Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis

The existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an IMF programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model. If countries who have arrangements with the IMF are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt, we could conclude that the adoption of an IMF programme could work as a sort of signal of a country's “good intent” which is thus rewarded with the debt relief. The results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by private creditors.     

How international financial flows affect stock markets?

Relying on the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, which reports countries’ bilateral investments in financial assets at end-2001 to end-2015, this article shows that a country’s stock market growth is not only spatially correlated with those of nearby countries, but also positively associated with the magnitude of connectedness of the country’s international investments in debt within a dynamic financial investment flow network. The positive relation arises because debts have become an increasingly important source of capital for developing countries.     

Optimal Debt Relief Under Threat of Trade Punishments

The theory of optimal debt relief hinges critically on the assumption that the output of a defaulting debtor country can be partially confiscated by the creditors. This assumption is at odds with the crucial feature of international credit relationships. The present paper focuses on an alternative enforcement method, namely the impediment of international trade. It is shown that a similar result can be derived. Additionally, it can be rational to grant further credit to countries with very little initial endowment, even though it is clear to the creditors that they will grant debt relief afterwards.     

An empirical characterization of the effects of public debt on economic growth

Based on a data set of 115 economies, this article empirically investigates the relation between public debt and economic growth. Using the World Bank’s classification for income groups, we initially find that those countries that present the lowest public debt are characterized by the highest economic growth, while the smallest growth rates are associated with the highest public debt. Nevertheless, this conclusion is tempered when we analyse the countries by income level: low-income countries have a different behaviour with respect to lower-middle, upper-middle and high-income countries. When using the IMF’s country classification, the results do not suggest a clear pattern in the public debt–economic growth nexus across different countries, but indicate a heterogeneous relationship between such key macroeconomic variables.     

Political instablility and seigniorage: An inseparable couple — or a threesome with debt?

In the literature, political instability is shown to raise seigniorage and/or debt, but there is no debt‐seigniorage trade‐off. However, what happens when the IMF gets involved? Based on a political economy model of intertemporal public finance this paper presents qualitatively new and robust results. First, political instability causes myopic government behaviour and produces more debt, not more seigniorage. Second, IMF policies requiring debtor countries to achieve both monetary and fiscal stability at the same time are ineffective. Third and surprisingly at first sight, debt conditionality aiming at monetary stability is particularly effective in heterogeneous societies with unstable governments.     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.     

LDC DEBT: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

For a combination of reasons that differ among countries, many developing countries' foreign debt service obligations have become difficult to meet. The size of the problem in 1982 raised concern over the stability of the banking system. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided the forum through which the international community's strategy for meeting this concern has evolved. The IMF also played, and continues to play, an active role in helping to finance the structural and balance-of-payments adjustments needed in countries with debt service problems. The IMF's involvement is an integral part of the broader strategy, which builds on the cooperation of debtors and creditors, on a case-by-case basis. The objective is to share the burden in a balanced way. Obtaining adequate adjustment in deficit countries is central to the strategy, but the Baker Plan increased the emphasis on restoring longer-term growth through more far-reaching structural adjustments supported by longer-term financing. The IMF has modified and enhanced some of its lending facilities in light of this emphasis. However, though the short-term nature of its lending was critical in averting a possible banking crisis during 1982 and 1983, it diminishes somewhat the IMF's role in financing the more protracted adjustments now required.     

Less debt,more schooling? Evidence from cross-country micro data

Soaring levels of public debt in low-income countries are fuelling concerns about their ability to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, such as free access to primary education. In the late 1990s and 2000s, international financial institutions introduced a series of debt relief initiatives aimed to restore debt sustainability among highly indebted countries. This study examines the impact of these initiatives on primary school attendance. We exploit the temporal variation in the implementation of these policies, in combination with individual-level data from 177 Demographic and Health Surveys covering more than 1.5 million school-age children from 44 low-income countries to implement difference-in-differences and spatial difference-in-discontinuity estimators. Results suggest that debt relief initiatives, by freeing up additional public resources, have significantly contributed to increasing primary school attendance in heavily indebted countries. Impact heterogeneity analysis also shows that debt relief has been effective at reducing wealth-based, intergenerational, religious, ethnic and spatial inequalities in education. Our results provide robust evidence to assert that debt relief, in combination with other financing sources, can contribute to improving educational outcomes in highly indebted poor countries.     

