The Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages

This article analyzes the performance of low-income and minority mortgages (LIMMs) from a large sample of fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgages. We find that low-income borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is optimal, whereas black and Hispanic borrowers prepay more slowly than other borrowers, regardless of the option's value. After controlling for equity, credit history and some other variables, LIMMs default slightly more frequently and have about the same loss severity as other loans. Our results suggest that, for most yield curve situations, differences in LIMM prepayment behavior have little effect on pricing.     

Prepayment Risk in Adjustable Rate Mortgages Subject to Initial Year Discounts: Some New Evidence

This paper uses microlevel data to examine recent prepayment performance of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) employing the competing risk methodology developed by Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000). We find support for the teaser rate and adjustment date effects implied by the theoretical model of Kau et al. (1993). In addition, we find that teased ARMs bear prepayment risk related to their discount, contrary to results reported by VanderHoff (1996) and Green and Shilling (1997). Finally, and contrary to the usual finding for fixed-rate mortgages, we find that loan age has a negative effect on prepayment risk for ARMs, consistent with the phenomenon that borrowers with high mobility and/or propensity to refinance exit the pool early.     

Interest Rate Risk, Residential Mortgages and Financial Futures Markets

Residential mortgage markets in both the United States and Canada have recently been dominated by instruments such as variable-rate and short-term rollover mortgages which require borrowers to assume a greater burden of interest rate risk. An outstanding question is whether this approach to risk allocation is Pareto optimal or whether there are other more effective methods of dealing with the risk created by interest rate volatility. This study examines the potential for shifting this risk from the mortgage market to the financial futures market. After considering the rationale for expecting that neither mortgage borrowers nor lenders wish to absorb the high levels of risk present in the existing financial environment, this study discusses the hedging of interest rate risk through financial futures markets. Empirical tests are then performed to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. futures markets for hedging positions from the U.S. mortgage market. These results indicate that the interest rate risk inherent in residential mortgages can be substantially shifted through one or more positions in the existing futures contracts and long-term, fixed-rate mortgages may still be financially feasible under conditions of interest rate volatility.     

Mortgage Choice: What's the Point?

This article shows that, in the presence of transaction costs payable by borrowers on refinancing, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which borrowers with differing mobility select fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) with different combinations of coupon rate and points. We also show that, in the absence of such costs, no such equilibrium is possible. This provides a possible explanation for the large menus of FRMs typically encountered by potential borrowers, and suggests that the menu available at the time of origination should be an important predictor of future prepayment. We numerically implement the model, developing the first contingent claims mortgage valuation algorithm that can quantify the effect of self-selection on real contracts in a realistic interest rate setting. The algorithm allows investors to account for self-selection when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. It also, for the first time, allows lenders to determine the optimal points/coupon rate schedule to offer to a specified set of potential borrowers, given the current level of interest rates.     

Origination Channel,Prepayment Penalties and Default

This article presents evidence that nonbank‐originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of default than bank‐originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties. Evidence also indicates that nonbanks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do, and nonbanks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less financially sophisticated borrowers. State antipredatory lending law provisions restricting the use of prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of nonbank originations relative to bank originations. These findings are consistent with incentives generated by nonbank compensation via yield spread premiums on loans with prepayment penalties.     

Differential Access to and Pricing of Home Mortgages: 2004 through 2009

This article documents trends and drivers of the residential mortgage market during the years 2004 through 2009, specifically focusing on the access to and pricing of mortgages originated by African‐American and Hispanic borrowers, and by borrowers living in low‐income and minority communities. Our analysis relies on a rich set of proprietary data that allow more expanded insights than can be obtained from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) alone. We show that access to mortgage credit increased between 2004 and 2006 for the borrowers we focus on in our study and declined dramatically thereafter. Trends in access to credit were driven primarily by the changing credit mix of mortgage applicants and secondarily by the replacement of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for subprime as the dominant mode of nonprime originations and tighter underwriting standards. Throughout our entire period of study, these borrowers also consistently paid higher prices for their mortgages; however, the extent of this differential varied considerably over time and across groups. These pricing trends were driven primarily by changes in the FHA and subprime shares as well as by the market's increasingly aggressive pricing of credit risk.     

