Does Public Firms’ Mandatory IFRS Reporting Crowd Out Private Firms’ Capital Investment?

We investigate how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by publicly listed firms in the European Union affects peer private firms. We find that private firms’ capital investment decreases significantly after the IFRS mandate, relative to public firms. Private firms also display decreased investment when benchmarked against firms relatively insulated from the impact of the IFRS mandate, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller in this case. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory IFRS reporting (combined with other reforms), while increasing public firms’ financing and investment, crowds out funding for private firms. The effect is more pronounced for larger private firms and in industries where public peers have greater external financing needs. Our evidence suggests that financial reporting regulations cause shifts in resource allocation in an economy.     

Cross-listing and corporate malfeasance: Evidence from P-chip firms

The rapid growth of the private sector in China in recent decades has resulted in a large number of capital-hungry private sector firms. An increasing number of these firms choose to raise equity capital on international exchanges, which typically have stronger disclosure, corporate governance, and investor protection regulations. In light of international investors' and regulators' concerns about the corporate finance practice of China's private sector firms, particularly regarding the integrity of their reported earnings, we investigate whether these firms aggressively manipulate their accounts by examining those listed in Hong Kong, commonly known as P-chips. We find systematic evidence that P-chips engage in more earnings management and other corporate misbehaviors than their counterparts in Hong Kong. We posit and provide evidence consistent with cross-jurisdictional enforcement difficulty as a possible explanation for P-chips' questionable practices, and discuss its implications.     

Ownership Concentration,State Ownership,and Effective Tax Rates: Evidence from China’s Listed Firms*

This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and state ownership on the tax reporting practices of China’s publicly listed firms. I argue that ownership concentration and state ownership are important for tax reporting practices in China because listed firms have high ownership concentrations and high levels of state ownership. Using a sample of 758 listed Chinese firms over the 1998–2008 time period, I find that firms with concentrated share ownership have lower effective tax rates. I also find that firms whose largest shareholders are government‐related have higher effective tax rates compared to firms whose largest shareholders are nongovernment related. In other words, the nature of the largest shareholder (government vs. nongovernment) matters. I also show that ownership‐concentrated firms are able to achieve preferential statutory tax rates compared to firms with low ownership concentration regardless of the identity of the largest shareholder.     

Private firms' financial constraints and share pledging by controlling shareholders of publicly listed firms: Evidence from China

Private firms face significant financial constraints that limit their investment and growth. Recognizing the fact that many private firms belong to business groups that contain at least one publicly listed firm, we hypothesize that private firms can partially relieve their financial constraints through the cash proceeds from share pledging of publicly listed firms by the common controlling shareholder. Using data from publicly listed Chinese firms, we find results consistent with this hypothesis, especially for private firms facing greater financial constraints. However, such share pledging also creates a negative spillover on shareholder value of publicly listed firms under common ownership.     

Shariah compliance and corporate cash holdings

This study investigates the influence of Shariah compliance status on cash holding levels and the speed of adjustment of non-financial listed firms in six Gulf Cooperation countries from 2005 to 2016. The results show that Shariah compliance status has a significant effect on firms’ cash holding decisions. Shariah-compliant firms have significantly higher cash holding levels than non-Shariah-compliant firms. Further, Shariah-compliant firms adjust more quickly towards their target cash holdings than their conventional counterparts. In our view, Shariah-compliant firms are subject to multiple restrictions that limit their external financing channels. Therefore, holding larger cash reserves is important as it helps gain from the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The findings of this study have important implications for regulators, investors and managers. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to compare the effect of Shariah compliance on firms’ cash holdings and the speed of adjustment towards the trade-off theory’s optimal cash holding target.     

Unintended Consequences of Granting Small Firms Exemptions from Securities Regulation: Evidence from the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act

This paper provides evidence about the unintended consequences arising when small companies are exempted from costly regulations—these firms have incentives to stay small. Between 2003 and 2008, the SEC postponed compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) for “non‐accelerated filers” (firms with public float less than $75 million). We hypothesize and find that some of these firms had an incentive to remain below this bright line threshold. Moreover, we document that these firms remained small by undertaking less investment, making more cash payouts to shareholders, reducing the number of shares held by non‐affiliates, making more bad news disclosures, and reporting lower earnings than control firms. Finally, there is no evidence that firms remaining small are doing so to maintain insiders' private control benefits. These findings have implications beyond SOX because numerous federal and state regulations exempt small firms via bright line size thresholds.     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

