Das Paradox der Medienwirkung auf Nichtnutzer

The article presents data from a secondary analysis of the project »Wählerwanderungen und Politikverdrossenheit« from 1994. The data allow to conduct time series analysis on a day-to-day basis. The focus is agenda setting in combination with a thesis formulated by Marcus Maurer — published in Publizistik 2004 — on the paradox of media effects on non-users. In contrast to Maurer, the paper is not concerned with the methodological but the theoretical paradox: Can there be such a thing as media effects on media non-users? The hypothetical effect is analyzed in comparison of daily and less than daily TV news users. The analyzed models confirm the agenda-setting effect: The media agenda affects the public agenda at later points in time, but the public agenda does not have effects on the later media agenda. In addition, there are indirect effects on people who seldom use TV news. As they do not watch every day, there is no direct immediate effect of the media input on them. But there is a significant effect some days later, which we interprete as a consequence of conversation. The effect of the media on the daily users is passed on to less frequent users by interpersonal communication.     

Das Bild der Public Relations in der Qualit?tspresse

In their survey study about the image of PR in Germany, Bentele and Seidenglanz (Das Image der Image-Macher. Eine repr?sentative Studie zum Image der PR-Branche und eine Journalistenbefragung. Leipzig: Universit?t Leipzig, 2004) presume an interrelation between media coverage on PR and the general public??s conception of PR. Their results show firstly: The higher the respondents?? media consumption the more negative was their perception of PR. And secondly: The journalists among their respondents had a much more negative image of PR than the general public. Thus, our study investigates the question of how German media cover PR. We conducted a longitudinal content analysis (1993?C2006) of quality newspapers??the first study of this kind in Germany. We compared our findings from the content analysis with what we call a ??contrasting foil,?? which represents a re-construction of the ??reality?? of PR consisting of empirical data and facts about PR and the profession??s official self-image as well as of science-based theoretical reflections of PR. This ??contrasting foil?? served as a reference to clarify the journalistic positions on PR found in media coverage and to outline differences between the media??s picture of PR and the reality of PR beyond the media. Our results show that the scandalisation of PR plays an important role in the media coverage on PR.     

