What Is Distinctive about China′s Economic Transition? State Enterprise Reform and Overall System Transformation

Entry of nonstate industrial firms has played a crucial role in China′s reform process by creating markets and competition. Yet the state-owned sector has also performed adequately, improving incentives and productivity, and turning in a respectable growth performance. Moderate improvements in the state sector have thus supported a virtuous cycle of reform. Simple contrasts between state and private ownership systems therefore explain little of China′s apparently successful combination of reform and growth. J. Comp. Econom., June 1994, 18(3), 470-490. University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093-0519.     

Agricultural Efficiency Gains in Centrally Planned Economies

This paper estimates the growth of agricultural production efficiency in nine centrally planned economics over two time periods, 1965-1977 and 1978-1989. The second time period was one of agricultural policy reform for most of the nine countries. Our major finding is that production efficiency improved in the second time period, helping to check a fall in growth of agricultural output. Gains in production efficiency were as large in Central and Eastern Europe as the gains in China, even though economic reforms were deeper in China, where production was privatized. The slowdown in growth of agricultural production in the 1980′s was not due to production inefficiencies, but rather due to slower growth of inputs, particularly fertilizer. The implication of our results is that privatization of farming may be unnecessary in order to achieve high production efficiency gains. J. Comp. Econom., June 1994, 18(3), pp. 000-000, University of California, Davis, California 95616.     

How Successful Has Chinese Enterprise Reform Been? Pitfalls in Opposite Biases and Focus

We analyze two new data sets: one on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and another on town and village enterprises (IVEs). We find zero TFP growth in SOEs and positive TFP growth in COEs. The evidence suggests that the positive TFP growth in SOEs found by some recent studies might be due to underdeflation of gross output and overdeflation of intermediate inputs. The criterion for successful SOE reform should also include intertemporal efficiency and SOEs′ contribution so macroeconomic stability. Increases in technical efficiency do not necessarily improve SOEs′ financial performance. SOE personnel have received an increasing proportion of value added, hence creating a fiscal crisis for the state. J. Comp. Econom., June 1994, 18(3), pp. 410-437. University of California, Davis, California 95616; Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado 81301; University of California, Davis, California 95616; and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100836, People′s Republic of China.     

Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence

We provide a framework to interpret the recent literature on financial development and inequality. In many developing countries, access to funding and financial services by firms and households is still very skewed. Recent evidence suggests that poor access does not only reflect economic constraints but also barriers erected by insiders. Inequality affects the distribution of political influence, so financial regulation often is easily captured by established interests in unequal countries. Captured reforms deepen rather than broaden access, as small elites obtain most of the benefits while risks are socialized. Financial liberalization motivated to increase access may in practice increase fragility and inequality, and lead to political backlash against reforms. Thus financial reforms may succeed only if matched by a buildup in oversight institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 748–773.     

Understanding china's economic performance

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged to interpret China's rapid growth since 1978: the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist school attributes China's successes to the evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of China's reforms. Specifically, the resulting non-capitalist institutions are claimed to be successful in (a) agriculture where land is not owned by the fanners; (b) township and village enterprises (TVEs) which are owned collectively by rural communities; and (c) state owned enterprises (SOEs) where increased competition and increased wage incentive, but not privatization, have been emphasized.

The convergence school holds that China's successes are the consequences of its institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market economies, and that China's economic structure at the start of reforms is a major explanation for the rapid growth. China had a high population density heavily concentrated in low-wage agriculture, a condition that was favorable for labor-intensive export-led growth in other parts of East Asia. The convergence school also holds that China's gradualism results primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the “innovative” non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances and not to its economic circumstances.

Perhaps the best test of the two approaches is whether China's policy choices are in fact leading to institutions harmonized with normal market economies or to more distinctive innovations. In this regard, the recent policy trend has been towards institutional harmonization rather than institutional innovation, suggesting that the government accepts that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-known.     

Macroeconomic Management and the Transition to the Market in Vietnam

Vietnam′s macroeconomic performance during the transition to a market economy has been very strong, better than those of most economies in Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. Vietnam grew at an average annual rate of 7% during 1989-1992; inflation declined from over 400% in 1988 to 17% in 1992; and exports increased at more than 30% per year during this period. The macroeconomic success can be attributed to the combination of good endowments and good policy. Vietnam′s output is concentrated in agriculture, services, and light industries, all sectors that responded quickly to price liberalization, strengthened property rights, and real exchange-rate devaluation. J. Comp. Econom., June 1994, 18(3), pp. 357-375. World Bank, Washington, DC 20433.     

