Does it help to have friends in high places? Bank stock performance and congressional committee chairmanships

Does a politician with power in the U.S. Congress positively affect the value of firms headquartered in their home state? We investigate this question by examining the profitability and stock performance of commercial banks. Banks can be enormously influenced by the political and regulatory environment. We find that banks headquartered in states where a Senator or member of the House of Representatives serves as the chairman on their respective banking committee in Congress outperform banks headquartered in other states. In addition, we find that this “chair effect” is more pronounced when the committee chairs are strongly aligned with other politicians in Congress, when they are more experienced, and when banks are clustered in the home state, suggesting that the potential benefits generated from chairmanship are in more demand. Overall, our results suggest that there are some important value implications of a local politician’s power in Congress.     

Political influence and banks: Evidence from mortgage lending

We show that banks expand mortgage lending in the home states of Senate Banking Committee chairs, and the effect is more pronounced in counties where the incumbent senator faces a competitive re-election race. Banks strategically target politically active borrowers. Consequently, banks’ profitability increases after favoring the incumbent politicians’ constituents, but they suffer a deterioration in mortgage asset quality in the long run. Our findings imply that political power could distort private capital allocation beyond conventional political contribution channels.     

The cost of being late? The case of credit card penalty fees

This paper is the first in the literature to examine the determinants of US credit card penalty fees. Many critics of credit card fees – including a number of US Senators – have argued that credit card penalty fees reflect banks’ market share. Using a unique data set we find that fees are increasing in customer risk which supports the position of defenders of penalty fees, such as banks. However, our finding that fees are increasing in a bank's market share is consistent with the concerns expressed by politicians and regulators. We also find card penalty fees are direct substitutes for card interest rates.     

政治关联的不确定性与企业经营风险——基于上市公司的案例分析

中国企业的政治关联,特别是企业与政治人物的关系长久以来都对企业的财务情况、企业业绩和股票价格有着深刻的影响。采用案例分析方法,对金螳螂、惠生工程和佳兆业三个具有政治关联的上市企业,在相关政治人物在任和“落马”前后的业绩和市值表现进行分析发现：上市企业与政治人物,特别是地方官员的紧密关系,能够帮助企业通过关联官员取得政策、信贷、信息资源,提升企业竞争能力和企业业绩,在企业初创和发展阶段能够为企业发展带来重大机遇,提升企业的市场价值。但这种政治关联,也会使企业面临成为政府官员权力寻租工具的风险,最终由于政治人物政治前途的不确定性造成风险,即使在企业业绩并未出现大幅下降的情况下,受到市场恐慌情绪影响,企业市场价值面临巨大下跌风险,并影响到企业的长远发展。     

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON FIRMS’ OPERATING PERFORMANCE AND FINANCING DECISIONS

We investigate the impact that the political connections of publicly traded firms have on their performance and financing decisions. Using a long‐term event study covering a sample of 234 politically connected firms headquartered in 12 developed and 11 developing countries from 1989 to 2003, we find that firms increase their performance and indebtedness after the establishment of a political connection. We also find that the political connection is more strongly associated with changes in leverage and operating performance for firms with closer ties to political power. Overall, our study confirms that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit and reap benefits in terms of performance from their ties with politicians.     

The Effect of Credit Ratings on Disclosure: Evidence from the Recalibration of Moody's Municipal Ratings

This paper examines how credit rating levels affect municipal debt issuers’ disclosure decisions. Using exogenous upgrades in credit rating levels caused by the recalibration of Moody's municipal ratings scale in 2010, we find that upgraded municipalities significantly reduce their disclosure of required continuing financial information, relative to unaffected municipalities. Consistent with a reduction in debtholders’ demand for information driving these results, the reduction in disclosure is greater when municipal bonds are held by investors who relied more on disclosure ex ante. However, we also find that the reduction in disclosure does not manifest when issuers are monitored by underwriters with greater issuer-specific expertise and when issuers are subject to direct regulatory enforcement through the receipt of federal funding. Overall, our results suggest that higher credit rating levels lower investor demand for disclosure in the municipal market, and highlight the role of underwriters and direct regulatory enforcement in maintaining disclosure levels when investor demand is low.     

中美债券市场制度的国际比较及其启示

近年来我国债券市场日益发展壮大,债券发行数量和品种大幅增加,债券市场交易日趋活跃,有力助推了多层次资本市场的建立.但中美债券市场制度的比较结果显示,我国债券市场在制度设计上存在做市商制度发挥不充分、债券市场监管权力分割、信息披露制度执行不力、信用评级体系建设滞后等问题.通过完善做市商准入与考评体系、重塑债券市场监管体系...     

Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper tests the proposition that politicians and their affiliated firms (i.e., firms operating in their province) temporarily suppress negative information in response to political incentives. We examine the stock price behavior of Chinese listed firms around two visible political events—meetings of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and promotions of high‐level provincial politicians—that are expected to asymmetrically increase the costs of releasing bad news. The costs create an incentive for local politicians and their affiliated firms to temporarily restrict the flow of negative information about the companies. The result will be fewer stock price crashes for the affiliated firms during these event windows, followed by an increase in crashes after the event. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the affiliated firms experience a reduction (an increase) in negative stock return skewness before (after) the event. These effects are strongest in the three‐month period directly preceding the event, among firms that are more politically connected, and when the province is dominated by faction politics and cronyism. Additional tests document a significant reduction in published newspaper articles about affected firms in advance of these political events, suggestive of a link between our observed stock price behavior and temporary shifts in the listed firms’ information environment.     

