Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Valuing and pricing IPOs

This paper investigates how underwriters set the IPO firm’s fair value, an ex-ante estimate of the market value, using a unique dataset of 228 reports from French underwriters. These reports are issued before the IPO shares start trading on the stock market and detail how underwriters determined fair value. We document that underwriters often employ multiples valuation, dividend discount models and discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis to determine fair value but that all of these valuation methods suffer from a positive bias with respect to equilibrium market value. We also analyze how this fair value estimate is subsequently used as a basis for IPO pricing. We report that underwriters deliberately discount the fair value estimate when setting the preliminary offer price. Part of the intentional price discount can be recovered by higher price updates. We find that, controlling for other factors such as investor demand, part of underpricing stems from this intentional price discount.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

An analysis of the liquidity benefits provided by secondary markets

Listing shares in liquid secondary markets either to facilitate acquisitions or to diversify owner’s personal wealth are among the most important reasons for firms to go public [Brau, J.C., Fawcett, S.E., 2006. Initial public offerings: An analysis of theory and practice. Journal of Finance 61, 399–436]. We contend that the expected benefits derived from the liquidity provided by secondary markets are relevant for understanding important decisions made in preparation for an IPO. We hypothesize that the potential losses caused by an IPO failure induce firms that benefit more from going public to hire more reputable underwriters and to adopt more conservative pricing policies. We use several proxies for the benefits firms derive from post-IPO liquidity. The results indicate that firms that benefited more from liquidity were taken public by more prestigious underwriters and exhibited substantially larger levels of price revisions and underpricing. Post-IPO liquidity is also important for understanding the decision to retain the lead underwriter in subsequent SEOs.     

UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND REPETITIVE PUBLIC OFFERINGS

A recent examination of underwriter reputation and initial public offerings (IPOs) suggests that one of the reasons prestigious underwriters market low-risk IPOs is to increase the expected present value of subsequent offerings. There is a greater likelihood that a firm issuing low-risk IPOs will be a viable future operation with the potential for subsequent offerings than a firm issuing high-risk IPOs. I examine the hypothesis that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is negatively related to IPO risk. In addition to finding support for this hypothesis, I show that the likelihood of subsequent offerings is positively related to the IPO underwriter's reputation and negatively related to the IPO gross spread. Finally, I find that the likelihood of firms switching IPO underwriters for subsequent offerings decreases with increasing IPO underwriter reputation.     

合资承销商影响新股破发率的实证研究

新股破发是目前中国股市目前面临的一个重要现象。本文基于2004年至2010年上市的A股IPO,研究合资承销商对新股破发率的影响。研究发现,合资承销商所承销的新股破发率显著低于本土承销商。合资承销商的低破发率主要归功于更加有效且符合市场预期的一级市场发行定价能力,其表现为合资承销商发行的股票的短期市场价格相对发行价的偏离程度显著低于本土承销商发行的股票。另外,我们还发现合资承销商采取了一定的托市行为,该行为也减小了短期内新股跌破发行价的概率。本文的发现从新股发行的角度提供了开放金融市场对我国资本市场影响的新现象。     

Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior?

We derive a behavioral measure of the IPO decision‐maker's satisfaction with the underwriter's performance based on Loughran and Ritter (2002) and assess its ability to explain the decision‐maker's choice among underwriters in subsequent securities offerings. Controlling for other known factors, IPO firms are less likely to switch underwriters when our behavioral measure indicates they were satisfied with the IPO underwriter's performance. Underwriters also extract higher fees for subsequent transactions involving satisfied decision‐makers. Although our tests suggest that the behavioral model has explanatory power, they do not speak directly to whether deviations from expected utility maximization determine patterns in IPO initial returns.     

