Stochastic dominance and thick-tailed wealth distributions

Right-skewed and thick-tailed wealth distributions have been documented as an empirical regularity across space and time. A key mechanism for explaining these distributional features is proportional random growth. We investigate the comparative statics of a well-defined class of random growth models when allowing for stochastically ordered shifts in the wealth return process. An order-contingent monotone comparative statics property is identified, according to which pure increases in risk (e.g. higher volatility of capital returns) foster top wealth concentration whereas first-order stochastically dominated shifts in the return process (induced by e.g. proportional capital income taxation) rather lower inequality at the upper end of the distribution. Our analysis points to the potentially ambiguous effects on top wealth inequality of introducing or modifying capital income tax treatments in the presence of stochastic returns.     

Reexamination of Economic Growth, Tax Policy, and Distributive Politics

The paper examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy, and distribution of capital and labor ownership in a one‐sector political‐economy model of endogenous growth with productive government spending financed by a proportional tax on capital income. The analysis shows that inequality in wealth and income can be positively or negatively related to the optimal tax rate. In either environment, higher inequality leads to a lower after‐tax return to capital, thereby reducing the economy's growth rate.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

The distributional effects of progressive capital taxes

Rising inequality since the 1980s has spurred much research examining the underlying causes and potential policy responses. Among the more controversial, One of the more controversial policy proposals is a progressive capital tax in response to rising top wealth shares around the world proposes a progressive capital tax in response to rising top wealth shares around the world. This paper introduces rank-based econometric methods for dynamic power laws as a tool for estimating the effect of progressive capital taxes on the distribution of wealth under different assumptions about the impact of these taxes on household behavior. In most scenarios, we find that a small tax levied on 1% of households would substantially reshape the US wealth distribution and reduce inequality.     

新古典模型中收入和财富分配持续不平等的动态演化

本文讨论了当个人劳动能力和偏好存在差异的情况下，资本收入和劳动收入分配的差异如何通过遗产机制影响收入和财富分配的持续性不平等程度。论文分析表明：在偏好、个人劳动能力和个人收入的随机冲击的影响下，如果市场是完善的，整个经济系统存在收入和财富分配的稳定不平等状态，而且，这种稳定的不平等状态与初始的财富分配的不平等和一次性的产权配置都是无关的。最后，本文分析了资本收入税和劳动收入税对持续不平等程度的影响，通过分析指出：从长期来看，在劳动能力和初始财富存在差异而偏好没有差异的情况下，征收劳动收入税比征收资本收入税更有利于改善由于能力差异所造成的持续不平等。     

Public policy,dynamic status preferences,and wealth inequality

This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.     

SEPARATING EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY,AUTOMATION, AND PIKETTY'S THEORY OF INCREASING CAPITAL SHARE

Despite disincentive effects, it is more efficient to tackle inequality by general equality promotion policies, including tax/transfers, than by trying to pursue equality in specific issues or policies. The latter policy also has the same degree of disincentive effects as the general policy but has additional distortive effects. While Piketty' concern with inequality is well taken and his proposal to reduce inequality has merits, his argument on the inevitability of increasing capital share under capitalism and the condition of rate of returns to capital being larger than the rate of growth in incomes (r > g) is not correct. (JEL D3, D6, H)     

新古典模型中收入和财富分配持续不平等的动态演化

本文讨论了当个人劳动能力和偏好存在差异的情况下,资本收入和劳动收入分配的差异如何通过遗产机制影响收入和财富分配的持续性不平等程度。论文分析表明:在偏好、个人劳动能力和个人收入的随机冲击的影响下,如果市场是完善的,整个经济系统存在收入和财富分配的稳定不平等状态,而且,这种稳定的不平等状态与初始的财富分配的不平等和一次性的产权配置都是无关的。最后,本文分析了资本收入税和劳动收入税对持续不平等程度的影响,通过分析指出:从长期来看,在劳动能力和初始财富存在差异而偏好没有差异的情况下,征收劳动收入税比征收资本收入税更有利于改善由于能力差异所造成的持续不平等。     

