FUNCTIONAL ESTIMATES OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC EXPENDITURES, FISCAL 1952–1963

The purpose of the paper is to describe current and constant price estimates of Japanese central and local government postwar domestic expenditures by economic type and function recently completed by Miss Yoshiko Kido, International Christian University, Tokyo, and myself. The rationale of the functional classification is to estimate those government expenditures which enhance the economy's productive capacity. Expenditures are divided into four broad functional categories: developmental, disaster repair and prevention, social welfare, and general government. These four categories are subdivided to two levels of disaggregation. We were able to break down government fixed investment, government enterprise inventory investment, current domestic transfers and subsidies into 42 functional components. For constant price series, each functional component by economic type was deflated by separate price indexes. We followed the Economic Planning Agency's procedure for the official national accounts of assuming no productivity change in the provision of government services. Our results are generally comparable to the official national accounts estimates. The major difference is that we attribute considerably more fixed investment to local governments, and correspondingly less to the central level. Government expenditures had the following characteristics. Growth was rapid; in real terms the public sector use of the economy's resources in 1963 was 2.2 times more than in 1952. The elasticity of government expenditures to GNP was unity in current prices, slightly less in real terms. The government postwar share in GNP has been smaller than in European nations and, unlike them, was not rising. This reflects the underlying growth strategy of emphasis upon private business fixed investment. Government consumption expenditures declined relative to GNP, and investment rose. Developmental expenditures comprised the largest share (40–45 per cent) of the government total. The elasticities to GNP of government expenditures by economic and functional categories are provided and discussed. A simple test was made of the cyclical relationship of government expenditures (both total and by category) to GNP. The results suggest that government expenditures, rather than contra-cyclical, were pro-cyclical in effect.     

THE TREATMENT OF INTANGIBLE RESOURCES AS CAPITAL

The author describes the results of his current research designed to measure total investment, tangible and intangible, and the derived capital stocks for the U.S., 1929–1966. With respect to total investment, the estimates show a marked increase in its ratio to GNP. All of the increase occurs in the intangible component comprising R & D, education and training, health, and mobility. The increase was concentrated in the government sector, although households increased the proportion of disposable personal income devoted to total investment.
Consistent with the relative investment trends, the stock of intangible capital grew considerably faster than the tangible stock. The growth of total capital stocks was somewhat less than that of GNP, however, in both current and constant prices. Thus, the rate of return on total capital rose somewhat over the period. Average rates of return on human and nonhuman capital were closely similar.
In real terms, the growth of total capital stocks accounted for two-thirds of the growth in real GNP, 1929–1966. One-third of the growth is attributed to residual forces, chiefly economies of scale, changes in inherent quality of human and natural resources, changes in values and motivations, and changes in rates of utilization of capacity.
The growth of the ratio of real intangible stocks to real tangible stocks accounted for less than half of the increase in total factor productivity 1929–1966. This is significantly less than the contribution of intangibles as estimated by Denison, and the author adduces several reasons why his estimates may understate the contribution. Nevertheless, it seems that the net effect of the residual forces enumerated above must also have made a substantial contribution to the growth of tangible factor productivity and real GNP over the 37-year period.     

TOTAL INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1946–1976: A SUMMARY REPORT

Extended accounts of total income and product and associated capital stocks for the United States, in current and constant dollars, are offered for the years 1946 to 1976. They include intangible and tangible capital accumulation and non-market and market outputs in all sectors, services of government and household capital and of unpaid household labor, and opportunity costs of students. Defense and police services are classified as intermediate product; a portion of commercial media services is counted as final product. Expenses related to work are subtracted while the values of employee training and human capital formation and net revaluations of existing tangible capital are added.
Total incomes (TISA) net national product was 50 percent greater than official Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) NNP in 1976. BEA gross private domestic investment was only about 18 percent of TISA gross capital accumulation. Intangible investment and TISA net domestic capital accumulation grew more rapidly than BEA net private domestic investment. Household investment has been growing while there have been sharp declines in government investment, particularly in research and development. Contrary to some views of the import of the narrower BEA accounts, total capital accumulation appears to have risen considerably more rapidly than total consumption, 6.3 percent versus 2.2 percent per annum from 1946 to 1976, thus increasing sharply its share of TISA GNP.     

