Corporate hedging versus risk-shifting in financially constrained firms: The time-horizon matters!

The paper presents an intertemporal theory of the optimal risk policy in shareholder-managed firms, which face future financing constraints and act under moral hazard as well as limited liability. Our model provides an integrated framework that overcomes the dilemma of “conflicting motives” of risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) on the one hand and corporate hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985) on the other hand by considering time-effects. Shareholders face a trade-off between a risk-shifting incentive if the investment horizon is short, and a hedging incentive that becomes dominant if the investment horizon is sufficiently long. Within an infinite-time investment horizon, Jensen and Meckling's risk incentive problem can be fully solved as permanent hedging is optimal except for firms in financial distress, which constantly opt for risk-shifting. We further show that the value of corporate hedging increases if financing constraints become more severe. Our results suggest that life-cycle features play a significant role in the firm's propensity to hedge. They also coincide with existing empirical evidence, which shows that only highly leveraged firms facing financial distress will primarily opt for risk-shifting.     

Political connection,market frictions and financial constraints: evidence from China

This paper studies the relationship between market frictions and political connections in determining financial constraints. We develop a novel index to measure the depth of political connections (PC) at the firm level and provide robust empirical evidence that firms in China actively build PC to alleviate the costs of market frictions. Specifically, we find that firms facing severe market frictions are not as financially constrained as expected. This is because these firms also possess strong PC, which alleviate the costs of market frictions. We find that market frictions can significantly affect financial constraints in Chinese firms, but only for those firms with modest levels of PC.     

Productivity and liquidity management under costly financing

We explore theoretically and empirically the relationship between firm productivity and liquidity management in the presence of financial frictions. We build a dynamic investment model and show that, counter to basic economic intuition, more productive firms could demand less capital assets and hold more liquid assets compared to less productive firms when financing costs are sufficiently high. We empirically test this prediction using a comprehensive dataset of Chinese manufacturers and find that more productive firms indeed hold less capital and more cash. We do not, however, observe this for US manufacturers. Our study suggests a larger capital misallocation problem in markets with significant financing frictions than previously documented.     

Firm dynamics and financial development

Using comprehensive firm-level datasets, this paper studies the impact of cross-country variation in financial market development on firms' financing choices and growth. In less financially developed economies, small firms grow faster and have lower leverage than large firms. As financial development improves, the growth difference between small and large firms shrinks, while the leverage difference rises. The paper then develops a quantitative model where financial frictions drive firm growth and debt financing through the availability of credit and default risk. The model explains the observed cross-country variations in firm size, leverage and growth in response to changes in financial frictions.     

Do Acquisitions Relieve Target Firms’ Financial Constraints?

Managers often claim that target firms are financially constrained prior to being acquired and that these constraints are eased following the acquisition. Using a large sample of European acquisitions, we document that the level of cash that target firms hold, the sensitivity of cash to cash flow, and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow all decline, while investment increases following the acquisition. These effects are stronger in deals that are more likely to be associated with financing improvements. Our findings suggest that acquisitions relieve financial frictions in target firms, especially when the target firm is relatively small.     

Moral Hazard in Lending and Labor Market Volatility

When the economy experiences a sharp economic downturn, credit spreads widen and project financing costs for firms rise as funding sources begin to dry up. The economy experiences a lengthy recovery, with unemployment rates slow to return to “full employment” levels. We develop a model that displays these features. It relies on an interaction between labor search frictions and firm‐level moral hazard that is accentuated during recessions. The model is capable of addressing the “Shimer puzzle,” with labor market variables exhibiting significantly more volatility on average as a result of the heightened moral hazard concerns during these episodes that significantly deepen and prolong periods of high unemployment, as vacancy postings fall dramatically and the job‐finding rate declines. Our mechanism is also found to induce internal shock propagation causing the peak response of output, unemployment, and wages to occur with a several quarter delay relative to a model without such frictions. Many other labor market variables also show slower recovery—their return to preshock level occurs at a slower pace for a number of periods after the peak response.     

