Is backdating executive stock options always costly to shareholders?

We use a binomial model to investigate the cost to shareholders of backdating employee stock option (ESO) grants to award in‐the‐money rather than at‐the‐money options to a manager. When the expected return of the stock underlying an ESO is sufficiently close to the risk‐free rate, a backdating arrangement can always be structured to simultaneously improve shareholders’ wealth and the manager's utility. The smaller the manager's non‐option wealth, personal income tax rate or risk tolerance, the more likely a backdating arrangement can be welfare improving.     

Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options

Using a utility-maximization framework, I show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted. Keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed, granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does not exceed a certain fraction of total wealth. Beyond this critical level, granting more options actually reduces incentive effects and becomes counterproductive. In addition, stock options also create incentive to reduce (increase) idiosyncratic (systematic) risk. These incentive effects are sensitive to the choice of exercise price.     

The information content of stock split announcements: Do options matter?

We provide a new test of the informational efficiency of trading in stock options in the context of stock split announcements. These announcements tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns. Our traditional event study results show abnormal returns that are significantly lower for optioned than non-optioned stocks, whether traded on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. After controlling for market returns, capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and trading volume, we find that the abnormal returns are significantly lower for NYSE/Amex optioned than non-optioned stocks. Although the results for Nasdaq stocks are not as clear, the overall effects tend to be lower after optioning. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the prices of optioned stocks embody more information, diminishing the impact of the stock split announcement. They provide new evidence of the beneficial effects of options on their underlying stocks.     

Do political connections affect stock price crash risk? Firm-level evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in the period from 2003 to 2012, this paper empirically investigates how the presence of politically connected directors affects stock price crash risk. We thereby make a distinction between listed state-controlled firms and privately controlled firms due to their different incentives to appoint politicians as directors on the board. Our empirical results show that politically connected directors exacerbate stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms, an effect driven by the appointment of local government officials as directors. In contrast, hiring politicians as directors, particularly central-government-affiliated directors, helps listed privately controlled firms to reduce stock price crash risk. Finally, good quality of institutions does not help to alleviate the positive relationship between political connections and stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms. However, it does weaken the role of political connections in reducing crash risk in listed privately controlled firms.     

Do the stock and CDS markets price credit risk equally in the long-run?

In this paper, we examine the existence and stability of the long-run equilibrium relation between the price of credit risk in the stock and CDS markets for a sample of non-financial iTraxx Europe companies during the 2004–2017 period. We show that standard cointegration tests with no breaks frequently fail to detect cointegration. Once we formally account for the breaks in the cointegrating vector, we are able to detect cointegration over the entire sample period for the vast majority of the companies considered. An application of these results to CDS-equity trading shows that the profitability of traditional trading strategies crucially depends on the presence of cointegration and on the stability of the cointegrating vector. Finally, we find that CDS illiquidity factors decrease the likelihood of the stock and CDS market cointegration.     

Are executive stock option exercises driven by private information?

In this study, we investigate the extent to which exercise of executive stock options is based upon private information. Contrary to popular belief, we find that shares are held more than 30 days following over a quarter of options exercised. Partitioning the data, we find weak evidence that decisions to exercise and sell immediately are prompted by bad news and stronger evidence that decisions to exercise and hold for at least 30 days are prompted by good news. Enhancing the power of our tests by considering several factors important to exercise decisions, we find that the higher the opportunity costs of early exercise as measured by the time-value of options, the greater the trading profits to executives. We also find that the greater the disguise provided by incentives to diversify and consume as measured by the depth of options in the money, the greater the trading profits to executives who exercise and sell. Turning to non-exercise decisions, we find that a strategy of holding options rather than shares to exploit good news yields positive abnormal returns consistent with theoretical predictions in the absence of dividends.

Do fear indices help predict stock returns?

This study investigates the forecasting power of implied volatility indices on forward looking returns. Prior studies document that negative innovations to returns are associated with increasing implied volatility of the underlying indices; thus, suggesting a possible relationship between extremely high levels of implied volatility and positive short term returns. We investigate this issue by examining the predictive power of three implied volatility indices, VIX, VXN and VDAX, on the underlying index returns. We extend previous research by also focusing on characterised selected stocks and examine the relationship between implied volatility indices and future returns across different sectors and classified portfolios. Our findings suggest that implied volatility indices are good predictors of 20-days and 60-days forward looking returns and illustrate insignificant predictive power for very short term (1-day and 5-days) returns.     

Do oil futures prices predict stock returns?

