产权管制放松与中国经济转轨绩效

基于信息成本约束的政府放松对分散决策单位的产权管制会带来资源配置的激励机制和行为角色的重大变化。由于市场分散性决策的信息成本过高成为政府资源权利配置的约束条件,所以政府应逐渐放松对配置资源权利管制的范围,并让位于分散决策单位进行产权运用和调配。产权管制放松对经济转轨绩效的影响显著,是提高中国经济绩效的关键因素。     

地方政府竞争、产业转移与制度安排

本文通过一个地方政府竞争的静态博弈模型,考察了地方政府竞争过度如何降低产业转移的绩效,解释了政府竞争强度加大、地方政府之间存在“内耗”、地方政府的竞争行为存在趋同、过度放松管制以及“产业转移粘性”的现象,并指出制度安排的长期改革方向是政府放松直接控制经济,保护私人产权,创造良好的市场环境,激励良性竞争和地区间分工协作。     

农村金融放松管制的动力机制——基于国家效用函数的分析

现有关于农村金融放松管制的研究多集中于对策层面.本文通过构建国家放松农村金融管制的效用函数,分析我国农村金融放松管制的动力机制.研究表明,在转轨经济中,当影响国家效用函数最大化的约束因素突破国家承受底线,进而降低国家效用时,国家会做出放松管制的决策.随着转轨经济的完成,国家效用函数会从租金偏好转为效率偏好,这会带来进一步的放松管制,以提升农村金融效率.     

制度困境与中小企业融资研究

对于现在我国中小企业面临的融资难问题,和大多数人认识的相反,我们发现,在中国经济转轨条件下,政府对金融的过度管制是中小企业面临融资困境的关键原因。只有加强产权的法律保护、放松金融的管制,才能从根本上解决我国中小企业融资难问题。     

沉淀成本与政府管制政策

新古典一般均衡理论的假设前提是完全的产品和要素市场,这是一个没有沉淀成本的经济模型。一旦我们放松新古典经济学资源流动性的假设前提,引入沉淀成本概念,就会发现,沉淀成本不仅导致要素市场失灵,造成进入壁垒,而且还为政府管制奠定了理论指导。为了提高市场绩效,政府管制必须将沉淀成本管制（进入壁垒）、产权管制（外部性）和信息不完全管制（交易成本）有机结合起来。     

经济转轨时期国有企业民营化研究述评

本文结合国外既有相关研究,重点从国有企业民营化的外部推力、内生机制、最优均衡模型以及超产权论与最优经济转轨路径等五大方面,对中国经济转轨中的国有企业民营化既有相关研究进行了梳理与述评;并指出,就中国经济转轨及中国经济重构的绩效而言,国有企业民营化其实只是一个相对表面的初始变量,如何基于市场竞争结构与相关制度供求的变化而将国有企业民营化整合于企业治理优化的控制系统中,才是一个更深层面的问题.     

开放经济下的经济转轨：寻求制度变革与发展政策的协调

作为２０世纪末叶的一种世界性现象,从计划经济向市场经济的转轨是经济全球化的一个组成部分。开放经济对转轨经济既有积极的制度变迁效应,也使转轨面临巨大的外部风险。分析表明,转轨国家间经济绩效的巨大差异,根源于不同的转轨方式及对制度变革和发展政策关系的不同处理。在对转轨经济理论和实践反思的基础上,一些经济学家批判了建立在新古典经济学基础上的“华盛顿共识”,强调转轨中制度建设的历史的重要性。论文指出,在开     

电信业改革:新加坡的经验

论文首先描述民营化的趋势、推动力及其益处,然后介绍有关所有制问题的争论,即在国家所有制条件下,国有企业(SOEs)是否能够获得卓越的绩效。虽然实证研究已经表明,私人所有制带来卓越绩效,但新加坡经验却是一个明显的反例。尽管由于放松管制、科技进步等全球化趋势造成电信行业的动荡和利润下滑。但由于国家所有制与一些特定的背景因素相结合,新加坡电信成为了保持世界一流绩效的成功案例。这些背景因素包括新加坡电信明确了以效率为中心的公司战略,将改善基础设施作为一项促进国民经济发展的战略资源的长期国家政策,以及一个充满活力的经济和制度环境。论文最后讨论了新加坡经验的启示。     

产权管制、土地财政及经济增长关系的理论与实证——以河南省1998-2011年的数据为例

农地产权管制是土地财政的根本成因,这将对土地财政影响的分析限制在经济增长方面.理论分析表明,产权管制使地方政府获得土地财政,而土地财政虽然在短期内会通过工业化、城镇化和公共支出促进经济增长,但不利于长期增长,随着农地产权稀殃的增加,农地产权管制和土地财政的负面影响将会越来越大,本文的实证研究支持了这一结论.因此,在肯定农地产权管制和土地财政对经济增长积极作用的同时,应该对其负面效应足够警惕.为了保持长期增长,应该逐步放松政府对农地产权的管制,减轻地方政府对土地财政的依赖.     

