The Wild West of executive coaching

Annual spending on executive coaching in the United States is estimated at 1 billion dollars. Yet information about coaching's effectiveness is scarce and unreliable. No one has yet demonstrated conclusively what qualifies an executive coach or what makes one approach to executive coaching better than another. Barriers to entry are nonexistent--many executive coaches know little about business, and some know little about coaching. The coaching certifications offered by various self-appointed bodies are difficult to assess, and methods of measuring return on investment are questionable. But strategic coaching can provide critical help both to individuals and to organizations. In this article, Stratford Sherman, a senior vice president of Executive Coaching Network, and Alyssa Freas, the founder and CEO, explore the popularity of executive coaching and investigate ways to make the most of the experience. They argue that coaching is inevitably a triangular relationship between the client, the "coachee," and the coach. Its purpose is to produce behavioral change and growth in the coachee for the economic benefit of the client. The best way to maximize the likelihood of good results is to qualify all the people involved. Even so, many triangular relationships continue to generate conflict among all three parties. At the most basic level, coaches serve as suppliers of candor, providing leaders with the objective feedback they need to nourish their growth. Coaching gets executives to slow down, gain awareness, and notice the effects of their words and actions. On a larger scale, the best coaching fosters cultural change for the benefit of the entire organization. It provides a disciplined way for businesses to deepen relationships with their most valued employees while also increasing their effectiveness.     

The hidden dangers of historical simulation

Many large financial institutions compute the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of their trading portfolios using historical simulation based methods, but the methods’ properties are not well understood. This paper theoretically and empirically examines the historical simulation method, a variant of historical simulation introduced by Boudoukh et al. [Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., Whitelaw, R., 1998. The best of both worlds, Risk 11(May) 64–67] (BRW), and the filtered historical simulation method (FHS) of Barone-Adesi et al. [Barone-Adesi, G., Bourgoin F., Giannopoulos, K., 1998. Don’t look back. Risk 11(August) 100–104; Barone-Adesi, G., Giannopoulos K., Vosper L., 1999. VaR without correlations for nonlinear portfolios. Journal of Futures Markets 19(April) 583–602]. The historical simulation and BRW methods are both under-responsive to changes in conditional risk; and respond to changes in risk in an asymmetric fashion: measured risk increases when the portfolio experiences large losses, but not when it earns large gains. The FHS method is promising, but its risk estimates are variable in small samples, and its assumption that correlations are constant is violated in large samples. Additional refinements are needed to account for time-varying correlations; and to choose the appropriate length of the historical sample period.     

The dangers of feeling like a fake

In many walks of life-and business is no exception-there are high achievers who believe that they are complete fakes. To the outside observer, these individuals appear to be remarkably accomplished; often they are extremely successful leaders with staggering lists of achievements. These neurotic impostors--as psychologists call them--are not guilty of false humility. The sense of being a fraud is the flip side of giftedness and causes a great many talented, hardworking, and capable leaders to believe that they don't deserve their success. "Bluffing" their way through life (as they see it), they are haunted by the constant fear of exposure. With every success, they think, "I was lucky this time, fooling everyone, but will my luck hold? When will people discover that I'm not up to the job?" In his career as a management professor, consultant, leadership coach, and psychoanalyst, Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries has found neurotic impostors at all levels of organizations. In this article, he explores the subject of neurotic imposture and outlines its classic symptoms: fear of failure, fear of success, perfectionism, procrastination, and workaholism. He then describes how perfectionist overachievers can damage their careers, their colleagues' morale, and the bottom line by allowing anxiety to trigger self-handicapping behavior and cripple the very organizations they're trying so hard to please. Finally, Kets de Vries offers advice on how to limit the incidence of neurotic imposture and mitigate its damage through discreet vigilance, appropriate intervention, and constructive support.     

Debate: The dangers of fiscal illusion

Crime prevention emerged as a separate policy issue in the late 1970s, with rising crime rates, disillusionment with traditional crime control methods and evidence that situational methods could be effective. There have since then been changes in language and approach. Situational crime prevention no longer dominates. The language is of community safety and crime reduction. The focus is on fear of crime and incivilities, as well as crime. Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships now have statutory responsibilities at a local level. While in some ways the circumstances are auspicious for improved, evidence-based policy and practice, they face substantial obstacles.     

高管控制下的财务重述与高管薪酬关系研究

本文在西方学者的管理层权力论基础上,结合中国垄断企业的特点,进一步提出了高管控制论,以2000～2008年曾发生过财务重述的我国代表性垄断行业上市公司共148个重述样本作为研究对象,深入分析高管控制与高管薪酬的相关性,考察了高管以财务重述为路径,影响企业财务业绩进而提高薪酬的可能性。研究发现:高管控制与高管薪酬显著正相关;虽然我国绝大部分国有垄断企业的高管不拥有或较少拥有股票和期权,财务重述仍然会影响公司高管的薪酬。     

The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation

We show that chief executive officers (CEOs) of prestigious firms earn less. Total compensation is on average 8% lower for firms listed in Fortune’s ranking of America’s most admired companies. We suggest that CEOs are willing to trade off status and career benefits from working for a publicly admired company against additional monetary compensation. Our identification strategy is based on matched sample analyses, difference-in-differences regressions, and a regression discontinuity design. We perform several robustness checks and exclude many alternative explanations, including that firm prestige just proxies for better corporate governance or for increased exposure of the pay-setting process to media attention.     