This paper explores stock return predictability by exploiting the cross-section of oil futures prices. Motivated by the principal component analysis, we find the curvature factor of the oil futures curve predicts monthly stock returns: a 1% per month increase in the curvature factor predicts 0.4% per month decrease in stock market index return. This predictive pattern is prevailing in non-oil industry portfolios, but is absent for oil-related portfolios. The in- and out-of-sample predictive power of the curvature factor for non-oil stocks is robust and outperforms many other predictors, including oil spot prices. The predictive power of the curvature factor comes from its ability to forecast supply-side oil shocks, which only affect non-oil stocks and are hedged by oil-related stocks.     

Accounting rules? Stock buybacks and stock options: Additional evidence

This paper finds that CEO stock options influence the choice, amount, and timing of funds distributed as a buyback. These results favor a managerial opportunism motive for buybacks over other theories and support two key research expectations – that buybacks impose option-induced agency costs on outside shareholders, and that managers benefit from weak governance and unclear accounting in this choice. CEOs increase their insider selling following a buyback, which also supports a managerial opportunism perspective. Once we control for these agency factors, we find no evidence that buyback activity associates reliably with EPS accretion from the reduction in common shares. We conclude that the popular use of stock buybacks as a form of cash distribution derives significantly from a strong contemporaneous relation between buybacks and CEOs’ use of stock options as additional compensation.     

Financial reporting for employee stock options: liabilities or equity?

This study seeks to determine whether employee stock options share key characteristics of liabilities or equity. Consistent with warrant pricing theory, we find that common equity risk and expected return are negatively associated with the extent to which a firm has outstanding employee stock options, which is opposite to the association for liabilities. We also find the following. (1) The association is positive for firms that reprice options and less negative for firms that have options with longer remaining terms to maturity, which indicates that some employee stock options have characteristics that make them more similar to liabilities. (2) Leverage measured based on treating options as equity has a stronger positive relation with common equity risk than leverage measured based on treating options as liabilities. (3) The sensitivity of employee stock option value to changes in asset value mirrors that of common equity value and is opposite to that of liability value. Also, we find that, unlike liabilities, employee stock options have substantially higher risk and expected return than common equity. Our findings are not consistent with classifying employee stock options as liabilities for financial reporting if classification were based on the directional association of a claim with common equity risk and expected return. Rather, our findings suggest the options act more like another type of equity.     

Is consumption risk priced in the stock market?

The paper examines whether the risk in the consumption of stockholders caused by incomplete consumption insurance is priced in the cross-section of average stock returns. Using Taylor series expansion of the average marginal utility of consumption, we show that the risk in the consumption of stock market participants can be decomposed into two components, insurable (hedgeable using financial assets) and uninsurable (caused by incomplete consumption insurance) consumption risks. We argue that the growth rate of average consumption may be viewed as a proxy for the insurable component of consumption risk, while the growth rates of the rescaled higher-order cross-sectional consumption distribution moments may be regarded as a multivariate proxy for uninsurable risk in consumption. Exploiting microlevel household quarterly consumption data from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey, we find that both components of consumption risk are significantly priced when the limited stock market participation is taken into account. Neither the insurable and uninsurable components of consumption risk nor the Fama–French risk factors are rejected as capturing important components of systematic risk when tested against each other in an integrated multifactor asset pricing model.     

Does corporate eco-innovation affect stock price crash risk?

We examine the effect of corporate environmental innovation (hereafter eco-innovation) on stock price crash risk and document a significant negative association. Utilising a large sample of publicly listed U.S. firms for the period 2003 to 2017, we find that an increase in eco-innovation from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with 17.62% reduction in stock price crash risk. This outcome remains robust to a variety of sensitivity tests and after accounting for potential endogeneity concerns. Eco-innovative firms attract more institutional investors and equity analyst following and disclose more information leading to lower stock price crash risk. Additional tests reveal that the negative effect of eco-innovation is contingent on the political leadership's ideology and environmental sensitivity. Our paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on the costs and benefits of eco-innovation, documenting the value-enhancing perspective of eco-innovation.     

What drives the dating game of executive options exercise? Evidence from Taiwan

Examining Taiwanese firms from 2002 to 2008, this paper investigates the motivations behind backdating the exercising of executive stock options. The probability of suspect exercises (backdating) is positively related to the firm’s stock return, the value of the option, tax savings, institutional ownership and the extent of CEO equity ownership and negatively related to firm‐specific risk and the use of Big Four accounting firms. Tax incentives motivate executives to backdate the exercise date, implying that the greater the potential for larger tax savings, the greater the likelihood of backdating. Backdating usually occurs in firms that have heavy ownership by the CEO, have more claims to executive stock options and are not family‐run, confirming the presence of the agency cost problem.     

Do political factors affect stock returns during presidential elections?

