THE GROWTH OF INSTITUTIONAL STOCK OWNERSHIP: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Despite the substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that institutional investors have acquired the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in the corporate governance process. Institutional ownership remains widely dispersed among firms and institutions in large part because of significant legal obstacles that discourage institutional investors both from taking large block positions and from exercising large ownership positions to control corporate managers. Thus, although much of the growth of institutional ownership since 1980 has been accounted for by the growth of mutual funds and private pension funds, there continue to be strong deterrents to the accumulation and use of large ownership positions to influence corporate managers. Another potentially important factor discouraging concentrated investments are incentive schemes that effectively reward money managers for producing returns that do not vary much from the S&P 500 (or whatever sector the manager is supposed to be representing). Using a very different incentive scheme that offers managers a share of the excess returns (as well as penalties for failure to meet benchmarks), a relatively new class of “hedge funds” has emerged that provides both more concentrated ownership positions and higher risk‐adjusted rates of return. To encourage mutual funds to take a more activist corporate governance role and to behave more like hedge funds, the authors recommend that current legal restrictions on mutual funds be relaxed so that mutual funds have a greater incentive to hold large ownership positions in companies and to use those positions to more effectively monitor corporate managers. In particular, the “five and ten” portfolio rules applicable to mutual funds could be repealed and replaced with a standard of prudence and diligence more in keeping with portfolio theory; mutual funds could be given greater freedom to adopt redemption policies that would be more conducive to holding larger ownership positions; and institutional investors could be permitted to employ a variety of incentive fee structures to encourage fund managers to pursue more pro‐active investment strategies. The prospect of actively involving institutional fund managers in the corporate governance process may be our best hope for improving U.S. corporate governance.     

Is Managerial Myopia a Persistent Governance Problem?

Critics of U.S. corporations have long argued that companies are overly focused on short‐term results and, as a consequence, sacrifice their own long‐run value and competitiveness. These criticisms have expanded in recent years to include those from prominent politicians, investors, consultants, and academics. If such criticisms have merit, they would imply a massive governance failure in which there has been decades of underinvestment with little adjustment on the part of managers, boards, or the market for corporate control. This article evaluates the economic underpinnings of these criticisms and analyzes their implications in the context of empirical evidence produced by several decades of research on corporate investment policies, the outcomes of corporate control events, investor horizons, and the market pricing of companies with little if any earnings. In reviewing the findings of these studies, the author finds little evidence to support the view that U.S. companies sacrifice long‐run value and competitiveness by systematically underinvesting. First, although U.S. companies have indeed cut back on tangible investments such as property, plant, and equipment, these cutbacks have been more than offset by the dramatic growth in investment in intangibles, such as spending on developing knowledge capital, brand‐building, and IT infrastructure. Second, when subjected to events that have the effect of reducing managerial control over investment policies and transferring control to outside investors—such as leveraged buyouts and recapitalizations, forced CEO dismissals, and shareholder activist campaigns—companies tend to reduce, not increase, investment spending. In fact, it is difficult to find any corporate control threats that have had the goal or effect of increasing investment. Third, and at the same time, the rising concentration of large institutional investors, including indexers such as BlackRock and Vanguard, suggests that investors have become, if anything, more long‐term oriented over time. Fourth, there is no evidence that the market shuns companies that have yet to report large (or indeed any) earnings. These findings suggest that curbing overinvestment, and not discouraging myopia and underinvestment, may well still be the larger corporate governance challenge facing investors when monitoring and attempting to influence the performance of U.S. companies.     

地方政府干预、境外战略投资者引入与城市商业银行治理

本文以8家城市商业银行的42份年报作为研究样本,利用主元分析法实证研究了地方政府和境外战略投资者对城市商业银行公司治理的影响,及其作用于城市商业银行的具体机制。研究结果表明,地方政府对城市商业银行治理产生了负面影响,境外战略投资者在一定程度上抑制了地方政府对城市商业银行的干预,促进了城市商业银行治理的改善。为了提升城市商业银行公司治理水平,本文建议地方政府进一步退出城市商业银行,取消城市商业银行中境外战略投资者持股比例监管限制,鼓励外资派驻更多的董事和高管实质性参与城市商业银行的经营管理。     

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE DIFFERENCES: MARKETS OR LAW?