Choice of Mortgage Contracts: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances

This study revisits the empirical question of the determinants of the choice between fixed‐ and adjustable‐rate mortgages using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances that overcome some of the data limitations in previous studies. The results from a logit model of mortgage choice indicate that pricing variables and affordability are important considerations. We also find that factors, such as mobility expectations, income volatility and attitudes toward financial risk largely influence mortgage choice, with more risk‐averse borrowers preferring fixed‐rate mortgages. For households that are less risk averse, the mortgage type choice decision is less sensitive to pricing variables and income volatility, and affordability factors are not significant. These findings provide empirical support that underscores the importance of attitudes toward risks in mortgage choice.     

Efficiency in the Mortgage Market: The Borrower's Perspective

This paper uses mortgage history data from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to analyze the prepayment behavior of homeowners and to test whether borrowers exercise their prepayment options in a manner consistent with contingent claims models. A variety of hazard models are estimated from individual data on more than 6000 mortgages issued during the 1976–1980 period. In these models, it is clear that the extent to which the prepayment option is "in the money" has a strong effect on behavior. However, it is less clear that the option is exercised quite as ruthlessly as the theory predicts.     

Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market

Reverse mortgages allow elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth without having to sell or move out of their homes. However, very few eligible homeowners used reverse mortgages to achieve consumption smoothing until recently, when the reverse mortgage market in the United States witnessed substantial growth. In this article, I examine 1989–2007 loan‐level reverse mortgage data and conduct three sets of analyses to better understand the demand for reverse mortgages among elderly homeowners. First, I study the ZIP code characteristics correlated with reverse mortgage originations. Second, I show that recent reverse mortgage borrowers are significantly different from earlier borrowers in many respects. Third, I investigate the reasons why the reverse mortgage market experienced substantial growth in the mid‐2000s. Combining the reverse mortgage data with county‐level house price data, I find that higher house prices lead to more reverse mortgage originations. Specifically, the increases in house prices account for about one‐third of the overall growth in the reverse mortgage market from 2003 to 2007.     

Refinancing Trends among Lower Income and Minority Homeowners during the Housing Boom and Bust

This article examines trends in mortgage refinancing activity during the housing boom and bust, with a focus on homeowners in lower income and minority market (LIMM) areas. Unlike any other period in recent history, during the boom LIMM homeowners refinanced their mortgages more frequently than non‐LIMM homeowners. This occurred primarily among borrowers for whom the refinance option was not in‐the‐money, and it is likely attributable to the concurrent growth of subprime, cash‐out refinancing. Following the 2007 mortgage market collapse, however, LIMM homeowners were less likely to refinance. This can be explained in part by systematic differences in home equity levels across borrowers.     

The Postforeclosure Experience of U.S. Households

Despite the recent flood of foreclosures on residential mortgages, little is known about what happens to borrowers’ households after their mortgages have been foreclosed. We study the postforeclosure experience of U.S. households using a unique data set based on the credit reports of a large panel of individuals from 1999 to 2010. Although foreclosure considerably raises the probability of moving, the majority of postforeclosure migrants do not end up in substantially less desirable neighborhoods or more crowded living conditions. These results suggest that, on average, foreclosure does not impose an economic burden large enough to severely reduce housing consumption.     

Spatial Heterogeneity in Mortgage Terminations by Refinance, Sale and Default

This article investigates the impact of spatially correlated unobservable variables on the refinancing, selling and default decisions of mortgage borrowers. Virtually the entire mortgage literature acknowledges that borrower-specific characteristics, such as culture, education or access to information, play an important role in mortgage termination decisions. While we do not observe these variables directly, we note that borrowers of similar background tend to cluster together in neighborhoods. We estimate a competing risks hazard model with random effects using a three-stage maximum likelihood estimation approach. We utilize the space-varying coefficient method to modify the covariance structure according to the spatial distribution of the observations. Beyond a significant improvement of the model performance, this yields a number of insightful implications for mortgage termination behavior. For instance, borrowers of the affluent "West Side" of Los Angeles County both refinance and move at a higher rate than predicted by the standard maximum likelihood estimation method. At the same time, borrowers from some lower-valued neighborhoods tend to stay longer than expected with their mortgages and properties.     

Why Mortgage Borrowers Persevere: An Explanation of First and Second Lien Performance Mismatch

Borrowers with a pair of mortgages collateralized by the same property sometimes continue to make payments on one while defaulting on the other. We articulate a framework for understanding this performance mismatch that emphasizes two types of borrowers: those with stable equity positions who perceive they are facing moderate or temporary liquidity shocks, and those facing severe financial stress in combination with negative equity. The former have an incentive to enter mismatch and subsequently cure, while the latter would default on both contracts. Our empirical analysis using newly available, national samples of matched first‐ and second‐lien mortgages supports this view.     