Why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor

Recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth: With convex technologies, progressive transfers increase aggregate output because marginal returns become more equalized across investment opportunities. We argue that this reasoning may not hold in general equilibrium. Since the investment functions are concave in wealth, reducing inequality increases capital demand and the interest rate. Hence, through the impact on capital costs, shifting wealth from the rich to the middle class depletes the poorest investors' access to credit. But because the poor face the highest marginal returns, the net effect on output may be negative. We find, however, that redistributing towards the bottom-end of the distribution has a clear positive impact. Finally, we discuss the implications of our theoretical findings for future empirical research.     

Capital Trading,Stock Trading,and the Inflation Tax on Equity

A market for used capital goods, or financial instruments that represent the ownership of the used capital goods, induces inflation taxes on wealth and on the nominal income flows that they provide. This paper explicitly introduces trading in either used capital goods or financial instruments into the standard stochastic growth model with money and production. These two monetary economies are equivalent. The value of the firm is equal to the firm's capital stock divided by inflation. The resulting asset-pricing conditions indicate that the effect of inflation on asset returns differs from the effects found in the literature by the addition of a significant wealth tax. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E0, E4, E5.     

THE VANISHING BEQUEST TAX: THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BEQUEST TAXATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bequest tax revenues have been declining in OECD countries for at least 70 years. We propose an explanation that is based on a dynamic politico‐economic model where the evolution of bequest taxation is determined by wealth inequality. Since economic development induces a growing role of labor income and thus a reduction of wealth inequality, bequest taxation is reduced over time. The model also embeds a process of structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing and a consequent shift of the tax base from easy‐to‐tax land to hard‐to‐tax capital. This process implies a lower tax level and slower equalization‐induced tax reduction, the higher is the tax avoidance rate and the less developed is the economy. The introduction of franchise restrictions which are gradually lifted over time allows the hump‐shaped long‐term evolution of bequest taxation to be reproduced starting from the nineteenth century for those countries that are now modern industrial democracies. The evolution of political institutions also helps to explain the discrepancies currently observed between tax systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.     

Labor or consumption taxes? An application with a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents

This study analyzes the effects of tax reform that shifts tax burden from labor to consumption. In this context, I also deal with the issue of progressivity. Even though this kind of tax policy change has recently gained popularity, its positive effects are debatable while the offsetting effect of a consumption tax on labor supply makes the net output change rather ambiguous. I examine these effects using a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. The model is calibrated to fit certain characteristics of the Finnish economy. In addition to output and employment effects, I study the tax reform's effect on income and wealth distribution. First, I find that eliminating progressivity in labor taxation increases output via increase in capital accumulation that comes, however, in expense of slightly more inequality. Then, tax reform that replaces progressive labor taxes with a flat-rate consumption tax leads to a significant rise in capital accumulation, a negligible change in labor supply and gross labor income distribution, but a relatively considerable increase in wealth concentration.     

Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem. Because incentives vary with an agent's wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently. But when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe, firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth: with enough inequality, it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth, even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D2, D31, J41, L2.     

Distribution of wealth and incomplete markets: Theory and empirical evidence

This paper analyses the equilibrium distribution of wealth in an economy where firms’ productivities are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, returns on factors are determined in competitive markets, households have linear consumption functions and government imposes taxes on capital and labour incomes and equally redistributes the collected resources to households. The equilibrium distribution of wealth is explicitly calculated and its shape crucially depends on market incompleteness. With incomplete markets it follows a Paretian law in the top tail and the Pareto exponent depends on the saving rate, on the net return on capital, on the growth rate of population, and on portfolio diversification. The characteristics of the labour market crucially affects the bottom tail, but not the upper tail of the distribution of wealth in the case of completely decentralized labour market. The analysis also suggests a positive relationship between growth and wealth inequality. The theoretical predictions find a corroboration in the empirical evidence of United States in the period 1989-2004.     

