THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION AND DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT

This paper studies the endogenous relationship between direct foreign investgment (DFI) and trade restriction. A domestic labor union interested in both employment and wages bargains with a foreign firm and lobbies against foreign imports. By endogeneizing the wage rate and incorporating resource-using lobbying, we show that more DFI results in higher lobbying efforts and lower imports under fairly general conditions, i.e. a reversal of quid pro quo DFI. We also conduct comparative statics analysis on wages and lobbying efforts.     

Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo

The literature on quid pro quo foreign direct investment describes how unwarranted investment may be undertaken because of the endogeneity of trade policy. The quid pro quo is that foreign producers, who are exporters to the host economy, invest in return for a liberal trade policy. We describe converse circumstances. The nexus between foreign investment and endogeneity of trade policy is implicit (not explicit as in quid pro quo investment), and a government with socially correct objectives (perhaps imposed by international-agency conditionality) wishes (i) to privatize a domestic firm by sale to a foreign investor who can provide technology improvement for domestic production and (ii) to pursue a liberal trade policy. The government is electorally constrained by needs of political popularity. The outcome is that efficient private investments may not be undertaken—in contrast with the quid pro quo case where in efficient investments are undertaken. While our model is general, the conditions we describe appear to be in particular present in post-socialist economies. Our model offers a contributing explanation for the slow pace of progress in many such economies, which rely on foreign technological transfer to improve the technology and product quality of post-socialist industry, but fail to receive the requisite foreign investment despite governments' good intentions.     

QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT*

The paper analyzes the phenomenon of industry-specific direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to defusing the threat of future protection by the host country (quid pro quo), under alternative imperfectly competitive market structures. It is established that, even in the absence of government intervention, firms in imperfectly competitive markets change the level of trade and DFI in response to future protectionist threats.     

Negotiation over Intellectual Property Rights Protection in a Mixed Market

This article models a North–South negotiation under a mixed oligopolistic setting where a public firm in the South and a private firm from the North compete in the southern market. The southern firm is a public one whose objective is a weighted sum of the South's social welfare and its own profit, whereas the northern firm is a pure profit maximizer. The North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when the northern and southern firms engage in quantity competition in the southern market, the southern government's optimal choice is either complete protection or complete violation. We show this to depend on the southern government's valuation of the quid pro quo. Moreover, strengthening IPR protection will deepen the privatization process in the South, though it brings about a social welfare loss to the South.     

Quid pro quo harassment,contracts and liability

This paper identifies two channels through which contracts induce performance and contain quid pro quo harassment: a disincentive effect raises the cost for harassers and a selection effect that attracts whistleblower types raises potential victims' resistance. An effective employer liability generates a negative relationship between wages and harassment risk. If liability is ineffective, however, employers can opt for low-wage contracts that induce high harassment and minimum internal complaints. In such environments, wages compensate exogenous harassment risks. Thus the wage-harassment risk equation can signal effectiveness of employer liability.     

Competing to Outsource in the South

This paper analyzes foreign direct investment (FDI) competition in a three‐country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing in a developing country. The host‐country government endogenizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are negotiated. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinationals, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) oligopolistic rivalry; (b) quid pro quo FDI; (c) strategic outsourcing—FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host‐country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host‐country wage is sufficiently high, the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions, as well as the host country.     

Rethinking banking. Debt discounting and the making of modern money as liquidity

The article radically challenges the conventional view of modern banking as financial intermediation and rejects the mutually related notion, firmly entrenched in both the mainstream and alternative imaginary, of fractional reserve banking. By contrast, it argues that modern banks are peculiar financiers which, far from banking other people's money, are originally and primarily involved with making money by creating a most fundamental institution of capitalism: liquidity. Crucially, central to the bank-engendered creation of liquidity is a negotiation of value that does not involve any formal lending of cash by a creditor – in fact, it does not require a creditor at all. Instead, it relies on a quid pro quo of debts performed by means of discounting whereby a regime of fluid property relations of mutual indebtedness, commonly known as debt finance, is established. In this regime of liquidity, money is constructed as entirely a debtors’ money: it is the outcome of a process of monetisation of bank debts entangled with a capitalisation of other people's debts.     