This study investigates whether or not political factors such as government policy and political connections affected stock returns during the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election. We find that firms that benefitted from (were threatened by) the proposed Three-Links policy of the winning party experienced positive (negative) stock returns during the election. We use the sensitivities of firms’ returns to bilateral trade flows between Taiwan and China to measure the government-policy effect. Our results show that the effects of political connections weakly exist, but they become more significant when the support ratio of the winning party increased in polling data. We also find that only the government-policy effect holds for different crash-risk and corporate-governance levels. Finally, investment strategies based on both political factors can generate positive abnormal returns with respect to the Fama-French Three-factor Model.     

Do institutional investors have superior stock selection ability in China?

This paper uses unique data on the shareholdings of both institutional and individual investors to directly investigate whether institutional investors have better stock selection ability than individual investors in China. Controlling for other factors, we find that institutional investors increase (decrease) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. In contrast, individual investors decrease (increase) their shareholdings in stocks that subsequently exhibit positive (negative) short- and long-term cumulative abnormal returns. These findings indicate that institutional investors have superior stock selection ability in China.     

Do hedge funds dynamically manage systematic risk?

Defining systematic risk management (SRM) skill as persistently low fund systematic risk, we find evidence of time varying allocation of hedge fund management effort across the business cycle. In weak market states, skilled managers focus on minimization of systematic risk via dynamic reallocations across asset classes at the cost of fund alpha and foregoing market timing opportunities. As markets strengthen, attention shifts to asset selection within consistent asset classes. The superior performance of low systematic risk funds previously documented arises due to the superior asset selection ability of managers in strong market states. Incremental allocations by investors arise due to this superior performance and not due to recognition of SRM skill.     

Personality and domain‐specific risk taking

The concept of risk propensity has been the subject of both theoretical and empirical investigation, but with little consensus about its definition and measurement. To address this need, a new scale assessing overall risk propensity in terms of reported frequency of risk behaviours in six domains was developed and applied: recreation, health, career, finance, safety and social. The paper describes the properties of the scale and its correlates: demographic variables, biographical self‐reports, and the NEO PI‐R, a Five Factor personality inventory (N?=?2041). There are three main results. First, risk propensity has clear links with age and sex, and with objective measures of career‐related risk taking (changing jobs and setting up a business). Second, the data show risk propensity to be strongly rooted in personality. A clear Big Five pattern emerges for overall risk propensity, combining high extraversion and openness with low neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. At the subscale level, sensation‐seeking surfaces as a key important component of risk propensity. Third, risk propensity differs markedly in its distribution across job types and business sectors. These findings are interpreted as indicating that risk takers are of three non‐exclusive types: stimulation seekers, goal achievers, and risk adapters. Only the first group is truly risk seeking, the others are more correctly viewed as risk bearers. The implications for risk research and management are discussed.     

Do industries matter in explaining stock returns and asset-pricing anomalies?

Industry returns cannot be explained fully by well-known asset pricing models. This study reveals that common factors extracted from industry returns carry significant risk premiums that go beyond the explanatory power of size, book-to-market (BM) ratios, and momentum. In particular, this study shows that (1) the small-firm effect is significant only for firms whose market capitalization is below their industry average; (2) the BM effect is an intra-industry phenomenon; (3) a one-year momentum effect is significant only for firms whose BM ratio is smaller than the industry average and limited to non-January months; and (4) there is seasonality in all effects that cannot be explained by risk-based asset-pricing models. Neither rational nor behavioral theories alone can explain industry returns, and it is perhaps too hasty to attribute asset pricing anomalies to a single driving force.     

CEO stock options and analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO stock options and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. A higher level of stock options may induce managers to undertake riskier projects, to change and/or reallocate their effort, and to possibly engage in gaming (such as opportunistic earnings and disclosure management). These managerial behaviors result in an increase in the complexity of forecasting and hence, less accurate analysts’ forecasts. Analysts’ optimistic forecast bias may also increase as the level of stock options pay increases. Because forecast complexity increases with stock options pay, analysts, needing greater access to management’s information to produce accurate forecasts, have incentives to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Alternatively, a higher level of stock options pay may lead to improved disclosure because it better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests. The improved disclosure, in turn, may result in more accurate and less biased analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical evidence indicates that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy decreases and forecast optimism increases as the level of CEO stock options increases. This evidence suggests that the incentive alignment effects of stock options are more than offset by the investment, effort allocation and gaming incentives induced by stock options grants to CEOs.     

Do bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading?

Using a sample of 279 upgrades and 310 downgrades from 1996 to 2004, we find that bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading and other measures of information risk. Specifically, when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, its stock information asymmetry and its analysts' earnings forecast dispersion are significantly reduced, while the institutional equity holdings of its shares are significantly increased. The reverse is true for a downgrade. In addition, the degree of change in stock information asymmetry is positively associated with the magnitude of the bond rating changes.