ECONOMIC RENT AND ESTIMATION OF SOVIET GNP GROWTH

The extraction of fuels and metals and production of agricultural goods in the USSR involve increasing marginal cost, which generates economic rent. In computing Soviet GNP accounts, though, the CIA excludes economic rent in measuring value added. The effect is to value output at average, as opposed to marginal, cost. The exclusion of rent understates the shares of fuels, metals, and agriculture in Soviet GNP, which adversely affects the CIA's calculations of Soviet growth. In this paper, the author estimates the economic rent generated by Soviet extraction of fuels and metals and agricultural production. He then uses the estimates to recompute the shares of these sectors in Soviet GNP, and GNP growth. The results suggest that inclusion of economic rent in value added (or alternatively, marginal cost valuation of output) more than doubles the share in GNP of mining (fuels and metals extraction), and increases agriculture's share during the 1980s from 20 percent to about 25 percent. The reestimates of Soviet GNP growth also differ from those of the CIA by 10–30 percent.     

Household wealth, public consumption and economic well-being in the United States

Standard official measures of household economic well-beingin several countries are based on money income. The generalconsensus is that such measures are limited because they ignorecertain crucial determinants of well-being. We examine two suchdeterminants—household wealth and public consumption—inthe context of the US. Our findings suggest that the level anddistribution of economic well-being is substantially alteredwhen money income is adjusted for wealth or public consumption.Over the 1989–2000 period, median well-being appears toincrease faster when these adjustments are made than when standardmoney income is used. Adding imputed rent and annuity from householdwealth to household income increases measured inequality, whileadding public consumption reduces it. However, all three measuresshow about the same rise in inequality over the period.     

APPRAISING THE U.S. OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES FOR GOVERNMENT–WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Output and productivity estimates for U.S. government organizations are a useful management tool, and are of potential value for improving national income accounts. Real gross government product is currently estimated on the basis of labor input data. However, this imparts a downward bias to real GNP estimates since labor productivity of federal civilian employees has risen, according to Labor Department estimates begun in 1972, at an average annual rate of 1; percent since 1967. The estimates now cover almost 70 percent of the employees. The chief avenue for further improvement lies in refinement of the output indicators. Coverage of state and local government employees is spotty and needs to be expanded. The author also recommends a major effort to estimate public capital stocks in current and constant prices as a basis for measuring rental values, capital inputs, and productivity.     

THE ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF HUMAN INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL

Defining investment as outlays that increase income- and output-producing capacity, the author presents estimates of human investment in the United States 1929–69, comprising rearing costs, education, training, health, safety and mobility outlays. He develops an economic accounting framework to accommodate human investments and research and development in national and sector capital accounts, with appropriate adjustments to the current accounts to provide consistency. The associated balance sheets and wealth statements are also developed.
The wealth and corresponding income estimates are used to compute rates of return on human, non-human, and total capital. In the business economy the average net rate of return on total capital was 10.6 percent in 1969, compared with 10.0 percent in 1929. The average and marginal rates of return on human capital were generally somewhat higher than on non-human capital throughout the period.     

BANK OUTPUT MEASUREMENT IN THE EURO AREA: A MODIFIED APPROACH

Banks do not charge explicit fees for many of the services they provide, bundling the service payment with the offered interest rates. This output therefore has to be imputed using estimates of the opportunity cost of funds. We argue that rather than using the single short‐term, low‐risk interest rate as in current official statistics, reference rates should match the risk characteristics of loans and deposits. This would lower euro area imputed bank output by, on average, 28–54 percent compared with the current methodology, implying that euro area GDP (at current prices) is overstated by 0.11–0.18 percent. This adjustment also leads to more plausible shares in value added of income from fixed capital in the banking industry.     

