Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.     

SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.     

PRICE DYNAMICS,FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND ANTICIPATED SHOCKS IN A TOURISM ECONOMY

Using a dynamic model of an open monetary economy, this paper examines the effects of tourism‐related anticipated shocks on goods prices and foreign exchange reserves. Foreign tourists consume mainly non‐traded goods in holiday destinations, converting them into exportable goods. This gives rise to a tourism terms‐of‐trade effect that affects the accumulation of foreign exchange. Announcements of anticipated events bring tourist visits forward, resulting in an initial under‐adjustment or an over‐adjustment in the prices of the non‐traded goods when the tourism terms‐of‐trade effect is positive or negative. This leads to an increase or a decrease in foreign reserves in the long run.     

The Transmission of Sustained Growth through the Terms of Trade in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper develops a two‐country model of endogenous growth and international trade in intermediate goods. In autarky just one of the economies enjoys sustained growth. The trade situation may be characterized by complete specialization of both countries, or by incomplete specialization of the growing economy. In either case, trade transmits perpetual growth to the stagnant economy because of the permanent improvements in its terms of trade. The existence of a non‐reproducible factor in the growing economy is crucial to ensure propagation of growth. Moreover, under incomplete specialization countries converge in per capita income. This result relies on two assumptions. First, there must be a large enough share of world income to pay for the input in which the stagnant economy has comparative advantage. Second, all technologies producing intermediate goods should be equally intensive in the non‐reproducible factor.     

Are wages equal across sectors of production?

The assumption that national labour markets are homogeneous across tradable and non‐tradable goods is common in multisector (open‐economy) macro models and crucial for the prominent Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis. To test it, this study introduces a novel, theory‐based method of distinguishing the tradable and non‐tradable sectors to the Balassa–Samuelson literature and employs modern empirical methods and a large and detailed macro dataset. It finds that both the internal relationship between productivity and wages in the tradable and non‐tradable sectors postulated by the Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis and its external transmission mechanism are rejected.     

Common property, information, and cooperation: Commercial fishing in the Bering Sea

A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has focused on the conditions under which cooperative behavior among actors providing public goods or extracting common-pool resources arises. The literature identifies the importance of coercion, small groups of actors, or the existence of social norms as conducive to cooperation. This research empirically investigates cooperative behavior in a natural resource extraction industry in which the provision of a public good (bycatch avoidance) in the Alaskan flatfish fishery is essential to the duration of the fishing season, and an information provision mechanism exists to relay information to all individuals. Using a mixed logit model of spatial fishing behavior our results show that conditionally cooperative behavior is prevalent but deteriorates as bycatch constraints tighten.     

Endogenous growth with a limited fossil fuel extraction capacity

Campbell (1980) and following authors have discussed a limited resource extraction capacity as an augmentation of the well‐known Hotelling model. We integrate a limited extraction capacity and related investments in the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) to study its effect on economic development. The capacity constraint gives rise to three effects. On the one hand, higher energy costs and the reallocation of production towards capacity investments decrease production available for consumption, research and/or capital investments (energy costs and reallocation effect). On the other hand, research investments may increase, which boosts available production (research effect). Depending on the capital endowment and the strength of the effects, long‐run consumption may be boosted or depressed. In particular, the capacity constraint may render everlasting consumption growth non‐optimal in a resource‐rich economy. Furthermore, we find that capacity investments may be postponed to later points in time if the capital endowment is high.     

The Division and Size of Gains from Liberalization in Service Networks*

If two disjoint country service networks involving a small and large country are connected as part of international liberalization in the presence of network externalities, the per capita gain for the small country from access to a large network will be large, and the per capita gain for the large country will be small. In contrast to goods, the benefits of liberalization in network‐related services are more likely to be approximately equally divided between large and small countries than is true of trade in goods, where benefits accrue disproportionately to the small country. We also argue that non‐cooperation in network‐related services trade may involve more extreme retaliation than suggested for trade in goods by the optimal tariff literature, so that relative to a non‐cooperative outcome, gains from liberalization in network‐related services become larger than from liberalization in goods. We develop simple models which we use for numerical examples showing these points, along with an empirical implementation for global telecoms liberalization for the US, Europe, Canada, and the rest of the world using the framework developed in the paper. This shows similar proportional gains to regions, consistent with the theme of the paper that goods and services liberalization differ.     

Resource abundance and regional development in China1

Over the past several decades, China has made tremendous progress in market integration and infrastructure development. Demand for natural resources has increased from the booming coastal economies, causing the terms of trade to favour the resource sector, which is predominantly based in the interior regions of the country. However, the gap in economic development level between the coastal and inland regions has widened significantly. In this paper, using a panel dataset at the provincial level, we show that Chinese provinces with abundant resources perform worse than their resource‐poor counterparts in terms of per capita consumption growth. This trend that resource‐poor areas are better off than resource‐rich areas is particularly prominent in rural areas. Because of the institutional arrangements regarding property rights of natural resources, most gains from the resource boom have been captured either by the government‐ or state‐owned enterprises. Thus, the windfall of natural resources has more to do with government consumption than household consumption. Moreover, in resource‐rich areas, greater revenues accrued from natural resources bid up the price of non‐tradable goods and hurt the competitiveness of the local economy.     

