Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.     

Higher risk,lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.     

Venture-Capital Investment in Minority Business

This study analyzes the performance of mature investments made by venture-capital (VC) funds that specialize in financing minority business enterprises. We explore the hypothesis that VCs focusing on investing in minority businesses earn attractive returns because this market niche is underserved. Minority VC funds collectively earned yields on their realized investments that were estimated to be broadly equivalent to those of the mainstream VC industry. However, these yields vary greatly from fund to fund. VC fund traits that predict high yields on individual investments are identified by estimating multivariate regressions explaining net investment returns.     

Mutual fund flows and investor returns: An empirical examination of fund investor timing ability

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991–2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.     

Risk-taking and performance of government bond mutual funds

This paper investigates the risk exposures of government bond mutual funds and how risk-taking behavior affects fund performance. Government bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark bond indexes before but not after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that the risk-taking behavior of fund managers helps to explain the different performances of government bond funds with and without controlling for the risk factors. Our results suggest that risk-taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal risk periods but lower returns in high risk periods, suggesting that fund managers consistently take risky bets in fund management. We further show that the risk-taking of government bond funds is persistent and that investors typically have no ability to differentiate between the skill and risk components of fund performance. These findings suggest why fund managers have incentives to take consistently risky positions.     

Has persistence persisted in private equity? Evidence from buyout and venture capital funds

This paper presents new evidence on performance persistence for U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds. We use high quality cash-flow data from Burgiss's large sample of institutional investors (as of December 2020) which allows us to examine how persistence has changed over more than three decades of fundraising. Venture capital (VC) performance remains remarkably persistent across funds raised by the same general partner (GP). In contrast, buyout funds' performance persistence becomes noticeably weaker over time. The patterns are different when we restrict the analysis to information that would have been available to investors – interim performance on the previous fund at the time a new fund is raised – rather than using final, or latest, performance. We find little evidence of persistence for buyouts, especially post-2000. We continue to find persistence for VC funds though it declines post-2000. The differences are driven by interim performance reported at the time of fundraising being only moderately correlated to final performance and GPs avoiding fundraising when interim performance is poor. Finally, we look at GPs who introduce new fund styles and find that performance is noticeably lower for buyouts (but not VC). Exploring the reasons for these divergent trends in persistence between buyout and VC is a promising area for future research.     

Luck versus Skill in the Cross‐Section of Mutual Fund Returns

The aggregate portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio, but the high costs of active management show up intact as lower returns to investors. Bootstrap simulations suggest that few funds produce benchmark‐adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs. If we add back the costs in fund expense ratios, there is evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true α) in the extreme tails of the cross‐section of mutual fund α estimates.     

Mutual fund advertising: Should investors take notice?

This research investigates the relationship between advertising, quality, and price in the mutual fund market, considering both equity and fixed income funds. The research considers these relationships based on the results for a time period following the advertisement. Given the complexity of the mutual fund purchase decision for investors, this research provides an initial investigation into whether investors can infer mutual fund quality and price from the presence of mutual fund advertising. Post-advertising period results show a negative relationship between advertising and fund quality, indicating that previously advertised funds exhibit weaker performance than nonadvertised funds. During the post-advertisement period, both equity and fixed income funds exhibit lower expenses (ie, price) than nonadvertised funds. These research findings and implications for theory are discussed.     

Socially responsible investment funds: Investor reaction to current and past returns

This paper investigates and compares the determinants of fund flows for socially responsible investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds. We consider the impact of current and past measures of monthly and annual return on fund flow. The results suggest SRI fund flows are less sensitive to returns than conventional funds. Our model also shows that flow is persistent and SRI investors are more likely to invest in a fund they already own relative to conventional investors. These results reflect the difficulty SRI investors face in finding alternative investments that meet their non-financial goals.     

THE COST OF MUTUAL FUND DISTRIBUTION FEES

Many individuals purchase shares in mutual funds as investments. With a lack of evidence supporting performance persistence in fund returns, investors should consider expenses as a fund-selection tool since fund expenses have a negative effect on fund returns. One of the largest expenses incurred by fund investors is distribution expenses, which include both load charges and annual fees. Close to two-thirds of all equity funds charge investors for fund distribution. The true cost of these distribution fees to investors is hard to measure because a myriad of distribution arrangements have evolved that vary both the timing and magnitude of distribution charges. We derive a simple methodology that expresses the present value of distribution costs as a percentage of the original investment in fund shares for any expected holding period. This methodology allows direct comparison of the effect on investors of distribution fees for mutual funds with different types of sales arrangements.     

Closed-End Fund Expenses and Investment Selection

Investment returns on closed‐end funds are highly volatile. Because expenses have a definite negative impact on closed‐end fund returns, investors should include the expense ratio as a criterion for fund selection in addition to performance, investment objective, and risk of the fund. This paper constructs a model of the expense ratio of closed‐end funds to explain cross‐sectional differences in the expense ratios for the period between 1989–1996. We relate closed‐end fund expenses to fund characteristics and identify the factors that can help investors choose low expense closed‐end funds.     