Rethinking of Social Space: Generational and Ethnic Differences in Estonia

This article analyses the changes in social space, based on perceptions of individuals in a transition country, Estonia. The Marxist approach to social space is used as a theoretical framework. The article originates from the premise that the changes in individuals' conceptual ‘apparatus’ are needed for keeping up with spatial developments related to capitalism. Analysis of empirical data collected in 2008 focuses on patterns of spatial perceptions of three generations of the two main ethno-linguistic groups in Estonia, the Estonian ethnic majority and the Russian-speaking minority. The results show perception of space is significantly correlated with indices of everyday social and cultural practices and individual wealth and reveal the geographical and ideological division of the world as seen by the inhabitants of a transition country. The article suggests transition has caused spatial disruption particularly amongst the ethnic minority. Increasing ethnic differences from one generation to another infers increasing societal inequality. The quid pro quo relationship between geopolitical changes and economic transition at the individual level is consequently more clearly defined.     

Reducing farmers' poverty vulnerability in China: The role of digital financial inclusion

This paper applies exogenous shocks to investigate the impact of digital financial inclusion (DFI) on farmers' poverty vulnerability in China. We find that farmers in highly developed DFI areas are less vulnerable to the poverty trap. The result is robust to various checks, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences method and the instrumental variable approach. Moreover, we find that income diversification is the possible economic channel through which DFI affects farmers' poverty vulnerability. Further analyses show that DFI has a “targeting” effect on those who are poor and vulnerable, and a synergistic effect by working with medical insurance and informal finance in terms of reducing farmers' poverty vulnerability. Our research findings provide new theoretical insights and useful guidance in enhancing financial inclusiveness and sustainable development in the post-COVID-19 era.     

Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare

In this paper, we explore welfare implications of a voluntary export restraint (VER) agreement within a simple model of duopoly with product differentiation and conjectural variations. We assume that the foreign exporter does not sell its product in its own market and that the imposition of a VER makes the domestic firm into a Stackelberg leader. Under these assumptions, it is shown that a VER introduced at the free-trade equilibrium level of export is welfare-improving for the importing country if and only if the foreign exporter is forced to comply with the restraint involuntarily . In other words, it is impossible to benefit home country and foreign country simultaneously by a VER agreement within the class of models we are envisaging. This result holds irrespective of whether firms compete in terms of quantities or prices.     

Protectionist Reputations and the Threat of Voluntary Export Restraint*

Voluntary export restraints are often administered in such a way that each firm's post-VER output allocation is positively related to its output under free trade. When this is true, a credible threat of a future VER will induce foreign firms to dump in the current period, decreasing the domestic price (the Yano effect), and possibly increasing welfare. We show that if an importing government's preferences are private information and if the government makes a series of VER decisions, there may exist an incentive for a welfare-maximizing government that normally prefers free trade to maintain a protectionist reputation by imposing a VER.     

Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: the case of foreign rivalry

Abstract.  Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favour of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and price undertakings. This paper compares these policy options in the presence of protection-jumping foreign direct investment (FDI), with special emphasis on rivalry between foreign firms. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. As a result, by settling AD cases with VER agreements, the importing country can pursue a more protectionist policy without triggering FDI. In this sense the GATT ban on VERs following the proliferation of AD uses was a sensible decision.     

Who Benefits from Voluntary Export Restraints?

Using a simple Cournot-oligopoly model, the paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on profits, market shares, consumers' surplus, and domestic welfare when the domestic market is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports from a third country. A VER may induce FDI from the VER-restricted country or exports from the third country. Under certain circumstances, the domestic firm loses from a VER. Even if the domestic firm gains, the increase in the market share of the domestic country induced by the VER could be less than that of the third country.     

