Does cross-listing facilitate changes in corporate ownership and control?

This paper examines whether controlling shareholders of foreign firms use a US cross-listing to facilitate changes in ownership and control. Prior to listing, about three quarters of the firms in our sample have a controlling shareholder. After listing, about half of the controlling shareholders’ voting rights decrease, with an average decrease of 24% points that differs significantly from that of the controlling shareholders of benchmark firms that do not cross-list. Large decreases in voting rights are associated with controlling shareholder characteristics, domestic market constraints, and better stock market performance and liquidity. In addition, there is control change in 22% of the firms. Controlling shareholders are more likely to sell control, and are more likely to do so to a foreign buyer, than controlling shareholders of benchmark firms. The results suggest that controlling shareholders who want to sell shares or their control stake can use a US cross-listing to decrease the cost of transferring ownership.     

Does international cross-listing improve the information environment

We investigate whether cross-listing in the U.S. affects the information environment for non-U.S. stocks. Our findings suggest cross-listing has an asymmetric impact on stock price informativeness around the world, as measured by firm-specific stock return variation. Cross-listing improves price informativeness for developed market firms. For firms in emerging markets, however, cross-listing decreases price informativeness. The added analyst coverage associated with cross-listing likely explains the findings in emerging markets, rather than changes in liquidity, ownership, or accounting quality. Our results indicate that the added analyst coverage fosters the production of marketwide information, rather than firm-specific information.     

Does cross-listing in the US foster mergers and acquisitions and increase target shareholder wealth?

We examine the role of cross-listing in alleviating domestic market constraints and facilitating mergers and acquisitions. Our results show that cross-listing allows shareholders of target firms to extract higher takeover premiums relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Moreover, shareholders of Sarbanes–Oxley-compliant targets seem to benefit from a higher premium. We also find that cross-listed firms are more likely to be acquisition targets, consistent with the belief that cross-listing increases firms’ attractiveness and visibility on the market for corporate control. Our results are robust to various specifications and to the self-selection bias arising from the decision to cross-list.     

Cross-listing and subsequent delisting in foreign markets

Employing a sample of stocks cross-listed and subsequently delisted from foreign markets, we examine the consequences of delisting to investors in terms of price, risk, and liquidity. We also provide a direct comparison between the firm's performance after a foreign cross-listing and after its subsequent delisting. We find a positive cross-listing and negative delisting effect on stock price, both of which dissipate in the long run. No significant changes in the market risk are found for either event. Foreign cross-listing and delisting are associated with increasing and decreasing long term trading volume respectively. Further analysis reveals that firms delist in response to low host market return and low firm trading volume in the host market. The changes in liquidity and market risk from delisting relate those from cross-listing. Finally, our results show that the bonding hypothesis fails to explain the listing premium and the delisting loss.     

The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?

This paper documents aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies, and analyzes their distinctive prelisting characteristics and postlisting performance. In 1986–1997, many European companies listed abroad, mainly on U.S. exchanges, while the number of U.S. companies listed in Europe decreased. European companies that cross-list tend to be large and recently privatized firms, and expand their foreign sales after listing abroad. They differ sharply depending on where they cross-list: The U.S. exchanges attract high-tech and export-oriented companies that expand rapidly without significant leveraging. Companies cross-listing within Europe do not grow unusually fast, and increase their leverage after cross-listing.     

Cross-listing and liquidity in emerging market stocks

In this study, we analyze liquidity costs for stocks and ADRs from the four main Latin American markets. The results indicate that international investors are exposed to different trading costs in Latin America, with market location and firm size as important determinants. In the local market, stocks that cross-list internationally do not always present a liquidity cost advantage relative to non-cross-listed stocks. When the ADR and the local stock markets are compared, large firms present lower trading costs in the home market. The opposite occurs for small firms.     

Cross-listing dynamics and labor investment efficiency: International evidence

This paper investigates the dynamics of cross-listing in the United States and labor investment efficiency. Using a sample of 11,780 firm-year observations from 44 countries over the period 2000–2019, we found that cross-listing is positively associated with labor investment efficiency. This result suggests that cross-listing is associated with lower deviations in labor investment at the level explained by economic fundamentals. We also found that cross-listing reduces both overinvestment and underinvestment problems. The positive impact of cross-listing on labor investment efficiency is more prevalent for firms from countries with weaker institutions and higher liabilities due to foreignness and for those operating in industries with low litigation risk. Further evidence shows that labor investment efficiency following cross-listing in the United States translates into high firm valuation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity concerns and have important policy implications.     

Does corporate control determine the cross-listing location?

