Public procurement in the presence of capital taxation

This paper considers governments’ public procurement decisions as a way of influencing industry structure. In a federation in which capital is mobile and capital taxation is harmonized, a home bias in public procurement can potentially be explained as an effort to increase the capital intensity of local production and to attract taxable capital. As a result, governments may prefer domestic firms to more efficient foreign firms.     

Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries

This paper studies international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets and sovereign national governments. Mobile capital and immobile labor are taxed in order to finance a fixed budget. This generates productive inefficiency. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a minimum capital tax level and a tax range, i.e., a minimum plus a maximum capital tax level. It is shown that the introduction of a lower bound to the capital tax level is never preferred to fiscal competition by all countries while there always exists a combination of both a lower and an upper bound (i.e., a tax range) which is unanimously accepted.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

On the effects of federal capital taxation on growing and declining areas

It has often been claimed that measures designed to stimulate capital formation at the national level will accelerate the decline of regions that are not growing. A number of simple models are employed to evaluate this claim, and it is found that the effect of national subsidies is ambiguous. Further, it is shown that on average the form of capital stimulus used in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 will tend to help higher-tax regions, which tend to be those that have experienced relative economic declines in recent years.     

Asymmetric information and capital mobility in antebellum America

The New York legislature granted charters to 28 new banks in 1829. Over $5 million in capital was subscribed by 1745 individuals or entities. The average distance between investor and bank is less than 40 miles, and the average number of investors is 75 per bank, with ownership and control closely aligned. A gravity model fixed effects regression is estimated. Insiders, such as public officials and bank officers account for over one quarter of the invested capital. After accounting for information asymmetry, a strong home bias exists which suggests a high degree of capital immobility. The failure of Northern capital to invest in Southern manufacturing is readily explained by the picture of a thin and localized market dominated by political elite and specialized traders.     

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

Optimal taxation in an RBC model: A linear-quadratic approach

We reconsider the optimal taxation of income from labor and capital in the stochastic growth model analyzed by Chari et al. [1994. Optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model. Journal of Political Economy 102, 617–652; 1995. Policy analysis in business cycle models. In: Cooley, T.F. (Ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research. Princeton University Press, Princeton], but using a linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation to derive a log-linear approximation to the optimal policy rules. The example illustrates how inaccurate ‘naive’ LQ approximation – in which the quadratic objective is obtained from a simple Taylor expansion of the utility function of the representative household – can be, but also shows how a correct LQ approximation can be obtained, which will provide a correct local approximation to the optimal policy rules in the case of small enough shocks. We also consider the numerical accuracy of the LQ approximation in the case of shocks of the size assumed in the calibration of Chari et al. We find that the correct LQ approximation yields results that are quite accurate, and similar in most respects to the results obtained by Chari et al. using a more computationally intensive numerical method.     

Human capital mobility patterns in the European Union and the financial crisis

This paper provides new evidence on the quantification of economic losses and/or gains from skilled human capital mobility in terms of GDP and productivity in several EU countries during and after the Great Recession. We construct two novel indicators to quantify and compare the economic effects of human capital mobility across EU countries in 2008, 2012, and 2016. Through hierarchical clustering, we created groups of countries to perform a non-parametric MANOVA. The results suggest the existence of three groups of countries aggregated by similar economic and mobility patterns. The differences between these groups are significant and allow us to delineate the countries’ gains and losses.

     

Optimal forecasts in the presence of structural breaks

This paper considers the problem of forecasting under continuous and discrete structural breaks and proposes weighting observations to obtain optimal forecasts in the MSFE sense. We derive optimal weights for one step ahead forecasts. Under continuous breaks, our approach largely recovers exponential smoothing weights. Under discrete breaks, we provide analytical expressions for optimal weights in models with a single regressor, and asymptotically valid weights for models with more than one regressor. It is shown that in these cases the optimal weight is the same across observations within a given regime and differs only across regimes. In practice, where information on structural breaks is uncertain, a forecasting procedure based on robust optimal weights is proposed. The relative performance of our proposed approach is investigated using Monte Carlo experiments and an empirical application to forecasting real GDP using the yield curve across nine industrial economies.     

