Economic effects of positive credit information sharing: the case of Korea

In many countries, in addition to negative credit information such as loan default and arrears, positive credit information is also exchanged on a voluntary and reciprocal basis. Employing optimal credit decision models of profit maximizing banks, and utilizing a unique dataset of 2?million consumer loan obligors in Korea, we investigate the economic effects of sharing positive credit information in addition to negative credit information already exchanged. We find that the discriminatory power of the credit scoring model improves significantly. We proceed to investigate the economic effects of the information gap in a competitive credit market by assuming two representative banks that differ only in the level of credit information sharing. The bank that utilizes negative information only suffers from deterioration of the borrower pool and reduced profit, as high credit risk borrowers are more concentrated on this bank due to underpricing of risks. Our finding suggests that banks have incentives to voluntarily participate in the positive information sharing mechanism, since even a small difference in discriminatory power stemming from the information gap may lead to a significant fall in profitability as the distribution of borrower quality changes endogenously due to adverse selection problems.     

二元体制下我国军民融合深度发展的法治实施困境与对策

军民融合发展是统筹经济建设与国防建设、实现富国强军与构建一体化国家战略体系和能力的必由之路。我国军民融合从初步融合走向深度融合,涉及多方主体的关系调整与利益重塑,需要在法治轨道上通过法律规范与法律运行两个维度整合各类主体力量、配置各类要素资源。目前,军民融合法治实施受制于“军”“民”二元分离体制结构的现实约束,在法律规范层面处于制度供给不完备状态,在法律运行层次面临主体实践不协调困境。二元体制下破解军民融合深度发展的法治实施困境,宜从静态规范层面和动态运行层面综合调整军民融合行为。一方面,通过适时制定和颁布具有统一效力的军民融合发展法,清理、废止和修订不适应军民融合发展需要的法律法规和政策文件,在规范层面建立健全统一完备的军民融合发展法律法规体系;另一方面,探索建立“委员会统一领导、各小组分工负责”的军民融合法治实施领导体制和统一领导、军地协调、顺畅高效的军地联合法律执行机制,形成诉调对接、诉仲结合的军民融合案件多元化纠纷解决机制暨法律适用机制,在法律运行层面建立协调高效的军民融合发展法律实施体系。     

湖湘文化对青年毛泽东法律思想的影响

毛泽东青年时期的文章和书信,对法律有着大量的论述,蕴涵着丰富的法律思想和法理,涉及了宪法,婚姻法、经济法等众多部门法领域。其法律思想也经历了一个曲折发展的过程,其间,“善法恶法论”、“民治”观点等清晰可见,“宪政”和“法治”的法律理念已依稀可辨。湖湘文化在四个方面深刻影响着青年毛泽东的法律品格。     

Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task‐independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.     

THE REVENUE‐SHARING RULE FOR INTERCONNECTION CHARGES*

In this paper we explore the economic principle behind the revenue‐sharing rule for interconnection charges. Our main finding is that symmetric firms can collude by splitting the revenues equally. We further characterize the optimal revenue‐sharing ratio and discuss the relationship between optimal ratio and the optimal access price. We also show that the revenue‐sharing rule can have the perverse effect of inducing a firm to raise its own costs in order to gain a higher share of revenues.     

Should Bangladesh Export to Countries with Better Institutional or Comparatively Similar Institutional Form?

Using panel data for the years 2006–2015, this study empirically investigates the effect of rule of law as an institution on Bangladesh's exports to 28 European Union countries (EU28) based on gravity model analysis. Two-step econometric results suggest that institutional rule of law is strongly associated with Bangladesh's exports, and institutional quality provides evidence of this significant effect. Furthermore, exports of Bangladesh are driven by economic size, market size, and the real exchange rate as well as rule of law. These results are suggestive of an important joint role for both trade and institutions in the long run.     

SELF‐REPORTED ECONOMIC CONDITION AND HOME PRODUCTION: INTRA‐HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION IN ITALY

This paper applies a collective model of intra‐household welfare distribution using individual self‐reported data. The model accounts for household production, and self‐reported information on economic condition is used to identify the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the family. The theoretical framework implies a broad concept of full income, which includes household production as time allocated to domestic activities. We find that self‐reported data on economic status are useful in recovering individual shares of household income and that both wages and non‐strictly‐economic individual variables play an important role in the bargaining process determining the sharing rule in Italy.     

