Universal Service and Entry: The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints

Universal service objectives are pervasive in telecommunications, and have gained new relevance after the introduction of competition in many markets. Despite their policy relevance, little work has been done allowing for a thorough discussion of instruments designed to achieve universal service objectives under competition. We intend to fill this gap, and disaggregate the problem into interacting forms of regulatory intervention such as uniform pricing and coverage constraints. It is shown that these are not competitively neutral and may have far-reaching strategic effects. Under uniform pricing, equilibrium coverage of both incumbent and entrant may be lower than without regulation. These effects depend on which measures are imposed at the same time, thus no single measure can be evaluated in isolation. We also point out that different groups of consumers are affected in different ways, making welfare comparisons difficult.     

Pricing and Access under National Competition Policy: The Case of the Natural Gas Pipeline Sector

This paper reviews the development of open access and deregulation of trunk pipeline natural gas transportation in Australia and the United States. It investigates Australian policy developments in the setting of reference tariffs for firm service, but argues that the institutional arrangements for granting third party access, and the pricing of that access on a spot or interruptible basis, are at least as important as tariffs for firm service. The paper concludes that, in the absence of an established pipeline network, pipelines may have little incentive to price their excess capacity efficiently. In this case, attempts to promote an efficient allocative outcome through privatisation and open access in Australia are unlikely to be as successful as they have been in North America.     

掠夺性定价行为的异化及其竞争策略研究

在网络经济条件下,掠夺性定价行为的主体、掠夺条件、表现形式和实施效果都出现了异化,因此,针对掠夺性定价行为的竞争政策也需作相应调整,从效率与公平两个角度系统考量新经济条件下掠夺性定价行为,而不是简单地加以限制.     

市场竞争、创业型雇员进入与竞争政策的福利评价

基于创业型雇员内源式进入视角,笔者构建了内部市场进入模型,并对雇员前向进入阻止及竞争政策效果进行了福利评价。研究发现,降低市场进入壁垒未必能促进市场竞争甚至会侵害社会福利;当存在创业型雇员前向进入风险时,雇员的能力差异会影响在位企业雇佣决策和福利水平。竞争政策的制定需充分考虑行业技术属性,高技术制造业和研发服务业应强化创业型雇员的诚信和知识产权保护,而提高雇员内源式进入违约成本并加大侵权惩罚力度对创建民族品牌和履行社会诚信义务意义重大。     

供应商规模、产品差异与通道费定价策略

传统理论对通道费的解释是大型零售商相对于供应商所具有的市场势力,本文借助双边市场的分析框架,将大型零售商视为一个为供应商和消费者提供交易服务的平台厂商,通过向双方分别收取通道费和零售加价来获得利润。用户数量和交叉网络外部性是影响大型零售商利润和通道费定价策略的重要因素,产品差异对交叉网络外部性的强弱有重要影响,通道费的高低则与供应商的规模与市场份额密切关系。     

Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for Environmental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Competition

The literature identifies linkages between domestic environmental policies and trade, the treatment of imports being an important issue in administration of domestic environmental excise taxes. With the aim of ensuring foreign exporters do not attain a competitive advantage, border tax adjustments are used. Since most environmental excise taxes apply to intermediate goods, the relevant border tax adjustment applies to final imported goods. However, when both intermediate and final goods markets are oligopolistic, border tax adjustments may be non‐neutral. Moreover, even if market access is unchanged, border tax adjustments can still lead to redistribution of profits between domestic and foreign firms.     

垄断、竞争与市场规制：美国的经验与中国的实践

经济学上的垄断是指对市场的控制和干预,它包括企业垄断和政府垄断,垄断的危害极大,各国法律对其限制严格。我国现有的《反不正当竞争法》不足以限制垄断行为,尤其是政府经济垄断;美国《反托拉斯法》的经济与法律思想及其实施给我们提供了一个很好的参考模式,因此,借鉴美国的经验,修订和完善《反不正当竞争法》规范政府垄断行为,是建立完善的市场经济秩序的重要保证。     

市场条件、承销商声誉与IPO定价

构建了一个两期承销商收益模型,用相对行业市盈率反映市场条件,研究了不同声誉的承销商在不同市场条件下的IPO定价机制。以2005—2012年中国A股市场的IPO公司为研究样本进行实证检验。研究结果表明:高声誉承销商为提高声誉对当期承销的IPO进行保守定价,低声誉承销商以最大化当期承销收入为目标对IPO进行激进定价。这种定价机制导致:相对于低声誉承销商,高声誉承销商承销的IPO有更高的首日收益和更好的长期市场表现;在高估值市场条件下,高声誉承销商承销IPO的首日收益与市场条件显著正相关,而IPO的长期市场表现与之显著负相关;在低估值市场条件下,低声誉承销商承销IPO的首日收益与市场条件显著正相关,高声誉承销商承销IPO的长期市场表现与之显著负相关。     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

治理成本、市场竞争与企业生产率

基于企业微观层面的全要素生产率,本文从公司内部治理和外部市场环境的视角,考察治理成本与市场竞争对企业生产率的影响,并进一步从调节效应和中介效应的角度深入研究人力资本对上述关系的影响机制。利用中国工业企业统计数据,研究发现,无论在国企还是民企中,治理成本都显著阻碍了企业生产率的提升,然而,市场竞争在提升民企生产率的同时,降低了国企生产率。进一步的扩展性检验表明,对于民企,人力资本在边际上显著促进了生产率的提升,同时,人力资本还是公司治理提高生产率的重要途径;而对于国企,人力资本不存在边际影响,只在市场竞争层面有微弱的中介效应。     

Access Pricing,Quality Degradation,and Foreclosure in the Internet

Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The optimal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict between international and domestic regulation policy.     

