MEDIA ADVERTISING AND BALLOT INITIATIVES: THE CASE OF ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATION

Spending on political advertising increases with every election cycle, not only for congressional or presidential candidates, but also for state‐level ballot initiatives. There is little research in marketing, however, on the effectiveness of political advertising at this level. In this study, we conduct an experimental analysis of advertisements used during the 2008 campaign to mandate new animal welfare standards in California (Proposition 2). Using subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs as a proxy for their likely voting behavior, we investigate whether advertising provides real information to likely voters, and thus sharpens their existing attitudes toward the issue, or whether advertising can indeed change preferences. We find that advertising in support of Proposition 2 was more effective in raising subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs than ads in opposition were in reducing it, but we also find that ads in support of the measure reduce the dispersion of preferences and thus polarize attitudes toward the initiative. More generally, political ads are found to contain considerably more “hype” than “real information” in the sense of Johnson and Myatt [Johnson, J. P., and D. P. Myatt. “On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing and Product Design.” American Economic Review, 96, 2006, 756–84]. (JEL D12, D72, K32, L66, M37)     

Adverse Welfare Shocks and Pro‐Environmental Behavior: Evidence from the Global Economic Crisis

This paper examines the effects of the 2008–9 global economic crisis on people's pro‐environmental behavior and willingness to pay for climate change mitigation. We hypothesize that the crisis has affected pro‐environmental behaviors through tightening of budget constraints and relaxation of time constraints. Using data from a large representative survey Life in Transition II, conducted in 35 European and Central Asian countries in 2010, we find that people adversely affected by the crisis are more likely to act in an environmentally‐friendly way, but less likely to be willing to pay for climate change mitigation. Our findings confirm the importance of time and budget constraints for undertaking pro‐environmental action, and highlight a potentially positive role of adverse, external welfare shocks in shaping pro‐environmental behavior.     

Willingness‐to‐pay for parallel private health insurance: evidence from a laboratory experiment

Abstract Debate over the effects of public versus private health care finance persists in both academic and policy circles. This paper presents the results of a revealed preference laboratory experiment that tests how characteristics of the public health system affect a subject's willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for parallel private health insurance. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Cuff et al. (2010), subjects’ average WTP is lower and the size of the private insurance sector smaller when the public system allocates health care based on need rather than randomly and when the probability of receiving health care from the public system is high.     

DO MANAGERS MATTER: EVIDENCE FROM E‐SPORTS

Growing importance of human resources places the role of managers at the core of company efficiency. However, there are studies that demonstrate the efficiency of teams without a manager, so‐called self‐managed teams, is higher comparing with managed teams. Thus, despite the focus on managerial efficiency in the economic literature, the issue of whether a team needs a manager is far from settled. In this paper, we use a quasi‐experimental setting from e‐Sports (competitive video gaming) to understand whether the hiring a manager is of benefit to team performance. The empirical part of the study is based on endogenous switching regression model. This method allows investigating what performance of self‐managed team would be if it will have a manager and vice versa. The dataset includes the information of prize money and features of top e‐Sports teams in Counter‐Strike: Global Offensive (e‐Sports discipline) from 2013 to 2017. The main finding of this study is that managed teams perform better than self‐managed ones but this is not due to the manager. (JEL Z2, M54, L25)     

Equilibrium opacity in ultimatum‐offer bargaining

We consider ultimatum bargaining between a seller and a buyer of an asset. They know each other's valuation of the asset. Both can defer their decisions to delegates. These delegates have opaque preferences. Seller and buyer choose the opacity of their delegate. For the seller's delegate this choice is restricted to a random reservation price drawn from the set of symmetric two‐point distributions around the seller's true reservation price. The opacity choice of the buyer's delegate is restricted to a random willingness‐to‐pay drawn from the set of symmetric two‐point distribution around the buyer's true willingness‐to‐pay. We characterize the set of pure‐strategy equilibria in their delegation choices. Multiple equilibria arise. Except for two corner solutions, both players will exploit the strategy of opacity. A large set of efficient equilibria exist. For these, opacity choices do not reduce the probability of transacting, but benefit the buyer compared with the no‐delegation equilibrium. We also study the robustness of the results with respect to the player's ability to also resort to a tougher delegate in addition to the opacity choice.     

The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Indirect Taxes

The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals, who differ in their willingness to pay for a taxed good, vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade‐off: more enforcement not only increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market. We obtain that the equilibrium enforcement level is the one most preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not affected by the structure of the market (number of firms) and the firms’ marginal cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of markets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that tax rates are not tailored to each market individually.     

IMPACT OF OUTCOME AMBIGUITY ON SELF‐INSURANCE AND SELF‐PROTECTION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This experimental study examines and compares individual valuations of the two risk reduction mechanisms: self‐insurance and self‐protection in risky versus ambiguous outcome situations. Results confirm that individuals do not perceive these mechanisms differently under risk. Moreover, ambiguity in the outcome (i.e., size of loss) affects valuations weakly, and changing representations of ambiguity do not alter valuation. In general, individuals are found to be ambiguity averse for low sizes of loss and ambiguity neutral for high sizes of loss, regardless of the probability of loss. Finally, no strong support is found for any particular model of ambiguity.     