Current differences in international corporate ownership and governance systems reflect primarily differences in the efficiency of capital markets, not differences in corporate law. Law is an output of this process, not an input. In countries where financial markets are more efficient, there is both less law and greater investor protection. Unlike nations in Asia and most of Europe, the U.S. and the U.K. have large and efficient capital markets, with no restrictions on cross-border capital flows. It is thus notsurprising that when American and English banks, mutual funds, and insurers are allowed by law to increase the concentration of their holdings, they don't do so. With efficient markets, there is no money to be made by holding undiversified blocks in public corporations. If public markets were inefficient, entrepreneurs would arrange for large blocks of stock (or take companies private), just as they grant powers of control to venture capitalists. The effect of law on corporate governance and ownership is far less pronounced in America than in Europe and Japan. Restrictions on U.S. banks aside, corporate law in the United States is “enabling”–that is, it lets people do largely what they want in organizing, managing, and financing the firm. Corporate law in Europe and Japan is much more “directory.” And there is a straightforward explanation for this difference: When capital markets are efficient, the valuation process works better, which in turn provides investors with stronger assurances of fairness. When markets are less efficient, some substitute must be found–law, perhaps, or the valuation procedures of banks. Thus, banks play larger corporate governance roles in nations with less extensive capital markets–and corporate law, as the European Union's company directives show, is more restrictive. European corporate law is today about as meddlesome and directory as U.S. law in the late 19th century, before U.S. capital markets became efficient.     

Split Share Structure Reform,corporate governance,and the foreign share discount puzzle in China

We examine the impact of the Split Share Structure Reform on the well-known foreign share discount puzzle in China. Existing literature confirms that foreign investors are more concerned about insider expropriation because of their information disadvantage relative to domestic investors. The split share structure of the ownership of Chinese listed firms created a conflict of interests between state and private shareholders. Since, before the reform, state shareholders held restricted shares that denied them any wealth effect from share price movements, they had a limited incentive to work with private shareholders to ensure that managers maximized the stock market value of the firm. By abolishing the trading restrictions for state shareholders, this reform has increased the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor managers. If foreign investors’ concerns over the corporate governance implications of the split share structure at least partly contributed to their discounting of Chinese listed firms, then this discount should be reduced following the reform. Indeed, our evidence confirms this prediction, especially among Chinese listed firms with more state ownership or restricted shares. Our findings imply that this significant institutional reform of the Chinese stock market has benefitted minority investors.     

Foreign institutional investment: Is governance quality at home important?

This paper examines the investment preferences of foreign institutional investors investing in the U.S. market. We analyse both firm and country-level determinants that influence the foreign institutional investors' allocation choices. At the country level, we find that the governance quality in a foreign institutional investor's home country is a determinant of their decision to invest in the U.S. market. Our findings indicate that investors who come from countries with governance setups similar to that of the U.S. invest more in the United States. The investment levels though, are more pronounced for countries with governance setups just below that of the U.S. Our results are consistent with both the ‘flight to quality’ and ‘familiarity’ arguments, and help reconcile prior contradictory empirical evidence. At the firm level, we present unequivocal evidence in favour of the familiarity argument. Foreign institutional investors domiciled in countries with high governance quality prefer to invest in U.S. firms with high corporate governance quality. This effect is primarily driven by grey (non-monitoring) institutional investors.     

Going Public: An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Bound Israeli IPOs

Between 1985–2003, more than 120 Israeli companies went public in the U.S., bringing the accumulated number of U.S. bound, Israeli initial public offerings (IPOs) to a figure greater than all other foreign countries combined. In this study, we compare the short and long run performance of Israeli IPOs to that of similar international and U.S. IPOs. Holding all else equal, we find that Israeli IPOs are significantly less underpriced than their local and foreign counterparts. As we examine the characteristics of Israeli issuers, we find that they differ than those of other foreign and local issuers in some important dimensions that compensate investors for information asymmetry and risk. First, compared to their home market capitalization size, U.S. bound Israeli IPOs, are significantly larger than the IPOs conducted by their foreign counterparts. Second, Israeli issuers tend to perform better than other foreign and U.S. local IPOs during our entire period of observation. Third, to a large extent, the Israeli firms in our sample have products, licensing or franchising relationships or venture capital funds with strong roots in the U.S. prior to the IPO. And fourth, the relevant investor community of Israeli IPOs, at least at the early stages, is small and overwhelmingly American. Our findings are consistent with prior studies documenting that firms raising capital outside of their domicile country are typically a select group of high quality firms in need of external financing that cannot be sufficiently provided in their home market.     

UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

Executive incentive compatibility and selection of governance mechanisms

Executive incentive compatibility plays a crucial role in firm's selection of corporate governance mechanisms. We provide a simple model to explain why firms with enough executive incentive compatibility still prefer having external governance mechanisms, and firms with poor executive incentive compatibility have to rely on a combination of large investors monitoring and external governance. This model facilitates a better understanding of the co-existence of the two governance mechanisms and also reconciles conflicting findings with respect to a substitutive and complementary relationship between the two governance mechanisms. Empirical evidence supports there is a substitutive relation between large investors monitoring and executive compensation.     

Additional Evidence on the Association Between Director Stock Ownership and Incentive Compensation

Governance scholars argue that outside directors have little incentive to monitor managers when their equity stake in the firm is not significant. A sample with a substantial level of outside director shareholdings is examined and a negative relationship between incentive compensation and outside director stock ownership is found. While firms pay higher incentive compensation when they have greater investment opportunities, the compensation contains excess pay due to ineffective corporate governance. Overall, the results suggest more effective corporate governance and lower incentive compensation when outside director stock ownership is higher.     

THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

The distinctive ownership and governance structure of the large American corporation-with its distant shareholders, a board of directors that defers to the CEO, and a powerful, centralized management-is usually seen as a natural economic outcome of technological requirements for large-scale enterprises and substantial amounts of outside capital, most of which had to come from well-diversified shareholders. Roe argues that current U.S. corporate structures are the result not only of such economic factors, but of political forces that restricted the size and activities of U.S. commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. Populist fears of concentrated economic power, interest group maneuvering, and a federalist American political structure all had a role in pressuring Congress to fragment U.S. financial institutions and limit their ability to own stock and participate in corporate governance.
Had U.S. politics been different, the present ownership structure of some American public companies might have been different. Truly national U.S. financial institutions might have been able to participate as substantial owners in the wave of end-of-the-century mergers and then use their large blocks of stock to sit on the boards of the merged enterprises (much as Warren Buffett, venture capitalists, and LBO firms like KKR do today). Such a concentrated ownership and governance structure might have helped to address monitoring, information, and coordination problems that continue to reduce the value of some U.S. companies.
The recent increase in the activism of U.S. institutional investors also casts doubt on the standard explanation of American corporate ownership structure. The new activism of U.S. financial institutions-primarily pension funds and mutual funds-can be interpreted as the delayed outbreak of an impulse to participate in corporate ownership and governance that was historically suppressed by American politics.     

EVA,not EBITDA: A New Financial Paradigm for Private Equity Firms

Private equity firms have boomed on the back of EBITDA. Most PE firms use it as their primary measure of value, and ask the managers of their portfolio companies to increase it. Many public companies have decided to emulate the PE firms by using EBITDA to review performance with investors, and even as a basis for determining incentive pay. But is the emphasis on EBITDA warranted? In this article, the co‐founder of Stern Stewart & Co. argues that EVA offers a better way. He discusses blind spots and distortions that make EBITDA highly unreliable and misleading as a measure of normalized, ongoing profitability. By comparing EBITDA with EVA, or Economic Value Added, a measure of economic profit net of a full cost‐of‐capital charge, Stewart demonstrates EVA's ability to provide managers and investors with much more clarity into the levers that are driving corporate performance and determining intrinsic market value. And in support of his demonstration, Stewart reports the finding of his analysis of Russell 3000 public companies that EVA explains almost 20% more than EBITDA of their changes in value, while at the same time providing far more insight into how to improve those values.     

Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany

This article provides a comparative study of four major dimensions of corporate governance in the U.S. and Germany: (1) the laws affecting corporate governance, particularly those designed to protect minority shareholders; (2) the prescribed role and actual conduct of corporate boards; (3) the market for corporate control (including hostile takeovers); and (4) incentive compensation. The authors pose the question: If the primary purpose of the corporate governance system is to serve the interests of minority shareholders, how do the U.S. and German governance systems rank on each of these four dimensions ? Their conclusion is that although the U.S. system is more shareholder friendly in many respects than the German, both systems have major shortcomings, particularly in the market for corporate control. The authors conclude with a list of proposed changes to both systems that would amount to “taking shareholders seriously.”     

The role of institutional investors in the inventory and cash management practices of firms in Asia

This paper examines the role of a particular class of institutional investors, domestic and foreign banks, in corporate decisions that have liquidity implications such as inventory and cash management. Using a sample of 256 non-financial listed firms in six Asian countries over the period of 2002–2005, this paper shows that foreign banks improve inventory and cash management practices, due to their superior monitoring of the managers. The disproportionate numbers of the institutional investors across industrial sectors in these Asian countries seem to suggest that some industrial sectors have stable demand of their products, such as in consumer goods sector, which is an attraction, for these institutional investors. Furthermore, the paper finds that forward-looking government policies are crucial to entry of these institutional investors in the developing countries. The research findings have implications for board structure and corporate governance standards.     

