QUID PRO QUO FOREIGN INVESTMENT*

The paper analyzes the phenomenon of industry-specific direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to defusing the threat of future protection by the host country (quid pro quo), under alternative imperfectly competitive market structures. It is established that, even in the absence of government intervention, firms in imperfectly competitive markets change the level of trade and DFI in response to future protectionist threats.     

CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A PANEL GRAVITY MODEL APPROACH

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of 15 transition countries by using a panel gravity model approach and suggests that corruption does not deter FDI.     

TECHNICAL PROGRAESS AND INVESTMENT: A VINTAGE MODEL*

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal investment decision of the firm with a vintage production function. First, the optimal conditions for the investment and replacement permitting jumps in the state variables are derived. Second the effects of exogenous parameters on investment are examined and the following new results are obtained: (1) whether a rise in the current money wage increases or decreases investment depends crucially on the time profile of the existing plants; (2) a rise in the rate of technical progress reduces investment.     

FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION

In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent‐holding firm negotiates with its rival firm about payments for licensing a cost‐reducing innovation. Applying the Nash bargaining solution, we compare two licensing policies, a fixed fee and a royalty. Our results are as follows. Royalty licensing is better than fixed fee licensing for both firms if the innovation is not drastic. So, royalty licensing is always carried out. Moreover, though there exists a case in which consumers prefer fixed fee licensing, royalty licensing is always superior to fixed fee licensing from the social point of view.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE*

This paper advances a model of multilateral trade negotiations to analyze the effects of the most-favored-nation clause (MFN) on international trade agreements. Negotiations are modeled in a three player, non-cooperative, dynamic bargaining framework that admits the possibility of both bilateral and multilateral agreements. The central result is that bargaining in the presence of MFN results in Pareto efficient, mutually advantageous, multilateral trade agreements. The free-rider problem commonly attributed to the presence of MFN does not arise, and, under a condition of symmetry, each country receives equal gains (or reciprocity) from the agreement. In the absence of MFN, many of these properties may not hold. Examples are given in which at most two of the three countries benefit from agreement. These results suggest that many of the criticisms levied against the MFN clause are misplaced; moreover, attempts to replace unconditional MFN with conditional MFN may sacrifice many of the long-held values of the GATT.     

THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION AND DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT

This paper studies the endogenous relationship between direct foreign investgment (DFI) and trade restriction. A domestic labor union interested in both employment and wages bargains with a foreign firm and lobbies against foreign imports. By endogeneizing the wage rate and incorporating resource-using lobbying, we show that more DFI results in higher lobbying efforts and lower imports under fairly general conditions, i.e. a reversal of quid pro quo DFI. We also conduct comparative statics analysis on wages and lobbying efforts.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE KNOWLEDGE‐CAPITAL MODEL AND A SMALL COUNTRY CASE

This research looks at how foreign direct investment (FDI) in a small open economy compares with that of larger countries. I apply several specifications of the knowledge‐capital model to unique FDI data from the isolated country of Iceland, allowing for comparison with previous analysis of larger and similarly open economies. Using this together with other techniques, I seek to explain investment determinants by geography, economic size and skilled labor availability. The results of these analysis show that popular specifications do not accurately predict the effects for a small country case.     

AN OLIGOPOLISTIC HECKSCHER–OHLIN MODEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*

We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.     

外商直接投资区域变化与中西部地区引资困境

根据中国内陆地区对外开放程度逐渐加大、国家对西部开发的重视程度不断加强,以及外资投资区位转移的“雁行理论”等条件推理,内陆地区近年来引进外资的增长幅度应该快于沿海地区。然而,实际分析结果表明,1979年以来的外资由沿海向内陆地区的转移,从1997年开始停滞,中西部地区引进外资总体表现不佳。文章从“路径依赖”、市场规模、基础设施、劳动力素质、产业关联和投资软环境诸方面分析了形成这种现象的原因。在此基础上,提出了加快中西部地区引资的思路。     

EC INTEGRATION AND JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EC

This study proposes two hypotheses to identify the cause(s) behind the short-term cyclical Japanese manufacturing foreign direct investment in the European Community (EC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s: (i) a catch-up process of Japanese firms in anticipation of EC single market integration in 1993 and (ii) the so-called bubble economic phenomenon caused by the overheated economy following expansionary monetary policy in Japan in the late 1980s. Applying multinomial logit models to the data on parent firms of 283 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries established in the EC from 1988 to 1992 reveals strong support for the bubble economy hypothesis but not for the catch-up hypothesis. Results also show that under a bubble economy situation, tax-related incentive policies in host countries—e.g., an investment tax allowance for foreign direct investment—are quite important in attracting Japanese firms.     