The real new economy

During the soar-and-swoon days of the late 1990s, many people believed that information technology, and the Internet in particular, were "changing everything" in business. A fundamental change did happen in the 1990s, but it was less about technology than about competition. Under director Diana Farrell, the McKinsey Global Institute has conducted an extensive study of productivity and its connection to corporate IT spending and use during that period. The study revealed that information technology is important--but not central--to the fate of industries and individual companies. So if information technology was not the primary factor in the productivity surge, what was? The study points to competition and innovation. In those industries that saw increases in competitive intensity, managers were forced to innovate aggressively to protect their revenues and profits. Those innovations--in products, business practices, and technology--led to the gains in productivity. In fact, a critical dynamic of the new economy--the real new economy--is the virtuous cycle of competition, innovation, and productivity growth. Managers can innovate in many ways, but during the 1990s, information technology was a particularly powerful tool, for three reasons: First, IT enabled the development of attractive new products and efficient new business processes. Second, it facilitated the rapid industrywide diffusion of innovations. And third, it exhibited strong scale economies--its benefits multiplied rapidly as its use expanded. This article reveals surprising data on how various industries in the United States and Europe were affected by competition, innovation, and information technology in the 1990s and offers insights about how managers can get more from their IT investments.     

The CEO's real legacy

The literature on CEO succession planning is nearly unanimous in its advice: Begin early, look first inside your company for exceptional talent, see that candidates gain experience in all aspects of the business, and help them develop the skills they will need in the top job. It all makes sense and sounds pretty straightforward. Nevertheless, the list of CEOs who last no more than a few years on the job continues to grow. Implicit in many, if not all, of these unceremonious departures is the absence of an effective CEO succession plan. The problem is, most boards simply don't want to talk about CEO succession: Why rock the boat when things are going well? Why risk offending the current CEO? Meanwhile, most CEOs can't imagine that anyone could adequately replace them. In this article, Kenneth W. Freeman, the retired CEO of Quest Diagnostics, discusses his own recent handoff experience (Surya N. Mohapatra became chief executive in May 2004) and offers his approach to succession planning. He says it falls squarely on the incumbent CEO to put ego aside and initiate and actively manage the process of selecting and grooming a successor. Aggressive succession planning is one of the best ways for CEOs to ensure the long-term health of the company, he says. Plus, thinking early and often about a successor will likely improve the chief executive's performance during his tenure. Freeman advocates the textbook rules for succession planning but adds to that list a few more that apply specifically to the incumbent CEO: Insist that the board become engaged in succession planning, look for a successor who is different from you, and make the successor's success your own. After all, Freeman argues, the CEO's true legacy is determined by what happens after he leaves the corner office.     

The power of the pen and executive compensation

We examine the press’ role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a sophisticated approach by the media in selecting CEOs to cover. However, negative coverage is also greater for CEOs with more option exercises, suggesting the press engages in some degree of “sensationalism.” We find little evidence that firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover.     

Risk management of real estate: The case of real estate swaps

Real estate swaps are a recent financial innovation based upon the principle of comparative advantage. A real estate swap is a useful tool for real estate risk management and for participating in real estate investment without the high costs associated with real estate. Potential economic benefits and costs associated with real estate swaps are considered and real estate swaps are compared to alternative tools for real estate risk management. The expected utility and effectiveness of risk management with a swap in a multiperiod framework are analyzed. The analysis finds that the subject property's return and its risk characteristics (as reflected in its correlation with interest rate and property index returns) delimit the risk management potential of a given swap position. Optimal swap positions are shown for various regions and property types based on historical return series, from the period between 1983 and 1992, and the parameters of the dynamic model developed.     

The determinants of director remuneration,executive tenure and individual executive disclosure in North African IPO firms

This paper examines the impact of board governance mechanisms, namely board size, independence ratio, opacity of earnings disclosure, and ratio of genuinely independent nonexecutive directors to total board size on director remuneration, executive tenure and likelihood of individual executive salary disclosure in a unique and comprehensive sample of 69 North African IPO firms. I find evidence of the enhanced governance role of true independent nonexecutives in family as opposed to non-family firms in improving disclosure of individual salaries and moderating lengths of executive tenure. However while their role is only significant in the context of family firms the evidence suggests that their presence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. The evidence also ascribes a greater role for business angel as opposed to more formal private equity financing which is more applicable within the highly social networked economy of the Maghreb region.     

The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO) throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.     

The evolution of shareholder voting for executive compensation schemes

We examine shareholder voting on management-sponsored compensation proposals from 1992 through 2003 to determine how voting has evolved as a result of changes in the corporate governance environment. We investigate three questions: have regulatory changes and changes in investor sentiment affected voting; do the same factors appear to influence voting over time and has the impact of the various factors changed over time; and do additional factors such as the level of compensation and alternate definitions of dilution influence voting support? We find evidence of changing trends in voting, that shareholders have become more sensitive to potentially harmful plan provisions, and that additional factors do affect voting.     

