Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

The distributive and welfare effects of product and labour market deregulation

This paper studies the effects of product and labour market deregulation on wage inequality and welfare. By constructing an analytically tractable model in which the level of product market competition and the wages are endogenously distributed among sectors, I show that deregulation in goods market has mixed effects on inequality: the wage variance and the Gini index are lower, but the ratio of the highest over the lowest wage paid in the economy increases. Moreover, deregulation in labour markets raises the aggregate level of employment and the average real wage but reduces the welfare of trade unions in sectors with a low level of competition.     

Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly

This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot‐oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term ‘efficient bargaining’ is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mexican integration into the North American free trade zone

Mexican integration into the North American free trade zone is modeled as removing the tariff on Mexican imports of manufacturing goods. Using a theoretical model, it is shown that this increases welfare through production, consumption and employment gains. The results are derived by nesting the theory of customs unions, and the Harris-Todaro type intersectoral labor migration model into a unified framework.     

Noncompliance and the effects of the minimum wage on hours and welfare in competitive labor markets

This paper shows that increases in the minimum wage rate can have ambiguous effects on the working hours and welfare of employed workers in competitive labor markets. The reason is that employers may not comply with the minimum wage legislation and instead pay a lower subminimum wage rate. If workers are risk neutral, we prove that working hours and welfare are invariant to the minimum wage rate. If workers are risk averse and imprudent (which is the empirically likely case), then working hours decrease with the minimum wage rate, while their welfare may increase.     

Social dumping and relocation: is there a case for imposing a social clause?

Public opinion in Europe seems worried about the relocation of production plants toward low wage countries often accused of practicing ‘social dumping’. To reduce the incentives for relocation trade unions proposed the adoption of ‘social clauses’ protecting domestic markets from commodities produced in countries where minimal labor condition are not met. We analyze the effects of the adoption of a social clause in a vertically differentiated Bertrand duopoly. We assess how such a policy affects firms’ relocation decisions in order to be able to assess its welfare implications. We also characterize the optimal social clause policy, both under domestic welfare maximization, and from an efficiency point of view. While we show that a social clause policy cannot be dismissed on domestic (or world) welfare grounds, its case is weaker the higher is the domestic wage and the lower is the foreign wage.     

Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work

This paper discusses the effect of tax progression on wage setting and employment in a unionised labour market. Recent contributions to this field argue that tax progression paradoxically enhances employment if wage setting is subject to collective bargaining. In this literature, individual hours of work are usually assumed to be exogenously given. We show that the positive employment effect of tax progression can be generalized to a model with a positive labour supply elasticity of individual workers. However, the wage-moderating effect of tax progression does not unambiguously carry over to a world where the union may fix both wages and individual hours of work. In this framework, the union reacts to tax progression by cutting individual working time. The wage rate, however, may decrease or increase. If the wage rate increases, the number of employed workers may decline despite the reduction in hours of work.     

Women's attitudes towards trade unions in the UK: a consideration of the distinction between full‐ and part‐time workers

This article considers the attitudes and experiences of female full‐ and part‐time workers towards trade unions. Expanding upon previous research it suggests that while the attitudes of full‐ and part‐time workers towards trade unions are similar, experiences of trade unions are not: they depend upon the employment context and work history. A life course perspective is advanced, which examines women's employment contexts and transitions between full‐ and part‐time work in order to further explain female part‐timers’ lower likelihood of unionising.     

Impact of China's currency valuation and labour cost on the US in a trade and exchange rate model

Ricardian dynamic general equilibrium analyses show that under free trade arrangements a low income country with lower wage cost and large endowment of labour has comparative advantage in trade. Efficiency gains from this enhance economic growth and welfare of households simultaneously in both low income and advanced economies. Theoretical predictions are empirically validated here with structural VAR analysis based on quarterly data over the time period 1995:1 to 2009:1 on China's relative wage cost, interest rate differential, real effective exchange rate (REER), relative GDP and the US current account balance. It is shown how the relative prices of labour, capital and the currency affect the economic activity in China and current account balance in the US. With free capital inflows and outflows and restrictions on labour mobility, comparative advantage of China and the trade deficit of the US will both be minimised if China allows real appreciation of the Yuan and complete adjustment in prices. Higher production cost and prices in China could reduce welfare of Chinese households and the trade imbalance of the US, while higher relative GDP of China lowers the current account balance for the US.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