AN ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE ANL STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL PRODUCT OF THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE

On the basis of rough estimates from the expenditure as well as from the income side, it is suggested that the national product per head of the Roman Empire at the death of Augustus (AD 14) was somewhat below 400 sesterces (31 g gold) yielding an aggregate national product of fully HS 20 billion for a population of 55 million and that these figures were approximately valid from the late first century BC to the mid-second century AD. The share of government expenditures in national product was very low, probably not above five percent, and that of gross capital expenditures even lower, probably not in excess of two percent. An attempt is also made to appraise the concentration of personal income and it is estimated that the 600 senatorial families, representing approximately the top 0.04 per m of the population, received about 0.6 percent of total personal income while the share of the top three percent of income recipients was in the order of 20–25 percent of total personal incomes. The second part of the article compares these estimates as well as a few indicators of the standard of living and of welfare in the early Roman Empire with the corresponding figures for a few countries before the industrial revolution and for mid-20th century less developed countries.     

TERMS OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN *

International trade and economic growth have been considered intimately linked in nineteenth century Britain. Conventional estimates of Britain's gross national product, however, fail to account for changes in the terms of trade and may be misleading indicators of changes in real income. Revised figures that incorporate terms of trade changes are presented here. One finding is that conventional estimates of GNP overstate growth in real income early in the century when the terms of trade deteriorated.     

A SYNTHETIC ESTIMATE OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH OF JAPAN 1885–1973*

This article present estimates, in current prices, of the national wealth of Japan and of about a dozen components for twelve benchmark dates between 1885 and 1973, the distance ranging, with one exception, from five to twelve years. The estimates are derived by a combination of (a) Ohkawa's perpetual inventory estimates of reproducible fixed assets for the period from 1885 to 1940 and Economic Planning Agency censuses for 1950 to 1965, roughly extrapolated to 1973; with (b) estimates of other components of national wealth (land, inventories, consumer durables and net foreign assets) taken for the pre-war period chiefly from census-type data and derived for the postwar period from miscellaneous, mainly official, sources. As in most countries the current value of Japan's national wealth increased until World War II considerably more slowly than its national product, which expanded with extraordinary rapidity. In the postwar period, however, the ratio showed a slight upward trend reaching by 1973 fully 3 1/2. The ratio of all reproducible assets to national product showed a similar pattern at a lower level, reaching 2 1/2 in 1973. In contrast the ratio of so-called productive assets (non-residential buildings, equipment and inventories) failed to show a definite secular trend remaining between 1.5 and 2.2 at all but one benchmark date. Changes in the structure of national wealth over the past century were pronounced, but very different before and after World War II. Up to the 1940's, the share of land declined sharply from about one-half to less than one-fourth, to the benefit primarily of producer durables and non-residential structures. In the last quarter of a century, in contrast, the extraordinary rise in urban land prices brought the share of land in national wealth back to one-third (though the share of agricultural land continued to decline rapidly), while that of producer and consumer durables continued to increase.     

HOW LARGE A FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT CAN WE SUSTAIN?

Governments may be unable to sustain large budget deficits indefinitely. Investors may impose limits on the amount of government debt—relative to gross national product (GNP)—they are willing to hold and thus limit the size of the deficit a government can sustain. The size of sustainable nominal deficits, then, would depend on the growth rate of nominal GNP. Reasonable assumptions regarding the GNP growth rate imply that the federal government can main tain its debt/GNP ratio at historically typical levels if it runs deficits of $175 billion in the near term and even larger amounts during future years.     

The Australian Economy

This article deals with developments in the Australian economy in the period from the second quarter of 1973 (the quarter for which the latest official estimates of national income and expenditure are available) through to the end of the financial year 1974–75. It was prepared in October and early November 1973.
Annual periods shown as 1971–72, 1972–73, etc. refer to years ended 30 June.     