Unobservable Risks in Mortgage Contract Choice

This study proposes a lifetime utility maximization model where borrowers choose optimal mortgage bundles including mortgage type, loan‐to‐value and loan size to maximize their allocation of limited budgets between housing and nonhousing consumptions. The model predicts that the mortgage bundle choices by borrowers of different income and risk attributes explain significant variations in the ex post default risks of the borrowers. The empirical tests using sampled mortgages pooled in nonagency residential mortgage backed securities support the hypothesis that the optimal choice of mortgage bundles reveals hidden risk factors of borrowers, which, if ignored, could lead to misjudgment of ex post default of borrowers.     

Thy Neighbor’s Mortgage: Does Living in a Subprime Neighborhood Affect One’s Probability of Default?

This article focuses on the potential externalities associated with subprime mortgage origination activity. Specifically, we examine whether negative spillover effects from subprime mortgage originations result in higher default rates in the surrounding area. Our empirical analysis controls for loan characteristics, house price changes and alternative loan products. Our results indicate that, after controlling for these characteristics, the concentration of subprime lending in a neighborhood does not lead to greater default risks for surrounding borrowers. However, we do find that more aggressive mortgage products (such as hybrid adjustable rate mortgages and low/no‐documentation loans) had significant negative spillovers on other borrowers. Stated differently, the aggressive alternative mortgage designs were more toxic to the housing and mortgage market than previously believed.     

Do Borrowers Make Rational Choices on Points and Refinancing?

Utilizing individual mortgage data, we find that borrowers with points are less likely to refinance, and when they do, they take longer to refinance. This finding supports the separating equilibrium prediction of earlier studies that borrowers with higher (lower) refinancing costs self‐select into mortgages with higher‐point/lower‐rate (lower‐point/higher‐rate) loans.     

Per-customer quantity limit and price discrimination: Evidence from the U.S. residential mortgage market

Theoretically, if firms face a regulatory per-customer quantity limit, they should have an incentive to discriminatively charge high-demand customers higher prices and make them just willing to buy a quantity equal to the limit. In the U.S. residential mortgage industry, mortgages with origination balances above the conforming loan limits cannot be guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises, which make lenders face a per-customer quantity limit. This paper finds that borrowers bunching at the limit pay higher interest rates due to price discrimination. This study rules out the alternative explanation that those borrowers are of higher risk (lending cost) than other borrowers.     

A Lattice Approach to Pricing Fixed-Rate Mortgages with Default and Prepayment Options

Existing models on the pricing of default and prepayment options in fixed-rate mortgages either use numerical methds or they do not consider refinancing or other transaction costs involved in default and prepayment. We provide in this paper an application of the Boyle [1] lattice model to price secured debt with two risky assets. This model is simple, efficient and capable of considering the major types of transaction costs involved in prepayment and default. Using our model, we estimate the option values under a range of assumptions about the underlying parameters. We also provide some comparisons of the lattice model estimates to other models in the literature.     

Mortgage Borrower Repayment Behavior: A Microeconomic Analysis with Canadian Adjustable Rate Mortgage Data

In this paper we estimate a model of mortgage borrower behavior using micro-level data on Canadian borrowers with rollover mortgages—a form of adjustable-rate mortgage. Our results suggest that the probability of default rises with a decrease in housing equity and an increase in the mortgage contract rate; however the size of these changes is relatively small. They also show that partial prepayment is sensitive to fluctuations in the rates of return from investing in housing versus other assets. For the United States experience, our results suggest that, relative to fixed-rate mortgage borrowers, adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers are more likely to default and less likely to prepay.     

Bankruptcy Exemption,Home Equity and Mortgage Credit

This article examines the impact of state bankruptcy homestead exemptions on mortgage application outcomes. The empirical analysis controls for endogeneity problems by focusing on 55 urban areas that cross state borders using the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act files from 2001 to 2008. The results indicate that holding the loan‐to‐value ratio constant, a more generous homestead exemption encourages borrowers to buy more housing and take out larger mortgages. However, holding house value constant, a more generous homestead exemption discourages mortgage borrowing and results in more home equity. Moreover, benefits of the homestead exemption outweigh the costs of it to mortgage lenders.