Das Medienbild in der islamistischen Online-Propaganda

Islamic terror attacks can be regarded as an endpoint of radicalization defined as a process that takes place on a cognitive and a behavioral level (Neumann 2013b). The analysis of Islamic online propaganda seems to be important when it comes to explaining radicalization processes, as it can be defined as the “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). The arguably most prominent Salafi propagandist in Germany is Pierre Vogel who has about 300,000 Facebook likes and who is said to be an extremely sucessfull missionary on the Internet (Wiedl and Becker 2014). Given Wiktorowicz’s (2006) differentiation of Salafi factions, Vogel belongs to the politicos who emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, but who do not call for violence. While previous research has analyzed several aspects of propaganda made by politicos and the violent jihadis (e.?g., Payne 2009), the media image Islamic propagandists hold has remained unexplored so far. This is an important deficit, as from the perspective of journalism ethics of responsibility, one can argue that journalists should know how their media coverage is perceived and instrumentalized by Islamists.Against this background, the present paper explores Vogel’s media image by analyzing Facebook posts that explicitly contain references to media. At first, the basic question of the Salafi’s understanding of the media arises, as a more technical view on the media can be distinguished from the perception of media as political actors bound by directives by the state (Neumann and Baugut 2017). Moreover, we were interested in the type of media and distinct media outlets Vogel refers to. Secondly, we wanted to find out in how far hostile media perceptions (Vallone et al. 1985), well-explored in other contexts, also occur among Islamists like Vogel that can be characterized by a considerable degree of cognitive and affective involvement that triggers hostile media perceptions (cf. Hansen and Kim 2011, S. 173–174; Matthes 2013, S. 375–376). Third, we were interested in the Salafi’s assumptions on media impact on third persons (Davison 1983), as previous research has pointed to cultural distance as one among several factors enforcing third person perceptions (Tsfati 2014). Fourth, as the perceptions mentioned above possibly foster radicalization, we were interested in whether Vogel consequently shows extremist tendencies in his statements on the media’s role. Methodologically, we conducted a qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2015) of all of Vogel’s media-related Facebook posts in the years 2014–2016 (N?=?137). In those years, Islamic terrorism became a major issue in consequence of terrorist attacks in Germany and other European countries.At first, our analysis shows that Vogel mostly refers indiscriminately to the media in general, not at least because he perceives journalistic cooorientation. In cases in which distinct media outlets are named, all types of journalistic media ranging from local newspapers to public and private broadcasting stations are concerned. The broad media repertoire suggests that the Salafist scene comes into contact with content of established journalistic media—albeit not always directly, but rather through the Salafist opinion leader Pierre Vogel in the sense of a “two-step flow” (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944).Second, we found strong hostile media perceptions indicating that the media are perceived as political actors “spending millions to fight Islam”. Vogel especially complains about media coverage portraying him in the context of terrorism. He traces this kind of media coverage back to both economic editorial imperatives and the media’s alleged political goal to divide the Muslim community. The public complaints about hostile media on Facebook can be interpreted as a contribution to the victim-narrative that is characteristic of Islamic propaganda (Payne 2009).Third, while Vogel criticizes media coverage in many respects, not at least in terms of credibility, he assumes that the media influence on third parties is relatively strong. For example, discrimination against Muslims in everyday life is ascribed to the media. Journalists are even made responsible for supporting terrorism by portraying non-radicalized individuals in the context of terrorism.Fourth, the occurrence of both hostile media and third person perceptions did not result in extremist statements on the role of the media. For example, we found no crimes such as an explicit verbal threat to journalists. Being aware that his critics might encourage supporters to attack the media which in turn could have legal consequences, Vogel emphasizes that complaints about ostensible lies should be raised in a reasonable way.All in all, this study shows journalists that their media coverage is intensively monitored by Germany’s most prominent Salafi and that hostile media and third person perceptions may at the same time also occur among extremists who use exemplars of media coverage for propaganda purposes. Especially an undifferentiated portrayal of Salafists as terrorists appears as grist to the mills of those who want to mobilize and recruit scene members by means of the victim-narrative. Clearly, this study has limitations. Given the heterogeneity of the Salafi scene (Wiktorowicz 2006), findings from a leading German Salafi cannot be simply transferred to the whole scene. Besides the problem of generalizability, an interview with Vogel is needed to understand the motives behind his analyzed postings and to find out whether his media image explored by a scholarly interview is congruent with his media image presented on Facebook.     

Das Geschäft mit der Prognose

All prognoses face a predicament of falsification. It is not whether a forecast development will really occur, but whether a forecast can be applied and used for decisions that finally decides its success. Good prognoses possess a reliable starting point, clearly defined conditions and empirically supported hypotheses of the relations between dependent and independent variables. Prognoses in the media usually serve as points for orientation in strategic planning and the formation of knowledge relevant for decisions. Even high-quality prognoses cannot completely do away with a remainder of insecurity, which cannot be totally eliminated with the most expensive research design. According to the degree of specialization and expenditure, various forms of prognostic advice can be classified, reaching from simple previews into the future to complex simulation models and scenarios. The examples of a »bygone future« presented in the article show that the opportunity for prognoses is substantially dependent on conditions of stability, and also finds its limits there.     

Das Bild der Nanotechnologie in deutschen Printmedien. Eine frameanalytische Langzeitstudie

According to a recent survey, roughly every second German has no mental association with the concepts of nanotechnology and nanomaterials. This is similar to reports from other countries. Nanotechnology is something that cannot be experienced and observed directly, which is hardly surprising, given that a nanometer is defined as one billionth of a meter. Accordingly, what people know about nanotechnology, and their interpretations and opinions of this knowledge, are based mainly on information from the mass media. Therefore, this first systematic study of the German media coverage aims at analyzing the media frames of nanotechnology. The analysis is based on a standardized content analysis of nine print media for the period 2000?C2008. The results indicate that the German media framing is predominantly highly positive towards nanotechnology, with particular emphasis being placed on its medical and economic benefits. The German media offers only a very limited critical alternative to this one-sided perspective of progress in this field. The situation is thus essentially the same as for media coverage in other countries.     

Das Zusammenspiel von gesellschaftlicher Umwelt- und Selbstbeobachtung in der Medienberichterstattung

Mass media communication makes societal changes visible and opens the platform for discussion and public debate. Observation of societal changes and public debate are intrinsically linked. Using the example of media coverage on war and questions of defense and security policies, we researched the relationship between societal changes and public debate in a longitudinal study. We performed a content analysis of the daily newspapers FAZ and Süddeutsche Zeitung for the time period of 1989?C2000. The results showed interesting frame relationships between the coverage of single wars and the coverage of defense policies. Specific aspects of war coverage lead to more coverage of security and defense policy issues, and the framing of the one is interrelated to the framing of the other in complex ways.     

