WAGES,HOURS OF WORK AND JOB SATISFACTION OF RETIREMENT‐AGE WORKERS*

I analyse, theoretically and empirically, the effects of pension benefits, family conditions and the personal characteristics of older individuals on their labour supply, wages, hours worked and job satisfaction, in the framework of the Nash bargaining condition whereby an older worker and a firm bargain over employment conditions such as wages, hours of work and job investment. It is stressed that as workers become older they tend to give greater priority to the number of hours worked, work environment and type of job than to wages, and try to improve these through job investment, even at the cost of lower wages.     

GENDER AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF SITUATED AGENCY

Amartya Sen defends a rich conception of social choice theory against tendencies to limit social choice theory to the formal investigation of rules of collective decision-making. His understanding of social choice theory makes the field a natural candidate for exploring gender issues in the evaluation of democratic policy. Not surprisingly, Sen has applied the insights he developed from his study of social choice to the evaluation of gender inequality, in particular to women's well-being in the context of the family. I focus on Sen's distinction between well-being and agency, and argue that from the perspective of women's movements and related social movements, the role of agency has so far been unduly neglected in social choice theory.     

JOB REALLOCATION, EMPLOYMENT CHANGE AND AVERAGE JOB TENURE: THEORY AND WORKPLACE EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIA

We explore determinants of job reallocation, employment change and average job tenure in this paper. A model which associates technological advances with the process of economic growth is modified and analysed. The features of this model allow for the possibility of asymmetric behaviour when looking at the net change in employment. Workplace data from Australia (AWIRS95) are used to test the predictions generated from the model for both employment change and average job tenure. Results are presented that provide clear evidence as to the nature of workplaces in which net employment growth is concentrated. We find that employment growth is asymmetrically related to expected changes in demand for the output of the workplace. We also find that employment is lower for workplaces that are larger, older, have greater union density, offer higher relative earnings, or are operating in a more competitive environment. The impacts on average tenure are as expected from the model and from these changes in employment. Overall there is a substantial degree of agreement between the predictions of the model and our empirical results.     

THE TENURE GAME: BUILDING UP ACADEMIC HABITS*

Why do some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? This paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between departments and scholars. We show that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive impact on scholar's productivity, leading to higher productivity growth rates and higher productivity levels.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

MENTAL HEALTH AND LIFE SATISFACTION OF YOUNG AUSTRALIANS: THE ROLE OF FAMILY BACKGROUND*

This paper uses the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey to investigate the factors that influence young Australians’ mental health and life satisfaction, with an emphasis upon the role of family background. It also explores male and female differences concerning those background effects. The results indicate a particularly significant negative association between parental divorce and well‐being, and suggest that the timing of divorce matters. Distinguishing the samples by gender shows that this relationship remains significant only for females. Past living arrangements consistently turn out to be statistically insignificant whether the sample used is the total, males or females. The current living arrangements, however, appear to be significantly associated with both mental health and life satisfaction of males. Adding potentially confounding characteristics to our basic regression, which includes only the family background variables, suggests that some of the ‘aggregate’ effects of family background might work indirectly through the mediating variables such as education or lifestyles, though most of them remain direct. Among those, marital status, education, labour market experience and lifestyles seem to be the major factors explaining the dispersion in well‐being of young Australians. Income and wealth, on the other hand, have only a minor impact.     

CONFRONTING OBJECTIONS TO PERFORMANCE PAY: THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL AND GAIN-SHARING INCENTIVES ON JOB SATISFACTION

The increasing use of incentive pay schemes in recent years has raised concerns about their potential detrimental effect on intrinsic job satisfaction (JS), job security and employee morale. This study explores the impact of pay incentives on the overall JS of workers in the United Kingdom and their satisfaction with various facets of jobs. Using data from eight waves (1998–2005) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and a uniquely designed well-being dataset (EPICURUS), a significant positive impact on JS is only found for those receiving fixed-period bonuses. These conclusions are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, and are shown to depend on a number of job-quality characteristics that have not been controlled for in previous studies.     

RISK AVERSION AND FIELD OF STUDY CHOICE: THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITY

Does the choice of field of study depend on individual risk aversion? The direction of the relationship between individual risk attitudes and type of university degree chosen is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, risk averse individuals may prefer degree courses which allow high returns in the labour market; on the other hand, if these degrees expose students to a higher probability of dropping out, those who are more risk averse may be induced to choose less challenging fields. Using data from a sample of students enrolled at a middle‐sized Italian public university in 2009, we find that, controlling for a large number of individual characteristics, more risk averse students are more likely to choose any other field (Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences) rather than Social Sciences. We interpret this result bearing in mind that some of these fields, such as Humanities, involve a reduction in the risk of dropping out, while others (such as Engineering and Sciences) involve a lower risk in the labour market. It also emerges that the effect of risk aversion on degree choice is related to student ability. Risk averse students characterized by high abilities tend to prefer Engineering, while the propensity of risk averse students to enrol in Humanities decreases when ability increases, suggesting that the attention paid to labour market risks and drop‐out risk varies according to student skills.     