Labor mobility and the incidence of the residential property tax

This paper analyzes the incidence of the residential property tax in an economy with two communities. Workers are perfectly mobile so that their utility levels are equal in the two communities in equilibrium. The property tax is modeled as an ad valorem tax on housing services.     

Estimation of sons' intergenerational earnings mobility in the presence of censoring

Based on intergenerational data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I provide estimates of income mobility across generations for men. Special attention is paid to issues of censoring caused by a son's unemployment. Employing non‐parametric bounds estimates, I illustrate that previous income mobility estimates rely heavily on (unjustified) assumptions of exogenous selection. Assuming a son's potential income is instead a function of his reason for unemployment and work history, I re‐estimate mobility. Allowing for sampling variability, the range of feasible slopes consistent with these modified bounds restrictions is 0.27 to 0.55. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Housing capital-gains taxation and homeowner mobility: Evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997

We provide new evidence on the impact of housing capital-gains taxation on homeowner behavior by examining residential mobility before and after the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which generated the most sweeping reform of capital-gains taxation in the last two decades. In addition to lowering marginal tax rates on long-term capital gains for all assets, TRA97 also eliminated any differential treatment of housing gains above and below age 55, allowing all homeowners to qualify for capital-gains exclusions. Utilizing data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS) on either side of the law change (1996 and 1998) on homeowners just above (56–58 year olds) and below (52–54 year olds) the age-55 threshold and a reduced-form, difference-in-difference empirical approach, our estimates suggest that the repeal of the differential capital-gains tax treatment by age embodied in TRA97 had an economically important and statistically significant impact on the residential mobility of under-55 homeowners. Across a variety of specifications, the repeal raised the mobility rate by around 1–1.4 percentage points, which, for a mean mobility rate of 4 percentage points, represented an increase in the mobility rate of homeowners in their early 50s by 22–31%. Furthermore, the bulk of this effect was concentrated among highly mobile homeowners who a priori were more likely to have wanted to trade down (e.g., divorced, empty nesters), those facing higher capital gains tax rates, and those living in states that had experienced higher rates of nominal appreciation.     

Housing as an asset and the effects of property taxation on the residential development process

A model of residential development is constructed recognizing the asset side of land and housing. The equilibrium process is characterized under the perfect foresight assumption, and the effects of a capital gains tax (both unanticipated and anticipated) and a tax on property values are examined.     

Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods

Pigou's proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper. A simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services. The case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered.     

Optimal road capacity in the presence of unpriced congestion

This paper studies how the optimal capacity of a road is affected by a pricing constraint which keeps the toll fixed below its optimal value. The answer is found to depend on the value of the price elasticity of travel demand at the second-best optimum. The pricing constraint lowers the optimal capacity, if the price elasticity is sufficiently high. But under reasonable assumptions, the pricing constraint raises the optimal capacity, if the price elasticity is less than the ratio of the consumer price of travel to the private congestion cost at the second-best optimum. This ratio cannot be less than one.     

On the effects of capital mobility on local infrastructure policy and rent-seeking

This paper deals with the influence of capital mobility on local infrastructure policy and on rent-seeking activities of local interest groups. It employs a model where households differ with respect to their endowments with the immobile factor land. Local governments decide about the level of productive infrastructure in their jurisdiction. According to their land endowments, different households benefit to a different degree from infrastructure. This redistribution effect of local infrastructure gives households an incentive for rent-seeking. As this paper shows, capital mobility and fiscal competition between local governments have an influence on the equilibrium level of rent-seeking. Rent-seeking expenditures increase with the introduction of capital mobility in a broad class of cases.     

地产:黄光裕的资本道具

他像变戏法一样把玩着房地产,然而这一次他穿帮了"鹏润地产现在面临的真正困境是群龙无首。那些高管们以前只对黄光裕负责,如今没了老板,也就没了资方代表,他们没有人可汇报了,只能是各管一摊,等待谜底揭晓。"12月2日,记者采访到一位接近鹏润系地产高管的知情人士。他表示,"黄光裕事件"对国美电器这样一个成熟上市公司的影响并不大,然而,对他旗下多个地产公司而言,影响则是不可估量的,并将随着事态的进一步发展而逐渐显现。