Misallocation,informality, and human capital: Understanding the role of institutions

The aim of this paper is to quantify the role of formal-sector institutions in shaping the demand for human capital and the level of informality. We propose a firm dynamics model where firms face capital market imperfections and costs of operating in the formal sector. Formal firms have a larger set of production opportunities and the ability to employ skilled workers, but informal firms can avoid the costs of formalization. These firm-level distortions give rise to endogenous formal and informal sectors and, more importantly, affect the demand for skilled workers. The model predicts that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by relatively lower stocks of skilled workers, larger informal sectors, low allocative efficiency, and measured TFP. Moreover, we find that the interaction between entry costs and financial frictions (as opposed to the sum of their individual effects) is the main driver of these differences. This complementarity effect derives from the introduction of skilled workers, which prevents firms from substituting labor for capital and in turn moves them closer to the financial constraint.     

An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market

In labor markets with worker and firm heterogeneity, the matching between firms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most productive workers and firms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal population-wide matched employer–employee data from Portugal. Using panel data methods, we quantify a firm-specific productivity term for each firm, and we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the firm. We find that there is positive assortative matching, in particular among long-lived firms. Using skill-specific estimates of an index of search frictions, we find that the results can only to a small extent be explained by heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skill groups.     

Job auctions and hold-ups

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which firms need to invest in capital before they can post a vacancy. This assumption creates a natural scope for hold-up problems, but the innovation of our study is that we allow for competition among the applicants who apply for the same job. In our economy all applicants are paid their actual marginal product. Nonetheless, with random search there exists a hold-up problem, leading to underinvestment in capital. On the contrary, if workers can direct their search towards firms with different capital levels, the equilibrium is efficient. This result contrasts sharply with the predictions of models with ex-post bargaining that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an environment with non-contractible investments.     

The effect of search frictions on wages

We aim to test whether the degree of informational search frictions in the labor market has a negative effect on wages. In a range of equilibrium search models of the labor market, this effect is predicted to be negative. Nevertheless, this has never been tested. We perform tests with matched worker–firm data. The worker data are informative on individual wages and labor market transitions, and this allows for estimation of the degree of search frictions. The firm data are informative on labor productivity. This allows us to investigate how the mean difference between labor productivity and wages in a market depends on the degree of frictions and other determinants, and to assess the quantitative relevance of frictions for wages.     

Costly external finance,reallocation, and aggregate productivity

Empirical studies document that resource reallocation across production units plays an important role in accounting for aggregate productivity growth in the US manufacturing. Financial market frictions could distort the reallocation process and hence may hinder aggregate productivity growth. This paper studies the quantitative impact of costly external finance on aggregate productivity through resource reallocation across firms with idiosyncratic productivity shocks. A partial equilibrium model calibrated to the US manufacturing data shows that costly external finance causes inefficient output reallocation from high productivity firms to low productivity firms and as a result leads to a 1 percent loss in aggregate TFP.     

Market conditions and worker training: How does it affect and whom?

This paper analyses the impact of labor market conditions on a firm's incentive to train its workers. In an equilibrium model of the labor market in which firms use both untrained and in-house-trained workers, we show that the incidence of training increases with the tightness of the labor market. In a multi-sector framework, the usual threat of hold-up by a trained worker is more severe for workers who change their sector of work; during downturns, this serves to bias firms' incentives in imparting training away from such workers and towards workers already in the firm and those new workers coming from the same sector. Evidence from the NLSY confirms both predictions—the incidence and duration of company-sponsored training is adversely affected by higher unemployment rates; furthermore, this negative effect is much stronger for workers who change industries as compared to those who do not.     

Partnership markets with adverse selection

Ownership positions in large corporations can be traded on anonymous markets, but professional partnerships and worker cooperatives prohibit members from transferring their positions to outsiders without the consent of other insiders. These contrasting policies can be explained by adverse selection, which implies that the joint payoff of the partners is at least as large when continuing rather than departing members choose the terms on which new partners can join. In a separating equilibrium, or a pooling equilibrium in which only low-quality workers apply for positions, market sorting reduces total surplus. The market can sometimes improve on random assignment of workers to firms when there is a pooling equilibrium in which both high- and low-quality types apply.     

Firm turnover and productivity differentials in Ethiopian manufacturing

Are the forces of market selection at work in Africa? How successful are markets in these economies in sorting out firms on an efficiency basis following the sequence of reforms to liberalize and particularly to transform some of the previous command economies to market oriented ones? What is the pattern of entry and exit in the manufacturing sector and how does it affect industry productivity growth? This study examines these issues using firm-level industrial census data from the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. It is the first attempt to analyze firm turnover and productivity differentials using industrial census data in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ethiopian manufacturing sector exhibits a high firm turnover rate that declines with size. Exit is particularly high among new entrants; 60% exit within the first 3 years in business. Our study consistently shows a significant difference in productivity across different groups of firms, which is reflected in a turnover pattern where the less productive exit while firms with better productivity survive. We also found higher aggregate productivity growth over the sample period, mainly driven by firm turnover.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

Labor unions and productivity: An empirical analysis using Japanese firm-level data

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between labor union and firm performance in areas such as productivity and profitability by using data on more than 4000 Japanese firms, ranging from listed large firms to unlisted SMEs, in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector. The presence of labor unions has statistically and economically significant positive effects on firm productivity. Unions' effects on wages are also positive, their magnitude being slightly larger than those on productivity. The decrease in the number of employees is greater at unionized firms than at non-unionized firms. The difference in employment growth is mainly attributable to the change in the number of part-time workers. In order to enhance productivity, close cooperation between management and unions is essential.     

Over-education for the rich,under-education for the poor: A search-theoretic microfoundation

This paper studies the efficiency of educational choices in a two sector/two schooling level matching model of the labor market where a continuum of heterogenous workers allocates itself between sectors depending on their decision to invest in education. Individuals differ in working ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and there is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education causes composition effects in the distribution of skills across sectors. This in turn modifies the intensity of job creation, implying the private and social returns to schooling always differ. Provided that ability and schooling cost are not too positively correlated, agents with large schooling costs — the ‘poor’ — underinvest in education, while there is overinvestment among the low schooling cost individuals — the ‘rich’. We also show that education should be more taxed than subsidized when the Hosios condition holds.     

Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition: Piece Rate versus Wage Rate

We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by "other working conditions," e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.     

Wage differentials across firms: an application of multilevel modelling

Multilevel modelling techniques are applied to a dataset that matches firms and workers, to pinpoint and explain contrasts among company wage policies. Results indicate that wage differences across firms are statistically significant, affecting every parameter of the pay policy (returns to schooling, tenure, experience, the penalty imposed on newly hired workers and on women). Gross labour productivity, average schooling in the firm, firm size and economic sector are relevant forces shaping the contrast between employers' pay policies. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Search in the product market and the real business cycle

Empirical evidence suggests that most firms operate in imperfectly competitive markets. We develop a search-matching model between wholesalers and retailers. Firms face search costs and form long-term relationships. Price bargain results in both wholesaler and retailer mark ups, which depend on firms' relative bargaining power. We simulate the general equilibrium model and explore the role of product market search frictions for business cycles. We conclude from the simulation exercise that incorporating product market search structure and shocks improve the standard real business cycle model to reproduce US business cycle fluctuations.     

Optimal promotions of competing firms in a frictional labour market with organizational hierarchies

We study optimal promotion decisions of hierarchical firms, with one junior and one senior managerial position, which interact in a search and matching labour market. Workers acquire experience over time while being employed in a junior position and the firm has to determine the experience level at which the worker receives a promotion which allows her to fill a senior position. Promoted workers move to the senior position in their current firm, if it is vacant, otherwise they search for senior positions on the market. The promotion cut-offs of the competing firms exhibit strategic complementarity, but we show that generically a unique stable symmetric general equilibrium exists. We find that stronger competition among firms leads to later (earlier) promotions if the initial number of firms is small (large) giving rise to an inverse U-shape relationship. In the presence of two skill groups, stronger competition among firms reduces the importance of skill differences, so the gap in wages and promotion times decreases with the number of firms. The model is compatible with empirical evidence that high-skill workers are promoted faster than the low-skilled and that internal promotions are more frequent than cross-firm moves to a higher hierarchical position.     

Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of an Equilibrium Search Model

We specify and estimate an equilibrium job search model with productivity differences across labour market segments. The model allows for two types of unemployment: frictional unemployment due to search frictions and structural unemployment due to wage floors. Wage floors exist because of high unemployment benefits or binding minimum wages. The productivity distribution is estimated semi-nonparametrically along the lines of Gallant-Nychka, using Hermite series approximation. We decompose the total unemployment rate and we examine the effects of changes in the minimum wage.     

Cash holding dynamics and competition intensity: Evidence from UK firms

Using a quasi-natural experiment and various measures of competition intensity, we examine whether an increase in product market competition is a key driver of firm cash holdings. We find that firms increase cash holdings when competition is intense. The results suggest that the degree of increase in cash holdings is magnified among firms exposed to high predatory threat and financing friction. In addition, we examine if increasing cash holdings offers a competitive advantage in the product market. Our results indicate that firms with large cash reserves make gains in market share at the expense of their rivals. Gains in the product market are more pronounced among firms with low exposure to predatory risk and financing frictions.     

Towards a theory of the labor market with a public sector

The object is to specify and analyze equilibrium in a labor market with frictions when there is a significant public sector. In the vast majority of equilibrium studies on labor markets, a public sector has been ruled out by assumption. This seems a strange oversight as about 17% of workers in the US are public sector workers, whereas in western Europe, approximately 22% of workers work in the public sector. The goal in this study is to provide answers to such questions as: what happens to private sector wages if the public sector is increased? If the Government increases the number of public sector jobs, does this crowd out private sector jobs? When will private sector wages be greater (less) than the public sector wage? Reasonably complete answers to these questions (and others) are provided within the context of the model developed.     

The need for speed: impacts of internet connectivity on firm productivity

Broadband access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor, but there are few firm-level estimates of its benefits. We use a large micro-survey of firms linked to longitudinal firm financial data to determine the impact that broadband access has on firm productivity. Propensity score matching is used to control for factors, including the firm’s own lagged productivity, that determine a firm’s internet access choice. Instrumental variables estimates are employed as a robustness check. Results indicate that broadband adoption boosts firm productivity by 7–10%; effects are consistent across urban versus rural locations and across high versus low knowledge intensive sectors.     

Unionisation structures, productivity and firm performance: New insights from a heterogeneous firm model

This paper introduces collective bargaining at the firm and at the sector level into the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz and Ottaviano (Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2008. Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 295-316). It then analyses how the two bargaining regimes change aggregate industry productivity and firm performance relative to a competitive labour market. While sector-level bargaining forces the least productive firms to exit and thus increases average productivity relative to the competitive benchmark, firm-level bargaining allows less productive firms to stay in the market and thus reduces average productivity. Sector-level bargaining also results in higher average output and profit levels than either firm-level bargaining or a competitive labour market. The paper also shows that the choice between sector- and firm-level bargaining can involve a trade-off between product variety and product prices: Not only the average price level but also product variety tends to be lower under sector-level bargaining than under firm-level bargaining.