Economic-demographic interactions and the impact of investments in population control

The interaction between economic and demographic factors in the Philippines was examined, analyzing the effects of investment in fertility control on the birthrate, population size, and such economic variables as gross national product (GNP), wage rate, and family income. A family planning model that was constructed and is used to project population program cost and births prevented is grafted to and simulated with a larger economic/demographic model. The simulation results are anayzed. The economic demographic model to which the family planning subsystem was grafted is a modified version of the model constructed by Encarnacion et al. (1974). It is basically a neoclassical model, a closed economy in which the real wage rate is determined by the intersection of the demand and supply of labor. The demand for labor is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function on the assumption that labor is paid the value of its margin product, and the labor supply is determined by age and sex specific labor force participation rates and population. Capital accumulation is influenced by population size through its effect on government and private consumption expe nditures. Fertility rate is determined by duration of marriage and the level and distribution of family incomes. The model was used to develop projections from 1970 through 2000. Results show that the effects on per capital income and real wage rate seem significant, yet family income appears largely unaffected and the effect on the traditional investment to output ratio (I/Y) seems minimal. One of the outcomes of the projection without family planning is that, if the economy were to depend solely on its own savings, the average annual rate of growth of gross national product (GNP) would be only about 4.32%, which is less than the historical growth rate of 6% and the present government longterm target of 8%. The result suggests that foreign investments and loans would have to play an increasingly important role in the economic growth of the Philippines unless the gross domestic investment of GNP ratio is increased substantially. Aggregate output is reduced due to a relatively smaller labor force. Thus, it is suggested that if population control programs are accompanied by an increase in the labor participation rate, particularly of women, the payoffs from family planning may be larger. Closer examination of the nature of the payoffs from the family planning program would reveal that they basically stem from the decrease in the number of persons sharing in national output and not from increased production and saving. The observation suggests that population control does not necessarily lead to more rapid economic growth defined as sustained increase in total output.     

HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND NATIONAL PRODUCTION: AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE RECORD

1 By no means is the home based production of housewives the only or even the most important aspect of nonmarket production. The entire question of work vs. leisure, and the distinction between leisure and nonmarket oriented production, are currently under intensive scrutiny. See for instance the work of Nordhaus and Tobin [7, especially appendix section A.3], Gronau [2] and items cited in Gronau. The omission from the national income accounts of work performed at home by males, non-married females, and “working wives” is extremely important. This paper is concerned only with married females because (1) they are the subject of what must be one of the oldest jokes in the subject of social accounting, and (2) the relationship of production by housewives to total production has changed in the past ten years or so, and that deserves some attention even if it is not the most important thing which has been happening with respect to the GNP.
Specifically, we will present estimates of the value of home based nonmarket production by housewives. These estimates will then be used to supplement various national product aggregates in order to calculate more accurate growth rates for the U.S. economy. We find that the value of nonmarket production by married women during the 1960's has averaged approximately thirty percent of the GNP and close to 40 percent of the national income. The inclusion of the nonmarket work of housewives in GNP would reduce the measured rate of growth of real GNP per potential worker by about ten percent, the exact amount depending on how the value of nonmarket work is estimated. Our estimates indicate a reduction in the absolute rate of growth of almost 0.25 percent.     

Canadian economic growth: random walk or just a walk?

This paper analyses the role of shocks in Canadian economic growth since 1870. It uses a nonparametric technique to evaluate the degree of presistence of an innnovation in long-run GNP. It is found that a one percent shock to Canadian GNP changes the long-run forecast of this variable by appproximately the same amount, which is characteristic of a random walk process. It is also shown that in important periods of Canadian economic growth its GNP evolved as a random walk with constant drift. With the exception of the period 1929–42, no evidence of business cycles is found. These results lead to the conclusion that movements and oscillations in the GNP of Canada since 1870 have been primarily driven by the accumulation of shocks rather than by cyclical movements.     