Das Risiko ökologischer und individualistischer Fehlschlüsse in der Inhaltsanalyse

In both survey studies and participant observation, individuals are the most natural unit of observation and usually constitute the unit of analysis. In content analysis, by contrast, the unit of observation is less predetermined. As a result, the choice of particular units of observation and analysis requires both a theoretical and methodological rationale. However, published content analyses hardly distinguish between units of observation and units of analysis. More importantly, units of observations and units of analyses often differ without further reasoning. This study demonstrates that consequences may potentially be severe when units of analysis are arbitrarily chosen. The results suggest that the validity of a number of published content analyses may be dubious and that these analyses may have suffered from individual and ecological fallacies.     

Das »Office for Strategic Influence« als Informationsmanager in der US-Kampagne in Afghanistan

The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, formed the starting point for the United States’ «war against terror,» which began on October 7, 2001, with the first bombardment of Afghanistan. The broad support around the world faded quickly after a few weeks without any significant success in the battle against Al Quaeda. To counter rising annoyance, the US Government created the «Office for Strategic Influence» (OSI) in November 2001. The declared purpose: to produce sympathy and support for the war. Though source material is scarce, it is possible to trace the activities of the OSI. In Afghanistan, the office coordinated «Information Operations» already under way. The OSI also tried to influence domestic and international public opinion by participating in the foundation of the «Coalition Information Center» and by consulting public affairs expert Charlotte Beers and the advertising agency «Rendom Group». After an intensive denunciation by several newspapers, especially the 〉New York Times〈, the OSI was abandoned in February 2002. The discussion about the office defined more concretely the formerly vague border between publicly7 accepted and necessary agitation on the one hand and reprehensible propaganda on the other.     

Das Wiederholungsparadoxon

In this paper we discuss how repetition of a single statement affects its perceived credibility. Using an experimental design, our results support previous psychological studies on the “truth-effect”, which have shown that repeated messages are considered more credible than non-repeated messages. In addition, our study sheds light on the unanswered question why the truth-effect vanishes or reverses if statements are repeated too often. Analysis strongly points to a parallel, indirect negative effect, caused by participants showing reactance as a consequence of repetition.     

Das Fach Kommunikationswissenschaft

Communication Science appears to become more and more professionalized and seems to increase its research activities and publications. Yet there are no far empirical data to support what seems to be evident. In a survey among DGPuK members in 2010, Altmeppen et al. (2011) found a status quo that shows two interesting aspects: German Communication Science has extended its research activity and, at the same time, differentiated itself substantively and methodically. The data also show that the survey instrument used in the past does not grasp the discipline’s thematic, theoretic, and methodical diversity any more. This finding is a challenge to the field: Communication Science must find a way to systematize and structure itself in order to gather all thematic and methodic directions under one umbrella, considering both the broad avenues and the side roads. Based on the 2010 data and the existing survey categories, this paper develops an empirical instrument that can be used to examine, in a long term design, the research activities in Communication Science and demonstrate, to the discipline itself and to outside observers, its multifarious facets and its dynamic.     

Das journalistische Feld in Deutschland

By using Bourdieus’ thinking tools field, habitus and capital, this article first develops a concept of the journalistic field, in which economic capital and journalistic capital decide on (collective and individual) agents’ latitude and in which their autonomy could be influenced by economic logic, the discussion on journalistic norms and the logic of other social fields. Subsequently, this concept is implemented in a qualitative study. For that purpose 501 guideline interviews with journalists were conducted; they were asked about their career, their working conditions and their role perception. The findings show that in Germany nowadays the journalistic field is dominated by information professionals, who know their craft and who made the needs of the audience the benchmark of their work. Different from what literature suggests, it makes little sense to differentiate between a “commercial” and an “intellectual” pole. Exclusive news (which is what the field is all about) can only be produced where enough capital is available. At the centre of power, to which news magazines, national daily newspapers and public broadcasting stations belong, one can most easily withdraw from the economic logic and the influence that emanates from the audience and the advertising clients.