The sequencing of reform policies in China's agricultural transition*

This paper provides evidence regarding gains due to agricultural market liberalization in China. We empirically identify the different effects that incentive and farm restructuring reforms and gradual market liberalization have on China's agricultural economy during its transition period. We find that average gains within the agricultural sector due to reforms that improved incentives and increased decision‐making authority of producers exceed gains due to market liberalization by a large margin. Our method of analyzing the effects of transition policies on economic performance can be generalized to other reform paths in other transition economies.     

Economic liberalization in China and India: Issues and an analytical framework

A simple analytical framework is proposed for assessing the credibility and prospects for success of economic liberalization policies of China and India. It is argued that liberalization of external transactions is likely to yield only limited benefits unless it is accompanied by elimination of controls on domestic transactions. Further, in China economic liberalization is likely to generate demands for political liberalization which in turn may result in a retreat from economic reforms. In India, on the other hand, interest groups enjoying “rents” from economic controls may try to prevent their elimination.     

Shock therapy and the transfer of institutions: the new debate and some lessons from the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in southwestern Germany

There is a new debate on shock therapy versus gradualism in economics, this time referring to developing and emerging countries. The French Revolution and its impact on the other European nations has repeatedly been highlighted as a historical example for both the merits and pitfalls of the Big Bang strategy. The present paper argues that a comparison between the post-1806 reforms in Prussia and in the southwestern states of Germany offers a particularly interesting historical case study that in the economics literature has not yet received the attention it deserves. In particular, the case study shows how deeply intertwined the economic and political dimension of social transformations are, and that different economic reforms strategies cannot and should not be evaluated without taking political starting conditions into account. In view of recent reform experiences it is particularly interesting to see that Prussia offers maybe the first historical case of state capture by the East-Elbian Junkers.     

The Uncertainty of Economic Success When Economic Regimes Are Uncertain: A Study of Transition Periods

We construct a model of a reform economy in transition from central planning to free markets. The eventual success of the reform is uncertain. A numerical implementation of the model examines the implications of two alternative paths, instantaneous or gradual price reform. If the controlled-price sector has sharply decreasing returns to scale in production, then gradualism may lead to welfare higher than that of instantaneous reform. Given the inefficiencies in production in many transition economies, this may help to explain why countries that have used gradualism have sometimes fared better than those that have followed a path of rapid price liberalization. J. Comp. Econom., October 1994, 19(2), pp. 217-236. University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.     

Decentralization,agency costs,and the new economic constitution of China

This article examines the evolution of the rules that govern central-local government relations in the Chinese political economy. Although the federalism that accompanied China’s market reforms has substantially facilitated economic growth, it has also created powerful incentives for local authorities to abuse their powers, significantly increasing the agency costs to the central government of maintaining political stability and creating a national market. This article analyzes the institutional design of the nascent Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), known to officials and academics as China’s new “Economic Constitution”. It demonstrates that the major purpose of the AML is to break up the so-called “administrative monopolies”, or bureaucratic fiefdoms over local economies. In contrast to existing academic treatment, it will study the AML in the framework of competition for influence over economic policy between rent-seeking central and local actors. It argues that the AML, despite its stated purposes, is indeed designed to reduce the policy-making powers of the regions to the comparative advantage of the central government. The AML can thus be modeled as a new constitutional contract that the center wishes to enter into with the localities in order to repeal the existing rules of decentralization. It will be further shown that the AML, reflecting the allocation of power in the Chinese state, prioritizes the political imperatives of recentralization over the facilitation of competitive markets.     

Economic transition and elections in Poland1

Poland's economic and political transition, one of the most successful, has depended very heavily on job creation in new firms to replace the jobs lost in the formerly state‐owned enterprises. This paper uses survey and aggregate data from three Polish elections to suggest that these de novo firms, the individuals they employ, and the residents in the local areas where they exist become an important constituency supporting pro‐reform political parties and constraining the actions of parties less sympathetic to the reforms. The creation of this political constituency helps explain how countries can successfully pursue both economic and political reforms. JEL classification: D72, P26.     

Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition

This paper addresses the existence of equilibrium for a nonatomic Bertrand game in a Chamberlinian environment. We reformulate O. Hart′s model (Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 1985, 529–546) as a nonatomic game and show that under dispersion of tastes and continuity of the tastes density, there exists a pure-strategies ε-equilibrium where prices exceed marginal cost. Unlike Hart′s model there is no need to impose uniformity (or even independence) on the distribution of the m-tuple of differential commodities that consumers care about. Moreover, demand curves are allowed to vary across firms and in equilibrium firms may earn profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B21, D43, L13.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SERVICE TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA ROUND*

Abstract.   In this paper we examine political economic issues of service trade liberalization of a developing country in the context of the Doha Round negotiations. We first discuss the various unique characteristics of the service industries. Then we incorporate these features in a Grossman-Helpman style political economy model and solve for the politically-determined service sector protection. We then examine how various factors such as increased cross-cutting lobbying, the reduction of state-owned service providers and linking negotiation on agricultural protection with negotiation on service sector liberalization can help reduce the political constraints on liberalizing the service sectors.     

Social trust,institutional and political constraints on the executive and deregulation of markets

Social trust is frequently claimed to be conducive for economic reforms. Likewise, the scope of policy liberalization is influenced by the political power structure as manifested in institutional and political constraints on the executive (IPCE). However, social trust and IPCE are possibly intertwined in their effects on economic liberalization. This paper empirically explores the relationship between social trust, IPCE and the scope of economic deregulation as measured by the first difference in the regulation subindex of the Economic Freedom of the World index. The results provide evidence in favor of a positive association of social trust with deregulation and of a negative association between institutional or partisan veto-points and deregulation. Yet, according to our analysis IPCE are an obstacle for economic deregulation only in relatively low trusting environments and social trust unfolds a particular strength as driver of deregulation with increasing levels of IPCE.     

Political connections and higher education

Do political connections affect investment in human capital? This paper studies the higher education decisions of politically connected and unconnected students during China's economic transition. Using the sequential introduction of reforms, I show that economic liberalization increased tertiary educational attainment, as well as sorting of students into different degree types depending on family background. Students whose parents were members of the Chinese Communist Party selected into relatively less prestigious vocational colleges with lower admissions standards. In contrast, politically unconnected individuals responded to the higher skill premium following the reforms by studying harder to obtain more demanding and sought‐after university degrees.     

Abenomics and Japan's Trade Policy in a New Era

Trade policy, in particular, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), has been a centerpiece of the Abe administration's economic strategy. The TPP's contributions to Japan's growth strategy include: (i) creating trade and investment opportunities abroad for Japanese companies through ambitious liberalization targets; (ii) advancing domestic reforms – with the largest service and agricultural liberalization commitments to date; and (iii) increasing bargaining leverage in other trade negotiations. But the domestic reform goals of Abenomics in agriculture have come up short due to opposition from domestic lobbies. American trade politics – which culminated in the US withdrawal from the TPP – have upended the goals of trade policy under Abenomics. Japan's best option in this new environment is to deliver on high quality, multi‐party trade agreements: concluding negotiations with Europe; scaling up the ambition of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; and salvaging a TPP 11. The merits of a bilateral free trade agreement with the USA will depend on how the Trump administration operationalizes its America First policy.     

休克疗法与制度移植:新的争论以及1806年后普鲁士和西南德国改革的启示

经济学界关于休克疗法和渐进主义的争论又有了新的发展,这一次是有关发展中和新兴国家的。法国大革命及其对其他欧洲国家的影响,已经作为一个历史案例,在讨论大爆炸改革策略的优缺点时被屡屡提及。文章为1806年后普鲁士和西南德国改革之间的比较提供了一个特别有趣的历史案例研究,这到目前为止并未得到应有的重视。这个案例研究将揭示社会转型过程中经济和政治之间的深层次互动,因而对不同的经济改革策略的评价不能也不应该脱离对政治初始条件的考量。从最近的改革经验来看,一个特别有趣的发现是,普鲁士可能提供了第一个政府被东易北容克(East-Elbian Junkers)俘获的历史案例。     

财政分权:促进国有企业效率提高的可置信承诺机制

中国的渐进式改革是政治集权下的财政分权改革。财政分权增强了地方政府发展地方经济的激励,导致地方政府间争夺经济资源的竞争。这种竞争提高了救助低效率国有企业的机会成本,可以作为一种承诺机制,硬化国有企业的预算约束,进而促进经济增长。     

Growth and Transition: Why Has China''s Performance Been So Different?

This paper explains the differences in performance between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) since 1989 and China since its 1978–1979 reforms by the differing goals of economic reformers in China and in the CEECs. In China reforms were intended to promote growth rather than to create a market-based economy. Eastern European reformers’ main goal has been the creation of a market-oriented economy. The paper focuses on policies toward foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign exchange since these highlight the differences in goals.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 422–440. University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005, Australia.