航空公司的管制和放松管制之争

对航空公司实施经济管制的两个主要理由是垄断势力的威胁和破坏性的竞争。不存在规模经济、进入和退出壁垒小、可竞争性理论可适用于民航运输市场是支持放松航空公司管制的三个理论支柱,但它们不断受到许多研究者的质疑。然而来自经济现实的证据表明,放松管制在机票价格、服务质量、生产效率等方面改善了产业绩效。     

Institutions matter,but which ones?

The purpose of this paper is to go beyond the narrow focus of the current institutional economics literature in development on the institutions protecting individual property rights, and to look at the economic effects of some other aspects of institutional quality on the development process (like democratic participation rights and institutions to address coordination failures). Another purpose is to suggest an alternative instrumental variable in quantifying the effects of property rights institutions. Finally, we speculate how, on account of distributive conflicts, institutions that have an adverse effect on economic performance often tend to persist for long periods of time in many poor countries.     

经济制度安排、国际贸易与经济增长影响机理的经验研究

本文分析了经济制度安排和贸易流量之间的相互关系及其对该国经济增长以及影响经济增长的其他因素的影响。在九个经济制度安排变量中对一国贸易流量影响作用最大的经济制度安排变量是该国的贸易政策,对一国高技术产品出口影响最大的经济制度安排变量是该国的产权保护程度。从对影响经济增长的渠道分析发现,在所有的经济制度安排变量中,一国产权的保护程度对该国经济增长的影响作用最大;同时产权保护的程度和政府干预对技术进步和人力资本的影响最为显著。     

Social trust,institutional and political constraints on the executive and deregulation of markets

Social trust is frequently claimed to be conducive for economic reforms. Likewise, the scope of policy liberalization is influenced by the political power structure as manifested in institutional and political constraints on the executive (IPCE). However, social trust and IPCE are possibly intertwined in their effects on economic liberalization. This paper empirically explores the relationship between social trust, IPCE and the scope of economic deregulation as measured by the first difference in the regulation subindex of the Economic Freedom of the World index. The results provide evidence in favor of a positive association of social trust with deregulation and of a negative association between institutional or partisan veto-points and deregulation. Yet, according to our analysis IPCE are an obstacle for economic deregulation only in relatively low trusting environments and social trust unfolds a particular strength as driver of deregulation with increasing levels of IPCE.     

论财产权利的两面性

财产权利具有两面性,一方面它是反对专制特权、增进个人自由以及促进市场经济效率的有效手段;另一方面在没有任何制度制约的情况下,财产权利的垄断极易导致对劳动者权利的侵犯。因此,我们应当在社会公正和平等目标的指导下,通过增强政府、工会组织以及工人自身力量的权力制衡方法规范财产权利的作用方式,遏制其消极作用的发挥。     

CULTURE AND GROWTH: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Using Hofstede's cultural data set, this paper examines the impact of cultural characteristics on a nation's economic performance. Using a two‐step estimation procedure, we first estimate a panel growth regression and obtain estimates of each nation's fixed effects, which reflect idiosyncratic differences in growth performance. In the second step, we regress the fixed effects on invariant cultural and institutional variables. Our estimation results suggest that individuality and tolerance for uncertainty are the most important cultural factors in explaining nation‐specific growth performance. Furthermore, our findings suggest that political and property rights play a major role in determining idiosyncratic growth.     

On economic growth and development

The paper offers a subjectivist approach to economic growth and an institutional view of development. In particular, the term development regards the prevailing rules of the game and their effects on the key variables for economic activity to take off: property rights and productive entrepreneurship. And growth is deemed to be the result of favourable institutional environments where chances are exploited and individuals succeed in improving their living conditions. Methodological and normative investigation questions the validity of the recent and increasing literature on institutional design, where institutional economics actually plays only a modest role. JEL Codes B53, O10     

The deep historical roots of modern culture: A comparative perspective

This paper presents evidence showing that there have been since antiquity two opposed types of institutional systems: one resembling central planning and present in ancient China, ancient Egypt, the Inca Empire and other territorial states, and another one with strong market institutions, protection of property rights present mostly in city-states, not just in the Mediterranean but throughout the world. Evidence is presented that these institutional differences dating back to the antiquity are shaped by special geographical conditions. These institutional differences can be seen to be at the root of the two cultural systems in today's world: individualism and collectivism. These cultural differences have effects on economic performance and institutions in today's world.     

产权信念及其对公平偏好与自利偏好的挤出

传统经济理论将产权作为经济绩效的外生变量,但是人类社会的演化路径表明产权是内生于人类族群的共同信念,它与内置于人类心智的公平偏好交互作用影响个体的决策行为。文章运用比较制度实验方法针对不同来源的产权考察其认同信念及其对公平偏好的影响。实验发现,产权不仅导致提议者对回应者和接受者有产权认同信念,也导致提议者的自利偏好和回应者的公平偏好被挤出;通过对利他偏好、策略行为和第三方评价的分离,测度了产权信念;提议者没有强烈的公平偏好动机,而是通过策略行为来最大化自身利益。     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.