Is the pragmatic response to International Monetary Fund quotas and credit limits favourable?

Under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s recently developed pragmatic response, the amount a member can borrow is not determined by its quota. We consider two pragmatic responses that produce a Pareto improvement, compared with the IMF rule: one mandated by the IMF and the other related to the trade of the additional credit limit in the market. Both these responses indicate that the additional credit limit on top of the IMF rule should be positive (negative) for a country whose investment return is larger (smaller) than the average investment return across all IMF member developing countries. The rule for the IMF credit limit does not reflect the demand for credit, which induces inefficiency. The first pragmatic response, which has an appropriately small negotiation and distribution cost per unit incurred by the IMF, may dominate the second one.     

WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS

This paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 118 countries over the period 1971–2000. Our results, based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that it is mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while most political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of IMF agreements than to the disbursement of IMF credits.     

Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies

This study aims to identify which factors explain why some countries enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals. We analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and banking crises by employing an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model (FMM). Real and financial variables show high predictive power for stability spells between currency crises. Regarding debt crises, the real interest rate is observed to be the best predictor. The time between systemic financial crises appears to be prolonged through government interventions and through IMF program participation, while bank recapitalization has a negative impact.     

Foreign Debt and Economic Development

This paper characterizes the optimal path of foreign public debt that can support politically unanimous (Pareto welfare improving) economic growth under uncertainty. The feasibility of the plan depends on whether the maintenance of political consensus in the debtor country requires additional loans that are high relative to the country's outstanding debt. If a program is feasible, then the creditors will have an incentive to preserve political support for the plan, in case of adverse developments, by offering debt relief. Unlike the certainty case, where only total debt matters, uncertainty makes also the timing of debt repayments critical for economic development.     

International coordination of debt rules with time-inconsistent voters

In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting of several countries with varying degrees of present bias. A case wherein each country sets its own uncoordinated debt rules is compared with a case wherein all countries have common coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present-biased preferences increase their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present-biased preferences reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by participating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that countries with weak present-biased preferences have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.     

Country Default Risk: An Empirical Assessment

We provide benchmarks to evaluate what is an optimal foreign debt and a maximal foreign debt ( debt-max ), when risk is explicitly considered. When the actual debt exceeds debt-max , then the economy will default when a 'bad shock' occurs. This paper is an application of the stochastic optimal controls models of Fleming and Stein (2001), which gives empirical content to the question of how one should measure 'vulnerability' to shocks, when there is uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital. We consider two sets of high-risk countries during the period 1978–99: a subset of 21 countries that defaulted on the debt, and another set of 13 countries that did not default. Default is a situation where the firms or government of a country reschedule the interest/principal payments on the external debt. We thereby explain how our analysis can anticipate default risk, and add another dimension to the literature of early warning signals of default/credit risk.     

对外负债与经济增长

本文分别在理论和实证上分析了对外负债与经济增长的关系。在拉姆齐-卡斯-库普曼斯框架下构建的理论模型预测结果显示:对于大国,对外负债率与经济增长之间可能呈现负向或正向的单调关系,也可能呈现倒"U"型的关系;对于小国,对外负债率与经济增长之间只存在负向或正向的单调关系。分别以发达国家和发展中国家为样本实证分析的结果表明:对于发达国家,当对外负债率处于较低水平时,负债率增加会促进经济增长,当对外负债率超过60%时,负债率增加不利于经济增长;对于发展中国家,不管对外负债率处于何种水平,负债率增加都会使经济增长的速度下降。实证分析的结果与理论模型的预测基本吻合。     

