中国商业银行净利差影响因素研究——基于2006~2012年的经验证据

适度的银行利差既能体现银行的高运营效率,又有利于商业银行的业务结构转型和竞争力的提高,实现社会福利最大化。本文针对中国14家商业银行2006—2012年的净利差影响因素进行了实证分析,结果表明,对商业银行净利差影响比较明显的因素是银行的经营管理能力和资产结构,宏观经济环境也有一定影响,风险因素对股份制银行的净利差影响更大。最后,针对如何促进银行实现合理的利差水平提出了相关建议。     

中小商业银行转型的SWOT分析及对策——基于利率市场化条件下

在利率市场化推进过程中,会出现存贷利差缩小、盈利能力下降、风险累积、竞争加剧等现象,商业银行的盈利模式必然发生根本性的变化,尤其是中小商业银行受利率市场化的冲击会更大.本文以中小商业银行为研究对象,揭示我国中小商业银行进行转型升级的必要性,运用SWOT模型分析了我国中小商业银行的内外部环境,并提出七点对策建议.     

经济新常态下我国商业银行流动性风险管理研究

在经济新常态的大背景下,商业银行的经营环境发生了变化,银行传统的盈利模式是依靠存贷利差,但存贷利差正逐步下滑,银行营业收入中,非利息收入占比日益增长。文章首先探讨了经济新常态带来的商业银行经营环境的变化,以及对商业银行流动性的影响,接着利用2011~2015年的数据做了面板数据模型,通过实证分析来探讨经济新常态下,影响商业银行流动性风险的因素,并提出了相应的流动性风险管理的建议。     

现行中小商业银行差异化存款定价策略浅析

2012年央行扩大了存款利率浮动区间,银行业利差收窄,中小商业银行面临严峻的考验。如何应对存款利率市场化挑战,制定合理的存款价格,是中小商业银行亟需解决的重要课题。本文分析了存款利率市场化定价的发展现状及其对中小商业银行的挑战,提出了基于客户弹性和客户贡献度的差异化存款定价策略。     

商业银行贷款增长过快的原因和对策分析

商业银行贷款增长得过快,会对社会和经济的发展带来一系列的不利因素。本文从银行对银行贷款增长过快危害的认识不足、往年的习惯性贷款、城市基础建设和房地产的疯狂发展三个方面分析了商业银行贷款过快的原因。并在此基础上提出了相应的对策:银行应加大风险意识和风险的控制;加强监督部门对银行资本充足率的监管;银行应加强和完善内部的考核机制和商业银行应开发非利差收入等。     

中国商业银行投资银行业务的发展方向

近年来，我国的商业银行投资银行业务呈现井喷之势，并获得快速发展。长期以来，我国的商业银行主要是以居民的存贷款利差为主要的收入来源，这种盈利模式限制了商业银行的发展壮大。虽然，目前，各商业银行都已进入投资银行业务市场，并且在积极开拓，也取得了可喜的经营业绩。但是，总体来说，我国的商业银行投资银行发展业务还处在一个起步的阶段。本文将主要分析中国商业银行投资银行业务的发展方向。     

利率市场化下我国商业银行的收入结构转型分析

我国的利率市场化改革一直在稳步的推进当中,2013年7月20日央行决定放开贷款利率,标志着我国贷款利率的全面放开,在利率市场化上迈出了实质性的一大步。而利率市场化带来利率波动、利差缩窄、以及失去了行政定价的资金价格,必会对我国金融业影响巨大。我国商业银行的收入结构亟需由利息收入主导,向利息收入与非利息收入均衡发展的收入结构转型。本文分析了我国商业银行收入结构现状,利率市场化对我国商业银行收入的影响,并提出商业银行的应对策略。     

对商业银行发展中间业务的思考

随着存贷款利差幅度的减少和我国商业银行面临的竞争形势日趋严峻,中间业务已成为商业银行新的利润增长点和竞争点。文章通过对商业银行中间业务的现存在的问题进行剖析,提出了解决相应问题的建议及对策。     