This paper explains the choice of the cross-listing location with particular emphasis on the level of investor protection provided by the host market. We find that firms with concentrated control, with a higher level of risk and those with more pronounced financing needs cross-list on a market with better investor protection. We also find support for the bonding hypothesis as firms from markets with weak shareholder protection tend to cross-list on markets with significantly higher shareholder protection.     

Has New York become less competitive than London in global markets? Evaluating foreign listing choices over time

We study the determinants and consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 2005. This investigation enables us to evaluate the relative benefits of New York and London exchange listings and to assess whether these relative benefits have changed over time, perhaps as a result of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. We find that cross-listings have been falling on US exchanges as well as on the Main Market in London. This decline in cross-listings is explained by changes in firm characteristics instead of by changes in the benefits of cross-listing. We show that after controlling for firm characteristics there is no deficit in cross-listing counts on US exchanges related to SOX. Investigating the valuation differential between listed and non-listed firms (the cross-listing premium) from 1990 to 2005, we find that there is a significant premium for US exchange listings every year, that the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, and that it persists when allowing for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. In contrast, no premium exists for listings on London's Main Market in any year. Firms increase their capital-raising activities at home and abroad following a cross-listing on a major US exchange but not following a cross-listing in London. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that an exchange listing in New York has unique governance benefits for foreign firms.     

Investor communication and the benefits of cross-listing

While studies have sought to explain the benefits of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of communication between managers and investors during this process. In this paper, I investigate whether managers change communication policies around U.S. cross-listings. I document significant increases in communication when firms cross-list. I then test whether these investor communication practices around cross-listing are associated with capital market benefits. I find that cross-listed firms that communicate more with investors experience greater and longer lasting cross-listing benefits. Lastly, I explore two potential reasons that may lead managers to choose higher levels of communication: to support an increase in investor recognition and to facilitate monitoring. I find results consistent with communication increasing visibility and scrutiny, suggesting that communication functions as a supporting tool to achieve managers’ cross-listing goals.     

Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision

This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross-list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of private benefits resulting from such listings. Using several proxies for private benefits related to the control and cash flow ownership rights of controlling shareholders, we find support for this hypothesis with a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 31 countries.     

Crises,contagion and cross-listings

We investigate whether cross-listing shares in the form of depositary receipts in overseas markets benefits investors in emerging market countries during periods of local financial crisis from 1994 to 2002. We regress cumulative abnormal returns for three windows surrounding the crisis events on the cross-listing status while controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm age, trading volume, foreign exposure, disclosure quality and corporate governance. Further, we examine cross-listing effects in countries popularly thought to experience contagious effects of these crises. We find that cross-listed firms react significantly less negatively than non-cross-listed firms, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. The results on contagious cross-listing effects are however mixed. Our findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of market segmentation as well as differential disclosure/governance between developed and emerging markets. We do not find evidence that foreign investors “panic” during a currency crisis.     

What drives the disappearing dividends phenomenon?

We study the determinants of dividend payout policy and examine the role of liquidity, risk and catering in explaining the changes in propensity to pay. Our results indicate that risk plays a major role in firms’ dividend policy. The evidence substantiates from a large sample of firms representing 18 countries over the sample period from 1989 to 2011. For firms in the US, France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is additionally an important determinant of dividend policy. We find that, although catering incentives persist only among firms in common law countries and not in civil law countries, after adjusting for risk there is little support for catering theory even among firms incorporated in common law countries. Our results indicate that catering incentives reflect the risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay dividends.     

Does Cross-Listing Benefit the Shareholders? Evidence from Companies in the GCC Countries?

The goal of this study is to estimate the impact of cross-listing on stock returns, on liquidity, and on risk. A sample of 24 companies from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries which cross-listed their stocks in a foreign market over the period 2000–2010 were chosen for study. An event study estimating abnormal returns related to the cross-listing event as well as parametric and nonparametric tests find that there is (1) a significant abnormal return of about 6 % that lasts until 6 days after the cross-listing day and starts fading away thereafter (2) a significant increase in liquidity during the event period for most firms and (3) on average a decrease in risk. Our results also suggest that cross-listing had a small impact on market risk measured by the average beta but led to a decrease in the total risk measured by standard deviation of returns and a decrease in the potential loss measured by the average value at risk at the 5 % confidence. Additionally, an analysis based on the foreign market of secondary listing suggests that the benefit of cross-listing varies with the market of secondary listing. The positive abnormal return is more obvious for companies that cross-listed in Kuwait, Bahrain, and London. The most obvious increase in liquidity is for firms that cross-listed in London or in Bahrain and the biggest decrease in risk is for companies that cross-listed in London. We conclude overall that cross-listing in London benefits the shareholders the most as it leads to positive significant abnormal returns, an increase in liquidity, and a decrease in risk.     