GENDER EARNINGS DIFFERENCES IN CHINA: BASE PAY,PERFORMANCE PAY,AND TOTAL PAY

We utilize a data set that has not been used in literature—the Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China (LHSCCC)—to provide new evidence on male‐female pay differences in China. The data set not only enables us to control for a wide range of pay‐determining characteristics but also is the first to enable an analysis of the different components of pay (e.g., base pay and performance pay) as well as for total pay. We find: (1) Women receive about three‐quarters of male pay for each of the dimensions of base pay, performance pay, and total pay, before adjusting for the effect of different pay‐determining factors; (2) Approximately two‐thirds of the gap reflect the fact that females tend to be paid less than males for the same wage‐determining characteristics (often labeled as discrimination), while about one‐third reflects the fact that males have endowments or characteristics that tend to be associated with higher pay, especially supervisory responsibilities, general labor market experience, occupational skills, education, and membership in the Communist party; (3) Marriage has a large positive effect on the earnings of women in China (and none for men), but childcare responsibilities for children under the age of 6 have a large negative effect on the earnings of women although these are offset almost completely if an elder family member is present, highlighting that childcare responsibilities disproportionately fall on women unless an elder family member is present; (4) Pay premiums for higher level skills and higher supervisory ranks are remarkably small for both males and especially females; (5) With respect to the unexplained or “discriminatory” portion of the gap, females get a huge pay penalty for simply being female, but a substantial portion of this gets offset by the higher pay premium they receive for such factors as Han ethnicity, being married, and education. This suggests that discrimination tends to occur in the form of a pay penalty for simply being female and not from lower returns to the same endowments of pay‐determining characteristics. (JEL J3, J7, M5)     

HETEROGENEITY IN WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY FOR THEATRE PRODUCTIONS: INDIVIDUAL SPECIFIC WILLINGNESS‐TO‐PAY ESTIMATES FOR THEATRES,SHOWS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES

This paper investigates people's preferences for live theatre, and heterogeneity in willingness‐to‐pay (WTP). A stated preference discrete choice model estimates utility and WTP for different attributes of theatre productions. Previous studies assumed fixed coefficients across all theatre‐goers. This study allows coefficients of attributes to vary across individuals in the population, providing information on the heterogeneity of tastes. Theatre‐goers' choices are used to estimate individual‐based parameters for a person's tastes in theatre productions. The analysis reveals the heterogeneity of tastes for different types of plays and ticket price; and the significance of ‘reviews’ by critics and ‘word of mouth’ opinions as important variables determining choice.     

CROSS‐MARKET TRADING IN CHINA'S LARGE STATE‐OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS, 2006–2011

This paper examines the differential between the share prices of China's large state‐owned commercial banks traded in Shanghai versus prices observed in Hong Kong. We find a significant role for investor sentiment, as reflected in relative price‐earnings ratios, in explaining these price differentials for all four banks. The share price in Shanghai tends to move ahead of the share price in Hong Kong when more positive sentiment in Shanghai makes local investors willing to pay more for the same predicted earnings. We also identify common trends in relative bank price‐earnings ratios and price differentials across the two markets. (JEL G14, G15)     

ECONOMIC VALUATION OF MORTALITY‐RISK REDUCTION: STATED PREFERENCE ESTIMATES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Two internet‐based surveys were conducted with adults aged 35 to 84–885 respondents in the United States and 641 respondents in Canada—to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for reducing mortality risks through out‐of‐pocket costs for health‐care programs. All respondents were asked a series of choice questions followed by a payment‐card question. Causes of death included cancer and heart attack. Levels of annual mortality‐risk reduction were 1, 2, and 5 in 10,000. Converted to values of statistical life, results were in the range of $4–5 million (2002 U.S. dollars) for the choice‐question results for a 2‐in‐10,000 annual risk reduction for illness‐related mortality. U.S. and Canadian results were similar. The payment‐card results were about 50% lower than the choice‐question results. WTP to reduce mortality risk was essentially the same for cancer and heart attack. The results showed WTP weakly increasing with age, and no evidence of lower WTP for older adults versus middle‐aged adults. (JEL Q51)     

INFORMATION, WILDLIFE VALUATION, CONSERVATION: EXPERIMENTS AND POLICY

The authors use experimental surveys to investigate the association between individuals' knowledge of particular wildlife species and their stated willingness to allocate funds to conserve each. The nature of variations in these allocations between species (e.g., their dispersion) as participants' knowledge increases is examined. Factors influencing these changes are suggested. Willingness-to-pay allocations are found not to measure the economic value of species, but are shown to be policy relevant. The results indicate that poorly known species, e.g., in remote areas, may obtain relatively less conservation support than they deserve. (JEL Q51 , Q57 , Q58 )     