The value of firms' voluntary commitment to improve transparency: The case of special segments on Euronext

This paper examines whether a firm's commitment to increase transparency affects firm value and liquidity by studying firms' voluntary decision to be listed in “special segments” created by Euronext. The empirical analysis finds positive valuation effects for firms that opted into the special segments and documents positive effects on the liquidity of these firms. In contrast, when similar market regulations are imposed on all listed firms, and the segments become unavailable, I find marketwide negative valuation effects. The findings suggest that stock exchanges can provide an effective channel that improves firms' liquidity and value; however, when a regulation with similar requirements is imposed on all firms in the market, the effect is less likely to be recognized, at least in the short term.     

Trust and the provision of trade credit

State-controlled listed firms in China receive preferential treatment when borrowing from commercial banks; in contrast, private controlled firms rely on informal finance and on trade credit. We argue for and find evidence that private firms located in higher social trust regions use more trade credit from suppliers, extend more trade credit to customers, and collect receivables and pay payables more quickly. These findings are enhanced for firms located in provinces with weak protection of property rights. Our results are robust to different measures of social trust, legal environment, and endogeneity. Overall, our results show that social trust helps private firms overcome institutional difficulties in financing their activities.     

Private equity exits after IPOs

We examine post-IPO exits of private equity sponsors of portfolio firms via follow-on secondary equity offerings and third party takeovers. Sponsors retain considerable ownership in listed portfolio firms for lengthy periods after IPOs, well beyond lockup expiration. After private equity post-IPO secondary offerings, corporate profitability is strongly superior to benchmark firms, indicating portfolio firms are successfully prepared for private equity's subsequent exit. Nevertheless, share prices fall at offering announcements, reflecting the failure of private equity sponsors to exit stakes in listed entities at the high premiums paid in third party takeovers, premiums that are invariably shared equally with public shareholders.     

The effect of cross‐listing on insider trading returns

Holding privileged positions within firms, insiders can acquire excessive private benefits based on their informational advantage. The bonding hypothesis suggests that this can be prevented when a firm is cross‐listed on an exchange with higher regulatory and legal costs compared with its home exchange. When cross‐listed insiders buy and sell shares, the returns earned are lower than in domestic firms. This difference is attributable to the increased shareholder protection in cross‐listed firms that constrains the extraction of private benefits, such that when cross‐listed insiders trade, they trade for non‐informational reasons.     

The voice of minority shareholders: Online voting and corporate social responsibility

In 2014, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange introduced “Rules for the Implementation of Online Voting” to standardize the implementation of online voting for its listed companies. Using this event as an exogenous shock, we design a difference-in-differences model to show that minority shareholders’ participation in online voting improves firms’ corporate social responsibility performance. We reveal that this improvement is achieved through minority shareholders’ positive influence on firms’ internal control and transparency and is more pronounced for private firms and firms with lower levels of profitability and less external monitoring. Accordingly, since the standardization of online voting, minority shareholders have played an important role in corporate governance and have a positive influence on firms’ sustainable development.     

An analysis of private versus public firm valuations and the contribution of financial experts

This study investigates differences in expert valuations of private versus public firms conducted for transactions outside the exchange. First, we provide evidence for extreme reliance of the experts on private firms' reported earnings, despite a possible manipulation of these earnings. In contrast, experts valuing public firms seem to rely on other, non-financial statement information sources, even if the quality of pre-acquisition earnings is higher in these firms. Second, we present evidence that the contribution of experts to investors in private firms is questionable at best. Our findings indicate that a private firm valuation performed by a potential investor based on available information provides results similar to those of the expert. Third, we show that inconclusive results regarding the existence of a discount in private firm valuations may be explained by experts' compliance with the interests of the commissioner of the valuation. This finding provides at least a partial explanation for the private company discount, one that adds to prior standard explanations (e.g., liquidity) offered in the finance literature.     