CHINA'S NATIONAL INCOME: A SURVEY OF ESTIMATES

A number of official and Western estimates of China's national income for the period since 1949 are at present available. The official estimates are based on the Marxian production concept while the Western estimates are, in the main, based on the comprehensive production concept. The periods covered by the estimates vary; and even in cases where the periods covered are the same, the estimates vary in magnitude and, in most cases, in the implied rate of economic growth. Apart from differences arising from the different national income concepts and definitions employed in individual estimates, sources of discrepancies between series of estimates can be traced to the particular sets of primary data employed and also to the particular procedures followed in estimating the national income components. The present paper brings together the various estimates available to date and indicates for each, as far as possible, the basic production concept adopted, the particular national income aggregates estimated, the basic estimation approach employed, and the special procedures used for estimating some of the components of national income. Comparisons of the major series of estimates for the period 1952–1959 are made and the sources of discrepancies between the series are discussed. Finally, some problems are described which a researcher in the West has to contend with in working on China's national income accounting.     

TRENDS IN AGGREGATE HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE US., 1900–83

New estimates of aggregate household wealth for the U S. covering selected years in the period from 1900 to 1983 are presented. I find that marketable wealth per capita grew at 1.46 percent per year in real terms over the 1900–83 period, while real wealth per household grew at 0.81 percent per year. However, the growth rate was not uniform over the period, with the rates high during the 1900–29 and the 1949–69 periods, and slow during the other years. Moreover, real per capita wealth actually increased more slowly than real per capita disposable income and real per capita GNP over the century. I also find dramatic changes in the composition of household wealth over the century. In particular, both tangibles and fixed claim assets increased relative to total assets over the period from 1900 to 1983, while equities fell from about half to a quarter. Owner-occupied housing increased only moderately as a proportion of assets, from 17 percent in 1900 to 20 percent in 1983. Unincorporated business equity fell from over a third of total assets to 12 percent. Among financial assets, the biggest relative growth occurred in deposits in financial institutions, which grew from 8 percent in 1900 to 22 percent in 1983. Corporate stock had the most volatile behavior in the household portfolio, growing from 13 percent of total assets in 1900 to 27 percent in 1929, falling to 10 percent in 1949, rising to 22 percent in 1965, and then falling to 11 percent by 1983. Debt as a proportion of total assets rose from 5 percent in 1900 to 16 percent in 1983. Finally, both pension reserves and social security wealth increased relative to marketable assets from virtually zero in 1900 to 12 and 48 percent, respectively.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS IN THE NETHERLANDS

This paper reports on a study designed to improve the information on income flows and income distribution in the Netherlands national accounts by building a bridge between the national accounts and income tax statistics. The methods used are described in some detail, and the significance of the results obtained is discussed. The figures show rather substantial fluctuations in the share of proprietors relative to that of wage earners. This result is not unexpected, since the share of proprietors is much more sensitive to the level of economic activity, but it does limit the usefulness of the figures for short-run economic policy determination. In the longer run, however, they do show what the development of the average incomes of the various social groups has been, and to what extent government action has contributed to that development.     

Twenty-five Years after Kramer: An Assessment of Economic Retrospective Voting based upon Improved Estimates of Income and Unemployment

Several studies in economics have derived estimates of economic activity in the years prior to World War II that differ significantly from official statistics. In this paper we examine the possibility that the impact of economic retrospective voting upon congressional election outcomes has been at least partially obscured by shortcomings in the official data series. To that end we re-estimate various specifications of the basic Kramer model with these revised measures of income and unemployment. Although the effect of changes in real per capita income does not depend much upon which particular income series we used, the observed impact of unemployment doubles in size when the new estimates of historical unemployment rates made by Romer (1986b) and by Darby (1976) are used. Although the evidence is less than definitive, the results of our analyses also lend credence to the proposition that economic conditions have a greater impact upon congressional voting in on-year elections than in off years, and that the incumbent party is bound to suffer a midterm penalty.