MODELING THE INCIDENCE OF SELF‐EMPLOYMENT: INDIVIDUAL AND EMPLOYMENT TYPE HETEROGENEITY

Modeling the incidence of self‐employment has traditionally proved problematic. Although the supply‐side characteristics of the self‐employed are well documented, we argue that the literature has neglected demand‐side aspects. We explore the determinants of self‐employment using the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances. We present results from an econometric framework that allows us to model, separately and simultaneously, the influences of individual heterogeneity (i.e., supply‐side factors) and employment type heterogeneity (i.e., demand‐side factors) on the probability of self‐employment. Our findings suggest that while individual characteristics are important determinants of self‐employment, there are factors specific to the type of employment that influence self‐employment. (JEL J23, J33, C25, C10)     

Social Security Systems,Human Capital,and Growth in a Small Open Economy

We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of pay‐as‐you‐go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest rate. The reason is that the pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e., progressively redistributive. If a flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. While such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by a coalition of older individuals and lower income workers.     

SOCIAL INVESTMENT AND YOUTH LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION

In this paper, we first rely on small area techniques to derive from EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU‐SILC) survey new indicators of compensatory and social‐investment policies at regional level. While compensatory policies have mainly the goal of protecting individuals from “old” risks (e.g., old‐age), investment‐related social policies tend to focus more on “new social risks” (e.g., skill deficits). We rely on these new indicators to perform a data‐driven structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) analysis to investigate the causal relationships between youth labor market outcomes and these two types of spending. Our results support the view that social‐investment policies are effective for tackling new social challenges. (JEL C18, C54, E02)     

R&D COOPERATION WITH UNIT-ELASTIC DEMAND

The present paper shows that R&D cooperation leads to the monopoly outcome in terms of price and quantity if demand is unit-elastic. If the demand function exhibits an upper bound for the willingness to pay, R&D cooperation is inferior to a scenario in which firms cooperate both in their R&D and their output decision.     

Non‐linear finance–growth nexus

This paper revisits the question of whether the finance–growth nexus varies with the stages of economic development. Using a novel threshold regression with the instrumental variables approach proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) to the dataset used in Levine et al. (2000) we detect overwhelming evidence in support of a positive linkage between financial development and economic growth, and this positive effect is larger in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The data also reveal that financial development tends to have stronger impacts on capital accumulation and productivity growth in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The findings are robust to alternative financial development measures and conditioning information sets.     

THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK ON SELF‐ASSESSMENT

It is a well‐known phenomenon that people have difficulties in assessing their ability correctly. Often they overestimate their (relative) abilities. We conduct an experiment to test whether the self‐assessment of individuals improves when they receive feedback and there are incentives to make a correct self‐assessment. We investigate the subjects' reactions to feedback in several subsequent rounds to see not only if, but also when and how they react. Our main finding is that feedback influences subjects' decisions and can improve their overall self‐assessment. The effects, however, depend on the kind of feedback. Furthermore, we observe differences in the reactions of subjects (e.g., to what extent they follow feedback), the robustness of their belief about their relative ability, and how they process feedback.     

DOES NEAR‐RATIONALITY MATTER IN FIRST‐ORDER APPROXIMATE SOLUTIONS? A PERTURBATION APPROACH

This paper studies first‐order approximate solutions to near‐rational dynamic equilibrium models. Under near‐rationality, agents' subjective beliefs are distorted away from rational expectations via a change of measure process which fulfills some regularity conditions. In most applications, the beliefs distortion process is also directly observed by (a subset of) the decision‐makers – e.g., ambiguity‐averse households or policy‐makers with a concern for robustness – and therefore included into their optimization problems. We investigate conditions for existence and local uniqueness of solutions under endogenous distortions, as well as the relation with their rational expectations counterparts. We show that linearly perturbed solutions may well be affected by the presence of distorted beliefs, depending on the underlying model economy. In particular, while directly affecting first‐order decision rules, near‐rationality may also induce failure of the certainty equivalence principle. Moreover, the martingale representation of distorted beliefs might prove non‐unique, pointing to a subtle form of equilibrium indeterminacy.     

WATER QUALITY TRADING IN THE PRESENCE OF ABATEMENT‐COST SHARING

This paper examines how water quality trading interacts with nonpoint‐source abatement‐cost sharing (e.g., as currently practiced by the National Resource Conservation Service through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]) to promote the participation of nonpoint sources in a water quality market, participation that has thus far been noticeably lacking nationwide. As such, an idealized version of water quality trading is envisioned, where water quality trading and nonpoint cost sharing are treated as complementary policy instruments rather than substitutes. Toward this end, the subgame‐perfect equilibrium concept is used to model a “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and nonpoint sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources' production costs. We characterize ex ante (or second‐best) nonpoint abatement levels when the regulator chooses cost‐share rates in concert with a water quality market. Numerical analysis indicates that current EQIP cost‐share rates would likely be lower and more flexibly determined in the presence of water quality trading. (JEL Q53)