利率市场化下商业银行利率竞争的博弈分析

受金融危机的影响,我国存贷款基准利率发生相对频繁的波动,这也引起人们更加关注利率波动的影响。存贷利差水平是目前影响我国商业银行盈利水平的最重要因素,因而随着利率市场化的逐步深入,商业银行无疑将围绕利率展开更激烈的存贷业务竞争。本文从微观角度,运用博弈论的非合作博弈与合作博弈的一些基本方法,构建博弈模型分析我国商业银行利率竞争的态势,并基于这一分析提出相应的建议。     

表外业务对银行收益的影响研究

随着我国金融制度的完善,商业银行不能只依靠存贷款利差来获取收益,而表外业务作为一种不占有银行的自有资本,增加银行收益的业务,成为了商业银行的新选择。本文通过实证分析研究表外业务对银行收益的影响,得出:表外业务对国有商业银行收益具有积极性,对非国有银行收益具有消极作用,从而具体地对表外业务管理提出建议。     

外资银行参股中资银行的选择模式

至2006年12月11日,中国市场向外资全面开放。外国银行以参股中国的银行来迅速渗透市场,已成为外资银行投资的一种重要方式。四大国有银行轰轰烈烈的IPO,将股份制改革推向高潮。在这样的大环境下,外国银行参股国有商业银行,相比较中小银行,国有银行的优势对外资银行更加具有吸引力。参股时,外资银行应当注意针对国有银行关心的技术转移度提出合适的方案,同时分散投资以降低非系统风险,获得理想的投资状态。     

On the Reputation of Islamic Banks: a Panel Data Qualitative Econometrics Analysis

This study investigates the issue of reputation for Islamic banks. Bank reputation can either be modelled using a direct approach based on Game Theory (Chemmanur and Fulghieri in J Financ 49:57–79, 1994) or through an indirect approach that investigates linkages between conventional and Islamic banks. Adopting the indirect test approach, we propose a binary measure of Islamic Banks (IBs) reputation by testing their dynamic interactions with regard to conventional banks. Interestingly, we propose different qualitative econometric specifications to capture the drivers of IBs’ reputation. Using panel data for 10 major conventional banks and 10 Islamic banks over the period April 2006 – February 2013 (about 17,800 observations), we show that reputation probability can significantly increase in line with Islamic banking performance, while excess risk taken by Islamic bankers will decrease it. Further, we show that an environment with high global financial risk -induced for example by an increase in conventional product risk- has a negative effect on IBs’ reputation.     

Accounting Choices and Risk Management: SFAS No. 115 and U.S. Bank Holding Companies*

This paper provides evidence that regulatory contracts affect firms' accounting choices and risk‐management decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether an exogenous shock to regulatory risk induced by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, “Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities” (SFAS 1993), encouraged U.S. banks to deviate from portfolio and risk benchmarks when they adopted the standard. Because we cannot observe relevant benchmarks, we model portfolio and risk decisions as functions of macroeconomic and firm‐specific factors using data from a period when regulatory capital was immune to SFAS No. 115 accounting. We examine a sample of 230 publicly traded banks and find that (1) irrespective of adoption timing, banks classified too few securities available for sale (AFS) relative to estimated benchmarks; (2) weaker banks that adopted the standard early classified far more securities as AFS relative to benchmarks; (3) banks altered the size of their securities portfolios along with the levels of interest‐rate risk and credit risk as regulatory capital decreased; and (4) the level of interest‐rate risk on banks' loan portfolios increased at the time of SFAS No. 115 adoption. We also explore the 1995 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) amnesty when firms could “readopt” SFAS No. 115. We find that banks used the 1995 FASB amnesty to undo strategic initial SFAS No. 115 adoption decisions. Taken together, our findings suggest that SFAS No. 115 caused some of the accounting and economic consequences predicted by bankers, analysts, and academics.     