证券投资基金规模适度性研究——基于中国市场的证据

随着社保、养老金等中长期资金的大规模入市,中国公募基金规模面临更快扩张,那么基金规模究竟是可以无限扩张还是存在制约？本文研究发现,基金规模扩张会受到基金经理与投资者之间的委托代理冲突、边际规模报酬递减、投资者大规模赎回的制约。基于此,本文提出了基金管理规模适度区间的概念及其相应计量模型,并借此对2011—2019年间中国公募基金市场规模的适度性进行实证判断和检验,结果显示:(1)中国公募基金的平均管理规模在2015年之前过大,2016年之后趋向适度,而在2019年出现偏小现象。(2)中国基金市场规模适度区间的上、下限呈现逐年减小趋势,但二者的差值,即适度性区间的宽度却逐年增加。(3)规模适度基金的业绩表现远好于规模不足和规模过大两类基金,但市场上的规模适度基金占比则小于另外两类基金。最后,本文就如何提升公募基金,尤其是对安全性和盈利性要求更高的养老保险基金的规模适度性提出了相应对策建议。     

Cash flow timing skills of socially responsible mutual fund investors

This paper studies, for the first time, the cash flow timing skills of socially responsible (SR) mutual fund investors. Our findings show that SR investors neither worsen nor improve their returns according to their cash flow timing decisions, although they show good timing for net purchase and perverse timing for net withdrawal decisions. When controlling for fund characteristics, investors in larger, institutional, with longer mean manager tenure, lower expense ratio, no load, lower mean turnover ratio and a fee level below the average funds, show better timing results; in other words, sophisticated and better informed investors make better cash flow timing decisions. Controlling for SR strategy, green fund investors (our proxy for profit-seeking investors) had the worst results (similar to those obtained for conventional investors in the prior literature), and religious fund investors (our proxy for the values-driven profile) had results that were most different from conventional investors.     

Is ethical money financially smart? Nonfinancial attributes and money flows of socially responsible investment funds

We study the money flows into and out of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds around the world. In their investment decisions, investors in SRI funds may be more concerned with ethical or social issues than with fund performance. Therefore, SRI money flows are less related to past fund returns. Ethical money is less sensitive to past negative returns than are conventional fund flows, especially when SRI funds primarily use negative or Sin/Ethical screens. Social attributes of SRI funds weaken the relation between money inflows and past positive returns. However, money flows into funds with environmental screens are more sensitive to past positive returns than are conventional fund flows. Stock picking based on in-house SRI research increases the money flows. These results give evidence on the role of nonfinancial attributes, which induce heterogeneity of investor clienteles within SRI funds. We find no evidence of a smart money effect, as the funds that receive more inflows neither outperform nor underperform their benchmarks or conventional funds.     

Excess Volatility and UK Investment Trusts

Abstract:   The issue of whether or not asset prices are more volatile than the underlying fundamentals is an empirical question with implications for market efficiency. Recent research suggests that the volatility of closed end fund returns in the USA is significantly higher than the returns on assets held by the funds. This has been attributed to noise trading as closed‐end fund shares are predominantly held by individual investors. This study demonstrates that UK investment trust returns exhibit similar excess volatility in spite of the prevalence of institutional investors. However, big investment trusts in terms of market capitalisation show greater excess volatility than small trusts. Although most of the excess volatility appears to be idiosyncratic, investor sentiment index is the most important variable associated with residual returns.     

Does Stock Return Momentum Explain the “Smart Money” Effect?

Does the “smart money” effect documented by Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) reflect fund selection ability of mutual fund investors? We examine the finding that investors are able to predict mutual fund performance and invest accordingly. We show that the smart money effect is explained by the stock return momentum phenomenon documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Further evidence suggests investors do not select funds based on a momentum investing style, but rather simply chase funds that were recent winners. Our finding that a common factor in stock returns explains the smart money effect offers no affirmation of investor fund selection ability.     

Commonality in hedge fund returns: Driving factors and implications

We measure the commonality in hedge fund returns, identify its main driving factor and analyze its implications for financial stability. We find that hedge funds’ commonality increased significantly from 2003 until 2006. We attribute this rise mainly to the increase in hedge funds’ exposure to emerging market equities, which we identify as a common factor in hedge fund returns over this period. Our results show that funds with a high commonality were affected disproportionately by illiquidity and exhibited negative returns during the subsequent financial crisis, thereby providing little diversification benefits to the financial system and to investors.     

中国公募基金挖掘了股票市场异象吗？

公募基金是我国重要的机构投资者之一,分析其投资逻辑对理解机构投资者行为和公募基金的选择至关重要。基于2005年至2019年主动管理偏股型开放式基金数据,本文检验了公募基金对A股市场87个异象因子的挖掘。为解决因子维度过大问题,本文采用非参方法从87个异象因子中提取有效信息的综合指标A-Score,并根据基金持仓构建基金的异象投资指标AIM(Anomalies Investing Measure)。结果显示:(1)中国公募基金挖掘了市场异象;(2)利用AIM可以选择表现更好的基金,并能获得0.45%的月度多空组合收益;(3)基金经理的选股能力、风格选择能力和风控能力是其挖掘异象收益的主要来源;(4)异象挖掘可以为基金带来长期资金流,同时也缓和了市场的错误定价。     

Sentimental mutual fund flows

We show that many stylized empirical patterns for mutual fund flows are driven by investor sentiment. Specifically, when sentiment is high, investors exhibit a stronger tendency of chasing past fund performance; fund flows are less sensitive to fund expenses; and investors are attracted more to funds with sheer visibility. Moreover, the well‐documented positive relation between fund flows and future fund performance is significant only during high sentiment periods and is mainly driven by expected component of fund flows. Finally, we show that mutual fund investors exhibit a significantly negative timing ability at the individual fund level when sentiment is high.     

Portfolio Distortions Among Institutional Investors: Evidence from China

The behavior of institutional investors often deviates from established personal or social norms; this deviation may reflect either an informational advantage or a psychological bias. In this paper, we investigate the reasons Chinese mutual funds hold lottery-type stocks, which are characterized by low average returns and high risk. We find that funds at the aggregate level do not exhibit a propensity to gamble, but when they do gamble, they earn abnormal returns on lottery-type investments. Gambling-related outperformance is greater among held firms with characteristics that enable fund managers to obtain more informational advantages. Our results suggest that portfolio distortion is driven by the ability of managers to capitalize private information rather than by behavioral bias.