Securities regulation and implicit penalties

The extant literature offers extensive support for the significant role played by institutions in financial markets, but implicit regulation and monitoring have yet to be examined. This study fills this void in the literature by employing unique Chinese datasets to explore the implicit regulation and penalties imposed by the Chinese government in regulating the initial public offering (IPO) market. Of particular interest are the economic consequences of underwriting IPO deals for client firms that violate regulatory rules in China’s capital market. We provide evidence to show that the associated underwriters’ reputations are impaired and their market share declines. We further explore whether such negative consequences result from a market disciplinary mechanism or a penalty imposed by the government. To analyze the possibility of a market disciplinary mechanism at work, we investigate (1) the market reaction to other client firms whose IPO deals were underwritten by underwriters associated with a violation at the time the violation was publicly disclosed and (2) the under-pricing of IPO deals undertaken by these underwriters after such disclosure. To analyze whether the government imposes an implicit penalty, we examine the application processing time for future IPO deals underwritten by the associated underwriters and find it to be significantly longer than for IPO deals underwritten by other underwriters. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the market penalizes underwriters for the rule-violating behavior of their client firms in China. Instead, the Chinese government implicitly penalizes them by imposing more stringent criteria on and lengthening the processing time of the IPO deals they subsequently underwrite.     

Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing?

We report that initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is positively related to analyst coverage by the lead underwriter and to the presence of an all‐star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter. These findings are robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and seasoned equity offering is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post‐IPO analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post‐IPO analyst coverage from highly ranked analysts.     

Two‐Sided Matching: How Corporate Issuers and Their Underwriters Choose Each Other

In this article, the authors update and confirm the findings of a 2005 article that was the first to view corporate underwriter choices as the outcome of a two‐sided matching process in which issuers look to the abilities of the underwriters offering their services and underwriters focus on the quality of the issuers that wish to use their services. This view offers a contrast with both the conventional representation of issuer‐underwriter associations as one‐sided decisions (by either issuers or underwriters) and the classical economist's representation of a competitive market in which prices serve as the primary market‐clearing mechanism. In their examination of both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the period 1980–2010, the authors continue to find strong evidence that higher‐quality issuers associate with more reputable underwriters and lower‐quality issuers match with lower reputation underwriters. Moreover, when examining cases of underwriter switching between an IPO and SEOs by the same issuer, they find that cases involving the largest divergence in the relative rankings of issuer and underwriter were the most likely to produce a change of underwriter—and that issuers that experienced larger post‐ IPO increases in quality were more likely to find more reputable underwriters for their SEOs (than for their IPOs). The authors also find that the larger the number of offerings brought to market in a given year, the smaller the market share of the top‐tier underwriters, likely reflecting the willingness of the most reputable underwriters to turn down business to maintain quality and reputation. Finally, the most reputable underwriters appear to benefit from the fact that the issuers whose IPOs they underwrite end up raising larger amounts of capital, both at the time of the IPO and in the larger and more frequent seasoned offerings by such issuers that come after the IPO. This evidence in support of two‐sided matching suggests that, especially for high‐quality issuers, the reputation of the underwriters they contract with for security offerings is likely to be more important than the underwriting fees they incur. What's more, the authors' finding that the most reputable underwriters are less likely to lose high‐quality clients and have more stable market share—and that the higher‐quality issuers they attract end up raising larger amounts of capital over their lives as public companies—suggests that underwriters' investments in building and preserving their reputations have a large expected payoff.     

The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions

Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.     

Underwriter learning about unfamiliar firms: Evidence from the history of biotech IPOS

This study examines the ability of underwriters to properly value unfamiliar firms prior to issuance. I use a sample of IPOs in biotechnology, a relatively new but thriving industry. The first American biotech IPO was in 1980. Through the end of 2004, almost 500 biotech IPOs have appeared in the public market. I find that biotechnology differs from other industries in the attributes of individual firms valued by the market. In particular, R&D and the quality of human capital (e.g., star scientists on the staff) are much more important for biotech valuations. I find also that underwriters appeared not to appreciate this distinction for early biotech IPOs; in those cases, first-day market returns were predictable by firm attributes not used by underwriters to establish IPO issue prices. I also find that underwriters have learned over time, albeit slowly. Over the 20+ years of biotech history, IPO issue prices have become more dependent on firm attributes unique to biotechs while first-day market returns have become less predictable.     

Why do firms switch underwriters?