The Long‐Term Effect of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on Cross‐Listing Premia

This paper uses a triple difference approach to assess whether the adoption of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act predicts long‐term changes in cross‐listing premia of affected foreign firms. I measure cross‐listing premia as the difference between the Tobin's q of a cross‐listed company and a non‐cross‐listed company from the same country matched on propensity to cross‐list (first difference). I find that average premia for firms cross‐listed on levels 2 or 3 (subject to SOX) declined in the year of SOX adoption (2002) and remained significantly below their pre‐SOX level through year‐end 2005 (second difference). Firms listed on levels 2 or 3, which are subject to SOX, experienced larger declines in premia than firms listed on levels 1 or 4, which are not subject to SOX (third difference). The estimated decline is 0.15–0.20 depending on specification. Riskier firms and firms from high‐disclosing and high‐GDP countries suffered larger post‐SOX declines. Firm size predicts smaller declines in premia in well‐governed countries. Faster‐growing firms in poorly‐governed countries experienced smaller declines in premia. The results are robust to the use of different before‐and‐after periods; the use of annual, quarterly, or monthly data; the use of individual companies' Tobin's q's instead of matched pairs, and different regression specifications. The overall evidence is consistent with the view that SOX negatively affected cross‐listed premia, and particularly hurt riskier firms and firms from well‐governed countries, while perhaps helping high‐growth firms from poorly‐governed countries. At the same time, after‐SOX, level‐23 firms continue to enjoy a substantial premium, estimated at about 0.32.     

Noncompliance with non‐accounting securities regulations and GAAP violations

Using enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a proxy for noncompliance with securities regulations, we examine whether a firm's compliance with non‐accounting laws and regulations is associated with GAAP violations. We find that firms that violate securities regulations related to non‐accounting issues are more likely to report accounting restatements than control firms that comply with securities regulations. We also find that the difference between the two groups is significant only for the periods subsequent to the start of the noncompliance period but not for periods prior to this date. Our results highlight the interrelation between the accounting and compliance systems, and suggest that managers who are non‐compliant with non‐accounting regulations are also more likely to be non‐compliant with accounting rules.     

Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed companies

By tracing the identity of large shareholders, we group China’s listed companies into those controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), and Private investors. We argue that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, we contend that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test our arguments we investigate the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and Private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG controlled firms are in the middle. The results are consistent with our predictions.     

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.     

Audit exemptions and compliance with tax and accounting regulations

We examine small firms’ compliance with tax and accounting regulations before and after a change in the threshold for mandatory auditing. Prior to 2011, all Norwegian firms were required to be audited. In 2011, a law change allowed small Norwegian firms to choose not to be audited. After this change, the Norwegian Directorate of Taxes conducted on- and off-site inspections of a representative sample of 2117 Norwegian firms, with a focus on compliance with specific requirements in tax and accounting regulation. We use the results from these inspections to construct a compliance quality score (CQS). We find that the firms that chose to opt out of auditing have lower CQS than do firms that chose to continue to be audited; that the CQS of firms that chose not to be audited declined after opting out; and that some of the opt-out firms fully mitigated the decline in CQS by engaging external accountants or auditors to prepare their annual financial statements. The results should be of interest to regulators considering increasing the thresholds for mandatory auditing, as our results show that (i) firms that choose not to be audited can experience a decline in CQS after opting out and (ii) CQS can be maintained at the same level as before if opt-out firms engage external consultants that assist in preparing the annual accounts.     

Government Credit,a Double‐Edged Sword: Evidence from the China Development Bank

Using proprietary data from the China Development Bank (CDB), this paper examines the effects of government credit on firm activities. Tracing the effects of government credit across different levels of the supply chain, I find that CDB industrial loans to state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) crowd out private firms in the same industry but crowd in private firms in downstream industries. On average, a $1 increase in CDB SOE loans leads to a $0.20 decrease in private firms' assets. Moreover, CDB infrastructure loans crowd in private firms. I use exogenous timing of municipal politicians' turnover as an instrument for CDB credit flows.     

Does Private Country-by-Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance and Income Shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13

To combat tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCr), requiring firms to provide tax authorities with a geographic breakdown of their profitability and activities. Treating the introduction of CbCr in the European Union as a shock to private disclosure requirements, this study examines the effect on corporate tax outcomes. Exploiting the €750 million revenue threshold for disclosure and employing regression-discontinuity and difference-in-differences designs, I document a 1–2 percentage point increase in consolidated GAAP effective tax rates among affected firms. I also find evidence consistent with a decline in tax-motivated income shifting, starting in 2018. These results suggest that, although private geographic disclosures can deter corporate tax avoidance, so far, the regulations have had a limited effect on tax-motivated income shifting. My findings have policy implications for the global implementation of private CbCr and extend the debate on public versus private disclosure of tax information.