Do modified audit opinions have economic consequences? Empirical evidence based on financial constraints

We present a framework and empirical evidence to explain why, on average, 11% of listed firms in China received modified audit opinions (MAOs) between 1992 and 2009. We argue that there are two reasons for this phenomenon: strong earnings management incentives lower firms’ financial reporting quality and soft budget constraints weaken the information and governance roles of audit opinions. We find that firms’ financial constraints eased after receiving MAOs, which suggests that MAOs have limited economic consequences. Further analysis shows that this phenomenon predominantly exists in government-controlled firms and firms that receive MAOs for the first time. We also find that MAOs have not influenced financial constraints after 2006. Finally, we find that MAOs did not affect borrowing cash flows from banks until 2005, suggesting that MAOs did not start affecting bank financing until that year. We also find that firms receive more related-party financing after receiving MAOs. Our results indicate that a limited effect on bank financing and increased related-party financing reduce the effect of MAOs on financial constraints.     

银行业竞争、融资约束与企业创新——中国工业企业的经验证据

本文将1998-2007年中国工业企业数据、专利申请数据与银监会公布的金融许可证数据相匹配,考察银行业竞争影响企业创新的内在机制。结果发现,竞争的加剧通过缓解企业面临的融资约束,从而提升其创新能力。在弱化内生性问题和一系列稳健性检验后,上述结果仍然稳健。进一步研究发现,外部融资依赖度较高的企业,中小、民营企业,以及位于市场化水平高和法治环境好的地区的企业,银行业竞争通过缓解融资约束促进其创新的效应更加明显。此外,本文还发现股份制银行和城商行的竞争能更好地推动企业创新。因此,建立健全多层次、多元化的金融体系,能有效缓解企业创新的融资困境,激发创新活力。     

Spillover effects of banking systemic risk on firms in China: A financial cycle analysis

This paper investigates the spillover effects of banking sector risk on firms in China and explores the risk transmission channels from the perspective of financial cycle. We use the banking risk-taking and systemic risk as the proxies of financial booms and busts. Our study yields four main findings. First, the banking risk-taking reduces firm risk in financial booms. Higher financing costs and constraints, larger firm size and financing scale, and state ownership inhibit the spillover effects. Second, the banking systemic risk increases firm risk during financial busts. Higher financing costs and constraints, larger firm size and financing scale, and state ownership facilitate the spillover effects. Third, the magnitudes of banking risk spillovers vary across industries, and this effect is more pronounced in the manufacturing industry. Fourth, bank risk-taking affects firm risk differently through various channels in different leading periods. When leading 1 to 3quarters, banking risk-taking reduces firm risk, and channel variables inhibit the spillover effects. However, when leading 4 to 8 quarters, the rising bank risk-taking eventually increases firm risk, and channel variables amplify its spillover effects. Our study offers important policy implications for risk assessment and mitigation in the Chinese loan market.     

Market Implied Ratings and Financing Constraints: Evidence from US Firms

Financing constraints have been found to play an important role in several aspects of firm behavior, but no attention has been given to their effects on credit ratings. In this paper we analyze a unique and comprehensive data set for US firms rated by Fitch over the period 2001–07. We employ Fitch's market implied ratings derived from bond and equity prices. The analysis finds evidence that financial variables are more important in predicting credit ratings for firms likely to face financing constraints. We conclude that the financing constraint is an important dimension in the market implied ratings process. Our findings are of relevance to managers, investors and rating agencies seeking to understand the mechanism through which financing constraints affect credit ratings.     

Does environmental labeling exacerbate heavily polluting firms’ financial constraints? Evidence from China

The Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection has enacted an environmental policy that restricts the investment activities of heavily polluting firms by increasing their financial constraints. In this paper, we examine the impact of environmental labeling on firms’ financial constraints. We document that the financial constraints of heavily polluting firms increase more than those of other firms after the issuance of environmental labeling. The debt and equity financing channels of heavily polluting firms are restricted, with smaller bank loans and less equity issuance in the future. The effect is stronger in firms that make a smaller contribution to the local government’s gross domestic product, receive greater media coverage, and are located in heavily polluted provinces. The environmental regulation is effective in increasing the environmentally friendly practices and decreasing the performance growth of heavily polluting firms. Our findings not only contribute to the growing literature on the factors influencing financial constraints, identifying the effects of non-monetary factors on financial constraints, but also provide more evidence for the underlying mechanism of efficient environmental policy. Our results also provide practical suggestions for investors and institutions on evaluating firms and for regulatory authorities on further implementing environmental policy.     

Financing Constraints and Workplace Safety

We present evidence that financing frictions adversely impact investment in workplace safety, with implications for worker welfare and firm value. Using several identification strategies, we find that injury rates increase with leverage and negative cash flow shocks, and decrease with positive cash flow shocks. We show that firm value decreases substantially with injury rates. Our findings suggest that investment in worker safety is an economically important margin on which firms respond to financing constraints.     