GENDER, POVERTY AND THE INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

Most empirical studies of poverty assume an equal sharing of resources between all household members. There is a growing body of research indicating that this assumption is not realistic. This paper explores how the unequal sharing of resources could potentially affect the measurement of poverty. Simulations based on micro-data from two countries (Italy and the U.S.A.) are carried out under the assumption that women "lose" and men and children "gain" because of unequal sharing in the household. Our findings suggest that if there is significant intra-household inequality of this type, as some writers have suggested, then conventional methods of poverty measurement will likely to lead to a serious under-estimate (over-estimate) of the incidence and intensity of female (male) poverty.     

EARNINGS INEQUALITY IN GREAT BRITAIN 1975–90: THE ROLE OF AGE

This paper is concerned with the growing earnings dispersion among British men. The study is based on unit record data drawn from the New Earnings Survey. It is found that increases in inequality within age groups account for most of the rise in earnings inequality overall. Occupation too is a significant explanation of growing inequality among workers, but the major part of increased inequality within age groups remains unexplained.     

HIGH AND LOW EARNINGS JOBS: THE FORTUNES OF EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS

The focus of the literature on the effect of job changes has been on the consequences of job destruction on the individual worker. In this paper we analyze the impact on the earnings distribution of both job creation and job destruction. We establish a link between job reallocation and the movement of workers into and out of the tails of the earnings distribution. Both job creating and job destroying employers shed jobs mostly from the middle and lower tails of the earnings distribution, although this is cyclically very sensitive. Labor mobility (triggered by job reallocation) is risky: mobile workers will generally end up in the upper or lower tail of the distribution rather than in the middle. If workers move across industry boundaries, they typically move to the lower tails of the distribution. In sum, the fortunes of workers depend on the fortunes of their employers.     

THE STRUCTURE OF THE EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION: HOW ARE HOUSEHOLDS AND INDIVIDUALS RELATED?*

This paper investigates the links between individual and household distributions of earnings. Using a sample of 1991 data from the UK, considerable complexity is uncovered in the structure of the household earnings distribution. This is due to heterogeneity of earners and positive ‘clustering’ of earners within households. The structure of the clustering behaviour of earners for different household types is estimated, and the contribution of clustering to overall earnings inequality is evaluated. Perhaps surprisingly in view of the observed clustering behaviour, it is found that clustering has reduced overall inequality, although the mean-adjusted distribution of individual earnings is insignificantly different from the distribution of household earnings.     

MID‐DAY MEAL PROGRAM AND INCIDENCE OF CHILD LABOUR IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY

The present paper purports to examine the consequence of a mid‐day meal program and/or cash stipend scheme on the incidence of child labour in a developing economy using a three‐sector general equilibrium model. It has been found that the policy may be counterproductive as it lowers both the initial incomes of the working families and the return on education. Direct cash payments to the working families instead of a mid‐day meal program are likely to be effective in eradicating the problem of child labour.     

ROLE OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN INTERGROUP COMPETITION

We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. We show that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, relative performance evaluation between the groups accompanied by absolute performance evaluation results in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In this case, any approximate Nash equilibrium nearly induces the first‐best allocation.     

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS

A good reputation can be an effective bond for honest behavior in a community of traders if members of the community know how others have behaved in the past – even if any particular pair of traders meets only infrequently. In a large community, it would be impossibly costly for traders to be perfectly informed about each other's behavior, but there exist institutions that can restore the effectiveness of a reputation system using much less extensive information. The system of judges used to enforce commercial law before the rise of the state was such an institution, and it successfully encouraged merchants (1) to behave honestly, (2) to impose sanctions on violators, (3) to become adequately informed about how others had behaved, (4) to provide evidence against violators of the code, and (5) to pay any judgments assessed against them, even though each of these behaviors might be personally costly.     

GROWTH, R&D AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

This paper analyzes the normative side of an R&D growth model in which market structure and growth are jointly determined in the equilibrium of a one‐sector economy under monopolistic competition. We find that a distortion in the allocation of R&D, namely the presence of technological spillovers between firms, generates two market failures: insufficient growth and excessive entry of firms. We show that this result is driven by the interplay between market structure and growth. A simple tax/subsidy scheme to support the efficient solution is proposed.     

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, INFORMATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC GROUPS

A domestic ratification game nested within an international bargaining game establishes that domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. When information on the domestic side is incomplete, an informational role of lobbies is established. Cooperation is more likely when domestic lobbies provide information to Congress about a treaty presented for ratification, especially when cooperation would not otherwise occur. As government becomes more divided, cooperation is less likely; when it does occur, the legislature is better off – internal divisions worsen the external leverage of states, while a united home front is the executive's best chance for obtaining her ideal agreement.     

DEPRECIATION, OBSOLESCENCE AND THE ROLE OF CAPITAL IN GROWTH ACCOUNTING

Maurice Scott has argued that the neoclassical production function and growth accounting are fundamentally flawed as tools for understanding the growth process. If the role of capital were correctly evaluated, then (he argues) the famous 'residual' of growth accounting would disappear. Contrary to these claims, this paper seeks to show that growth accounting gives correct answers to interesting questions, even when all technical progress is embodied in new capital goods and even when depreciation is entirely due to obsolescence.