The agency costs of tranching: Evidence from RMBS

This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.     

Securitization and the dark side of diversification

Diversification by banks affects the systemic risk of the sector. Importantly, Wagner (2010) shows that linear diversification increases systemic risk. We consider the case of securitization, whereby loan portfolios are sliced into tranches with different seniority levels. We show that tranching offers nonlinear diversification strategies, which can reduce the failure risk of individual institutions beyond the minimum level attainable by linear diversification without increasing systemic risk.     

Maturity and Corporate Loan Pricing

We investigate the relation between corporate loan spreads and maturity to test whether lenders are compensated for longer maturity loans (tradeoff hypothesis) or limit their exposure by forcing riskier borrowers to take short‐term loans (credit‐quality hypothesis). Earlier studies reject the tradeoff hypothesis. We use the LPC DealScan database to create a matched sample of pairs of loans to the same borrower on the same day holding credit quality constant. We perform mean of difference tests and cross‐sectional and regression analyses, and find evidence supporting both the tradeoff and credit quality hypotheses.     

The alchemy of CDO credit ratings

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts. The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up. Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill the gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations we document the rating practices of CLOs and analyze their structures.     

ARE PROJECT FINANCE LOANS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER SYNDICATED CREDITS?

This paper provides the first full-length empirical analysis of project finance, which is defined as "limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project through the establishment of a vehicle company." The article compares the characteristics of a sample of 4,956 project finance loans (worth $634 billion) to comparable samples of non-project finance loans, all of which are drawn from a comprehensive sample of 90,784 syndicated loans (worth $13.2 trillion) booked on international capital markets since 1980.
The authors find that project finance (PF) loans differ significantly from non-project finance loans in that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are more likely to have third-party guarantees, and are far more likely to be extended to non-U.S. borrowers and to borrowers in riskier countries. Project finance credits also involve more participating banks, have fewer loan covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich industries, such as real estate and electric utilities. Despite being nonrecourse finance, floating-rate project finance loans have lower credit spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans. The authors also report that projects funded with PF loans are heavily leveraged, with an average loan to value ratio of 67%.     

A macro stress test model of credit risk for the Brazilian banking sector

This paper proposes a model to conduct macro stress test of credit risk for the banking sector based on scenario analysis. We employ an original bank-level data set that splits bank credit portfolios in 21 granular categories, covering household and corporate loans. The results corroborate the presence of a strong procyclical behavior of credit quality, and show a robust negative relationship between the logistic transformation of non-performing loans (NPLs) and GDP growth, with a lag response of up to three quarters. The results also indicate that the procyclical behavior of loan quality varies across credit types. This is novel in the literature and suggests that banks with larger exposures to highly procyclical credit types and economic sectors would tend to undergo sharper deterioration in the quality of their credit portfolios during an economic downturn. Lack of sufficient portfolio granularity in macro stress testing fails to capture these effects and thus introduces a source of bias that tends to underestimate the tail losses stemming from the riskier banks in a system.     

Discrimination in Lending: Theory and Evidence

Using a general equilibrium model of credit market discrimination, I find that both taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination have similar predictions for the intergroup differences in loan terms. The commonly held view has been that if taste-based discrimination exists, loans approved to minority borrowers will have higher expected profitability than those to majorities with comparable credit background. I show that the validity of this profitability view depends crucially on how expected loan profitability is measured. I also show that taste-based discrimination must exist if loans to minority borrowers have higher expected rates of return or lower expected rates of default loss than those to majorities with the same exogenous characteristics observed by lender at the time of loan originations. My analysis suggests that the valid method to test for taste-based discrimination should be reduced-form regressions. Empirically, I fail to find supporting evidence for the existence of taste-based discrimination.     

Mortgage risks,debt literacy and financial advice

A limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. We developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice. Our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks. Large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier, as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles. Homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline. Homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan. Riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts. Financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers, too, hold riskier mortgages.     

Securitization bubbles: Structured finance with disagreement about default risk

An additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets. When risk-neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities, structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists’ demand on risky tranches. With disagreement about default correlation, low-correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless. High-correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good. Risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass-through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching.     

Did quantitative easing reduce the borrowing costs of firms? The risk-taking channel

This paper examines the effect of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) on the cost of bank loans and documents large heterogeneous effects across different firms. In QE1, the average loan spread is 22.7 percent lower compared to the non-QE period. This effect falls in QE2 and OT and then rises in QE3 and the tapering period. The rates of riskier loans are restrained more than less risky loans during QEs as banks take more risks by offering lower rates to attract risky borrowers. The Fed mortgage-backed securities purchases have a larger impact in narrowing the borrowing cost difference between riskier and safer loans than the Fed Treasury purchases. Our results are robust to borrower, year-quarter and bank fixed effects. Overall, our findings support that the risk-taking channel of QE plays a significant role in the corporate bank loan market.     

Modeling loan commitments

Loan commitments represent more than 82 percent of all commercial and industrial loans by domestic banks. This paper develops a valuation model for loan commitments incorporating early exercise, multiple fees, partial exercise and credit risk. The model is analytically tractable and easy to implement. Using a sample of commercial paper backup credit lines from the Dealscan database, we show that our model prices closely match loan commitment market prices.     

Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?

Banks can choose to keep loans on balance sheet as private debt or transform them into public debt via asset securitization. Securitization transfers credit and interest rate risk, increases liquidity, augments fee income, and improves capital ratios. Yet many lenders still retain a portion of their loans in portfolio. Do lenders exploit asymmetric information to sell riskier loans into the public markets or retain riskier loans in portfolio? If riskier loans are indeed retained in portfolio, is this motivated by regulatory capital incentives (regulatory capital arbitrage), or a concern for reputation? We examine these questions empirically and find that securitized mortgage loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in portfolio, providing evidence consistent with either the capital arbitrage or reputation explanation for securitization.     

Information Opacity,Credit Risk,and the Design of Loan Contracts for Private Firms

This paper examines the structure and cost of a large sample of bank loans to private firms. Compared to public firms, private firms are more informationally opaque and riskier. The results suggest that the design of a loan to a private firm is significantly different from that to a public firm. Bank loans to private firms are more likely to be by a sole lender, collateralized, and have sweep covenants than loans to public firms. The cost of borrowing is higher for a private firm than for a public firm, even after holding constant firm and loan characteristics.     

Loan Sales and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing

When a loan is sold, it goes to a lower-cost financing sourcethan its originator. Yet, lending markets are less than perfectlycompetitive. Despite the lower funding cost, therefore, theloan price is not necessarily more favorable to the borrower.However, corporate borrowers are averse to the participationof their loans to other lenders because of the complexity ofdealing with multiple banks and the potential information costsof the sale announcement. Consequently, I conjecture that theborrower extracts a price concession in exchange for allowingthe bank to sell participations in the loan. Using a hand-matcheddataset of loans, borrowers, and lenders, I find that the averageyield spread on loans originated by active loan sellers is about20 basis points lower than the average spread on loans originatedby moderate loan sellers.     

Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets

This study examines the pricing of personal loans in the form of second mortgages to determine whether state-specific default laws have an effect on the availability and cost of that debt. We examine the pricing of loans to higher risk borrowers and whether borrowers in states that limit lender ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs. Our results indicate that, for the most part, lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers. However, when we focus on borrowers with low credit scores, the results indicate that mean actual loan rates are higher than those predicted by our model. The results also indicate that state-specific default laws have an effect on the price of credit. Finally, the results show that there is a greater degree of error in the pricing of second mortgage loans to borrowers with low credit scores than to borrowers with high credit scores.     

Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

Bank loans and bond prices

We test whether bank loans change public bond yields. A 25% increase in bank debt raises bond yields by 8 bps, reflecting a trade-off between the benefits of bank cross-monitoring and higher bond risk. This effect is smaller for firms with no credit default swaps (CDSs) and with junk debt—scenarios where bank monitoring is most valuable. It is unlikely that firms with bank debt are riskier, because they are less likely to be downgraded and have lower loan spreads. We find similar results using a natural experiment around the 2014 oil shock. Our results highlight how bond yields depend on incentive conflicts among creditors.     

Corporate Loan Securitization and the Standardization of Financial Covenants

We examine whether syndicated loans securitized through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) have more standardized financial covenants. We proxy for the standardization of covenants using the textual similarity of their contractual definitions. We find that securitized loans are associated with higher covenant standardization than nonsecuritized institutional loans. In addition, we show that CLOs with more diverse or frequently rebalanced portfolios are more likely to purchase loans with standardized covenants, potentially because standardization alleviates information processing costs related to loan monitoring and screening. We also document that covenant standardization is associated with greater loan and CLO note rating agreement between credit rating agencies, further supporting the relation between lower information costs and covenant standardization. Overall, our study provides evidence that loan securitization is related to the design of standardized financial covenants.     

Bank portfolio choice with private information about loan quality: Theory and implications for regulation

This paper models bank asset choice when shareholders know more about loan quality than do outsiders. Because of this informational asymmetry, the price of loans in the secondary market is the price for poor quality loans. Banks desire to hold marketable securities in order to avoid liquidating good quality loans at the ‘lemons’ price, but also have a countervailing desire to hold risky loans in order to maximize the value of deposit insurance. In this context, portfolio composition and bank safety is examined as a function of the market distribution of loan quality, and the distribution of deposits. The model suggests that off-balance sheet commitments have little effect on bankruptcy risk, and induce banks to hold more securities. We also show that an increase in the bank equity requirement will unambiguously increase bank safety in the long run. In the short run, banks are unambiguously riskier on-balance sheet, although the effect on bank safety is ambiguous.