Wage determination in the union and nonunion sectors.

This study contains estimates of wage equations for white male union and nonunion employees. The authors find that nonunion wages are generally more responsive than union wages to individuals' education and experience and to regional price-level variation. Despite those differences, however, estimates of union-nonunion wage differentials based on these separate equations do not differ greatly from a differential obtained from a union dummy variable in an equation based on combined union and nonunion observations. Union-nonunion differentials vary widely across occupational groups and are generally larger in the lower skilled and more highly unionized occupations. The results for manufacturing, for which additional industry data are available, indicate a negative impact of high concentration ratios on the wages of all workers and a greater impact of establishment size on nonunion than on union wages. Data were drawn from the May 1973 Current Population Survey.     

Paying to queue: a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages

Traditional theories of the effect unions have on nonunion wages are difficult to reconcile with firm and worker mobility. We show how differences in nonunion wages can persist in a two-city search model. Nonunion wage differences across cities are driven by transition rates into the union sector. Should union queues form in the nonunion sector, union power decreases nonunion wages as workers are willing to take lower wages to line up for union jobs. However, if queues are formed in the unemployed sector, union power increases nonunion wages as nonunion firms pay premiums to induce workers to leave the queue.     

Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments

Life cycle wages of immigrants from developing countries fall short of catching up with wages of natives. Using linked employer–employee data, we show that 40% of the native–immigrant wage gap is explained by differential sorting across establishments. We find that returns to experience and seniority are similar for immigrant and native workers, but that differences in job mobility and intermittent spells of unemployment are major sources of disparity in lifetime wage growth. The inferior wage growth of immigrants primarily results from failure to advance to higher paying establishments over time. These empirical patterns are consistent with signaling disadvantages of immigrant job seekers, but not with the explanation that low wage growth follows from inferior information about employers and job opportunities.     

MEASURING HUMAN CAPITAL AND ITS EFFECTS ON WAGE GROWTH

Abstract Ever since Mincer, years of labour market experience were used to approximate individual's general human capital, while years of seniority were used to approximate job‐specific human capital. This specification is restrictive because it assumes that starting wages at a new job depend only on job market experience. In this paper, I investigate the effects of human capital on wage growth by using a more flexible specification of the wage equation, which allows for a rich set of information on past employment spells to affect the starting wages. In addition, I endogenize the labour mobility decision. In order to illuminate the effects of human capital accumulation patterns on wage growth, I compare counterfactual career paths for representative individuals.     

Job and wage mobility with minimum wages and imperfect compliance

We propose a job search model with minimum wage regulations and imperfect compliance to explain the doubling of the mean and variance of hourly earnings of white males during the first 18 years of labor market experience. The model encompasses job mobility and on‐the‐job wage growth as sources of wage dynamics, and is estimated by simulated generalized method of moments using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths 1979. Our estimates provide a good fit for the observed levels and trends of the main job and wage mobility data, and for the increase in the mean and variance of wages over the life cycle, as well as for the fall in the fraction of workers paid below the minimum wage. Job mobility explains 40–50% of the observed wage growth. Increases in the minimum wage and/or compliance deliver small effects on the wage distribution and the nonemployment rate. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

What really matters in a job? Hedonic measurement using quit data

This paper uses labour market spell data from the first seven waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to model separations and quits. Three main results emerge. First, job satisfaction data are powerful predictors of both separations and quits, even controlling for wages, hours and standard demographic and job variables. Second, the comparison of the power of seven domain job satisfaction measures in a quit equation yields a ranking of job characteristics: job security and pay are the most important, followed by use of initiative, the work itself, and hours of work. This ranking differs markedly across different labour market groups. Last, union job dissatisfaction seems to be real: dissatisfied union members are just as likely to quit as are dissatisfied union non-members. However, union “free-riders” (non-union members at establishments with union recognition) do seem to behave differently from workers at establishments where unions are not recognised.     

