土地财政与最优城市规模

土地是有限的,完全依靠土地收入的发展模式是不可持续的。本文主要考察土地财政作为地方政府的一种融资渠道,城市建设用地规模的使用是否与城市人口规模的增加相协调,是否存在过度扩张城市面积促进地区经济发展的现象。为了分析土地出让收入(地租)、公共品供给以及城市规模之间的关系,本文以乔治亨利定理为基础,并引入林达尔均衡条件建立起最优城市人口密度理论模型。采用1999～2009年31个省面板数据对中国城市成本收益模型进行计量分析,结果表明全国26个省低于估算的最优城市人口密度,验证了中国存在城市面积的扩张与人口的增加不协调发展的情况。     

Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods

Most of the literature on government intervention in models of voluntary public goods supply focuses on interventions that increase the total level of a public good, which is considered to be typically underprovided. However, an intervention that is successful in increasing the public good level need not benefit everyone. In this paper we take a direct approach to welfare properties of voluntary provision equilibria in a full blown general equilibrium model with public goods and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary provision outcome. Towards this end, we study a model with many private goods and non-linear production technology for the public good, and hence allow for relative price effects to serve as a powerful channel of intervention. In this setup we show that Pareto improving interventions generally do exist. In particular, direct government provision financed by “small” , or “local” , lump-sum taxes can be used generically to Pareto improve upon the voluntary provision outcome.     

Spatial equilibrium with local public goods: Urban land rent,optimal city size and the Tiebout hypothesis

This paper extends the standard model of urban land rent to consider the spatial equilibrium conditions in a local public goods market as hypothesized by Charles M. Tiebout. An analysis is made of the spatial dimensions of public goods, their degree of ‘localness’ and their impact on land values. It is shown that the optimal population size of the community (Tiebout's sixth assumption) is simultaneously derived with the optimal supply of local public goods and local taxes. It is also shown that land rent is a poor output indicator of Tiebout's equilibrium conditions and that the capitalization assumption is not the appropriate test for his hypothesis.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

Spatial provision of local public goods with spillover effects

Most of the works dealing with local public goods are aspatial in their treatment since they consider only the case of a pure local public good; such works do not address the problem of where the good is to be supplied. In this paper, an initial attempt to treat the distribution of an impure local public good as a choice function is made within the framework of optimum urban land use. The distance-decay nature of spillover effects inherent in an impure local public good is explicitly considered by adopting a negative exponential function. To highlight the spatial aspect of an impure local public good, a two-supply-site problem with a log-linear utility function is formulated to determine the optimal supply sites. It is shown that if the weight of the utility function on the public service is greater than or equal to that on land, then the local public good is exclusively supplied at the center. Otherwise, separate supply sites can be optimal.     

土地使用管制及其利益补偿研究评述和启示

土地使用管制是政府配置土地资源、干预土地市场的一种方式。纠正土地使用的外部性、提供公共产品是管制的主要目的。土地使用管制的存在是必要的，但是人们必须注意加强对其效果的研究。这些效果有些是积极的，有些是消极的。土地使用管制本身是有成本的。随着社会的发展，土地使用管制方式越来越多样化、弹性化和市场化。由于管制而给有关主体造成的影响可通过税费或者补偿的方式予以再调整，以维护社会公平，并达到特定的社会目标。本文通过对国内外有关文献的回顾，得出了几点对我国土地制度有益的启示，这些制度包括耕地保护制度、用途管制制度和城市土地出让制度。     

农民征地补偿满意度实证研究

研究目的:对农民征地补偿满意度进行测算,探究农民征地补偿预期在实践中的实现程度及征地补偿薄弱环节。研究方法:因子分析、结构方程模型。研究成果:武汉市被征地农民征地补偿满意度总指数为53.28;农民对征地补偿程序和监督二因子的满意度较低;对公开透明性、民意反馈、矛盾调解、补偿形式、补偿数量各单项指标的满意度较低。研究结论:增强征地补偿的公开透明性,提高农民参与水平、完善矛盾调解机制,提高征地补偿标准、扩大征地补偿范围等有助于提高农民对征地补偿的满意度水平。     

地方政府竞争、土地价格与外商直接投资——基于69个地级市面板数据的分析

选取2005—2015年我国中部五省共69个地级市的数据,在考虑存在空间溢出效应可能性的基础上,采用空间面板数据模型分析地方政府竞争、土地价格对外商直接投资的空间影响。实证研究结果表明：工业用地价格降低和商业用地价格升高有利于吸引外商直接投资,地方政府竞争通过直接和间接作用于土地出让价格两种手段影响外商直接投资规模。土地价格和政府竞争对地理相邻地区的FDI能够产生显著影响,一个地区的工业土地价格降低、商业土地价格升高将抑制地理相邻地区的FDI规模,同时,一个地区政府竞争的加剧也会降低地理相邻地区的FDI,但这一空间溢出效应在经济距离相邻权重下并不显著,说明中部五省地级市的竞争主要存在于地理位置相邻的地方政府间。     

Congestable local public goods in an urban setting

In this paper, we recognize two types of unpure local public goods (LPGs): congestable and pollutable. This paper and the forthcoming one (Clubs in an urban setting, mimeo, 1980) are devoted to congestable LPGs (CLPG). In Part I we define, classify, and characterize CLPGs. CLPGs may vary in their degree of congestability between zero, in the case of a pure LPG, and one, in the case of a private good. Spatially, we recognize two types of LPGs: the dispersed LPG (DiLPG) and the concentrated LPG (CoLPG). The first is distributed throughout the residential ring and the second is provided in specific locations to which households must travel. The second part of this paper is devoted to the investigation of the properties of a CDiLPG in an urban setting. The properties of CoLPG are investigated in (Clubs in an urban setting, mimeo, 1980). A version of Samuelson's rule as to the optimal allocation of pure public goods is extended on one hand to local dispersed public goods and on the other hand to CLPGs. Two corrective Pigouvian taxes are identified: congestion tolls levied on households, and a residential land tax. These two taxes cover total government expenditure on the LPG. The fraction of the expenses on the LPG covered by congestion tolls is α, and that covered by land taxes is (1 − α), where α is the degree of congestability. Efficiency can also be achieved by zoning the residential ring and regulating the housing density in it. This procedure may replace taxation and its advantage is that we can control a large number of externalities by a single set of zoning rules and regulations. An a posteriori rule to guide the local government as to the desirability of its actions is provided.     