The determinants of the location of USA direct foreign investment

This article estimates a model of the location of USA direct foreign investment (DFI) in manufacturing that accounts for sociopolitical factors as well as host country demand and cost conditions. The results indicate that all three sets of factors play a significant role in shaping the geography of USA DFI. The results further indicate that the exclusion of sociopolitical factors from a model of DFI location not only limits the model's explanatory power, it leads to a misassessment of the influence of labour cost, tax rates, market size and other economic factors.     

Determinants of US direct foreign investment in the Caribbean

This study evaluates two groups of variables (economic and structural/locational) associated with US short- and long-run direct foreign investment (DFI) in the Caribbean over the 1983–1994 period. Separate generalized least square models for the Caribbean and Latin America were estimated to determine whether differences existed between the two regions as to the variables associated with the levels of DFI. This helped provide insights as to the strategies that should be maintained or introduced to give the Caribbean a competitive edge in attracting the limited amounts of US DFI likely to be available for investment in the Western hemisphere.     

Why exporting countries agree to voluntary export restraints: the oligopolistic power of the foreign supplier

This paper studies the impact of VER on an exporting country. It shows that a VER at the free‐trade level favours the concentration of industry, allows firms with an export licence to expand, causes the contraction of the size of the firms producing for the domestic market only, and raises the price mark‐up in the domestic market. The impact on welfare is indeterminate depending upon the effect on global efficiency. If a VER is binding, also the price mark‐up in the foreign market rises and this effect on terms of trade, ceteris paribus, is welfare improving. An applied general equilibrium model for Turkey supports the conjecture that with a VER the increased oligopolistic power of incumbent firms with an export licence, the higher price mark‐up in the domestic market and a possible social welfare gain, are the key elements in understanding the rationale behind VERs. However, if authorities induce firms to engage in unproductive profit‐seeking activities, rent dissipation occurs and the impact on social welfare becomes negative.     

WHEN ARE VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS VOLUNTARY? A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH

We revisit voluntariness of voluntary export restraints (VERs) in a differential game model of duopoly with sticky prices. We show that a VER set at the free trade level has no effect on equilibrium under open‐loop strategies while the same policy results in a smaller profit for the exporting firm, i.e. it is involuntary under a non‐linear feedback strategy. Moreover, we prove an extended proposition of Dockner and Haug (1991 ) on voluntariness of VERs under a linear feedback strategy.     

Status quo bias,multiple priors and uncertainty aversion

Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of an agent for each possible status quo option, and provide a characterization according to which the agent considers a full-dimensional set of possible priors and abandons her status quo option only if she finds an alternative that returns a higher expected utility for each of these priors. We then show that, in this framework, the very presence of a status quo induces the agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option.     

Investment under Uncertainty in Dynamic Conflicts

This paper analyses a model in which two groups repeatedly compete with each other for a prize in every time period. We assume that there is a status quo bias: if there is a fight today, yesterday's winner is in a stronger position than the other group. Hence, a change of the status quo has long-term consequences that groups need to take into account. Important applications of this model include lobbying for legislation and political transitions through revolutions. We analyse the strategic timing of attacks on the status quo, which is similar to investment decisions under uncertainty. We find that the attack threshold is considerably lower than in a comparable one-period game, and that the expenditure level necessary to change the status quo is low in comparison to the prize; this provides a possible solution to Tullock's "rent-seeking paradox" in lobbying.     

推动四川省工业园区生态化发展研究

推进产业生态化和工业生态园区的研究对于我国经济发展和资源环境状况而言,是十分迫切的任务.生态工业园区所具有的工业链条、循环经济模式、经济外部性以及企业之间的复合共生等生态化发展特征是推动当地生态工业经济发展的重要路径.本文结合四川省工业园区发展的现状,从理论上探讨了工业园区发展与生态经济发展的关系,从实践上.研究了推动四川省工业园区生态化发展的路径和政策建议.