Job hopping, earnings dynamics, and industrial agglomeration in the software publishing industry

This paper investigates the implications of industrial clustering for labor mobility and earnings dynamics in one large and increasingly important high-technology sector. Taking advantage of longitudinal employee-employer matched data, I exploit establishment-level variation in agglomeration to explore how clustering in the software publishing industry affects labor market outcomes. The results show that clustering makes it easier for workers to job hop within the sector. Higher earnings levels in more agglomerated areas are partly attributable to sorting across locations among workers and firms in the industry on the basis of observable and unobservable characteristics. Controlling for this heterogeneity, workers in clusters have relatively steep earnings-tenure profiles, accepting lower wages early in their careers in exchange for stronger earnings growth and higher wages later. These findings are consistent with theoretical models in which agglomeration improves labor market coordination and facilitates greater learning and human capital formation.     

Job hopping,earnings dynamics,and industrial agglomeration in the software publishing industry

This paper investigates the implications of industrial clustering for labor mobility and earnings dynamics in one large and increasingly important high-technology sector. Taking advantage of longitudinal employee-employer matched data, I exploit establishment-level variation in agglomeration to explore how clustering in the software publishing industry affects labor market outcomes. The results show that clustering makes it easier for workers to job hop within the sector. Higher earnings levels in more agglomerated areas are partly attributable to sorting across locations among workers and firms in the industry on the basis of observable and unobservable characteristics. Controlling for this heterogeneity, workers in clusters have relatively steep earnings-tenure profiles, accepting lower wages early in their careers in exchange for stronger earnings growth and higher wages later. These findings are consistent with theoretical models in which agglomeration improves labor market coordination and facilitates greater learning and human capital formation.     

Seniority Profiles in Unionized Workplaces: Do Unions Still have the Edge?*

The focus of this study is to distinguish the different paths seniority earning profiles follow depending on whether the individual is employed in a workplace where trade unions and collective bargaining are present, or not. Within this framework, two propositions are set. In the union sector seniority should be an important determinant of wages, while in the non‐union sector productivity, proxied by occupational experience, should have a key role on earning profiles. The empirical analysis verifies both propositions. Seniority earning profiles appear to be steeper in the union sector, while occupational expertise is estimated to have a more significant role in non‐union jobs.     

Analysis of the practice of job evaluation in the metal industry in Turkey

Job evaluation's main aim is to establish a fair wage structure. Its main principle is ‘equal pay for equal work’. ‘Metal Industry Job Grouping System’ (MIDS) has been in the metal industry in Turkey for more than 20 years. The results of the practice of the system were measured by the Gini coefficient. By the findings, the average wages of the job groups are different enough from each other by their job groups in the way the wage of the bigger number job group is higher than the smaller except the job group two in the industry. However, the wages are far from the principle ‘equal wage for equal job’ within the same job itself. In addition, the workers make use of bonuses and social benefits. The effect of social benefits of them on the wage structure is positive within the same job group and negative between different job groups within the same company. Nevertheless, the effect of both bonuses and social benefits on the wage structure is negative between the companies because, between them they are different from each other. Job group and seniority affect the wage structure. Seniority has a socio-psychological self-producing dynamic. The distribution of seniorities within the same job group has negative effects on the wage structure. However, this fact for each worker disappears for the long term since the worker of today who has short-term seniority will be the one of tomorrow who has long-term seniority. Therefore, for each worker, the wage structure gets closer to the principle ‘equal wage for equal job’ within the same job group itself over time.     

Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

Promotion Signals,Experience, and Education

This paper uses a nation‐wide representative survey of employees to examine whether more informative job promotions carry larger wage increases. In job assignment models with asymmetric information, unexpected promotions send a signal to the external labor market to revise upward their assessment of a worker's ability. The employing firm must then increase wages to prevent the worker from being bid away. Less educated workers are assumed to come from a group with lower average ability. Their promotion is hypothesized to induce a larger positive update of the assessment of their ability than the promotion of more educated workers. Promotions of less experienced workers, with less known about their abilities, should also result in strong signaling effects. We obtain regression results consistent with our hypotheses, although the size and significance of the estimates hinge on the promotion definition. Inexperienced workers gain more from promotions that entail new managerial responsibilities, whereas less educated workers gain more from nonmanagerial promotions. This sensitivity to the definition of promotion suggests that promotions reveal information on different dimensions of ability for different types of workers.     

Worker visibility and firms' retention policies

In the last two decades, the widespread use of web‐based social networks has led to a higher visibility of workers to the labor market. We theoretically and experimentally analyze the consequences of such increased labor market transparency for the efficiency of job assignments, the wages of workers, and firm profits. Our theoretical results show that higher visibility of workers increases the efficiency of job assignments, leads to a redistribution of income between workers of different ability, and increases overall surplus. Our experimental findings generally support the theoretical results with the exception that increased visibility leads to higher worker turnover such that surplus does not increase.     

Job mobility and careers in firms

This paper presents a theoretical model that combines employers learning about worker productivity, human capital acquisition, job-assignment and resolution of worker uncertainty regarding disutility of work from a job, to show how widely documented findings on both wage and promotion dynamics and turnover can be captured in a single set-up. Specifically we show how our model can capture results such as; probability of turnover decreases with labor market experience, wage changes during job changes is more in earlier periods, serial correlation in wages and probability of promotion increases in wages, amongst others.     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

Housing tenure and labor market impacts: The search goes on

We develop two search-theoretic models emphasizing firm entry to examine the Oswald hypothesis, the idea that homeownership is linked to inferior labor market outcomes, and compare their predictions to three extant theories. The five models have surprisingly different predictions about the labor market at both the aggregate and micro levels. Using a suitable instrumental variable strategy, we estimate both micro and aggregate level regression models of wages and unemployment and compare the estimates to those predictions. We find that while homeowners are less likely to be unemployed, they also have lower wages, all else equal, compared to renters. In addition, higher regional homeownership rates are associated with a greater probability of individual worker unemployment and higher wages. The outcome of a horserace between our new search-theoretic models is mixed—the wage-posting model predicts observed unemployment impacts while a bargaining variant does a better job explaining observed wages and aggregate labor market outcomes. Overall, we conclude that firm behavior is important for understanding the labor market impacts of homeownership. Because this is the case, regional homeownership rates are not good instruments for individual tenure choice in empirical work. And while individual homeowners may have inferior labor market outcomes as compared to renters, from the viewpoint of society, higher homeownership rates may result in greater job creation and overall production, among other benefits.     

Who benefits from job placement services? A two-sided analysis

In light of additional information market agents would achieve better outcomes, for example, a lower ask price for the buyer and a higher offer price for the seller. I examine this notion in a labor market, where employers and employees do not possess perfect information about wages, and address the question of who benefits from the information provided by job placement services? The empirical strategy considers the two-sided nature of the labor market. Estimates of employee and employer incomplete information are contrasted between users and non-users of placement services provided by Job Corps, America’s largest and most important job training program for youths. Findings suggest that employees that use placement services don’t have more information about better offer wages, relative to non-users. Interestingly, firms that employed users of placement services are better informed about reservation wages relative to firms that employed non-users.     

Wage bargaining,union membership,and the organization of unemployment insurance

The paper offers a theoretical analysis of a labor market institution known as the Gent system, which is a system where unions run unemployment insurance (UI) through government-subsidized UI funds. This system is practiced in four Nordic countries with comparatively very high unionization rates. The analysis shows that the Gent system is more conducive to unionization than a compulsory UI system if the Gent system is heavily subsidized by the government or if workers are strongly risk averse. Moreover, a rise in the share of benefits financed by union members is likely to reduce wages as well as union membership.