How Does Being Public Affect Firm Investment? Further Evidence from China

What role does the stock market play in the allocation of capital? Few studies have examined how being public affects firm investment in emerging markets. This study fills this gap by comparing investment behavior in public and private Chinese firms over the period 2004–2010. We find an overall improved capital allocation of public firms relative to private firms in China. By disentangling the financial constraints effect from the agency effect, we show that public firms are less likely to underinvest when there is cash flow insufficiency and more likely to overinvest when there is free cash flow. We conclude that both effects coexist and that whether or not being public improves investment behavior depends on the net effect of loosening financial constraints and worsening agency conflicts. Further examination shows that financial information plays a limited role in these effects, implying that the association between being public and firm investment may not be attributed to information asymmetry but, rather, institutional arrangement in China.     

Does financing influence the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility?

Research shows that asset tangibility substantially impacts firms’ cash levels and investment. Using the deregulation of equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, we investigate the influence of financing on the dependence of cash and investment on asset tangibility. We show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility, and promotes investment and firm growth. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S. benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.     

Access to financing and firm growth

Why do some firms grow faster than others? Although various observed and unobserved aspects of firms have been suggested as potential drivers of firm heterogeneity, economists disagree sharply on the role of financial structure in influencing firm growth. In this paper, I use a sample of quoted and unquoted firms to show that the effect of financial structure on firm growth is statistically significant and quantitatively important. In the presence of external financing constraints, firms rely more on internal funds to finance growth, but the effect of internal financing on firm growth decreases with an increase in the firm’s access to an external bank credit facility. As the external financing constraint is alleviated, the firm relies less on internal funds and switches to external financing as the primary source of financing for its growth. This pattern of transition between internal and external financing is particularly pronounced in small unquoted firms (conditional on their survival). These results suggest a real effect of financial structure on growth via the channel of an external financing constraint.     

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effect of accounting conservatism on firm‐level investment during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Using a differences‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with less conservative financial reporting experienced a sharper decline in investment activity following the onset of the crisis compared to firms with more conservative financial reporting. This relationship was stronger for firms that were financially constrained, faced greater external financing needs, or had higher information asymmetry. We also find that more conservative firms experienced lower declines in both debt‐raising activity and stock performance. The evidence suggests that accounting conservatism reduces underinvestment in the presence of information frictions.     

The Effect of Venture Capital Financing on the Sensitivity to Cash Flow of Firm's Investments

This work studies the effect of venture capital (VC) financing on firms' investments in a longitudinal sample of 379 Italian unlisted new‐technology‐based firms (NTBFs) observed over the 10‐year period from 1994 to 2003. We distinguish the effects of VC financing according to the type of investor: independent VC (IVC) funds and corporate VC (CVC) investors. Previous studies argue that NTBFs are the firms most likely to be financially constrained. The technology‐intensive nature of their activity and their lack of a track record increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Moreover, most of their assets are firm‐specific or intangible and hence cannot be pledged as collateral. In accordance with this view, we show that the investment rate of NTBFs is strongly positively correlated with their current cash flows. We also find that after receiving VC financing, NTBFs increase their investment rate independently of the type of VC investor. However, the investments of CVC‐backed firms remain sensitive to shocks in cash flows, whereas IVC‐backed firms exhibit a low and statistically not significant investment–cash flow sensitivity that we interpret as a signal of the removal of financial constraints.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

The Real Effects of Financial Sector Interventions during Crises

We assess the importance of supply‐side credit market frictions by studying the impact of bank recapitalization on firm growth in 50 countries during the recent crisis. Our identification strategy exploits the crisis as a shock to credit supply and combines an exogenous measure of firms’ dependence on external financing with policy interventions aimed at restoring bank capital. We find that the growth of financially dependent firms is disproportionately positively affected by bank recapitalization. This effect is quantitatively important and robust to controlling for other policies. These results provide new evidence of the influence of credit market frictions on economic activity.     

The Value of Financial Flexibility

We develop a model that endogenizes dynamic financing, investment, and cash retention/payout policies in order to analyze the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. We show that the value of financing flexibility depends on the costs of external financing, the level of corporate and personal tax rates that determine the effective cost of holding cash, the firm's growth potential and maturity, and the reversibility of capital. Through simulations, we demonstrate that firms facing financing frictions should simultaneously borrow and lend, and we examine the nature of dynamic debt and liquidity policies and the value associated with corporate liquidity.