Do Low‐Wage Workers React Less to Longer Unemployment Benefits? Quasi‐Experimental Evidence*

The fact that unemployed workers have different abilities to smooth consumption entails heterogeneous responses to extended unemployment benefits. Our empirical exercise explores a quasi‐experimental setting generated by an increase in the benefits entitlement period. The results suggest a hump‐shape response of unemployment duration over the one‐year pre‐unemployment wage distribution; individuals at the bottom and top of the wage distribution reacted less than those in the interquartile range. This behaviour of job searchers is consistent with labour supply models with unemployment insurance and savings. It questions the optimality of very long entitlement periods to target the unemployment experiences of low‐wage workers.     

DURATION DEPENDENCE VERSUS UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY IN TREATMENT EFFECTS: SWEDISH LABOR MARKET TRAINING AND THE TRANSITION RATE TO EMPLOYMENT

The effect of a treatment on the hazard rate of a duration outcome may depend on the elapsed time since treatment. In addition, treatment effects may be heterogeneous across agents. The former gives rise to duration dependence of the treatment effect, whereas unobserved heterogeneity gives rise to spurious duration dependence of the observable hazard rate. We develop a model allowing for duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect. The model incorporates a Timing of Events model and allows for selectivity on unobservables. We prove identification, exploiting variation in the timing of treatment and outcome. In the application we analyze the effects of the Swedish vocational employment training program on the individual transition rate from unemployment to work. We demonstrate the appropriateness of the approach by studying the enrollment process. The data cover the population and include multiple unemployment spells for many individuals. The results indicate a large, significantly positive effect on exit to work shortly after exiting the program. The effect at the individual level diminishes after some weeks. When taking account of the time spent in the program, the effect on the mean unemployment duration is small. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Demographic and education effects on unemployment in Europe

We analyse the effects of demographic and education changes on unemployment rates in Europe. Using a panel of European countries for the 1975–2002 period - disaggregated by cohort and education - we empirically test the economic effects of the “baby bust” and the “education boom”. We find that structural shifts in the population age structure play an important role and that a significant share of variation in unemployment rates is also attributable to educational changes, the latter being usually neglected in aggregate studies. Results show that demographic and education shocks are qualitatively different for young (adult) workers as well as for more (less) educated people. Changes in the population age structure are positively related to the unemployment rate of young workers, while have no effect on adults. Conversely, changes in the education structure show a negative effect on the unemployment of the more educated. Labour market institutions also influence unemployment rates in different ways. Employment protection for regular workers increases unemployment rates, while temporary employment provisions reduce it. Unemployment benefits are found to have a displacement effect on unemployment, while corporatism of wage bargaining improves employment performance.     

The impact of unemployment insurance taxes on wages

This paper examines the incidence of state unemployment insurance taxes on wages paid to workers in various demographic groups. The empirical work matches state level measures of unemployment insurance tax and benefit variables to data aggregated from the Current Population Survey on worker earnings for the period 1992 to 2002. Econometric evidence presented in the paper supports the paper's main hypothesis that UI tax rate structure has its greatest adverse impact on less mobile workers (prime age married women and young workers) and little impact on more mobile workers (prime age men).     

Duration dependence in the exit rate out of unemployment in Belgium. