THE EFFECTS OF SPIN-OFFS ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE

We examine characteristics of firms involved in spin-offs and test whether these spin-offs induce changes in investment incentives and economic performance. We find that firms engaging in spin-offs are larger, more highly leveraged, and have higher asset turnover and lower real asset growth than their industry rivals. We also find that spin-offs generate significant increases in real asset growth and cash flow margin on sales for combined firm measures (spun-off firm plus parent firm). The gains result from increases in real asset growth for parent and spun-off firms, and improvements in cash flow margin on sales for parents. Our evidence is consistent with models in which spin-offs create value by improving investment incentives and economic performance.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

The effects of corporate spin-offs on productivity

Using a unique sample of plant level data from the Longitudinal Research Database of the U.S. Census Bureau, which enables us to correctly identify the parent and spun-off entities prior to spin-offs, we establish that efficiency improves following spin-offs. A spin-off refers to the separation of the management of some assets of a firm into a separate entity (which we term as the spun-off entity or subsidiary). We investigate the underlying mechanisms and the real effects of spin-offs after correcting for potential endogenous selection using treatment effect estimators and propensity score matching in our analysis. We identify how (the precise channel and mechanism), where (parent or subsidiary), and when (the dynamic pattern) efficiency improvements arise following spin-offs. We show that spin-offs increase total factor productivity (TFP) and that such productivity improvements are long-lived. This post spin-off productivity improvement can be attributed to cost savings but not to higher sales. Further, such improvements arise primarily in plants remaining with the parent. However, contrary to speculation in the previous literature, we show that plants that are spun-off do not underperform parent plants prior to the spin-off. We identify acquisitions following spin-offs and find that while productivity improvements occur immediately after the spin-off in non-acquired plants, they start only after being taken over by another firm in acquired plants. Finally, we show that unrelated spun-off entities show greater improvements in productivity compared to related spun-off entities.     

Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?

This paper examines the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts a positive association between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the wealth effects of capital investments are negatively associated with CEO reputation. We find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for firms with more reputable CEOs. Moreover, CEO reputation mitigates the negative stock price reaction associated with announcements of capital investments by firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Additional analysis indicates that firms with more reputable CEOs exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance improvements than those with less reputable CEOs, especially in firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Collectively, our results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the rent extraction hypothesis in terms of net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firm.     

Individual political contributions and firm performance

We present evidence that individuals make political contributions strategically by targeting politicians with power to affect their economic well-being. Individuals in Congressional districts with greater industry clustering choose to support politicians with jurisdiction over the industry. Importantly, individual political contributions are associated with improvements in operating performance of firms in industry clusters. The relation between contributions and firm performance is strongest for poorly performing firms, firms closer to financial distress, and for contributions in close elections. The results imply that individual political contributions are valuable to firms, especially during bad economic times.     

The Design of Financial Policies in Corporate Spin-offs

We examine differences in financial leverage between parentand spun-off firms that emerge from corporate spin-offs. Ourtests control for past financing choices and the costs of adjustingcapital structure, factors that can obscure cross-sectionalpatterns among firms' target leverage ratios. We find that firmsthat emerge from spin-offs with more financial leverage havea higher cash flow return on assets, lower variability of industryoperating income, and a greater proportion of fixed assets.The positive relation between profitability and the use of financialleverage, in a setting that is free of pecking order effects,is particularly important because it contrasts with existingevidence. Our results indicate that the ability to cover debtpayments and default-related costs are important determinantsof the use of financial leverage, as implied by the trade-offtheory of capital structure. We find no evidence that managerialincentives or governance characteristics affect the differencein leverage ratios in firms that emerge from spin-offs.     

It Takes Two: The Incidence and Effectiveness of Co‐CEOs

This study examines the phenomenon of co‐CEOs within publicly traded firms. Although shared executive leadership is not widespread, it occurs within some very prominent firms. We find that co‐CEOs generally complement each other in terms of educational background or executive responsibilities. Our results show that firms most likely to appoint co‐CEOs have lower leverage, a more limited firm focus, less independent board structure, fewer advising directors, lower institutional ownership, and greater levels of merger activity. The governance structure of co‐CEO firms suggests that co‐CEOships can serve as an alternative governance mechanism, with co‐CEO mutual monitoring substituting for board or external monitoring and co‐CEO complementary skills substituting for board advising. An event study indicates that the market reacts positively to appointments of co‐CEOs while a propensity score analysis shows that the presence of co‐CEOs increases firm valuation.     

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.     

The evolution of capital structure and operating performance after leveraged buyouts: Evidence from U.S. corporate tax returns

This study uses corporate tax return data to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure and performance after leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for a comprehensive sample of 317 LBOs taking place between 1995 and 2007. We find little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO, although consistent with prior studies, we do observe operating improvements in the set of LBO firms that have public financial statements. We also find that firms do not reduce leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flow. Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO structure.     

Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?

This paper examines the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed bids by UK companies from 1999 to 2005. We find that foreign acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs have strong incentives to do foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions since they receive larger compensation following a foreign acquisition regardless of how poor firm performance is. Furthermore, we observe a positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and firm size during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in foreign acquisitions, thus their CEOs would expect to increase their compensation package through foreign acquisitions. However, our results show that there is no significant link between firm size and CEO compensation during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in domestic acquisitions.     

Is Chapter 11 costly?

We examine a sample of 459 firms filing for Chapter 11 during the period 1991–1998 and find that our sample firms experience significant improvements in their operating performance during Chapter 11. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Chapter 11, if anything, provides net benefits to bankrupt firms. In the cross section, firms with higher debt ratios experience greater improvements in operating performance, and the complexity of the renegotiation process negatively affects the improvement. We find no relationship between Chapter 11 outcome and changes in risk-adjusted firm value in Chapter 11.     

Managerial expertise,corporate decisions and firm value: Evidence from corporate refocusing

This paper investigates how managerial expertise—specifically, industry expertise—affects firm value through divestiture. Using CEOs’ managerial experiences in industries throughout their careers as a measure of their industry expertise, I find that CEOs in diversified conglomerates are more likely to divest divisions in industries in which they have less experience. This finding is consistent with CEOs who divest such divisions in order to refocus on those divisions in which they have specialized—that is, to achieve a better match between their expertise and their firms’ retained assets. Firms that divest for a better CEO-firm match experience significant improvements in operating performance, as well as significant abnormal stock returns that persist for an average of three years following a divestiture. Further, among firms that divest for a better match, those firms with more experienced CEOs realize greater gains in firm value. In contrast, divestitures that increase corporate focus, but do not improve the expertise-asset match, do not lead to long-run increases in firm value.     

Corporate social responsibility and the wealth gains from dividend increases

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) influences the stock price response to dividend increase announcements and changes in subsequent operating performance. We find that dividend increasing firms with lower CSR scores elicit higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in industry‐adjusted operating performance. These findings support the argument in the literature that socially responsible firms are more transparent and commit to higher ethical standards than other firms, suggesting that they suffer fewer agency and informational problems (Kim, Park, & Wier, 2012). Consequently, larger dividend payouts reduce agency costs in firms with lower CSR commitments, thereby generating higher wealth gains for shareholders.     

The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance

This paper examines the relation between institutional investor involvement in and the operating performance of large firms. We find a significant relation between a firm’s operating cash flow returns and both the percent of institutional stock ownership and the number of institutional stockholders. However, this relation is found only for a subset of institutional investors: those less likely to have a business relationship with the firm. These results suggest that institutional investors with potential business relations with the firms in which they invest are compromised as monitors of the firm.     

The Effects of Downsizing on Operating Performance

We examine the performance of 118 firms that downsized between 1989–1993. We find that downsizing firms experience declines in operating performance prior to the downsizing announcement. Operating performance improves significantly following the downsizing. These firms are able to reduce the cost of sales, labor cost, capital expenditures and R&D expenditures. We also find that firms that perform poorly in their industries prior to the downsizing and have increases in assets following the downsizing have larger improvements in performance. There is some evidence that the improvements are greater for firms that increase their focus.     

CEO Power and Firm Performance under Pressure

Are powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) more effective in responding to pressure from the economic environment? Concentrating decision‐making power may facilitate rapid decision making; however, the quality of decision making may be compromised, with severe consequences for the firm if a powerful CEO is less likely to receive independent advice or to have her decisions scrutinized. We empirically investigate the performance of firms with powerful CEOs when industry conditions deteriorate. We focus on industry downturns as these represent an exogenous shock to a firm's environment and on settings in which CEO power and access to quality information is likely more consequential: innovative firms, firms with relatively little related‐industry board expertise, firms operating in competitive industries, and firms operating in industries characterized by relatively greater managerial discretion. In each of these settings we find powerful CEOs perform significantly worse than other CEOs, suggesting contexts in which centralized decision making is potentially of greater concern.     

Labor mobility and antitakeover provisions

How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts, which exogenously decreases knowledge-worker mobility, thus elevating takeover risk and reducing employee incentives to innovate. Firms respond to the IDD adoption by strengthening ATPs that defend against hostile takeovers, especially when they have greater ex-ante employee mobility and human capital and place greater importance on employee relations. We find no evidence that managers strengthen ATPs for entrenchment or takeover bargaining purposes in this setting. Our findings show that ATPs can be used to credibly commit to employees in order to protect long-term value creation.     

Firm size,takeover profitability,and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control: Does the absence of anti-takeover provisions make a difference?

The market for corporate control is generally regarded as an important disciplinary mechanism in well developed economies. Entrenchment mechanisms commonly used by US firms in the form of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) may offer some protection from disciplinary action, facilitating entrenchment and value-reducing behavior. One manifestation of entrenchment is poor acquisitions, with the literature reporting significant losses to large acquirers, and to acquirers with a higher number of ATPs. We examine the profitability of acquisitions in Australia, a market where US-style ATPs are prohibited. The results show that unlike their US counterparts, large Australian acquirers earn significant value for their shareholders, both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operating performance improvements. Takeover premiums are also substantially lower than those reported for the US and UK, and do not differ between large and small acquirers. Premiums are also positively correlated with long-run operating performance, indicating that they reflect real synergies, as opposed to hubris or overpayment. We also find that bidders who destroy value in takeovers are likely to be subsequently acquired. However, unlike US evidence, larger acquirers are just as likely to be targeted for takeover as smaller acquirers, indicating that size is not an effective impediment to the disciplining function of the market for corporate control in Australia. The findings are robust to several econometric issues common to the type of models used in our analysis.     

Corporate governance when founders are directors

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.     

Operating and stock market performance of state-owned enterprise privatizations: The Spanish experience

We investigate the operating and stock market performance of Spanish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized through public share issue offerings (SIPs) from 1990 to 2001, when the last SIP was conducted. We compare the performance of SOEs and privately-owned firms. We find significant operating improvements in Spanish SOEs after the privatization. Specifically, they show significant increases in income efficiency, real sales and employment. Spanish governments tried to minimize the foregone proceeds when selling SOE shares and underpriced them lower than private firms. We relate these results with the pressure of the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria, as well as lower information asymmetries between firms and investors. Finally, we do not find long-term abnormal stock market performance after SIPs.