商业银行风险导向审计思考

本文通过分析我国商业银行面临的主要风险,提出在商业银行审计中采用风险导向审计模式,对目前商业银行审计中存在的问题进行了深入思考并提出相应对策,为商业银行风险导向审计提供一些思路.     

浅谈风险导向审计在中小城市商业银行内审的运用研究

伴随着我国经济建设的快速发展,商业银行内部审计工作重心也逐步发生着变化。风险导向审计不仅关系着商业银行内部审计工作的质量与水平,而且对于中小城市商业银行内部审计工作整体发展也具有重要影响。论文为风险导向审计在中小城市商业银行内部审计中的运用研究提供几点参考性建议。     

风险导向审计在银行内部审计中的作用

目前,风险导向审计已经成为审计理论界和实务界研究的新趋势,在银行内部审计中引入风险导向审计,对于改善银行内部控制具有重要意义。本文从风险导向审计的相关概念入手,阐述了在银行内部审计中运用风险导向审计理念的可行性与必要性,并进一步论述了风险导向审计在银行内部审计中的作用。     

对规避审计风险提高商业银行审计质量的思考

思考一:内部审计风险产生的原因近些年来我国商业银行在加强内部控制方面做了大量工作,内部控制不断趋于完善,经营风险得到了一定程度的控制。但由于商业银行的特殊性,使其内部审计风险与社会审计风险相比,具有不同特征。从我国商业银行经营管理的现状看,商业银行审计风险主要表现在以下几个方面:     

现代风险导向在商业银行内部审计中的应用

在我国的金融体系之中,商业银行也存在一席之地,对金融和经济发展有着不能否认的重要作用。近年来,我国商业银行不光外部风险增加,内部风险也逐年升高。银行内部采用的传统审计也再也不足以支持如今银行内部的审计需求。因此,在当前状况下,商业银行也急需更新审计模式,进而对内部审计风险进行评估。在此时,现代风险导向审计以其远超传统方式的优点,成为理论和实践探索的焦点。文章首先介绍了现代风险导向审计的内涵及优点,及其在商业银行开展的现实意义以及大概思路,然后给出一些开展措施和关键点。     

对风险导向内部审计的思考

随着市场竞争的不断加剧,企业面临的各种风险因素也不断增大,于是不少企业实施全面风险管理,要求内部审计参与企业风险管理,风险导向内部审计应运而生.本文在阐述了风险导向内部审计特点的基础上,介绍了应用风险导向内部审计方法,并提出了保证其应用的措施.     

基于风险导向的银行内部审计探讨

风险导向内部审计是内部审计发展的最新趋势。新的审计模式倡导新的审计理念，新的审计理念必将引导内部审计发生诸多变化。银行是高风险行业，在银行实施风险导向内部审计有利于提高银行审计的效率与效果，强化银行的风险管理。本文首先对风险导向内部审计进行了初步探讨，并从银行内审的角度分析了推行风险导向内部审计所带来的变化，最后提出了银行内部审计的工作重点。     

论企业风险导向内部审计程序的构建与执行

世界经济全球化、市场化是当今时代的背景，面对日趋复杂的、激烈的市场竞争和越来越复杂的经营风险，如何建立、执行和完善企业风险导向内部审计程序，如何进行有效的风险管理，将风险降低到最低的水平，是企业管理人员迫切需要面临的问题。本文首先回顾了内部'审计理论与实践的历史演进的五个阶段，介绍了风险导向内部审计的本质、对象、目标与职能。然后通过企业风险导向内部审计程序对企业管理的战略意义，来研究企业的风险导向内部审计程序的构建与执行，其中通过将风险分为四个阶段来设计，从而开展风险导向内部审计的应对策略及执行措施。     

浅论风险导向审计模式在公积金内部审计中的实践

住房公积金制度建立至今,已成为我国住房保障体系的重要组成部分。住房公积金中心业务的快速发展,使得公积金资金运营风险不断加大,给住房公积金内部审计工作带来了新的挑战。住房公积金内部审计只有立足于住房公积金运营管理的需要,才能有效防范风险,实现公积金的安全、保值与增值。文章从风险导向审计的内涵和实质出发,对公积金管理中引入风险导向内部审计的必要性和可行性进行探讨,并在此基础上得出风险导向审计模式对提高住房公积金内审工作质量,提升公积金中心管理水平的启示。     

企业内部审计实施风险导向审计的必要性和可能性分析

内部审计实施风险导向审计,以评估企业风险为起点,确定重要性水平,提高风险防范意识,并将工作重点从财务审计转向企业的经营审计,为企业管理层提供更有价值的建设性意见,更容易得到管理层的支持.因而在内部审计开展风险导向审计是必要且可能的.     

对商业银行内部审计独立性的思考

文章试图通过商业银行内部审计独立性的经济学涵义,从公司治理、内外部监管与审计理念发展等理论的角度来阐述对商业银行内部审计独立性的要求。     

新巴塞尔协议与银行审计风险

新巴塞尔协议强化了银行风险管理理念，对银行业建立完善的内部风险制度提出了更高的要求。为适应新巴塞尔协议全面实行后带来的冲击与挑战，银行审计的理论和方法也需要改进。本文主要探讨了新巴塞尔协议对我国银行业的影响，以及银行审计的改进措施。     

An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees,Nonaudit Fees,and Audit Committees*

This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and the ratio of nonaudit service (NAS) fees to audit fees, using data gathered under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) fee disclosure rules. Issues related to NAS fees have been of concern to practitioners, regulators, and academics for a number of years. Prior research suggests that audit committees possessing certain characteristics are important participants in the process of managing the client‐auditor relationship. We hypothesize that audit committees that are independent and active financial monitors have incentives to limit NAS fees (relative to audit fees) paid to incumbent auditors, in an effort to enhance auditor independence in either appearance or fact. Our analysis using a sample of 538 firms indicates that audit committees comprised solely of independent directors meeting at least four times annually are significantly and negatively associated with the NAS fee ratio. This evidence is consistent with audit committee members perceiving a high level of NAS fees in a negative light and taking actions to decrease the NAS fee ratio.     

The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

审计失败的博弈分析与防范措施

近年来,我国审计失败事件层出不穷。为深入了解其原因,有必要对委托代理审计关系中各方经济行为进行博弈分析。本文以博弈理论为基础,对委托代理审计中的相关关系人的行为进行了博弈分析,并提出了防范审计失败的对策。     

对企业验资注册审计的思考

企业虚假验资注册在银行法人信贷业务中几乎成为企业骗取银行贷款惯用的手法。而企业因虚假验资、增资注册增加企业资本金,从而美化企业资产质量,以达到银行准入标准,致使银行信贷风险加大,最终形成不良信贷资产。本文从审计角度揭示企业虚假验资注册的表现形式、危害及银行信贷的薄弱环节,总结审计查证企业虚假验资注册的手段,以揭示信贷风险,达到防范风险的目的。     

浅析金融环境变化下我国的商业银行审计

随着我国金融对外开放与不断深入发展,金融环境的变革对商业银行审计的模式、内容、范围等方面产生了巨大影响。本文从介绍金融环境的变化入手,分析了这些变化的影响,提出了强化商业银行内部控制、提高商业银行审计人员素质、建立审计公告制度、推行定期小规模专项审计等应对措施。     

Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services*

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.