Labour market institutions and employment in France

The purpose of this paper is to use individual data to study how the minimum wage and the welfare system combine to affect employment in France. Using the 1997 Labour Force Survey, we decompose non‐employment of married women into three components: voluntary, classical (due to the minimum wage) and ‘other’ (a residual category). We find that the minimum wage explains close to 15% of non‐employment for these women and that the disincentive effects of some welfare policy measures may be large. Our approach also allows us to evaluate various labour and welfare policy experiments in their effects on participation and employment. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Puzzle of Jobless Growth in Indian Manufacturing

In the 1980's, India experimented with deregulation in industry and trade. Manufacturing output accelerated but employment declined, raising doubts about the desirability of the policy reforms. This paper proposes an explanation of employment behaviour in terms of increases in total factor productivity, in actual hours worked, and in the product wage. Using robust methods, it is shown that neglect of hours worked results in a substantial upward bias in estimates of the wage elasticity. Growth in productivity and hours appears to be associated with the reform process, with the increase in hours worked reflecting recovery of lost time. To the extent that hours must hit a ceiling, the drop in employment on this count is expected to be temporary. Other things being equal, employment prospects appear to depend considerably on the course of productivity growth.     

Should managerial delegation contracts be made before or after union wage setting? A game‐theoretic analysis

This paper analyzes a multiple‐stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) firms compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to this stage, firm‐specific unions set the workers' wages, while the owners of both firms hire managers and provide them with incentive contracts. Owners can freely decide to arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non‐managerial) wage determination stage. Hence, the endogenous choice of the incentive contract stage is derived. The possibility of multiple equilibria arises, where both owners choose managerial contracts before or after unions' wage setting, crucially depending on unions' preferences. Such results also prove to be true for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in preferences over wages vis‐à‐vis employment across unions.     

The trade union response to agency labour in Britain

The growth of agency work in recent years has posed a challenge to trade unions, which must decide if they will accept agency workers as part of their constituency and accept employment agencies as legitimate labour‐market actors. This article analyses the reaction of British unions to agency work and identifies four main responses: exclusion, replacement, regulation and engagement. It concludes with an evaluation of union policies, which stresses the need for unions to secure broad regulation of the agency labour market either through multi‐employer bargaining or employment law.     

‘What problems you got?’: managerialisation and union organising in the voluntary sector

This article explores how government public service modernisation policies have impacted on management practices and employment conditions in voluntary sector welfare organisations and the problems unions have encountered in responding to such impacts in the context of public service modernisation. The study finds that employees encounter problems developing workplace union organisation and unions face problems developing a coherent strategy on support for the sector and for resisting public sector reform, which hinders trade union resistance. The implications of this may be important in strengthening managerial control over the public service labour process.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Bargaining Over Housework

A bstract .   This paper investigates the limited increase in housework provided by husbands in response to higher earnings and labor force participation by their wives. An explanation is provided that integrates the time availability, relative resources, and gender ideology perspectives that traditionally have been used to explain housework decisions. The outcome is the result of a bargaining process in which two concerns are identified as limiting the response of primary wage earning spouses to the employment of secondary wage earning spouses. First, the secondary wage earners' employment may in part be motivated by a concern about the durability of their marriage rather than their family's welfare. Second, a balancing of the inconveniences and the net earnings of the additional employment may be viewed as making only a limited contribution to the family's welfare. Empirical results of an analysis of the individual household tasks imply that both gender ideology and the spouses' earnings are important in determining the hours that each spouse devotes to household tasks. When making decisions about the amount of housework to perform, both spouses respond to changes in relative earnings, but the response of husbands, who are usually the primary wage earners, is smaller than that of wives, who tend to be the secondary wage earners.     

The effect of the minimum wage on employment and hours

This study examines the effect of minimum wage increases on teen hours of work and employment using both state- and individual-level panel data in the US. The state-level results indicate that minimum wage increases may lower employment rates but do not adversely affect hours among either working teens or all teens. The individual-level results do not indicate that minimum wage increases have a significant negative effect on hours worked by low-wage teens who are likely to be affected by a minimum wage increase. The results suggest that low-wage teens are less likely to remain employed, relative to high-wage teens, when the minimum wage is raised. However, this adverse effect disappears when these low-wage teens are compared to other low-wage teens during periods when the minimum wage did not increase.     

Technology and collective agreements: some recent Scandinavian developments

New technology and its effects on work and employment has been a major issue in Scandinavia for several years. This article evaluates progress made between employers and trade unions subsequent to legislation passed in the 1970s concerning co-determination, the quality of working life and the work environment.     

Working-time reductions: a survey of the Australian experience

Since the mid-1970s Australian trade unions have conducted a concerted campaign to reduce standard working hours. Part of the logic behind this was to increase employment opportunities for those currently unemployed. This article reviews the economic and industrial relations implications of that campaign by reference to the major studies undertaken in this area and compares them with those from other countries.