers obtain more credit and are less credit constrained.     

Aggregate uncertainty and the supply of credit

This paper presents a model in which a bank can exhibit self-insurance with loan supply contracting when uncertainty increases. This prediction is tested with U.S. commercial banks, where identification is achieved by looking at differential effects according to banks’ capital-to-assets ratio (CAR). Increases in uncertainty reduce the supply of credit, more so for banks with lower levels of CAR. These results are weaker for large banks, and are robust to controlling for monetary policy, to different measures of uncertainty, and to breaking the dataset in subsamples. Quantitatively, the effect of uncertainty shocks on credit supply is about as important as that of monetary policy shocks.     

Cyclicality of credit supply: Firm level evidence

We quantify fluctuations in bank-loan supply in the time-series by studying firms' substitution between loans and bonds using firm-level data. Any firm that raises new debt must have a positive demand for external funds. Conditional on the issuance of new debt, we interpret firms' switching from loans to bonds as a contraction in bank-credit supply. We find strong evidence of this substitution at times that are characterized by tight lending standards, depressed aggregate lending, poor bank performance, and tight monetary policy. We show that this substitution behavior has strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small firms.     

Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.     

Interest rate linkages within the EMS and bank credit supply

The exchange rates between the currencies of European Monetary System (EMS) members are essentially fixed between narrow bands mandated by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). the intent of such a fixed rate regime is to enhance policy co-ordination within the EMS. However, it has instead led to German policy dominance within the system according to several recent studies. We examine the optimal dynamic credit policy of a bank in an EMS country that is subject to such German ‘dominance’. Our stochastic control model reveals conditions under which German monetary policies can influence domestic bank lending behaviour. It also suggests that banks may be able to hedge such risk exposure by increasing in size. the model offers ‘credit supply' based explanations for recent regulatory reforms in Europe towards unified banking and the attempts of several EMS members to de-link their policies from that of the German Bundesbank.     

On the direct and indirect real effects of credit supply shocks

We explore the real effects of bank-lending shocks and how they permeate the economy through buyer-supplier linkages. We combine administrative data on all Spanish firms with a matched bank-firm-loan dataset of all corporate loans from 2003 to 2013 to estimate firm-specific credit supply shocks for each year. We compute firm-specific measures of exposure to bank lending shocks of customers (upstream propagation) and suppliers (downstream propagation). Our findings suggest that credit supply shocks have sizable direct and downstream propagation effects on employment, investment, and output, especially during the 2008–2009 crisis, but no significant impact on employment during the expansion. We provide evidence that both trade credit extended by suppliers and price adjustments in general equilibrium explain downstream propagation of credit shocks.     

海南省农村信用社贷款定价存在的问题及对策建议

随着利率市场化改革步伐的加快,中国人民银行对贷款利率取消了上限管理,贷款定价由金融机构自主决定。农村信用社作为我国金融机构的重要组成部分,是农村金融的主力军,肩负着支持农业发展和农民增收的重任,其贷款利率定价事关农民增收、农村信用社增效与农村金融稳定的大局。因此,农村信用社适应利率市场化改革,依据审慎、稳妥的原则,结合自身特点建立科学、有效的贷款利率定价机制已经成为非常迫切的需要。本文基于对海南农村信用社贷款定价的现状调查,通过分析贷款定价存在的问题提出了进一步完善海南农村信用社贷款定价机制的相关对策建议。     

Disentangling demand and supply in credit developments: A survey-based analysis for Italy

This paper combines qualitative information from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey with micro-data on loans for the participating Italian banks to assess the role of supply and demand factors in lending to enterprises developments, with a focus on the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Both demand and supply have played a relevant role, in the whole sample period and during the crisis. A counterfactual exercise shows that the effect of supply factors on the growth of lending was strongest after the Lehman collapse. On average, over the crisis period the negative effect on the annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the panel banks’ lending to enterprises can be estimated in a range of 2.3-3.1 percentage points, depending on the specification. About one fourth of the total supply effect can be attributed to costs related to the banks’ balance sheet position, the rest to their perception of credit risk.     

Valuation of loan guarantees

In this paper, the authors develop contingent claims models of loan guarantees in various circumstances: (1) a fully guaranteed issue of non-callable coupon debt; (2) a partially guaranteed issue of non-callable coupon debt; (3) junior and senior non-callable debt with guarantees; (4) callable coupon debt with guarantees. Numerical solutions of the resulting valuation models are performed using the method of Markov chains. Tables and graphs of the resulting values of loan guarantees are provided. The paper concludes with suggestions for extensions of this approach to the valuation of loan guarantees.