The evolution of morality and the end of economic man

1871 saw the publication of two major treatises in economics, with self-seeking economic man at their center. In the same year Darwin published The Descent of Man, which emphasized sympathy and cooperation as well as self-interest, and contained a powerful argument that morality has evolved in humans by natural selection. Essentially this stance is supported by modern research. This paper considers the nature of morality and how it has evolved. It reconciles Darwin’s notion that a developed morality requires language and deliberation (and is thus unique to humans), with his other view that moral feelings have a long-evolved and biologically-inherited basis. The social role of morality and its difference with altruism is illustrated by an agent-based simulation. The fact that humans combine both moral and selfish dispositions has major implications for the social sciences and obliges us to abandon the pre-eminent notion of selfish economic man. Economic policy must take account of our moral nature.     

法治之用:公共支出、税收与经济绩效

法治对经济绩效的影响可以从公共支出和税收两方面解释.税收与再分配所造成的激励扭曲是决定公共支出乃至经济绩效的关键因素.在其他条件不变的情况下,法治的完善会降低经济体的均衡税率水平,减少税收与再分配造成的激励扭曲和总产出损失.在法治与民主的协同作用下,公共支出与社会总产出水平都会得到提高.从现实经济生活来看,法治之用主要体现在两方面:协调经济利益,实现"非自我实施型"交易收益.     

Colonization and the Rule of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common Law and Civil Law Countries

The rule of law is one of the most important components of any explanation of cross-national differences in economic well-being. But what leads to better rule of law in a country? Using an institutional approach this paper probes the effect of legal systems in influencing the rule of law. There has long been speculation that the countries adopting English common law are better at providing legal dispute resolution than those adopting the continental forms of civil law. That speculative assessment is found to be true only in those countries that have been colonized, further analysis demonstrates that it is the effectiveness of the protection of property rights in common law systems rather than the institutions themselves that influence rule of law statistics. The paper calls for a more refined examination of legal systems which takes into consideration whether law is organically developed or transplanted.     

Fiscal crises,decentralization, and indiscipline

How does fiscal decentralization influence fiscal discipline and the probability of a fiscal crisis? Discrete choice analysis used with panel data reveals that crisis probability is associated positively with spending decentralization and negatively with vertical fiscal imbalance. These effects are prevalent in countries with a higher degree of tax revenue decentralization, while a stronger rule of law mitigates such adverse decentralization effects. The findings imply that reduced risk sharing against local shocks under tax revenue decentralization destabilizes the sustainability of a nation's fiscal system. Therefore, policymakers should be cognizant of the undesirable impacts of decentralization on fiscal crisis and indiscipline.     

Disequilibrium economic dynamics: A post-Schumpeterian contribution

Adaptive economizing in a decentralized economy with alternative technologies and scarce resources leads to various kinds of locally unstable behavior. Economic disequilibrium is the rule in such a world and requires the presence of market mechanisms that make possible continued viability. If in addition to local instability economies are also globally unstable, as considerable evidence suggests, then the discovery and application of new structure is essential. A complete dynamic theory of economic change must therefore be based not only on conventional rationality and routinely adapting behavior but on a superior faculty which may perhaps best be called creative intelligence.     

Sharing Rules in Teams

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D2, C72, J54.     

利益最大化实现的法律思考

利益最大化是市场经济主体的普遍追求。追求利益最大化的界限就是主体在不侵害他人利益最大化和社会利益最大化的合理范围内实现各自利益最大化。市场调节机制在调整利益实现过程中的作用是显而易见的,但也是有限的,民商法是保障利益最大化实现的基础性法律,经济法则以社会总体经济效益和社会利益为其立法本位,二共同构成了利益最大化实现的保证。     

New Private Enterprises in Three Transitional Contexts: Central Europe,the Former Soviet Union and China

