CONSISTENT TRADE POLICY AGGREGATION*

Most empirical policy work requires policy aggregation. Trade policy aggregation exemplifies the aggregation problem poignantly, with thousands of highly dispersed trade barriers. This article provides methods of policy aggregation that are consistent with two common objectives of empirical work. One is to preserve real income. The other is to preserve the real volume of activity in the parts of the economy being aggregated. Both objectives must be achieved for consistent multicountry policy modeling. An application to India shows that the standard atheoretic method of aggregation overstates India's real income by around three times the global gains from free trade.     

PRODUCTIVITY MATTERS FOR TRADE POLICY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

In the growth literature that investigates the effect of trade liberalization on productivity, nearly all studies assume that trade policy is determined independently of productivity, and, hence, it is exogenous. I show, both theoretically and empirically, that this assumption is not valid in general. I find that in Colombia more productive sectors receive more protection and the sectors with higher productivity gains are liberalized less even in the presence of a large unilateral liberalization shock that affects all sectors. Researchers may be underestimating the positive effect of liberalization on productivity when they do not account for the endogeneity bias.     

LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.     

DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE*

In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.     

VOTER PREFERENCES,INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM

The enormous impact that economic freedom can have on economic outcomes makes an understanding of the factors or forces affecting its level paramount. To what extent do citizen preferences regarding the role of government in the economy drive the level of or changes in economic freedom? We explore this question using a new index of voting in the U.S. Congress constructed consistent with the Fraser Institute indices of economic freedom. We use voting on national legislation to examine state‐level economic freedom to clearly separate the measurement of preferences from policies that at least partly reflect these preferences. We find that Congressional votes, both from the House and Senate, are related to increases in state economic freedom, and that the result is generally statistically and economically significant, and robust to inclusion of a variety of socioeconomic control variables. (JEL D72, H10, H50)     

ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME-SERIES APPROACH*

This paper provides a time-series analysis on the relationship between the extent of endogenous trade policy and both political and economic variables. The chosen trade policy indicator is the number of foreign-trade regulations passed each year for the benefit of a single firm or industry. The data are from Uruguay, 1925–1983. This country, which experienced an impressive economic decline, is an outstanding example of the rent-seeking society. The paper shows that endogenous regulations increased with discretionary policies, with adverse macroeconomic shocks and under dictatorship. It also shows that these regulations had a negative long-run effect on the growth rates of output and exports. The short-run effect was positive however.     

ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY*

I characterize the optimal export promoting policy for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for duopolies, it is always optimal to subsidize exports when entry is endogenous, under both quantity and price competition. With homogenous goods the optimal export subsidy is a fraction 1/ε of the price, where ε is the elasticity of demand (the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade theory). Analogously, I show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous.     

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH INTERNATIONALLY OWNED FIRMS*

The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent-shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.     

ASYMMETRIC PREFERENCES FOR INTEREST RATE VARIABILITY AND NON-LINEAR MONETARY POLICY INERTIA

Introducing in a central bank loss function asymmetric preferences for interest rate stabilization together with a (symmetric) smoothing goal could lead to asymmetric interest rate smoothing. An empirical analysis supports this theoretical result and finds for the disinflation (Volcker) period a more cautious adjustment of interest rates downwards than upwards, and for the 'price stability' (Greenspan) period a more inertial behaviour in the opposite direction.     

INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS,IRREVERSIBILITY OF INVESTMENTS AND FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

In this paper, we analyse the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to improve long‐run welfare when productive investment is irreversible and uncollateralizable and there is no insurance. Only fiat money or government issued bonds provide self‐insurance. We demonstrate that an increase in precautionary savings reduces irreversible productive investment. Hence, subsidies to promote productive but irreversible investment should be financed in such a way that they do not reduce insurance capability. When lump‐sum subsidies are high, a consumption tax is likely to be more redistributive and thus more consumption smoothing than are the other sets of instruments analysed in our model.     

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND TRADE PROTECTION: POLICY ISSUES FOR SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

This article shows that economic integration acts as a viable instrument of protection for individual countries, when benefits of discriminatory protectionist policies like the multifiber arrangement are withdrawn. Using United Nations Conference on Trade and Development statistics for 1995–2013 and applying an extended version of the augmented gravity model, we show that the formation of a trade bloc like the South Asian Free Trade Area unambiguously promotes member countries' exports of textile and clothing at both intra‐bloc and extra‐bloc levels. The expansion of south‐south trade is facilitated by the growing intraregional trade in intermediate goods. The creation of a regional value chain can shield the smaller countries in the context of enhanced global competition. (JEL F14, F15, F13)     

STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES AS INSTRUMENTS OF INNOVATION POLICY

This article expands the literature on the rationales and governance of state owned enterprises (SOEs). We show that SOEs could be seen as instruments of innovation policies and change agents within broader innovation systems that can overcome many of the conventional challenges of innovation policy and its implementation, from coordination and implementation of policies and innovation system actor networks to financing innovation. We review the existing literature on the rationales of SOEs and extend it to include innovation as a central rationale. Thereafter we provide a taxonomy that reveals the necessary policy and managerial conditions and constraints for using SOEs as instruments of innovation policy. We place some of the better‐known innovation‐oriented SOE successes and failures into this taxonomy and show that this approach will allow in future research to explore different SOE practices and potential for using SOEs as innovation policy instruments across countries.     

INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE AND NATIONAL ENTRY POLICY

Abstract.  This paper analyses entry policy in an open economy using an intra-industry trade model. Entry policy is the policy by which a government regulates the number of firms in the country. Implementation of this policy is accompanied by subsidies. In this paper, only one country implements this policy and the other country does not enforce any regulations. We show that the national entry policy makes both countries better off than they would be at the market equilibrium if a certain condition is met. This means that national entry policy is not necessarily a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.