The persistence of real estate cycles

This paper presents a model that attempts to explain the underlying causes of the prolonged cycles observed in real estate markets. In addition, the paper characterizes the features that make some property types more prone to such boom-and-bust behavior. The combination of demand uncertainty, adjustment costs, and construction lags leads to two phenomena that may help explain market persistence. The first phenomenon is the reluctance of owners to adjust occupancy levels, even in the face of large shifts in renter demand. The second phenomenon is the occurrence of periods of sustained overbuilding: the addition of new supply in the face of already high vacancy rates.     

The executive compensation implications of the tax component of earnings

We extend prior research by examining the weight applied to earnings generated by changes in ETRs (i.e., the tax component of earnings) in determining CEO and CFO compensation. We examine both bonus and total compensation and find that the predicted relationships between compensation and the tax component of earnings are largely limited to bonus compensation. This is not surprising since bonus compensation represents an unambiguous link between contemporaneous performance and compensation, while equity compensation is in part determined by agency considerations. Our evidence suggests that both CEOs and CFOs are compensated for the tax component of earnings. We find that CEOs are rewarded equally for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings, while CFOs are rewarded more for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings. Additionally, the weight applied to the tax component of earnings when determining CFO bonus compensation is greater when; (1) the tax component of earnings does not appear to be related to earnings management; (2) ETRs decrease rather than increase, (3) the firm pays bonus based on after-tax earnings rather than pre-tax earnings, and (4) the firm is tax aggressive rather than non-tax aggressive. The variations in the weighting of the tax component of earnings for CFO bonus compensation noted above in combination with evidence that CEO bonus compensation is indifferent to ETR-related earnings versus other components of earnings, suggests that the tax component of earnings is a contractual component of CFO bonus compensation.     

The post-capitalist executive. Interview by T George Harris

For half a century, Peter F. Drucker has influenced senior executives across the globe with his rare insight into socioeconomic forces and practical advice for navigating often turbulent managerial waters. In his latest contribution to HBR, Drucker discusses the impact of the ideas in his latest work, Post-Capitalist Society, on the day-to-day lives and careers of managers. Drucker argues that managers must learn to negotiate a new environment with a different set of work rules and career expectations. Companies currently face downsizing and turmoil with increasing regularity. Once built to last like pyramids, corporations are now more like tents. In addition, businesses in the post-capitalist society grow through many and varied complicated alliances often baffling to the traditional manager. Confronted by these changes, managers must relearn how to manage. In the new world of business, information is replacing authority as the primary tool of the executive. And, Drucker advises, one embarks on the road toward information literacy not by buying the latest technological gadget but by identifying gaps in knowledge. As companies increasingly become temporary institutions, the manager also must begin to take individual responsibility for himself or herself. To that end, the executive must explore what Drucker calls competencies: a person's abilities, likes, dislikes, and goals, both professional and personal. If executives rise to these challenges, a new organizational foundation will be built. While a combination of rank and power supported the traditional organization, the internal structure of the emerging organization will be mutual understanding and trust.     

The real earnings management of cross-listing firms

We examine the existence of real and accrual-based earnings management before and after cross-listings on the U.S. market. The results indicate that firms actively manage their earnings around cross-listing events, using both accrual and real earnings management, but real earnings management is dominant. American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) cross-listed at Level 1 and sponsored ADRs show the largest increase in real earnings management from before to after the listing. Firms that have adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) display lower increases than firms under domestic GAAP. Finally, our results confirm a significant negative relationship between long-run performance and real earnings management before and after major corporate events.     

The real effects of credit default swaps

We examine the effect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.     

一对古巴年轻人的真实生活

我在哈瓦那港口流连。碧蓝的海水、漫长的海岸线,对岸是西班牙人在17世纪修建的城墙,还有矗立在蓝天下面的高大的基督雕像。我在一个小摊儿留步,要了一杯叫古巴自由的鸡尾酒,一串烤鸡肉,独自悠然地欣赏着风景。对面坐着一个古巴小伙子和一个姑娘。小伙子热情地跟我打招呼,我干脆把     

The real leadership lessons of Steve Jobs

The author, whose biography of Steve Jobs was an instant best seller after the Apple CEO's death in October 2011, sets out here to correct what he perceives as an undue fixation by many commentators on the rough edges of Jobs's personality. That personality was integral to his way of doing business, Isaacson writes, but the real lessons from Steve Jobs come from what he actually accomplished. He built the world's most valuable company, and along the way he helped to transform a number of industries: personal computing, animated movies, music, phones, tablet computing, retail stores, and digital publishing. In this essay Isaacson describes the 14 imperatives behind Jobs's approach: focus; simplify; take responsibility end to end; when behind, leapfrog; put products before profits; don't be a slave to focus groups; bend reality; impute; push for perfection; know both the big picture and the details; tolerate only "A" players; engage face-to-face; combine the humanities with the sciences; and "stay hungry, stay foolish."