Explaining Interest Rate Spreads in Ghana*

Abstract: The question of the optimal spread between bank lending rates and rates that banks pay on deposits, which is fair to bankers, depositors and borrowers, has dogged economies for some time. In Ghana, there is widespread perception that the spread is too wide. Bankers, on the other hand justify the spread on the basis of economic variables that affect them. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying, in the case of Ghana, the short‐run response of the net interest margin of banks to changes in bank‐specific, industry‐specific and macroeconomic variables within the broad framework of Ho and Saunders (1981) . We find that increases in the following factors significantly increase net interest margin — bank market power (or concentration), bank size, staff costs, administrative costs, extent of bank risk aversion and the rate of inflation. On the other hand, increases in the following variables decrease net interest margin significantly — bank excess cash reserves, the central bank lending rate, management efficiency and the passage of time. To help reduce interest rate margins, we recommend that banks should not get too big, the central bank should consider lowering the capital adequacy ratio and banks should be required to pass on to borrowers the full extent of reductions or increases in the central bank lending rate. Continued efforts at keeping inflation at bay will also help.     

Does “skin in the game” reduce risk taking? Leverage,liability and the long-run consequences of new deal banking reforms

This essay examines how the Banking Acts of the 1933 and 1935 and related New Deal legislation influenced risk taking in the financial sector of the U.S. economy. The analysis focuses on contingent liability of bank owners for losses incurred by their firms and how the elimination of this liability influenced leverage and lending by commercial banks. Using a new panel data set, we find contingent liability reduced risk taking. In states with contingent liability, banks used less leverage and converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could survive larger loan losses (as a fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. In states with limited liability, banks took on more leverage and risk, particularly in states that required banks with limited liability to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In the long run, the New Deal replaced a regime of contingent liability with deposit insurance, stricter balance sheet regulation, and increased capital requirements, shifting the onus of risk management from bankers to state and federal regulators.     

Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game

This article studies the open-economy Rogoff delegation game, taking into account both intra-country and intercountry interactions between fiscal authorities and central banks. With representative bankers, the Nash equilibrium of fiscal and monetary authorities independently responding to supply-side shocks sees insufficient monetary adjustment and an imbalance towards fiscal stabilization if shocks are sufficiently symmetric; the opposite occurs if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric. Appointing conservative bankers shifts the fiscal–monetary balance away from monetary towards fiscal policy. Unilateral delegation benefits that country; but when all countries independently delegate, the outcome is only favorable if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric.     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

Bankers on the Board,Market Competition,and Conflicts of Interest

Abstract

Bankers on the board are expected to act as a fund-raiser and to help lowering financial costs, but they can impose conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. We empirically analyse the impact of banker-directors on corporate leverage and investment, using Korean firm data during the period from 2000 to 2012. Bankers on the board turn out to play different roles depending on market competition and macroeconomic circumstance. In less competitive industries where banks are less concerned about financial distress as a creditor, the presence of bankers on the board has higher leverage and more active investment, which can align with the interest of shareholders. However, in more competitive environment where firms are more concerned about financial distress and external financing, bankers on the board do not always increase leverage and investment, which can be divergent from the interest of shareholders.     

Liquidity support to banks during Indonesia's financial crisis

During the 1997–98 financial crisis, Bank Indonesia provided liquidity support to many banks experiencing difficulties. This policy became controversial because of the magnitude of the likely losses to the government, which in the end would have to be borne by the general public. Suspicions of corruption involving bankers and officials of Bank Indonesia fuelled the debate. Surprisingly, however, concerns of this kind have not been raised in relation to the far larger amount of support provided to banks by the government in the form of recapitalisation bonds. The public's lack of understanding of the operations of the banking sector further complicated the debate. This paper attempts to shed some light on the central bank's actions and on the proposed solutions to the problems that arose from them.     

Exchange rate determination: a theory of the decisive role of central bank cooperation and conflict

Economists’ faith that variable exchange rates benevolently equilibrate has been empirically disconfirmed. That faith is here tackled at its theoretical core with an exchange rate model that although ultra abstract, includes the undeniable fundamentals of market power and differential goals of central bankers and large-scale private players. It permits a game theoretic analysis under the assumption that all agents maximize their payoffs. The paper then relaxes the assumption of maximising agents, allowing for a more complex and thus realistic second version of the model that is interpretable within SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory of risk and uncertainty. In an experimental setting, this second version of the model points to: a) the inability of agents in central banks, governments and the private real and financial sectors to operate in maximising ways; b) destructive central bank conflict; and c) the widely discrepant outcomes arising from the dynamics of individual personality differences. The paper’s theoretical and empirical findings thus both point to the merits of a single world currency.