Crash for cash: Offshore financial destinations and IMF programs

A growing body of literature scrutinizes the harmful consequences of capital flight to offshore financial destinations. While financial integration is a well-known facilitator of capital flight, we shed light on an under-appreciated determinant—the availability of an IMF bailout. Expanding on previous literature analyzing moral hazard in the context of IMF programs, we introduce a socially even more destructive mechanism that we label the ‘crash for cash’ effect. We argue that by drawing on the IMF, elites can benefit from accumulating excessive debt to extract rents and hide these safely in offshore financial destinations while steering their countries into financial disaster. To test this mechanism, we show that elite wealth in offshore bank accounts has a first-order impact on a captured government’s willingness to draw on a lender of last resort. From a policy perspective, our analysis underscores the importance of closing financial loopholes to mitigate the devastating socio-economic effects of sophisticated financial engineering in a financially integrated global economy.     

Credit risk and sustainable debt: a model and estimations of why the Euro is stable in the long-run

Sustainable debt has become the key issue in rating of private as well as sovereign debtors. The problem of how to estimate sustainable debt has also been at the center of the debate over the Asian 1997–1998 financial crisis. If the external value of the currency depends on the external debt of a country, it is necessary to estimate the creditworthiness of the country. This paper studies credit risk and sustainable debt in the context of a dynamic model. For a dynamic growth model with an additional equation for the evolution of debt, we demonstrate of how to compute sustainable debt and creditworthiness. The model is estimated by employing time series data for the core countries of the Euro-area. The computations show that the Euro-area has large external assets. Using time series methods, the sustainability of external debt (assets) is estimated for those core countries of the Euro-area. Those estimations show that the Euro will be a stable currency in the long-run.     

The Response of Other Lenders to the IMF

Until the late 1980s, it was a stylized fact that when a country adopted an IMF program, additional loans from non-IMF sources would be triggered. Subsequent empirical research cast doubt on this catalytic effect; a country's past involvement with the IMF appeared to be negatively correlated with new lending. This paper examines directly the response of lenders to the presence of IMF conditional agreements in developing countries in the 1973–89 period. While total lending does appear to increase in response to the presence of some IMF agreements, the effect varies over time, and across recipients and lenders.     

Beyond the Sovereign Debt Crisis: Alternative Forms of Market-Based Debt Restructuring Schemes

The resolution of the international debt crises has stimulated extensive research onhow to design solutions for countries facing external debt overhang problems. Thispaper analyses the benefits for creditors and debtors of the following `market-based'debt restructuring schemes: (i) issue of collateralised new assets inexchange for the old debt; (ii) automatic roll-over of the debt repayment with astate-contingent penalty rate. The first proposal combines the basic debt conversionscheme proposed by Krugman (1989) with Cline's proposal (1995) of self-enhancementson the new claims as a form of risk-compensation for creditors (seealso Williamson, 1988). Under this scheme the debtor country modifies the streamof the debt service payments by voluntarily exchanging the outstanding debt fornew assets with different debt service characteristics where the principal and/or theinterest rate payment can be fully or partially collateralised. The roll-over schemeentitles illiquid countries to extend the outstanding debt for a specified period at apenalty rate which is contingent on a measure of the country's creditworthiness.This solution has the desirable effect of reducing the future contractual obligationsby lowering the penalty rate on the excess of debt rolled over, thus helping thedebtor country to use additional resources to invest in the economy.     

Sovereign bond markets with political risk and moral hazard

A model of interest rates on sovereign bonds with default risk is presented. The model accounts for interaction between interest rates and default risk. Multiple equilibria and stability issues are examined. The model explores the level of debt that markets will tolerate in a context where there is uncertainty about output growth, fiscal discipline, real exchange rates, and IMF intervention. The effect of likely IMF assistance on the debt ceiling is shown to be large.