基于共赢理念的双渠道冲突管理研究

网络技术和电子商务的发展使很多制造企业不仅通过传统零售渠道分销产品,而且通过网络渠道直接向消费者销售产品。双渠道策略的实施在实现网络渠道与传统渠道优势互补的同时,也引发了渠道冲突。双渠道环境下的渠道冲突可分为外部冲突和内部冲突。外部冲突和内部冲突会相互影响,相互转化。有效管理企业内外部渠道冲突以求得整个渠道系统利益的最大化,对双渠道运营的企业来说既是机会又是挑战。文章通过构造制造商和传统零售商的博弈模型,分析、比较模型中的局中人赢得,认为可通过模型中部分变量的选择来实现双渠道环境下制造商和传统零售商的共赢。双渠道环境下,对制造商而言,应对外部和内部渠道冲突实施不同的管理策略,对外部渠道冲突进行有效区隔,对内部渠道冲突增进企业内部渠道组织之间的沟通和协调;对传统零售商而言,应直面制造商采用网上直销渠道的现状,争取更大的销售折扣,增加销量,降低成本。     

试论新市场环境下的渠道推广和管理

电子商务的迅速发展使得企业与消费者之间信息沟通距离被缩小,很多生产商在保留传统分销渠道的同时,纷纷开拓新型的电子商务直销渠道。然而,对于采用多渠道策略的企业而言,必须处理好渠道冲突,否则会激化各渠道间的矛盾,破坏原有渠道间的合作关系,甚至破坏各方的利益。因此,本文从电子商务环境下的渠道建设、渠道管理、渠道冲突方面分析和阐释了如何加强渠道建设推广和管理,并与不同渠道成员有效合作增加利润,实现共赢。     

考虑零售商销售努力的双渠道供应链定价策略研究

随着电子商务市场的日益成熟,制造商建设线上直销渠道来适应新的商品销售环境成为趋势。制造商线上直销渠道的建立占领了部分原本属于线下零售渠道的市场份额,对线下零售渠道造成冲击。针对双渠道供应链中的竞争,将零售商销售努力行为考虑在内,通过构建博弈模型分别研究了在集中决策模式和分散决策模式下,制造商与零售商的定价策略。研究发现,在集中决策模式下,线下零售渠道与线上直销渠道之间的价格差异随着两个渠道潜在需求量之间差异的增大而增大,并且两个渠道的最优价格分别与其市场潜在需求成正比。在分散决策模式下,两个渠道的最优价格亦与潜在需求成正比,并且线下零售渠道的最优价格随零售商销售努力程度的增加而增加,线上直销渠道的最优价格随着零售商销售努力程度的增加而减少。     

电子商务环境下基于单目标的定价策略模型

电子商务渠道与传统渠道之间的竞争,给电子商务环境下的制造商定价提出了新的挑战。本文针对制造商,研究了电子商务中对称信息下的定价模型,并进一步得出了定价策略,为电子商务环境下单目标的制造商确定定价策略,同时,为实现定价目标提供理论上与实践上的指导。     

双源渠道模式下供应链协调的斯塔克伯格博弈分析

目前供应链中越来越多的制造商已采用直销与传统分销相结合的双源渠道零售模式.本文从经济学角度分析供应链双源渠道的特点,并构建制造商和零售商组成的供应链模型,比较传统分销营销模式与分销和直销混合的双源渠道营销模式下的各变量的均衡结果,并对市场中的需求策略、价格策略以及其他竞争策略作出科学分析.     

基于电子商务环境下的和谐渠道关系建立的对策研究

伴随着电子商务的普及,新型的电子商务直销渠道和传统营销渠道之间的冲突也随之产生。如何使多渠道并存,并建立和谐的渠道关系,实现渠道相关各方协调和共赢,是当前营销渠道管理的一个重要任务。本文从分析不同营销渠道的差异性入手,探究了渠道冲突的成因,并提出了相关的解决对策。     

论电子商务环境下的营销渠道管理

在信息技术快速发展的背景下,电子商务为商业提供了快速而有效的发展信息,对传统营销渠道产生了巨大的冲击,重新配置了营销渠道成员权利。传统营销渠道中的制造商、营销商作为两端渠道,控制力不断增强,中间商的权利和角色逐渐被电子商务环境下的网络中间商所弱化并取代。电子商务环境下营销渠道越来越复杂,产生了新的营销渠道管理问题。电子商务环境下营销渠道的管理创新进行分析,并给出电子商务营销渠道的管理路径,以更好的整合电子商务环境下营销渠道的优势。     

考虑自有品牌与直销渠道下的广告模型研究

本文研究制造商引入直销渠道和零售商创建自有品牌之间渠道的竞争关系。零售商创建自有品牌作为制造商品牌的替代品,消费者判断购买何种产品时,受制造商产品广告效应的影响,而制造商开通直销渠道受消费者渠道偏好的影响。研究发现,当制造商产品的销售比例小于一定范围时,零售商和制造商渠道的均衡决策是双方同时引入自有品牌和直销渠道。     

零售商风险规避对制造商双渠道选择的影响

在随机的市场需求条件下,本文针对风险中性制造商为主导和风险规避零售商为随从的两级供应链,构建了单源渠道和双源渠道情形下供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了不同情形下供应链均衡策略的变化。研究结果表明零售商的风险规避只能改变零售渠道的价格,而不会影响制造商批发价格和电子直销价格的制定;电子直销渠道市场份额会影响制造商和零售商决策的制定,减缓零售商的风险规避影响程度,品牌差异策略并不能完全协调渠道间的冲突。     

品牌权益影响下的双渠道供应链定价决策及协调研究

针对一个制造商开通直销渠道销售产品与零售商的价格竞争问题,文章基于制造商与零售商共享品牌权益的视角,研究在制造商双渠道供应链结构中,价格和品牌权益同时作用下的双渠道供应链定价决策,分别分析在集中决策下和分散决策下,品牌权益对两种渠道价格和利润的影响。研究发现：在集中决策下,两种渠道的价格、利润与品牌权益成正相关;在分散决策下,当品牌权益超过一定临界值时,其对制造商直销渠道的价格和制造商总利润的影响大于零售商。鉴于品牌权益对供应链定价决策的重要影响,文章建立制造商和零售商之间的品牌权益成本共担机制,并通过数值仿真分析发现,当实施品牌权益成本共担机制时,制造商和零售商的销售价格和利润均是最优的。因此,零售商应加强与制造商的互动,共同创造高品牌权益的同时,也应共同分享高品牌权益。     

Exclusive dealing without territory exclusivity in multichannel systems: managing channel conflict and driving commitment

The exclusive dealing literature suggests that manufacturers should protect exclusive dealers (ED) from intrabrand competition by assigning exclusive territories (ET). We consider ED systems without ET and investigate how manufacturers can enhance ED channel outcomes, such as the ED’s level of commitment to the relationship, by strategically managing its downstream communication efforts with ED and non-ED channels. We show that these cross-channel communication efforts (i.e., the quality of communication between the manufacturer and non-ED resellers in the ED reseller’s territory) are important drivers of relationship conflict and commitment for ED resellers, while playing a limited role for non-ED resellers. These results underscore the need for manufacturers to understand the perspectives and behaviors of each individual channel within a multichannel system and manage their different distribution channel types as an integrated system. We find support for our hypotheses in a sample of 672 observations corresponding to different ED and non-ED resellers selling a manufacturer’s product-line across several European countries.     

Power-Dependence and Reseller Influence on SMEs' Continued Use of Online Direct Sales Channels: An Empirical Study

A dual-channel model with a physical sales channel and an online direct sales channel (ODSC) frequently causes channel conflicts. Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) using such a model may be forced to suspend ODSC to ease conflicts and maintain traditional resellers. From a channel conflict perspective, this study investigates a few critical factors underlying SMEs' intention to continue with an existing ODSC. We develop a research model by integrating power-dependence theory and the technology acceptance model. Then we construct and administer a survey to a sample of US SMEs currently using the dual-channel model. Partial least squares regression is employed to analyze the data and evaluate the impact of four key factors on SMEs' continuance of ODSCs: perceived business value of ODSCs, perceived ease of continuance with ODSCs, reseller dependence, and reseller forceful actions. Findings of the study contribute to the understanding of supplier-reseller relationships and continued use of information technologies among SMEs.     

When electronic management tools work - and don't work - in social-based distribution channels: A study of IT manufacturers and resellers

Electronic information tools have become increasingly popular with channel manufacturers in their efforts to manage resellers. Although these tools have been found to increase the efficiency of communications, researchers and practitioners alike have questioned their effectiveness. To investigate how top-down electronic information affects social channel relationships we consider the use of such tools in information technology distribution channels. Using electronic communications theory and channel governance theory we hypothesize that the usefulness of the tools is a function of the type of information inherent in each tool (demand creation information or supply fulfillment information) and the particular communications characteristics of this information.     

Effects of Exclusivity Agreements on Supplier's Control Over Marketing Channels

Abstract

This paper outlines an investigation aiming to increase knowledge of the effects of exclusivity agreements on marketing channels. We focus on one of the more relevant benefits of exclusivity for manufacturers mentioned in the marketing literature: control over resellers. We analyze the different ways these agreements could affect the manufacturer's control over the distribution channel and propose five hypotheses regarding the consequences of exclusive territories and exclusive dealing on the supplier's control. The empirical results provide strong support for the hypotheses regarding their effects on control through bargaining processes.     

Competitive channel relationship management: When resellers establish competing manufacturer relationships

The focus of this study is the impact of competitive relationships on the effectiveness of channel relationship management strategies. We argue that the characteristics of a reseller??s relationship with alternative manufacturers influence his/her evaluation of the relationship with a focal manufacturer. We extend previous research by suggesting that the relative levels of channel conflict and information exchange are critical determinants of relationship outcomes. Building on previous literature on customer satisfaction, we argue that this relation is asymmetric; improvements in the levels of channel conflict and information exchange will have a greater effect when these are below the competitor??s comparative level than when these are above. We find support for these hypotheses in a sample of 491 observations corresponding to different resellers selling a manufacturer??s product line across several countries. Our results underscore the need for suppliers to go beyond conflict minimization and information exchange policies across relationships and consider individual-level competitive effects for each relationship.     

Consumer and Retailer Promotions: Who is Better Off?

The long-term effects of promotions on sales are increasingly linked to the supposed shift of economic power within channels from manufacturers to retailers. However, formal knowledge about how they influence channel decisions under different promotional arrangements and the distribution of channel profits remains very sparse. In this paper, I develop two 2-period models to investigate the impact on channel decisions and profits of manufacturer-controlled and retailer-controlled promotions targeted at consumers. My findings indicate that retailers always invest in retailer promotions, while manufacturers may find it optimal to not invest in consumer promotions. Economic power shifts from manufacturers to retailers when consumer promotions significantly expand the baseline demand in the long-term. Otherwise, manufacturers remain more powerful. Trade promotions or other profit-transfer mechanisms may be indispensable in easing conflicts over who should undertake promotions, especially when these promotions substantially increase future sales.     

The changed legality of resale price maintenance and pricing implications

From 1911 until 2007, minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturers and resellers were illegal under federal antitrust law. This handicapped manufacturers which sought to exert control over how their products were priced and promoted through the distribution channel. In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court—via the Leegin case—ruled that bilateral minimum resale price maintenance agreements would no longer be automatically illegal. Rather, they would be legal if their net impact is pro-competitive, and illegal only if the net impact is anti-competitive. This ruling empowers manufacturers to use resale price maintenance to create value for their customers and consumers. However, not all stakeholders—including some state legal systems—have embraced the Leegin ruling, thereby creating uncertainty regarding its final impact. Despite this uncertainty, the opportunities created by Leegin are worth exploring and acting upon. Since the Leegin ruling 3 years ago, a new landscape for resale pricing maintenance has been evolving. We discuss this landscape and the considerations for using resale price maintenance within its ambit. For many manufacturers, the chance of benefitting from Leegin outweighs any potential risks.     

Efficient algorithms to detect pricing inconsistency for customizable products

For assemble‐to‐order manufacturers, the production is an assembly of predefined items. Products from these manufacturers are usually sold to customers directly, instead of through resellers. When these manufacturers adopt electronic commerce for their businesses, they explicitly publish the prices for their products in their electronic commerce web sites, and allow customers to make on‐line purchases based on the prices and the customized configurations. It is critical for the manufacturers to ensure that the same type of products has the same price, no matter how a customer does the customization. Unfortunately, pricing inconsistency exists in some electronic commerce web sites due to various reasons. In this paper, we present the problem to be solved at first. Then, we define two types of pricing inconsistency. Finally, we propose efficient algorithms to solve the problem based on reasonable assumptions. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Gray markets: past,present, and future

This article conducts a literature review on three gray market areas: strategy, legal issues, and consumer behavior. Previous gray market strategy-based articles do not discuss the impact of the Web on gray market activity, limit their analysis to international gray markets, and do not identify situations where gray market activity is profitable for a manufacturer and its authorized resellers. Like the strategy-based articles, the legal issue-based articles confine their discussion to international gray markets. A current US Supreme Court case that expands the potential for gray market activity is discussed. The third research stream focuses on the impact of brand image and brand equity and the relationship of perceived risk and gray market acceptance by consumers. The authors develop an overall strategy for dealing with gray market activity based on balancing positive and negative issues. In some cases, it is prudent for manufacturers and resellers to view gray markets as an alternative strategy to private labels, second-tier brands, or fighting brands. In other instances, firms need to explore supply- and demand-based strategies to deter gray market activity. Alternative organization formats for gray market surveillance and control are discussed. Difficulties associated with conducting gray market research as well as directions for future research in gray markets are covered.     

Marketplace,reseller, or web-store channel: The impact of return policy and cross-channel spillover from marketplace to web-store

With the advent of e-commerce, new platform sales have been created in the online retailing industry, and choosing the best platform has become a challenge for manufacturers. For instance, marketplace and web-store are two e-channels for selling goods directly to end customers. In the marketplace, manufacturers sell their products directly to online customers through e-tailers' platforms and share revenue with e-tailers. In the web-store channel, manufacturers sell their products directly to end customers through their platforms and do not need to e-tailers' platforms. However, some manufacturers and e-tailers continue with reseller channel yet. Reseller channel is another conventional channel in which manufacturers distribute their products to e-tailers, then e-tailers choose retail prices and sell them to consumers. Therefore, with these three different channels, the key question is when and under what conditions manufacturers can choose marketplace or reseller channel in addition to their web-store channels to grow their market share. In this paper, we analyze these three different e-channels and the conditions that manufacturers adopt the marketplace or reseller channel. For this purpose, we consider a model with two manufacturers and one e-tailer in which the manufacturers have their web-store channels, and they are willing to adopt another channelـ reseller or marketplace. The manufacturers offer a return policy in their web-store channels as a competitive strategy for attracting more customers. We find that offering return policy in web-store channels has no effect on the choice between the marketplace and reseller channel, but it has an impact on the amount of manufacturers' profits in each channel. Also, we demonstrate that regardless of offering return policy, as the coefficient of cross-channel effect increases, the manufacturers' profits, whether they choose reseller channel or marketplace channel, increase. But, as the coefficient of cross-channel effect increases, the e-tailer's profit increases when both manufacturers choose reseller channel, otherwise decreases. If manufacturers offer a return policy, the e-tailer's profit is highest when both manufacturers choose reseller channel, and if they do not offer a return policy, the e-tailer's profit is highest when both manufacturers choose marketplace channel.