The costs of lead bank–distressed borrower relationships: evidence from commercial lending in Taiwan

This is the first study to investigate the impact of the adjudication of a borrower's reorganisation filing on the shareholder wealth of the lead bank. The results reveal that the market is acutely sensitive to adverse information and the reorganisation adjudication of a borrower's plan has a detrimental effect on the reputation and wealth of the lead bank. Further, while both are positively associated with wealth effects, the RATE of the loan-level variable is more highly related than the LEVERAGE of the borrower-level variable to wealth loss. Additionally, large lenders experience less wealth loss. The higher the bank debt of a firm, the higher the adverse abnormal returns to the lead bank. Higher collateral and rates on loans are used to compensate for the greater risk of the loan portfolio. Likewise, the market may view lead banks with high loan loss reserves as banks that are not particularly adept at identifying creditworthy borrowers.     

MEAN–VARIANCE PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION WITH STATE‐DEPENDENT RISK AVERSION

The objective of this paper is to study the mean–variance portfolio optimization in continuous time. Since this problem is time inconsistent we attack it by placing the problem within a game theoretic framework and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. This particular problem has already been studied in Basak and Chabakauri where the authors assumed a constant risk aversion parameter. This assumption leads to an equilibrium control where the dollar amount invested in the risky asset is independent of current wealth, and we argue that this result is unrealistic from an economic point of view. In order to have a more realistic model we instead study the case when the risk aversion depends dynamically on current wealth. This is a substantially more complicated problem than the one with constant risk aversion but, using the general theory of time‐inconsistent control developed in Björk and Murgoci, we provide a fairly detailed analysis on the general case. In particular, when the risk aversion is inversely proportional to wealth, we provide an analytical solution where the equilibrium dollar amount invested in the risky asset is proportional to current wealth. The equilibrium for this model thus appears more reasonable than the one for the model with constant risk aversion.     

DEFAULT AND SYSTEMIC RISK IN EQUILIBRIUM

We develop a finite horizon continuous time market model, where risk‐averse investors maximize utility from terminal wealth by dynamically investing in a risk‐free money market account, a stock, and a defaultable bond, whose prices are determined via equilibrium. We analyze the endogenous interaction arising between the stock and the defaultable bond via the interplay between equilibrium behavior of investors, risk preferences and cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We find that the equilibrium price of the stock experiences a jump at default, despite that the default event has no causal impact on the underlying economic fundamentals. We characterize the direction of the jump in terms of a relation between investor preferences and the cyclicality properties of the default intensity. We conduct a similar analysis for the market price of risk and for the investor wealth process, and determine how heterogeneity of preferences affects the exposure to default carried by different investors.     

Consumer Default of Delinquent Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Loans

An examination of the default behavior of delinquent Canadian rollover mortgage borrowers suggests that borrower ability-to-pay considerations are relevant to the default decision. They are, however, secondary to housing equity considerations. Results from both ratio and linear-additive specifications suggest that a ratio specification conceals the independent effect of income and wealth variables.     

Equilibrium with Default and Endogenous Collateral

We study a two‐period general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and default. We make collateral endogenous by allowing each seller of assets to fix the level of collateral. Sellers are required to provide collateral whose first‐period value, per unit of asset, exceeds the asset price by an arbitrarily small amount. Moreover, borrowers are also required to be fully covered by the purchase, in the first period, of state‐by‐state default insurance. These insurance contracts are offered by lenders. The insurance cost or revenue is a linear charge and plays the role of a spread penalizing borrowers who will incur in default and benefiting lenders who will suffer default. Under these assumptions, equilibrium always exists.     

Credit risk in Islamic microfinance institutions: The role of women,groups, and rural borrowers

Using international data, we find that Islamic MFIs experience reduced credit risk by offering more groups loans, serving more women, and serving more borrowers in rural locations. Conventional MFIs benefit from fewer group loans, less loans to rural borrowers, and a greater focus on female borrowers. Our results contribute to microfinance and financial inclusion literature by highlighting the potential of tapping into the social dynamics within Muslim communities. We present encouraging insights for Islamic MFIs donors and managers on the possibility of promoting the financial inclusion of women and rural borrowers without compromising the quality of the credit portfolio.     

Consumer Credit Risk and Pricing

Previous academic studies viewed borrower rejection as a sign of market imperfections in the consumer credit markets, but this view was based upon the assumption that differences in the levels of borrower creditworthiness could not be accurately identified. Today, it is possible to differentiate between types of borrowers, and riskier borrowers can participate in credit markets if they are willing to pay relatively higher borrowing costs. Hence, a more critical issue concerning the performance of these markets should be whether loan prices correctly reflect the level of borrower credit risk. This paper reexamines consumer participation in credit markets looking specifically at issues related to the pricing of borrowers of different credit risk.     

Credit access for high-risk borrowers in financially concentrated markets: Do SBA loan guarantees help?

The Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan guarantee program was established to correct financial capital market inefficiencies and improve small business access to financial capital. However, the SBA loan guarantee program has been criticized for its failure to improve the performance of financial capital markets available to small businesses. This study considers the financial capital market failure created by lenders' monopoly power (specifically, financial market concentration) in financial capital markets. Based on this potential market failure, a model is derived to evaluate the behavior of lenders and borrowers in financial capital markets. Using the national Survey of Small Business Finance, this study compares the financial characteristics of small business borrowers with and without SBA loan guarantees, and provides a qualitative assessment of the SBA's ability to correct financial capital market inefficiencies. When considering only the interaction between borrower quality and the degree of financial market concentration, high-risk borrowers in high concentration financial markets have a higher probability of receiving an SBA loan guarantee than low-risk borrowers in low concentration financial markets. However, when other factors influencing the demand for financial capital are included in the model, only the borrower attributes (credit risk and age) are significant. While the SBA loan guarantee program appears to partially mitigate the effects of the market failure caused by financial market concentration for high-risk borrowers, the program appears to be better designed to address borrower risk, rather than credit market failure.     

The bank–firm relationship during economic transition: The impacts on bank performance in emerging economies

We analyze the lending relationships between 1011 banks and 17,284 client borrowers across 11 emerging economies. We first demonstrate that a state-owned bank's risk appetite increases as its number of family business group-owned borrowing partners increases. Second, we show that a non-financial firm-owned bank's risk appetite also increases as its number of family business group-owned borrowing partners increases. Finally, we show that a bank is more likely to reduce its risk appetite and improve its operational cost efficiency as its foreign ownership ratio increases, regardless of the bank's lending partner. These findings suggest that, in the post-privatization period, the ownership structure changes of banks and/or borrowers affect the lending relationship and the bank's risk appetite and cost efficiency.     

Why discouraged borrowers exist? An empirical (re)examination from less developed countries

Using the fourth-round database of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2008/09 BEEPS), this study examines the determinants of discouragement in less developed countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The results show that whereas firms' opaqueness, demographic factors, and distance between lenders and borrowers better explain the discouragement due to tough loan prices and/or loan application procedures, firm risk and banking concentration explain the incidence of discouraged borrowers due to the fear of rationing. Innovator status, the legal protection of creditors and lenders in the event of default, and the coverage of information sharing instruments help explain discouragement in a transversal way.     

Protecting Minority Homeowners: Race,Foreclosure Counseling and Mortgage Modifications

Millions of minority homeowners are at risk of losing their homes as a result of the housing crisis due to mortgage foreclosure and home repossession. One consumer‐oriented policy response to this crisis is mortgage default counseling for borrowers. This study examines the rate at which minority borrowers seek default counseling and the resulting correlation between counseling and the probability that a borrower obtains a modification of his/her original mortgage contract terms. The results suggest that African Americans are more likely to be counseled, relative to Whites. However, Latinos or other non‐White groups are no more or less likely to be counseled. The probability of loan modifications among counseled African Americans is also higher than other counseled borrowers. These results suggest that counseling policies and the public subsidy of default counseling may be one approach for promoting consumer financial well‐being of these households, but also suggest counseling efforts might be better designed for other minority groups. These results also have implications for the application of counseling to other mortgage decisions, such as refinance .     

Factors Affecting Borrower Choice Between Fixed and Adjustable Rate Mortgages

For this study, data were collected from 352 mortgage borrowers to determine whether mortgage decisions are economically rational with regard to the type of mortgage believed to have the higher expected cost, and how various factors affect mortgage choice. For many borrowers, the type of mortgage with actual higher expected cost (based on interest rates and residency expectations) is not the type of mortgage thought to have the higher expected cost. The financial planning aspect of a mortgage choice and the risk factor have a significant influence on this choice, whereas lender constraints and the financial cost aspect do not. These findings suggest that consumer education programs focusing on mortgage choice are needed.     

Financial Turmoil Still Ahead？

Asub-prime mortgage refers to a type of loai3 that is normally made to borrowers who do not qualify for market interest rates,often due to a variety of risk factors,such as their income level,size of the down payment,credit history,or employment status. As a result of the borrower＇s low credit rating, a conventional mortgage cannot be offered because the lender views the borrower as having a greater-than-average risk of defaulting on the loan. Lending institutions often charge interest on sub-prime mortgages at a rate that is higher than a conventional mortgage in order to compensate for this added risk. Recently,     

RISK-AVERSION BEHAVIOR IN CONSUMPTION/INVESTMENT PROBLEMS1

In this paper, we study the risk-aversion behavior of an agent in the dynamic framework of consumption/investment decision making that allows the possibility of bankruptcy. Agent's consumption utility is assumed to be represented by a strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable function in the general case and by a HARA-type function in the special case treated in the paper. Coefficients of absolute and relative risk aversion are defined to be the well-known curvature measures associated with the derived utility of wealth obtained as the value function of the agent's optimization problem. Through an analysis of these coefficients, we show how the change in agent's risk aversion as his wealth changes depends on his consumption utility and the other problem parameters, including the payment at bankruptcy. Moreover, in the HARA case, we can conclude that the agent's relative risk aversion is nondecreasing with wealth, while his absolute risk aversion is decreasing with wealth only if he is sufficiently wealthy. At lower wealth levels, however, the agent's absolute risk aversion may increase with wealth in some cases.     