The system of towns with spatial public goods

In this paper, we introduce a model of ‘spatial public goods’, whose provision costs depend on the size of the benefit area. It is assumed that there are many developers providing spatial public goods in their towns. Each developer chooses the area size of his/her town and the quality of its spatial public good so as to maximize profit, taking the market price system as given. Each consumer chooses the level of the public good, and hence the town that supplies it, so as to maximize his/her utility. We show that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy is efficient.     

'Public Goods' from the Market

In the mounting criticism of 'government failure', a role for government is stubbornly argued by statist-minded economists on the ground that only government can supply public goods - from defence to (some) research (p. 34). Frank van Dun of the University of Ghent argues that public goods have the same disadvantages of monopoly, restriction of choice, confiscation by taxation, pressure group distortion, as non-public goods unnecessarily supplied by government. Moreover, technical progress will make it possible to supply more public goods in the market by creating separable benefits that can be financed by pricing.     

Effects of an anticipated expansion in international public goods on public capital accumulation

This paper presents a generic model to include public capital accumulation and the services of international public goods provided by a neighbor country. It examines the long-run and short-run responses of private and public capital accumulation in the home country to an anticipated increase in international public goods. It is found that the home economy in effect cuts its public capital stock, but keeps an unchanged private capital stock in the long run when a neighbor commits itself to expanding the stock of public goods in the future. The key factor determining the short-run responses of the home country is the extent to which it will match its government spending with a neighbor country's policy, which is associated with the relative difference between the marginal utility of consumption and that of home public capital affected by an increase in international public goods.     

The accuracy of changes of urban land values as a measure of social benefits from public programs

This paper extends the standard model of urban land rent to consider the impact of the output of public programs on the spatial equilibrium and to analyze the accuracy of changes of urban land values as a measure of social benefits from public investment. Two consistent output indicators of public investment are advanced: the individual's welfare and total land values. The general results of the comparative analysis are that there is a lack of correspondence between both output indicators, and that changes in land values are, in general, not an accurate measure of the benefits of such programs.     

A supply-demand model of public sector size

We develop a supply-demand model for the public sector with a political equilibrium. The model considers the inefficiencies caused by taxes and includes costs associated with the provision of public goods to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector may depend on the median voter's income, population size, costs associated with paying tax, and quality of institutions, all of which reflect the costs of provisioning public goods. The estimates for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries are compatible with theoretical predictions; however, they do not confirm Wagner's law, which holds that the public sector share does not grow with an increase in income. A greater dependency ratio and the Gini coefficient increase demand for redistribution policies. Greater government effectiveness is a supply-side factor that increases the public sector's share in an economy.     

我国农民体育公共产品供给的激励问题研究

论文分析了农民体育公共产品的供给概念,政府提供农民体育公共产品上存在供给效率低下的问题,由此引出农民体育公共产品供给的激励问题分析,设计好农民体育公共产品的激励机制是解决农民体育发展问题的关键。     

A dynamic von Thünen model with a demand function

This paper examines the dynamic processes of agricultural land use in the context of the von Thünen model. Consumers purchase agricultural goods to maximize their utility levels; farmers plant agricultural goods only once in a year and they decide their land use according to the last year's prices. In this context, it is first shown that land use is generally unstable for a broad class of utility functions, although the equilibrium land use is achieved in a very specific case. Second, it is shown that under a certain condition, land use changes cyclically with 2-year intervals.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

城市公共服务的价值估计、受益者分析和融资模式探讨

城市生活质量决定城市价值.城市政府所提供的各类公共服务,直接影响着居民在城市中生活的舒适和便利程度,关系到城市长期发展的动力.围绕此主旨,论文探讨了3个相关的问题.第一,如何估计城市公共服务这些非市场的价值;第二,这些城市公共服务的成本承担和利益享受是否匹配;第三,怎样的公共口融资模式能够使上述关系更为匹配.基于显示性偏好法中的特征价格模型,利用北京市住宅市场和土地市场的徽观和个体交易数据,实证结果表明,居民愿意为居住在地铁站、公交车站和公署周边一定范围(0.8公里)内分别支付住宅价格的17.1%、12.4%和6.4%,但是,这种价值并没有被资本化到土地价格中.这表明,居民对城市公共服务偏好的住处并没有被房地产开发企业以地价的形式传递给政府,开发企业成为实际的受益者.以房地产价值作为税基的物业税的征收使信息可以从居民直接传递至城市政府,将使城市公共服务的融资模式更为合理.     

政府间转移支付与地方公共支出关系的实证研究——基于协整、VAR模型的分析

政府间转移支付的一个重要功能是增强地方政府的财力,满足其提供公共产品的需要。文章运用协整分析和VAR模型对我国政府间转移支付与地方公共支出之间的关系进行了实证考察。结果表明,在控制其他变量的影响后,政府间转移支付与地方公共支出之间存在长期均衡关系,而格兰杰因果检验表明二者是双向因果关系。以上结论意味着转移支付有利于地方财政支出的增加和财政纵向均衡目标的实现等含义。最后,文章给出了相应的政策建议。