HARD OR SOFT? INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AS DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA*

We examine whether hard infrastructure in the form of more highways and railroads or soft infrastructure in the form of more transparent institutions and deeper reforms lead to more foreign direct investment (FDI). We use data on FDI from the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Korea to various regions of China from 1990 to 2002. We control for the standard determinants of FDI—regional market sizes, wage rates, human capital and tax policies. Then we add indices of hard and soft infrastructures. We found that empirically soft infrastructure consistently outperforms hard infrastructure as a determinant of FDI.     

VOLUNTARY IMPORT EXPANSION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT*

This paper analyses the welfare effects of a market‐share Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE) in the presence of foreign direct investment utilizing a duality approach. Introducing the cost burden of VIE explicitly, this paper considers the conditions under which a market‐share VIE is voluntary to the importing country. It is shown that the voluntary nature of VIE depends upon the capital import, cost burden and price difference effects and that a VIE is truly voluntary if it is accompanied by direct investment. We also show the existence of a complementary relationship between VIE and direct investment in attaining a particular level of welfare.     

CRIME AND POVERTY: A SEARCH‐THEORETIC APPROACH*

Numerous studies document that criminal activity is positively related to unemployment and negatively related to educational attainment levels within given communities. We study this phenomenon in the context of a search‐equilibrium model, in which agents choose between formal employment and pursuing crime‐related activities (theft). Prior to their “occupational choices,” agents undertake costly schooling, raising their productivity. Crime acts, in essence, as a tax on human capital by affecting the probability that a worker's earnings (possessions) are subsequently appropriated. There are multiple equilibria. High crime, low levels of educational attainment, long spells of unemployment, and poverty are correlated across them.     

外商直接投资对江浙沪经济发展影响的比较

用1985—2006年的时间序列,就外商直接投资对长江三角洲的江苏、浙江、上海经济增长的短期和长期效应进行实证比较。从短期效应看当年外商直接投资对三地经济增长的需求拉动作用明显,对上海的效应最大,浙江次之,江苏最小。从长期效应看,超前两年的外商直接投资对江苏、浙江、上海经济增长的长期供给创造以及溢出作用明显,对浙江的效应最大,上海次之,江苏最小。无论是短期效应还是长期效应,外商直接投资的"质"对经济增长的效应大于外商直接投资的"量"的影响,故提出吸引更多高质外资的对策。     

HUMAN CAPITAL AND CONVERGENCE: A PRODUCTION‐FRONTIER APPROACH*

Using nonparametric, production‐frontier methods, we decompose labor productivity growth into components attributable to technological change (shifts in the world production frontier), technological catch‐up (movements toward or away from the frontier), and physical and human capital accumulation (movements along the frontier). We find that (1) technological change is decidedly nonneutral, (2) productivity growth is driven primarily by physical and human capital accumulation, (3) the increased international dispersion of productivity is explained primarily by physical capital accumulation, and (4) international polarization (the shift from a unimodal to a bimodal distribution) is brought about primarily by efficiency changes (technological catch‐up).     

INTERNATIONAL AND INTRA‐NATIONAL TRADE: A CONTINUUM APPROACH*

We build up a Ricardian trade model with multiple regions within a nation and examine how international trade determines interregional patterns of production and specialization. We show that the degree of interregional concentration of economic activities moves in different directions in two trading nations. The role of “absolute advantage” becomes crucial in dictating the course of income disparity across regions. We discuss cases with varying degrees of labour mobility and reconfirm the result on post‐trade interregional concentration and dispersion. Later we explore the impact of “scale factor” in this model and show how principle of comparative advantage and economies of scale interact to determine the pattern of specialization and volume of trade.