A DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE AUSTRALIAN RAW WOOL MARKET*

This paper develops a quarterly disequilibrium model of the Australian wool market. It is postulated that because of inherent market imperfections the market does not clear. The model consists of demand and supply equations for both private and government traders, a minimum condition to determine quantity transacted and a price adjustment equation based on excess demand/supply. Effective demand/supply concepts which recognise the expectation of rationing are employed to model private demand/supply. Supplier price expectations explicitly account for the lower bound imposed by the minimum reserve price scheme (RPS). The estimates suggest that the disequilibrium hypothesis cannot be rejected, as a consequence measures of market imbalance are provided. The model is also used to simulate the effects of the removal of the RPS.     

LEARNING-BY-DOING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLY REGULATION*

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation.     

THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON WAGES AND INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT PRICES UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY1

This paper seeks to determine whether, under bilateral monopoly, profit rate regulation induces an input price bias in addition to the well known Averch-Johnson capital intensity bias. Using a Nash-type employer-union, fixed bargaining power model, it is found that regulation may induce lower as well as higher wage rates. Similarly, when the two parties are respectively capital equipment supplier and user, regulation of the user's profit rate has an ambiguous effect on the equipment rental rate. In both cases the input price effect is shown to depend on the elasticity of factor substitution and on how demand elasticity varies with output.     

可计算的一般非均衡模型

本文根据现实世界经济变化的鲜明特征,建立了一个多部门市场经济的可计算非均衡动态模型。该模型突出了市场经济运转中市场中介人的核心作用:即在供求不等的价位上如何促使买卖成交,在生产和消费计划不协调的情况下如何协调生产、交换和消费活动。文章用递归(recursive-programming)方法模拟了市场的非均衡动态过程,部门内、部门间和市场上的反馈系统结构以及各种产品、投入物的存货调节机制和价格形成机制。经济人受约束的理性行为、适应性行为和小心谨慎行为以及若干经济制度特征都按可操作、可运转、可计算的方式进行了详细精致地描述和刻画。     

THE AD-AS MODEL AND ITS SOLUTIONS: SOME NEW RESULTS IN A DISEQUILIBRIUM PERSPECTIVE*

This paper discusses the logical foundation and the solutions of a microfounded aggregate demand … aggregate supply model under the disequilibrium hypothesis. We first show that a) the latter hypothesis is the only one ensuring model consistent expectations and that b) price predetermination, more than price flexibility, should be embodied in an AD-AS framework. Then we develop a full AD-AS scheme, both under excess supply and excess demand for labour. We prove that in the latter case no well defined equilibrium exists. Finally, we discuss stability and perform some comparative statics exercises.     

A DISEQUILIBRIUM INTERPRETATION OF KALDOR'S TECHNICAL PROGRESS FUNCTION*

This note examines the nature of underlying production function to Kaldor's technical progress function. It has been found that in the context of disequilibrium between planned savings and investment the history of capital accumulation becomes crucial.     

THE PRICE-QUALITY RELATIONSHIP UNDER MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION

The standard economic approaches (screening and signalling) to product quality imply an upward sloping relationship between price and product quality. In the case of screening models it is a relationship which applies to the product line of each individual firm. In the case of signalling models it applies across firms. Both types of model have their shortcomings. An alternative approach is presented which involves endogenising the quality control process. Firms voluntarily provide a warranty contract for their products and this, in turn generates an incentive to control quality. The model compares monopolistic and competitive markets in respect of warranties. quality control and the price-quality relationship. Under monopoly, the price-quality relationship is always upward-sloping or flat. Under competition, however, cost shifts or certain demand side shifts can generate a downward-sloping relationship between price and quality.     

FISCAL POLICIES IN AN INTERTEMPORAL DISEQUILIBRIUM MACROECONOMIC MODEL

A two-period macroeconomic model where consumption and investment decisions are given microeconomic foundations is presented. The model is used to analyse the effects of both current and anticipated fiscal expansion; careful attention is paid to the implications of the government's intertemporal budget constraint. It is shown that anticipated fiscal expansion may, in certain circumstances, be expansionary. Also, current fiscal expansion, if financed by bonds which are retired through future money creation, may be contractionary.     

DISCOUNT RATE FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN A MONETARY DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMY*

In this paper, we explore the social rate of discount for public investment in a monetary overlapping generations model which allows for market disequilibria arising from price and wage rigidities. Financing public investment with a lump-sum tax on the younger generation, borrowing and money supply, the government maximizes the sum of generational utilities discounted by a social rate of time preference. For the social welfare optimum, it is required to take the boundary-maintaining policy by making demand for output equal to supply. In a stationary state, we show that (i) the social rate of discount on the Keynesian-repressed inflation boundary should be the weighted average of the social rate of time preference and the market rate of interest, the weights depending on the amount of private investment crowded out by public investment, and (ii) on the Keynesian-classical boundary it should be a modified version of the weighted average rule, containing an extra term which represents the marginal opportunity cost of public investment through its impact on labour employment.     

MONOPOLY POWER AND DOWNWARD PRICE RIGIDITY UNDER COSTLY PRICE ADJUSTMENT

A method of 'backward deduction' is used to analyse the decisions of a firm, setting price and quantity before demand observations are made, with the option to adjust price at a cost after demand is observed. It is shown for such a firm that the events of (1) downward price rigidity; (2) overproduction; and (3) a high degree of monopoly power are closely related. The paper distinguishes itself from the previous literature on costly price adjustment in its treatment of disequilibrium situations and focus on monopoly power in relation to price rigidity. The main results are obtained for a linear demand curve and a uniform demand distribution.