This article compares the new private businesses that have been created in three transitional (from communism) contexts: Central Europe (Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine) and Asia (China). There have been major differences among these world regions in the contexts created for the development of new enterprises: in the pace of change, the extent to which state control and the rule of law have been maintained or created, whether there has been economic growth, decline or stagnation, the degrees of political continuity and the length of the communist period. Despite the contrasting contexts, there have been many similarities in the characteristics of new private businesses, but alongside some major differences: in the types of business with which beginners have usually commenced, the match with their specialities, whether self-employment has normally been a full-time or part-time occupation, whether or not the state has been perceived as basically supportive, in uses of the second economies and bribery, and whether sole proprietorship or partnership has been the normal initial business arrangement. It is concluded that there are just two essential conditions for successful transition (as regards the development of small business sectors): economic growth and the rule of law. Thereafter everything seems to depend on creating a favourable configuration of conditions which, our evidence suggests, is most likely when countries have maximum scope to plot their own transitional routes. It is argued that imposing one allegedly correct approach will usually be counter-productive.     

政府规模和法治水平有助于提升服务贸易发展水平吗——来自G20国家面板数据分析

本文构建政府规模和法治水平影响服务贸易发展的一般性分析框架，结合G20国家的面板数据，实证检验了政府规模、法治水平与服务贸易发展之间的关系，并对实证结果进行稳健性检验。研究发现：政府规模在促进服务贸易发展上存在明显双路径传递效应，即政府规模通过两种不同渠道影响服务贸易发展；法治水平显著抑制服务贸易发展，其可能原因是法治水平作为经济发展的制度要素，也存在边际收益递减规律；部分G20国家臃肿的法治体系与其服务贸易创新发展的需求不相适应。针对时间影响的稳健性结果和针对收入影响的稳健性结果表明，随着政府规模或法治水平等制度安排日渐稳固，经济因素则成为推动服务贸易发展的主要动力。     

Equal,proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage

This paper analyzes the consequences of a parametrized class of sharing rules on the propensity of individuals to sabotage each other in a cooperative production framework. The considered sharing rules include equal and proportional sharing as special cases and are parametrized with respect to their sensitivity to relative input contributions. This parameter affects the equilibrium provision of productive individual labor (that increases the respective individual input contribution) but also the propensity to sabotage others (which decreases the input contributions of sabotaged individuals). The theoretical analysis shows that sharing rules in which more weight is put on equal sharing induce zero sabotage in equilibrium; however, they might also lead to inefficient underproduction. In contrast, sharing rules that are highly sensitive with respect to relative input contributions lead to destructive sabotage activities and moreover to inefficient overproduction.     

Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims

We study the behavior of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims when there is a large number of claimants with small claims. We model such situations by replicating some basic problem. We show that under replication, the random arrival rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behaves like the proportional rule, the rule that is the most often recommended in this context. Also, under replication, the minimal overlap rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behaves like the constrained equal losses rule, the rule that selects a division at which all claimants experience equal losses subject to no-one receiving a negative amount.     

Sharing-group allocation problems

We deal with allocation problems among sharing groups. We introduce some allocation rules and axioms. The egalitarian rule is characterized by equal treatment of equal groups, solidarity, and group consistency.     

Discussing the political survival of Romanian ministers since 1989—Do economic conditions matter?

Political longevity in young democracies has attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners alike due to several particular characteristics of such democracies, such as a low level of trust, a low level of credibility, corruption, economic difficulties, a less well‐established rule of law and an increased bureaucracy. In such a context, we studied the tenure duration of Romanian ministers since 1989, as well as their accumulated political longevity in ministerial offices. Using proportional hazards regression, we observed some peculiarities in the young Romanian democracy in comparison with more established regimes. We observed that left‐wing majorities tend to increase the probability of seat changes and thus diminish tenure longevity. We also observed that good economic conditions may lead to the substitution of certain types of ministries, while higher inflation rates tend to shorten tenure longevity for Romanian ministers. Moreover, our estimations support the finding that Romanian ministers tend to have shorter tenures as the number of past ministerial functions increases and that the burden of simultaneously managing various ministries significantly contributes to the shorter political longevity of a given minister. Finally, recent ministers have had longer tenures than those in the first years after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989.