The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.     

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.     

Incorporating risk input into the analysis of bank productivity: Application to the Taiwanese banking industry

This study reappraises banks’ productivity by using 42 Taiwanese banks during 1999–2007 as observations. It introduces an input-oriented generalized metafrontier Malmquist productivity index (I-gMMPI), while considering the latent effect of risk-taking behavior in the analytic framework. We learn that public and private banks should face separate short-term technological frontiers, while the econometric model considering risk input can portray banks’ operating frontiers better. Moreover, neglecting the influence of risk input would bring about distortions of efficiency, technology and TFP dynamic estimations for banks; meanwhile, the degree of scale economies would also be overestimated. The paper concludes that neglecting the risk-taking essence in bank performance evaluation is equal to allowing banks to barter risk-bearing as the term for further output growth. Consequently, the potential cost is that banks may excessively aggrandize their scales of business, implying the possibility of another financial crisis.     

Bank ownership and lending patterns during the 2008–2009 financial crisis: Evidence from Latin America and Eastern Europe

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership on credit growth in developing countries before and during the 2008–2009 crisis. Using bank-level data for countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, we analyze the growth of banks’ total gross loans as well as the growth of corporate, consumer, and residential mortgage loans. While domestic private banks in Eastern Europe and Latin America contracted their loan growth rates during the crisis, there are notable differences in foreign and government-owned bank credit growth across regions. In Eastern Europe, foreign bank total lending fell by more than domestic private bank credit. These results are primarily driven by reductions in corporate loans. Furthermore, government-owned banks in Eastern Europe did not act counter-cyclically. The opposite is true in Latin America, where the growth of government-owned banks’ corporate and consumer loans during the crisis exceeded that of domestic and foreign banks. Contrary to the case of foreign banks in Eastern Europe, those in Latin America did not fuel loan growth prior to the crisis. Also, there are less pronounced and robust differences in the behavior of foreign and domestic banks during the crisis in Latin America.     

The impact of sovereign rating actions on bank ratings in emerging markets

This paper analyses the effects of sovereign rating actions on the credit ratings of banks in emerging markets, using a sample from three global rating agencies across 54 countries for 1999–2009. Despite widespread attention to sovereign ratings and bank ratings, no previous study has investigated the link in this manner. We find that sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) have strong effects on bank rating upgrades (downgrades). The impact of sovereign watch status on bank rating actions is much weaker and often insignificant. The sensitivity of banks’ ratings to sovereign rating actions is affected by the countries’ economic and financial freedom and by macroeconomic conditions. Ratings of banks with different ownership structures are all influenced strongly by the sovereign rating, with some variation depending on the countries’ characteristics. Emerging market bank ratings are less likely to follow sovereign rating downgrades during the recent financial crisis period.     

Does IT investment improve bank performance? Evidence from Europe

This paper investigates whether investment in information technology (IT) – hardware, software and other IT services – influences the performance of banks. Using a sample of 737 European banks over the period 1995–2000 we analyse whether IT investment is reflected in improved performance (measured using both standard accounting ratios and cost and alternative profit efficiency measures). Despite banks being major investors in IT we find little relationship between total IT investment and improved bank profitability or efficiency indicating the existence of a profitability paradox. However, the impact of different types of IT investment (hardware, software and services) on banks’ performance is heterogeneous. Investment in IT services from external providers (consulting services, implementation services, training and education, support services) appears to have a positive influence on accounting profits and profit efficiency, while the acquisition of hardware and software seems to reduce banks’ performance.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.     

Efficiency and productivity growth in the banking industry of Central and Eastern Europe

We employ the directional technology distance function and provide estimates of bank efficiency and productivity change across Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and across banks with different ownership status for the period 1998–2003. Our results demonstrate the strong links of competition and concentration with bank efficiency. They also show that productivity for the whole region initially declined but has improved more recently with further progress on institutional and structural reforms. Input-biased technical change has been consistently positive throughout the entire period suggesting that the reforms have induced favorable changes in relative input prices and input mix. However we find evidence of diverging trends in productivity growth patterns across banking industries and that foreign banks outperform domestic private and state-owned banks both in terms of efficiency and productivity gains. Overall, we find that productivity change in CEE is driven by technological change rather than efficiency change.     

Bank connections,corporate investment and crisis

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.     