消费者寻求多样化、拥塞效应和厂商歧视 定价竞争

在一些同时存在消费者寻求多样化购买和拥塞效应的行业,寡头厂商广泛使用基于消费者购买历史进行歧视定价的商业模式,文章建立了动态博弈模型针对这类行业和商业模式进行了深入研究.研究结果表明厂商实施歧视定价源于消费者寻求多样化购买,而且消费者寻求多样化和拥塞效应会导致厂商每一期产生"默契合谋".与统一定价相比,歧视定价会增加消费者福利,降低社会总福利.进一步的定价策略选择研究发现,寡头厂商都会选择获利较少的歧视性定价策略,陷入"囚徒困境"的境地.对于文章所研究的行业,厂商应该利用信息技术,积极使用这种定价策略,而公共政策不应过多地干预.     

Transfer Pricing Rules,OECD Guidelines,and Market Distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on prices, firms' organizational structure, and consumers' utility in a two‐country monopolistic competition model with source‐based profit taxes. Firms can either be multinationals and serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate, or be exporters and serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. The use of the OECD's comparable uncontrolled transfer price (CUP) rule distorts firms' output and pricing decisions, because the comparable arm's length transactions between exporters and distributors—which serve as the benchmark—are not efficient. We show that the CUP rule is detrimental to consumers in the low‐tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high‐tax country when compared to the benchmark of unconstrained profit shifting. Using the OECD rule increases tax revenue at the expense of consumer surplus. Those results also hold under the alternative cost‐plus transfer pricing rule.     

市场有效性与风险定价--有效市场理论综述之二

笔者在《经济经纬》2003年第6期上对有效市场理论作了综述,接下来的问题是,有效市场假设(efficient market hypothesis)是如何得到运用并推广的?我们知道,证券市场相对于产品市场的价格机制更为有效,因为它的交易、运输、信息成本更低,竞争更充分。这里给出了证券定价利用市场有效性假设的具体例子。     

人民币汇率、依市场定价与资源配置效率

本文基于依市场定价模型分析人民币汇率变动对资源配置扭曲指标——加成率离散度的影响机制。结果表明,企业市场份额越高,加成率也越高,但其出口加成率对汇率的弹性也越大。因此,在出口市场份额悬殊的外向型垄断行业中,本币升值会相对压低高市场份额(高加成率)企业的加成率,缩小行业内加成率离散度。本文采用中国微观企业数据,结合倍差法发现人民币升值降低了外向型行业的加成率离散度,但该资源配置改善效应仅在垄断行业中显著。分位数倍差法进一步发现,升值相对压低了垄断的外向型行业中高加成率企业的加成,直接地缩小了加成率离散度。升值还对垄断行业中的低生产率企业产生了倒逼效应,减轻了资源配置扭曲。     

消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

竞争市场与垄断市场:一个基于福利的分析

传统经济理论认为垄断会导致社会福利的损失。在它的分析框架中。实际上瞻舍着成本不变假说，即完全竞争市场中的企业与垄断市场中的企业的成本(或边际成本)是相同的。规模经济理论告诉我们，规模大的企业更容易形成规模经济效果，因而垄断企业的规模经济效果是完全竞争企业不可比拟的，成本不变假说就显得很不真实。本文试图证明在某种前提(如资金密集型产业和知识密集型产业)下垄断所带来的规模经济效果能够弥补社会福利的损失，甚至使社会总福利增加。这一结论对我国市场化改革具有现实意义。     

审计市场结构：自由竞争抑或垄断竞争

国内文献大多认为我国独立审计市场属于自由竞争市场.我们的市场检验发现,我国的审计市场不具备经济学意义上的完全竞争市场特征.按照贝恩的划分,以客户资产和主营业务收入计量的市场集中度表明我国寡占型审计市场已初步形成.但居高不下的本地客户率表明.我国审计市场地区垄断情况很严重,应引起监管部门的注意.     

Average-cost Pricing, Increasing Returns, and Optimal Output: Comparing Home and Market Production

We employ a model with both market production and home production to show that, ignoring administrative costs and indirect effects (such as rent-seeking), even if both the home and the market sectors have the condition of increasing returns and there are no pre-existing taxes, it is still efficient to tax the home sector to finance a subsidy on the market sector to offset the under-production of the latter due to the failure of price-taking consumers to take account of the effects of higher consumption in reducing the average costs and hence prices, through increasing returns or the publicness nature of fixed costs. Within market production, it is efficient to subsidise more the sector with a higher fixed cost, a lower elasticity of substitution between goods (higher value of diversity), and a lower degree of importance in preference, which all increase the degree of increasing returns.     

市场竞争、银行市场势力与流动性创造效率—来自中国银行业的证据

商业银行是中国社会融资的主要渠道,银行向社会提供流动性的效率直接决定了社会融资的效率.为弥补流动性创造研究在效率和中观层面的不足,文章采用中国商业银行2000?2015年微观数据,探讨了市场竞争、银行市场势力与流动性创造效率之间的关系,得到以下结论:(1)市场竞争与流动性创造效率之间存在倒U形关系,中国银行业存在最优的市场结构;(2)银行市场势力过强是中国商业银行流动性创造效率较低的重要原因,银行市场势力越强,其流动性创造效率越低;(3)市场竞争程度与市场势力的流动性创造效率系数之间存在不显著的负相关关系,寄希望于通过增强中国银行业竞争程度来改善银行市场势力过强所导致的流动性创造效率过低,作用可能非常有限.中国应沿着"增强商业银行流动性创造能力,扩大直接融资规模"的改革方向继续前进.文章的研究丰富了已有文献,而且为中国银行体系改革的顶层设计提供了重要参考.