CEO's Total Wealth Characteristics and Implications on Firm Risk

We study the connections between firm risk and the CEO's personal wealth characteristics, using a unique dataset on CEO wealth and its components. Consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion, we find that wealthier CEOs are associated with higher risk firms. Riskier firms tend to have CEOs whose wealth is more independent of the firm. We also find that CEOs with high personal portfolio betas run firms with higher betas. CEO's tenure is negatively associated with firm risk measured either as beta, idiosynchratic risk, or volatility of accounting profitability. A possible interpretation is that risk‐averse managers are better able to imprint their risk preferences on the firm over time. Stronger corporate governance weakens the connection between CEO wealth characteristics and firm risk.     

Cyclical wage movements in emerging markets compared to developed economies: a general equilibrium comment

I examine distinct cyclical properties of labor markets in emerging economies compared to developed ones from a general equilibrium perspective. The evidence in emerging economies shows that (1) wages are more volatile than income, while (2) employment is less volatile and (3) less pro-cyclical than in developed economies. I use a standard open-economy model to study the implications of wealth effects on labor market dynamics in both emerging and developed economies simultaneously. In contrast to the (partial equilibrium) results of the small open economy (SOE) model, I show that in general equilibrium, strong wealth effects on labor supply in emerging economies are necessary to rationalize the evidence. The model is also consistent with empirical regularities of exchange rate fluctuations, namely (1) excess volatility of real exchange rates, and (2) the negative co-movement between the real exchange rate and relative consumption.     

Incentives for Loan Repayments: Evidence from a Randomized Field Study

This field experiment tests an innovative approach for helping automobile loan borrowers make their loan payments on time. Borrowers were randomly assigned to a loan with an interest rate reduction after three on‐time payments; borrowers assigned to this loan show fewer late payments compared to a control group. While the financial incentive of the interest rate reduction was small, the offer of a rate reduction appears to result in borrowers attending to due dates. This result illustrates that lenders can use simple mechanisms to encourage more positive repayment patterns among borrowers with a history of late payments.     

Has Japan entered a new era of financial constraints?

The collapse of Japanese asset prices in the early 1990s-which weakened the balance-sheet positions of banks, firms, and households-has led some observers to suggest that “balance-sheet problems” may have contributed to the recent economic downturn and may impede a recovery. In this article, we conclude that balance-sheet problems did not and will not play a significant role in depressing the Japanese economy. First, while asset prices appear to have some explanatory power in loan demand and supply relationships, we find that asset price shocks in the 1990s had little effect on borrowing and lending, other than through traditional wealth effects on aggregate demand. Second, we find little evidence that bank lending was tighter than usual compared to downturns of the 1990–1993 magnitude. Finally, we find some puzzling evidence that borrowers lowered their appetite for loans, even after accounting for sharp declines in aggregate demand and asset prices.     

Equilibrium investment with random risk aversion

We solve the problem of an investor who maximizes utility but faces random preferences. We propose a problem formulation based on expected certainty equivalents. We tackle the time-consistency issues arising from that formulation by applying the equilibrium theory approach. To this end, we provide the proper definitions and prove a rigorous verification theorem. We complete the calculations for the cases of power and exponential utility. For power utility, we illustrate in a numerical example that the equilibrium stock proportion is independent of wealth, but decreasing in time, which we also supplement by a theoretical discussion. For exponential utility, the usual constant absolute risk aversion is replaced by its expectation.     

Optimal screening capacity and perceived risk of mortgage banks across countries

In this paper, we investigate the optimal combination of the levels of perceived risk and screening capacity that maximizes the fair value of a mortgage bank, while considering the probability of bank failure and the distribution borrower's wealth across emerging and developed countries. This is a novel contribution to the current literature that does not address that optimal combination and its dependency on the distribution borrower's wealth.We show that in countries where both levels of inequality of borrowers' wealth and the amount of the maximum wealth are high, the bank prefers to adopt a very severe level of perceived risk and cut down the screening capacity to the lowest level that enables the bank to be successful in lending its allotted funds. In countries where the level of wealth inequality decreases, the bank prefers to keep the severe level of perceived risk while increasing its screening capacity. Only when the level of screening capacity is bounded, the bank freezes its level of screening capacity while adopting a medium level of perceived risk.