First Financial Restructuring and operating efficiency: Evidence from Taiwanese commercial banks

This paper investigates the effect of the “First Financial Restructuring” (FFR) on the operating efficiency of commercial banks in Taiwan. Applying data envelopment analysis (DEA) to operations data for 40 commercial banks over the 6-year period 2000–2005, we find that while the banks have lower operating efficiency on average during the reform period (2002–2003) compared to the pre-reform period (2000–2001), improved operating efficiency is reflected in the post-reform period (2004–2005). Our results remain unchanged even after controlling for the non-performing loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio, bank ownership, size, and GDP growth rate. These results suggest that the improved efficiency in the post-reform period is possibly due to enhanced banking and risk management practices and benefits obtained from compliance with the FFR.     

A geographically weighted approach to measuring efficiency in panel data: The case of US saving banks

This paper discusses a new approach to controlling for the environment when estimating efficiency. In response to the literature on the international comparison of bank efficiency, we draw the attention to a local dimension of comparison. By introducing geographical weights and estimating local frontiers for each US savings bank in the 2001–09 period, we find that the bank technical performance is higher for most banks in comparison to a fixed-effects approach. This result highlights the importance of taking into account the local environment and constraints while analyzing banks’ performance, so as not to consider the factors that are exogenous to these institutions as inefficiencies. Further analysis could improve the weighs calculation by employing other measures of interconnectedness besides geographical distance.     

TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

Banks’ capital buffer,risk and performance in the Canadian banking system: Impact of business cycles and regulatory changes

Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between Canadian banks’ capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this cyclical behavior of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both micro- and a macro-prudential “through-the-cycle” approach to capital adequacy as advocated in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector.     

Why ‘Basel II’ may need a leverage ratio restriction

We analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks. It is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks, an additional, risk-independent leverage ratio restriction may be necessary to induce truthful risk reporting. The leverage ratio helps to offset the banks’ potential capital savings of understating their risks by (i) reducing banks’ put option value of limited liability ex ante, and by (ii) increasing the banks’ net worth, which in turn enhances the supervisors’ ability to sanction banks ex post.     

Bank efficiency,productivity, and convergence in EU countries: a weighted Russell directional distance model

The objective of this study is three-fold. First we estimate and analyse bank efficiency and productivity changes in the EU28 countries with the application of a novel approach, a weighted Russell directional distance model. Second, we take a disaggregated approach and analyse the contribution of the individual bank inputs on bank efficiency and productivity growth. Third, we test for convergence in EU28 bank productivity as well as in the inefficiency of individual bank inputs. We find that bank efficiency has been undermined by the financial crisis in banks notably from the EU15 countries. We also argue that bank efficiency and productivity in EU countries vary across the banking sector with banks from the ‘old’ EU showing higher efficiency levels. Nonetheless, a noticeable catching up process is observed for banks from the ‘new’ EU countries. Consequently, we do not find evidence of group convergence for bank productivity but there is evidence of convergence in bank efficiency change and technical change among the EU28 countries throughout the period 2005–2014. The driving force seems to be convergent technical change from the old EU member states’ banks. On the other hand, almost no convergence is detected for the banks’ individual inputs while the transition paths show heightened diversity during the crisis years.     

Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer – that is, maximize put option value – by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between Tobin’s q and an ex ante measure of the failure probability, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts outweighing charter value. From these estimates, we infer the prevalence of moral hazard. Examining publicly held bank holding companies (BHC) during the tumultuous 1986–1992 period, we find that shareholders’ risk-taking incentives were confined to a small fraction of highly risky institutions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the inflection point at which banks begin to tilt in favor of moral hazard increased substantially in 1993–2005. These findings are encouraging to bank regulators and legislators because they indicate that tighter capital rules and more rigorous supervision introduced by several legislative initiatives in the 1990s have helped squeeze a lot of the moral hazard incentives out of the banking system.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Parliamentary election cycles and the Turkish banking sector

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary election cycles on the Turkish banking system. Using annual bank-level data representing all banks in Turkey during 1963–2007, we present evidence of meaningful differences in the structure of bank assets, liabilities and financial performance across different stages of the parliamentary election cycle. However, we find that government-owned banks’ behavior does not meaningfully differ from that of either domestic and foreign-owned private-sector banks before, during or after elections. Our estimates also show that government-owned banks underperform both domestic and foreign-owned private-sector counterparts.     

Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads

Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of bank size and government deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. We find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its liabilities-to-GDP ratio, especially in countries running large public deficits. CDS spreads appear to decrease with stronger public finances. These results suggest that systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, especially if they are located in countries with weak public finances. We document that banks’ average liabilities-to-GDP ratio reached a peak in 2007 before a significant drop in 2008, which could reflect these private incentives to downsize.