Payday loans and consumer financial health

The annualized interest rate for a payday loan often exceeds 10 times that of a typical credit card, yet this market grew immensely in the 1990s and 2000s, elevating concerns about the risk payday loans pose to consumers and whether payday lenders target minority neighborhoods. This paper employs individual credit record data, and Census data on payday lender store locations, to assess these concerns. Taking advantage of several state law changes since 2006 and, following previous work, within-state-year differences in access arising from proximity to states that allow payday loans, I find little to no effect of payday loans on credit scores, new delinquencies, or the likelihood of overdrawing credit lines. The analysis also indicates that neighborhood racial composition has little influence on payday lender store locations conditional on income, wealth and demographic characteristics.     

Capital regulation and credit fluctuations

Credit cycle stabilization can be a rationale for imposing counter-cyclical capital requirements on banks. The model comprises two productive sectors: in one sector, firms can finance investments through a bond market. In the other, firms rely on bank credit. Financial frictions limit banks’ borrowing capacity. Aggregate shocks impact firms’ productivity. From a welfare perspective, banks lend too much in high productivity states and too little in bad states, although financial markets are complete. Imposing a (stricter) capital requirement in good states corrects capital misallocation, increases expected output and social welfare. Even with risk-neutral agents, stabilization of credit cycles is socially beneficial.     

Economic policy uncertainty and short-term financing: The case of trade credit

We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on trade credit. We document a decline (increase) in accounts payable, receivable, and net credit during periods of high (low) policy uncertainty and that firms react quickly to changes in uncertainty. The relation is long-term and holds after controlling for endogeneity, non-policy economic and political uncertainties, and the Great Recession. Industry competitiveness, proxied by firm market power, moderates the impact of economic policy uncertainty on trade credit. Uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policies, taxes, and regulations are the major drivers of trade credit changes. The reduction in trade credit during periods of increasing uncertainty can be explained by financial distress, constraints, and relation-specific investment channels.     

征信信息安全管理的国际经验借鉴

征信信息安全管理是征信业务管理的重心.目前,我国征信信息安全管理面临法律法规有待健全、征信信息供需失衡、征信系统接入机构管理水平有待提高、征信信息跨境流动风险日益显现等问题.借鉴日本和韩国征信信息安全管理的成功经验,为加强我国征信信息安全管理,应进一步完善法律法规,强化监督管理,增加征信产品与服务供给,推动金融科技在征...     

Regional favoritism and tax avoidance: evidence from China

This paper investigates the effect of officials’ regional favoritism on corporate tax avoidance activity in China. We find that firms located in regions that were formerly administered by the current provincial governors have a higher level of tax avoidance than other firms in the province. Further evidence indicates that regional favoritism affects tax avoidance through two channels: regional politicians’ personal connections with the governor and firms’ political access to the governor. Overall, the findings support China's current official selection and promotion guidelines that restrict hometown favoritism. Our results further imply that favoritism can also extend to officials’ former administrative regions.     

New development: How MPs in the Dutch parliament strengthened their budgetary and accounting powers

After experiencing a lack of political interest for financial and performance information in the Dutch House of Representatives, the author, a member of parliament, introduced a systematic approach for parliamentarians to review the country’s national budget and accounts. Drawing on corporate experience, the approach is a parliamentary version of a corporate audit committee working with a standardized review questionnaire. It gained wide support and is now used by several parliamentary committees. Nevertheless, the author raises various questions to the public accounting and control research community to improve the method and ensure its long-term use by politicians.     

Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.     

Does local political support influence financial markets? A study on the impact of job approval ratings of political representatives on local stock returns

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.     

Knowledge of campaign finance regulation reduces perceptions of corruption

We use an experimental survey design to measure how campaign finance regulation influences perceptions of political corruption and trust in politicians when citizens are exposed to information about regulation. Unlike most observational studies, results of this experimental study suggest that knowledge of campaign finance regulation substantially reduces citizens’ perceptions of corruption but has only limited effect on trust in politicians. Findings have crucial implications for public policy. At a time when public cynicism about politics is high, a significant reduction in perceptions of political corruption through successful dissemination of campaign finance regulation would be a boost to the legitimacy of democracies.     

The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century

Financial regulation was as hotly debated a political issue in the 19th century as it is today. We study the political economy of state usury laws in 19th century America. Exploiting the wide variation in regulation, enforcement, and economic conditions across states and time, we find that usury laws when binding reduce credit and economic activity, especially for smaller firms. We examine the motives of regulation and find that usury laws coincide with other economic and political policies favoring wealthy political incumbents, particularly when they have more voting power. The evidence suggests financial regulation is driven by private interests capturing rents from others rather than public interests protecting the underserved.     

Debate: Increasing the impact of academic research on public policy

Audit committees were perceived as overcoming the difficulties of operating in a political environment. In general, they achieved good ratings for monitoring internal audit but were seen as less effective in engaging with external auditors and risk management. In some key aspects the attitudes of internal auditors differed from those of committee chairs and CFOs.     

Does debtor protection really protect debtors? Evidence from the small business credit market

This paper analyzes how different levels of debtor protection across US states affect small firms’ access to credit, as well as the price and non-price terms of their loans. We use an individual-specific measure of debtor protection that has its maximum value when the borrower’s home equity is lower than the state homestead exemption (the debtor’s home equity is fully protected), and is decreasing in the difference between the home equity and the homestead exemption (the amount that the creditor can seize). We find that unlimited liability small businesses have lower access to credit in states with more debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws. In addition, these businesses face tighter loan terms - they are more likely to pledge business collateral, have shorter maturities, and borrow smaller amounts. For limited liability small businesses, we also find a reduction in credit availability, but of smaller magnitude, together with an increase in the loan rate.