Liquidity minimization and cross-listing choice: Evidence based on Canadian shares cross-listed on U.S. venues

This paper examines whether a Canadian-listed firm seeking to cross-list in the U.S. needs to consider liquidity differences when making a choice among the main U.S. venues (AMEX, NYSE or NASDAQ). After controlling for firm characteristics, we find that trade costs for Canadian shares cross-listed in the U.S. do not depend on the U.S. cross-listing venue. This suggests that the choice of U.S. listing venue may be better motivated by the desire to minimize listing fees or to increase investor recognition and visibility.     

The effect of board gender diversity on cross-listing

This paper examines whether board gender diversity affects the decision to cross-list firms. The study is based on an extensive sample of 131,022 company-year observations consisting of 15,751 unique companies across 66 industries in 83 countries with different levels of institutional development from 1999 to 2018. Analysis reveals that cross-listing is not rare phenomena, but rather a very attractive strategy that is widely used by corporations seeking financial internationalization. The findings show that greater gender diversity on the board reduces the probability of cross-listing, and are robust to a battery of endogeneity tests including IV of gender grammatical marking, propensity score matching and reverse causality. In addition, we find that stronger institutional context will offset part of the negative effect that having women on the board has on cross-listing.     

International cross-listings by Australian firms: A stochastic dominance analysis of equity returns

This paper examines the share return and risk exposure consequences of Australian companies deciding to cross-list on major international stock exchanges. Due to limited sample availability of cross-listing transactions by Australian companies and concerns regarding non-normality, we apply bootstrapping and stochastic dominance techniques to evaluate share return and return variance changes following cross-listings. The findings provide evidence that firm share returns decline following the undertaking of cross-listings, with an associated fall in the post-listing variance in share returns. Measures of the importance and ownership concentration of stockmarkets in destination countries are found to be correlated with post-listing share return outcomes, however, no evidence of superior return or risk reduction benefits from firms cross-listing in countries providing stronger investor protection or higher accounting reporting and disclosure requirements is identified.     

Cross-Listing and Operating Performance: Evidence from Exchange-Listed American Depositary Receipts

Abstract:  In this paper we examine the operating performance of non-US firms that enter major US stock exchanges using American Depositary Receipt (ADR) programs. Our dataset consists of 108 capital-raising and non-capital-raising firms from twenty four countries, cross-listed on major US stock exchanges during the period 1994–2004. We provide evidence that capital-raising cross-listed firms experience improvements in their operating performance after the listing, relative to a non-cross-listed matched sample of firms and relative to the pre-listing period, whereas non-capital-raising cross-listed firms out-perform a non-cross-listed matched sample of firms for both the pre-listing and the post-listing periods. These results suggest that the type of ADR program conveys information about changes in the post-listing operating performance. Moreover, both capital-raising and non-capital-raising cross-listed firms have positive abnormal returns due to the cross-listing and these abnormal returns are positively related with the post-listing abnormal changes in operating performance, suggesting that the market anticipates the post-listing abnormal changes in operating performance. Results are robust after adjusting for various firm and country risk characteristics.     

Investor protection and cash holdings: Evidence from US cross-listing

This paper examines (i) whether the level of firms’ cash holdings differ depending on the strength of investor protection, (ii) whether excess cash holdings are valued more with better investor protection, and (iii) whether cross-listed firms that improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively more cash than non-cross-listed firms. We analyze 1405 ADR firms and their corresponding matched firms from 39 different countries and document that ADR firms have significantly higher cash holdings relative to their non-cross-listed peers, especially in recent years. The increase in cash holdings is much higher for emerging market firms because of their transition from particularly poor home country investor protection and accounting standards before cross-listing to much higher standards after cross-listing. In addition, firms with level III ADR listing, which represents the strongest investor protection, have higher cash holdings relative to other types of ADR firms.     

Changing risk exposures of cross-listed firms and market integration

A standard finding is that risk exposures of companies that cross-list tend to increase against the market in which they list, a change typically associated with a decline in the cost of capital. However, this finding is predicated on the assumption that the home and foreign market co-movements are stable over time. By contrast, another common finding is that risk exposures across market indices have increased over time due to international market integration. In this paper, I ask whether the firm-level findings for changing risk exposures are due to the more general changes in market co-movements. Indeed, for a panel of cross-listed firms in the U.S., I find that 72% do not find evidence of breaks in their relationships beyond those derived from their home markets. This finding suggests that the apparent increase in risk exposures for cross-listed firms arises from general market integration trends. Moreover, the remaining 28% of firms tend to have significant breaks after cross-listing, be younger, and have home markets with lower government regulation.