Can the link between functional and personal income distribution enhance the analysis of inequality?

The aim of this paper is to present a framework which links functional and personal income distribution. In the first part of the paper, Piketty’s book “Capital in the XXI Century” is briefly reviewed. Piketty’s framework is discussed arguing that it can only partially explain levels and changes within personal income distribution. Piketty links the returns from capital r to the rate of growth of national income g in a very innovative way comparing them within a macroeconomic framework. He claims that when returns on capital rise more quickly than the overall economy and taxes on capital remain low, a vicious circle of ever-growing dynastic wealth and growing concentration of wealth takes place. However, the rise in the inequality of personal income distribution cannot only be explained by the rise of capital incomes. An analysis of the generation of personal incomes, and consequently of inequality, requires a suitable framework that links incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and incomes at the level of the individual/household. It is possible to set up this framework starting from individual endowments and their link to the productive structure: that is to what can be called the “generating function of personal income.” This function transforms personal endowments into personal earnings, given the productive structure, the technologies, and the market rules that determine the functional distribution. Personal income distribution and its inequality are linked to the functional one through the shares of capital and labor owned by each individual. The framework introduced here seems to be a suitable tool to account for the fact that personal income distribution is inextricably tied up to different sources of inequality in the distribution of national income. Sources come from institutional and productive structures (matrix Y), but also from the distribution of endowments and of individual/household entitlements (matrix S). This approach, we argue, allows for the assessment and evaluation of the effects of “ambitious new policies,” aimed at reducing poverty and inequality ex-ante, as suggested by Atkinson in his last book.     

The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the proceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its effects on the capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation and ambiguously affects the capital stock and labor.     

ESTIMATES OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE U.S., 1962–1983

The study has two major objectives. The first is to determine time trends in household wealth inequality in the U.S. over the 1962–83 period. Four concepts of wealth are analyzed: (i) total household wealth, defined as total household assets less liabilities; (ii) fungible wealth, defined as total household wealth less consumer durables and household inventories; (iii) financial wealth, defined as fungible wealth less equity in owner-occupied housing; and (iv) capital wealth, defined as financial wealth less currency, checking accounts, and time deposits. Relying on a variety of data sources, I find that wealth inequality remained relatively constant from about 1962 to 1973, fell sharply from about 1973 to about 1979, and then rose sharply between 1979 and 1983. Concentration in 1983 was greater than that in 1962 for financial and capital wealth but of similar magnitude for total and fungible wealth. The second, methodological in nature, is to analyze the effect on measured inequality of the alignment of raw survey data to national balance sheet totals. I find that the alignment process can significantly affect point estimates of household wealth distribution but does not generally affect the direction of inequality trends.     

Automation and inequality with taxes and transfers

Declines in low-skill labour shares are reviewed, and a stylised model is constructed to examine their determinants and future implications. A retrospective analysis of US shocks suggests that technological change has contributed more to raising income inequality and the wealth to GDP ratio than other changes. An anticipated future twist away from low-skill labour toward the capital, combined with population growth, risks high unemployment rates. Productivity growth at twice the pace since 1990 limits this, though inequality persists. Analysis shows that a generalisation of the US ‘earned income tax credit’ system with consumption tax outperforms alternatives of the ‘universal basic income’.     

Pure rent taxation and allocation of capital in a two-sector open economy: A long-run analysis

In this paper, the long-run incidence of a tax on pure rent is analyzed in an OLG two-sector small open economy, in which one sector produces a capital good and one sector a consumer good. Contrary to what is obtained in a one-sector closed economy, a land rent tax does not necessarily foster nonhumam wealth accumulation and capital formation. The accommodating scheme for the government budget plays a crucial role for the effects of pure rent taxation. A rent tax stimulates nonhuman wealth if distortionary taxes on wealth or on income from nonland inputs are alleviated. The mechanism spurring capital formation is brought into action, instead, only when the rent tax is matched by a fall in capital taxation or, if the capital sector is capital intensive, by an increase in government spending on the capital good.     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.