Bottom‐up world climate policies: Preserving fossil fuel deposits vs. capping fuel consumption

The policy of purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation is an alternative to the demand‐side climate policies that predominate in practice and in professional studies. This paper analyzes the deposit purchase approach and compares it to the standard demand‐side policy in a model with international trade and non‐cooperative governments that account for the effects of their policies on equilibrium prices. We investigate how the two regimes differ with respect to their equilibrium allocations and, in particular, with respect to the countries’ mitigation effort and welfare. If countries are symmetric, mitigation is stronger in the demand‐side than in the supply‐side regime and the transition from the latter to the former is welfare enhancing for all countries. If countries have different endowments of deposits in a two‐country economy, the country with higher extraction costs does not purchase deposits for preservation, and the country with lower extraction costs is better off with the supply‐side than with the demand‐side policy. Finally, we consider the case of combined policies and find surprisingly that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists, when heterogeneous countries apply both policy instruments.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Why Are Rich Countries More Politically Cohesive?*

We document empirically that rich countries are more politically cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the productivity of their supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization are sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non‐cohesive under self‐sufficiency, the political decision‐making process becomes cohesive in the market economy, because the welfare of individuals will be mutually interdependent as a result of the exchange of goods.     

Protection and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy

In a small‐open‐economy model with two tradables and one nontradable, if a price index of these three goods is stabilized and the exchange rate is flexible, conditions are obtained in the cases of two and of three or more factors for an export subsidy or an import tariff to result in currency appreciation. In the case of three or more factors, conditions are obtained under which either an export‐subsidy or an import‐tariff policy (or a combination) can take the place of a flexible exchange rate in accommodating the necessary resource allocation to an exogenous capital outflow, generalizing Keynes’s 1931 proposition.     

The implications of heterogeneous resource intensities on technical change and growth

Abstract We analyze the long‐term dynamics of an economy in which sectors are heterogeneous with respect to the intensity of natural resource use. It is shown that heterogeneity induces technical change to be biased towards resource‐intensive sectors. Along the balanced growth path, the sectoral structure of the economy is constant as the higher resource dependency in resource‐intensive sectors is compensated by enhanced research activities. Resource taxes have no impact on dynamics except when the tax rate varies over time. Research subsidies and the sectoral provision of productivity‐enhancing public goods raise growth and provide an effective tool for structural policy.     

Why does the velocity of money move pro‐cyclically?

The velocity of money usually rises in expansions and falls in recessions This paper explains this pro‐cyclical movement of velocity using two ideas: (i) during business cycles the movement of investment and consumption of durable goods has a larger amplitude than consumption of non‐durable goods and services; (ii) the velocity associated with expenditure on investment and durable goods is much higher than the velocity associated with consumption of non‐durable goods and services, because the former expenditures are synchronized with the attainment of money by economic agents whereas the latter are not. In this setting, the rise in the weight of expenditure in durable goods relative to the weight of non‐durable goods and services, which occurs during expansions, generates an increase in the average velocity of circulation. The opposite happens during recessions and thus velocity moves pro‐cyclically.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Sectoral Shocks: Is International Monetary Cooperation Beneficial?

A stochastic general‐equilibrium model is used to explore the welfare effects of optimal monetary policy and the potential benefits of policy coordination. Cross‐country perfectly symmetric shocks in the traded goods sectors and imperfectly correlated shocks in the non‐traded goods sectors are considered. In this set‐up, monetary policy may not be able to achieve efficient sectoral resource allocations within countries and avoid inefficient relative price changes across countries. Welfare gains from coordination are sizable if the shocks to the traded and non‐traded goods sectors are negatively correlated and both sectors are of roughly equal size.     

Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long‐run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non‐cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.     

Climate policy and the optimal extraction of high‐ and low‐carbon fossil fuels

Abstract. We study how restricting CO₂ emissions affects resource prices and depletion over time. We use a Hotelling‐style model with two non‐renewable fossil fuels that differ in their carbon content (e.g., coal and natural gas) and in addition are imperfect substitutes in final good production. We show that an economy facing a CO₂ flow‐constraint may substitute towards the relatively dirty input. As the economy tries to maximize output per unit of emissions it is not only carbon content that matters: productivity matters as well. With an announced constraint the economy first substitutes towards the less productive input such that more of the productive input is available when constrained. Preliminary empirical results suggest that it is cost‐effective to substitute away from dirty coal to cleaner oil or gas, but to substitute from natural gas towards the dirtier input oil.     

Reducing Inefficiency in Public Good Provision Through Linking

We characterize the optimal mechanism for the provision of n public goods in an economy with m agents, binary valuations. The mechanism “links” the n problems together because decisions and transfers are based on the whole vector of valuations of the agents. In particular, the decision on whether or not to provide a public good depends not only on the valuations of the agents for that good but, in some cases, also on the valuations for the other goods reported by the low‐valuation agents. For the two‐agent case, we show that the mechanism is asymptotically efficient and we provide an example that compares its relative efficiency with optimal separate provision and with another asymptotically efficient mechanism in the literature.