In the mid-1990s, 30% of firms completing an SEO within three years of their IPO switched lead underwriter. This article provides evidence on why they switched. Contrary to predictions of prior research, there is little evidence that firms switch due to dissatisfaction with underwriter performance at the time of the IPO. A surprising result is that switchers’ IPOs were significantly less underpriced than non-switchers’ IPOs. However, switchers raised fewer proceeds than expected, compared to the mid-point of the filing range, while non-switchers raised significantly more proceeds. There are two main reasons for switching. Firms graduate to higher reputation underwriters, and they strategically buy additional and influential analyst coverage from the new lead underwriter. Survey results support these conclusions.     

Is Underwriter Retention of IPO Shares a Good Substitute for Underwriting Spreads?

In Taiwan, underwriters are required to retain at least 10 percent but no more than 25 percent of underwritten initial public offering (IPO) shares and sell the remainder to the public. We find that IPO underpricing causes underwriters to retain more shares to earn capital gains on retained shares and that underwriter retention is a signal of IPO underpricing. If underwriter retention is cancelled, underwriters need to be compensated through lottery draw processing fees or underwriting spreads. We show that issuers should compensate underwriters through underwriting spreads directly, rather than indirectly through underwriter retention or lottery draw processing fees.     

Do institutional investors play hide-and-sell in the IPO aftermarket?

We document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in the IPO aftermarket: institutions that sell IPO shares through non‑lead brokers tend to have bought them through the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. This trading behavior is consistent with institutional investors hiding their sell trades and presumably breaking their laddering agreements with the lead underwriters. The asymmetry is the strongest in cold IPOs and is limited exclusively to the first month after the issue, when the incentives not to be detected are the strongest. We show that the intention to flip IPO allocations is not an important motive for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters. We find that hiding sell trades is an effective strategy to circumvent underwriters' monitoring mechanisms: the more institutions hide their sell trades, the less they are penalized in subsequent IPO allocations.     

Does aggressiveness help? Evidence from IPO corruption and pricing in China

Using a unique database of Chinese firms bribing initial public offering (IPO) regulators, we examine the impact of bribing on IPO pricing. Our findings suggest that bribing firms are younger, smaller, more volatile in their operating activities, and more generous in compensating underwriters and management. Most important, bribing firms price their IPO shares more aggressively than non-bribing firms and exhibit a higher price-to-earnings ratio, lower first-day return, and poorer post-IPO stock performance. Additional analyses suggest that both bribing and non-bribing firms exhibit negative announcement returns after the arrest of corrupt officials. However, the effect is stronger for bribing firms. Overall, bribing firms are systematically more aggressive than their non-bribing counterparts. They concede less to IPO investors and reward underwriters and management for helping them access the capital market.     

Audit quality, auditor compensation and initial public offering underpricing

We jointly study the impact of audit quality on auditor compensation and initial public offering (IPO) underpricing using a sample of Australian firms going public over the period 1996–2003. We find that quality (Big Four) audit firms earn significantly higher fees than non-Big Four auditors, and audit quality is positively associated with IPO underpricing. The positive relation between audit quality and underpricing is more pronounced for small issues, IPOs underwritten by non-prestigious underwriters, and those that are not backed by venture capitalists. Taken together, our results suggest that quality auditors serve as a signalling device that enhances post-issue market value of equity.     

Pre-IPO券商股权投资:鉴证功能还是独立受损?

Pre-IPO券商股权投资的经济后果是财务研究领域热点话题,具体到中国,Pre-IP券商股权投资是否损害承销商的独立性引起社会公众极大的关注,本文选取2009~2011年中国IPO的样本进行了初步研究。研究发现,整体上,有券商股权投资的公司其上市前盈余管理程度显著高于其他公司,券商早期入股的公司其盈余管理程度更为明显,有券商股权投资的公司其上市之后会计业绩下滑幅度更大。进一步研究发现,有券商股权投资的公司其承销费显著更高,发行折价的幅度明显更大。这意味着作为金融创新的券商股权投资一定程度上损害了承销商的独立性,进而导致IPO市场融资效率的损害。     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.