Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Public Technology Infrastructure,R&D Sourcing,and Research Joint Ventures

In this paper, we define public technology infrastructure to mean public resources that bring new R&D into existence. Examples are public research that yields knowledge spillovers and government contracts that broker new research. Using this definition we explore the effect of public infrastructure on cooperative R&D, especially R&D sourcing and research joint ventures (RJVs). Our findings strongly suggest that public infrastructure promotes cooperative R&D. We begin by studying the role of federal laboratories in R&D sourcing by private laboratories, finding that sourcing increases as a result. Then we examine patents arising from RJVs sponsored by the Advanced Technology Program (ATP). We find that R&D subsidies as well as difficulty and novelty increase patents produced by the RJVs. Contractual oversight by ATP has no direct effect but an indirect effect appears to exist, since firms value ATP oversight more highly for more difficult and novel projects, and these produce more patents.     

Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower than cooperation and lower even than free trade, though qualifications to the dangers from no commitment are noted.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13     

Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium

We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R&D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

R&D policy in a vertically related industry

In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of public policy aimed to stimulate business-performed R&D in a vertically related market. We examine the role of an R&D active upstream supplier in a four-stage R&D model, where we incorporate public funding. The considered policy instrument is direct funding of firms’ R&D efforts. We calculate the optimal policies and show that they have a positive impact on firms’ R&D investments. From a welfare point of view, it is optimal to differentiate the subsidy rates between the upstream and the downstream markets. Competition in the product market leads to a higher subsidy rate to the upstream supplier than to the downstream firms. When concentration is high in the downstream market, the optimal solution is an R&D subsidy for these firms, otherwise the optimal solution is an R&D tax for the downstream firms.     

Strategic R&D policy under multiproduct duopoly and quality-price competition

This paper analyses strategic R&D policy in a third-country trade model where multiproduct firms with different production technologies compete in a vertically differentiated market. I show that the optimal R&D policies for both countries are subsidies when the product market is under price competition.     

Effect of proximity on recombination innovation in R&D collaboration: an empirical analysis

Recombination innovation is a process of creatively combining different knowledge domains in an invention. Recombination innovation in R&D collaboration – joint recombination process, which is integration of the organisation’s internal knowledge with the partner’s new knowledge, serves as the stepping stone of the knowledge search in the technological space. This paper tries to illuminate how different dimensions of proximity of the collaborating partners affect the probability of the collaborative innovation to be recombination innovation. Our result shows that technological proximity has a negative effect on joint recombination innovation. Geographical proximity has an inverted U-shaped effect on joint recombination innovation. The positive effect of organisational proximity on joint recombination innovation is not supported.     

Environmental Policy with Endogenous Technology from a Game Theoretic Perspective: The Case of the US Pulp and Paper Industry

The merits of different types of regulatory tools in eliminating pollution and at the same time inducing innovation have long been an interest of researchers in both environmental economics and industrial organization. Although there is a substantial theoretical literature investigating the potential for various environmental policies to attain these dual goals, this is a challenging empirical problem because every industry has its own inherent characteristics that play an important role in determining the performance of different regulatory tools. The majority of the work to date focuses on pollution abatement while leaving pollution prevention understudied. In most of the literature firms are also assumed to be symmetric. Asymmetries among firms add another degree and level of complexity to their strategic interactions, and affect the performance of different regulatory tools. This paper investigates the performance of two alternative regulatory tools, an emissions performance standard and an emissions tax, in reducing pollution and inducing pollution prevention and abatement R&D in the US pulp and paper industry. We construct a model representing the industry in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly framework, calibrate the model to disaggregated industry data, and run scenarios to replicate the behavior of the firms in an imperfectly competitive output market. Our results suggest that pollution prevention R&D can respond quite differently than abatement R&D to different policy instruments. The results indicate that R&D spillovers among firms play crucial role in technology development and strategies of the firms. Our results also suggest that strategic interactions between firms in an imperfectly competitive industry can have significant impacts of the levels of both types of R&D.      

Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect

I uncover a new force towards increasing dominance (the property whereby, in dynamic games, the leader tends to increase his or her lead in expected terms). The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that, in equilibrium, the laggard chooses a less promising path, in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the leader. This results in increasing dominance and holds true even if no joint-payoff (or efficiency) effect is present. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, L1.     

Open technology innovation activity and firm value: evidence from Korean firms

Despite the importance of Open Technology Innovation Activity (OTIA) for firm value, the literature investigating effects of OTIA announcements of developing country firms is not known in international academic circles. Our study using an event study approach examines the effects of OTIA (technology import and joint R&D) announcements of firms in Korea, one of the leading developing and highly innovative countries. We find that the announcements of OTIA produce positive average abnormal returns. Interestingly, unlike the prior studies on developed country firms, OTIA with firms in the homogenous industry leads to greater firm value than that involving firms in heterogenic industries. This implies an importance of a technological fusion with external firms in different industries for value of developing country firms. In addition, this article finds no home bias that a nationality of partner firms is not essential for the relation between OTIA and value of firms.     

Strategic Product R&D Investment Policy under International Rivalry in the Presence of Demand Spillover Effects

Abstract

We develop a model of product (i.e., quality-improving) research and development (R&D) investment competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. In particular, based on a third-country market model, we consider the optimal product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality level of a product. We show how the optimality of a non-cooperative and a cooperative R&D investment policy depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. Furthermore, we consider the same issues in the case of heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.     

Research technology organisations as leaders of R&D collaboration with SMEs: role,barriers and facilitators

Research technology organisations or RTOs have attracted academic interest in the last decade due to their role as technology transfer agents and R&D collaborative leaders for firms and especially for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Although their role within the diversity of specialised structures in generating R&D for industry in National Innovation Systems is recognised, there are scarce publications in relation to their strategies, performance or characteristic, as leaders of R&D collaboration with SMEs. The aim of this work is to identify the role, barriers and facilitators for RTOs performance as well as to develop a contingency relationship between industry environment, strategy, organisational structure and other factors for successful technology transfer from technology organisations to SMEs. This research is based on a field study conducted on 14 technology organisations based in the Valencia region, working with various industry sectors.