Corporate governance and operating performance of Chinese listed firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation in China. Our study introduces a composite measure of corporate governance to measure the association between corporate governance and Chinese firms’ performance and valuation. Because agency theory suggests that companies with better corporate governance standards perform better, we propose that better governed Chinese firms would have greater performance and higher valuation. We find that our composite measure of corporate governance is positively and significantly associated with firm performance and valuation. These findings have implications for policy makers, researchers, managers, and investors in general and those in emerging markets in particular.     

LARGE BANK STOCKHOLDERS IN GERMANY: SAVIORS OR SUBSTITUTES?

This article challenges Mark Roe's suggestion that the prevalence of the widely held public corporation in the U.S. may not have been inevitable because U.S. laws prevented financial institutions from playing the monitoring role assumed by large German banks. The differences between Germany and the U.S. in the importance of trading markets and the role of banks as monitors can be explained in large part by actions of German banks that blocked the development of German capital markets and provided big banks with informational advantages over other traders.
Markets are likely to be more effective monitors than large banks because of the banks' conflicts of interest as creditors as well as underwriters and market-makers for German firms. Moreover, there is more diversity in the ownership structure of U.S. corporations than the current governance debate would suggest. In the U.S. there are many publicly owned companies that are either closely held or have reverted to private ownership through LBOs. This in turn suggests that U.S. capital markets have devised means for bringing about concentrated stock ownership in those cases where large stockholder monitoring is likely to be more efficient.
Thus, to the question what is likely to happen to U.S. corporate ownership structure if remaining legal constraints on stock ownership by U.S. banks are relaxed, the answer this article offers is "not much." Indeed, if one considers increasing U.S. institutional ownership together with recent SEC attempts to liberalize shareholder communications, there appears to be a striking trend toward a new concentration of voting power–one that may ultimately rival that of the German banks.     

On the decision to go public with dual class stock

Why do firms deviate from a one share-one vote regime when going public? This question raises considerations that are at the core of many corporate governance issues. We consider three arguments for this choice. Examining data on IPOs from 1980 through 2008, we do not find that firms go public with dual class stock so managers have more incentive to invest in hard to monitor projects nor to gain more when selling control of the firm. Rather, managers appear to take their firms public with dual class stock in order to retain control of their firms while reducing their lack of diversification costs.     

THE STATE OF U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT'S WRONG?

Largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other prominent American companies, U.S. corporate governance practices have come under attack. These much publicized failures and the resulting popular outcry have served as catalysts for legislative and regulatory changes that include the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ. But is the U.S. corporate governance system really as bad as critics suggest? And will the recent legislative and regulatory changes lead to a more effective system? The authors begin by noting that the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. governance system. During the past two decades, the U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries, even in the wake of the corporate scandals in 2001. Moreover, the most notable changes in U.S. corporate governance in the 1980s and 1990s‐including the institutionalization of U.S. share‐holders and the dramatic increase in equity‐based pay‐have served mainly (though not always) to strengthen the accountability of U.S. managers to their shareholders. The authors' message, then, is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system gave way under the exceptional strain created by the bull market of the 1990s, the overall system‐which includes corrective market forces as well as oversight by the public and government‐has reacted quickly and decisively to address its weaknesses. The net effect of the recent legislative and regulatory changes has been to make a good governance system an even better one. But, as the authors caution, perhaps the greatest risk now facing the U.S. financial market system (of which corporate governance is a critical part) is that of overregulation.     

Did Good Corporate Governance Improve Bank Performance during the Financial Crisis?

This paper focuses on the effects of corporate governance on bank performance during the financial crisis of 2008. Using data on large publicly traded U.S. banks, we examine whether banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms were associated with higher profitability and better stock market performance amidst the crisis. Our empirical findings on the effects of corporate governance on bank performance are mixed. Although the results suggest that banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms were associated with higher profitability in 2008, our findings also indicate that strong governance may have had negative effects on stock market valuations of banks amidst the crisis. Nevertheless, we document that banks with strong corporate governance practices had substantially higher stock returns in the aftermath of the market meltdown, indicating that good governance may have mitigated the adverse influence of the crisis on bank credibility.     

Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors

A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance:

• • What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of “stakeholder” groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities?
• • Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares?
• • Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay?
• • Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model—notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors—be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies?