Antecedents of participative budgeting

This paper has four purposes. First, it analyzes 47 published studies on participative budgeting. Almost all of these studies focus on the effects of participative budgeting and not on its causal antecedents. Second, to provide insight into these antecedents, we report the results of a survey which identifies reasons why managers participate in setting their budgets. Third, we report how these reasons are associated with four theoretical antecedents—environmental and task uncertainty, task interdependence and superior-subordinate information asymmetry. The results indicate that participative budgeting is most important for planning and control, specifically vertical information sharing and co-ordinating interdependence, and that specific reasons for participative budgeting are correlated with three of the antecedents. Finally, directions for future research on participative budgeting are presented.     

Slack in participative budgeting: The joint effect of a truth-inducing pay scheme and risk preferences

An incentive problem in participative budgeting occurs when a worker has private information about factors that influence his or her performance and the pay scheme is budget- or standard-based. This information, if communicated accurately by the worker, may be valuable to a manager for planning and control purposes. However, the worker has an incentive to bias its communication such that a relatively easy standard is set, thereby creating slack. To alleviate this problem, analytical research has proposed truth-inducing pay schemes that provide incentives for accurately communicating private information and maximizing performance. A conventional assumption underlying these schemes is worker risk neutrality, despite the wide-spread belief that risk aversion is more typical in organizational settings. This paper reports an experiment demonstrating that, when a (conventional) truth-inducing scheme is introduced, slack decreases for risk-neutral subjects but not for risk-averse subjects.     

Informational influences on group decision making in a participative budgeting context

Potential benefits derived from participative budgeting may be unattainable if employed in certain group configurations. A model is developed based on group polarization research which demonstrates that the participative process that is supposed to increase motivation may generate decisions that are opposed to the integrative aspect of budgeting in a subsystematic environment. A laboratory experiment manipulating information/leadership tests the model's validity. Results indicate a polarization in attitude, while information/leadership affect the direction and strength of polarization.     

The influence of voice and explanation on performance in a participative budgeting setting

This paper examines the relationship between the use of a fair budgeting process and subordinate performance. Organizational justice theory is used to define a fair budgeting process as having two components: the subordinate’s involvement in the budgeting process, voice; and the communication of a rationale for the subordinate’s lack of influence over the final budget target the superior sets, explanation. Results indicate significant performance improvements when voice and explanation are combined as compared to voice alone.     

Participative budgeting with kinked linear payment schemes

This paper studies the truth-inducing property of a class of budget-variance-based payment schemes calledkinked linear schemes. In these schemes, the manager is either paid a bonus proportional to a favorable budget variance, or charged a penalty proportional to an unfavorable budget variance. With the penalty rate higher than the bonus rate per unit variance, the payment to the manager is piecewise linear in the actual output and kinked at the budgeted output. This paper shows that participative budgeting with kinked linear compensation schemes can induce truthful reporting of expected output from an informed manager even when the manager can shift the underlying output distribution by his unobservable efforts. Furthermore, participative budgeting with kinked linear payment schemes can achieve optimal contracting between a risk-neutral manager and a risk-neutral owner even in a setting where a menu of linear payment schemes cannot. This paper is based on my dissertation at University of California-Berkeley. I am grateful to my dissertation committee members (P.K. Sen, Nils Hakansson, and Robert Anderson), and other faculty members at the University of California-Berkeley. I thank anonymous referees, my colleagues at New York University, and the participants at the 1991 annual meetings of the American Accounting Association and the European Accounting Association for their helpful comments.     

The effect of participative budgeting on job satisfaction and performance: Role ambiguity as an intervening variable

The results of studies into the effects of participative budgeting have been equivocal. This study seeks to explain the process by which participation in budget setting affects managers' performance and job satisfaction. A model is developed to show how role ambiguity acts as an intervening variable in the link between participation and outcome criteria. Empirical results indicate that budgetary participation acts indirectly, via role ambiguity, to influence job satisfaction and performance.     

Piecewise linear trends and cycles in primary commodity prices

We extend the methodology put forward in Yamada and Yoon (2014, Journal of International Money and Finance, 42(C), 193–207) to analyze the trend and cyclical behavior of relative primary commodity prices. These authors propose the use of the so-called ℓ₁-filter that renders piecewise linear trends of the underlying data. Our focus on the calibration of such filter and its implications for the empirical analysis of primary commodity prices, especially the interpretation given to the resulting trend. We also illustrate how suitably calibrated filters may be used to compute piecewise linear (super) cycles, whose turning points are easy to identify.     

Capital budgeting and delegation

As part of our ongoing research into capital budgeting processes as responses to decentralized information and incentive problems, we focus in this paper on when a level of a managerial hierarchy will delegate the allocation of capital across projects and time to the level below it. In our model, delegation is a way to save on costly investigation of proposed projects. Therefore, it is more extensive the larger are the costs of such investigations. This delegation takes advantage of the fact that the lower-level manager's preferences are assumed to be similar (though not identical) to those of the higher level.     

The interaction between a standard time incentive payment scheme and a simple accounting information system

Under a standard time incentive payment scheme, workers “manage” their recorded job times. A job cost accounting system allocates labour costs and sometimes overheads on the basis of the recorded job times. By simulating the interaction of two such systems at a medium sized engineering firm, it is found that the direct labour costs for a product could be over-estimated by up to 35%. Further, these over-estimates occur on those products on which the workers earn their highest bonuses and, hence, whose discontinuation could damage industrial relations.     

When Grilli and Yang meet Prebisch and Singer: Piecewise linear trends in primary commodity prices

In this study, we test the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis on the secular decline of relative primary commodity prices with the extended Grilli and Yang (1988) data set, ending at 2010.” Rather than asking whether it holds for the whole sample period, we examine if the hypothesis holds sometimes during the sample period by estimating the piecewise linear trends of primary commodity prices. We employ the new ℓ₁ trend filtering proposed by Kim et al. (2009) to estimate the piecewise linear trends. We find that the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis holds sometimes, but not always, for many of the primary commodities in the Grilli–Yang data. The strength of the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis has become substantially weaker recently, as the relative prices of many primary commodities have increased sharply since around 2000.     

Problem-oriented participative forecasting : Theory and practice

Problem-oriented participative forecasting¹ (POPF) is an autonomous and evolving concept. It aims not only to provide early signals of threats to development or to identify opportunities for development, but also to articulate interests and mobilize different social groups to act in a manner conducive to the elimination of such threats and exploitation of such opportunities. This concept of the function of forecasting has major factual and methodological implications. The focus of this article is primarily on the forecasting process as a way of active social learning and anticipatory behaviour. It attempts to synthesize the problem-oriented and participative approaches to forecasting into a single methodology, which it documents by a specific example of its application in science forecasting in the Slovak Socialist Republic.     

Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is “paternalistic”: the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals.      

Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover

When a firm has minimal agency and informational asymmetry problems it should make efficient capital budgeting decisions. Many firms over-invest prior to CEO turnover, halt investments in the period surrounding the turnover, and then greatly increase their level of expenditures. Empirical analysis of the cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the quality of firms' corporate capital budgeting decision reveals that the impact of CEO turnover is asymmetric between under- and over-investing firms, and this complements the larger literature using average firm-wide performance measures. Firms are more likely to have forced turnovers when there is more over-investment prior to the turnover, and these firms make more efficient investment decisions subsequently. Board influence is largely insignificant prior to a CEO turnover but is consistently associated with higher levels of investment subsequently.     

Capital budgeting,valuation and personal taxes

This paper examines the relationship between before tax and after tax valuation and uses this to examine the literature on capital budgeting and capital structure in the presence of corporate and personal taxes, a literature which features a bewildering array of valuation formulae. Some of the variation between such formulae naturally arises out of variations in underlying model assumptions; however, in several cases, it arises because there are (by no means obvious) internal inconsistencies. The potential magnitude of the errors that might arise in a capital budgeting context is then explored through sensitivity analysis.     

CEO optimism and incentive compensation

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.     

Risk-adjusted discount rates and capital budgeting under uncertainty

This paper is concerned with the valuation of multiperiod cash flows in a world where prices are determined according to the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model of capital market equilibrium. We find that the current market value of any future net cash flow is the current expected value of the flow discounted at risk-adjusted discount rates for each of the periods until the flow is realized. The discount rates are known and non-stochastic, but the rates for the different periods preceding the realization of a cash flow need not to be the same, and the rates relevant for a given period can differ across cash flows. The risk adjustments in the discount rates arise because of uncertainties about reassessments through time of the expected value of a flow and the relationships between these reassessments and the corresponding reassessments of the expected cash flows of all firms.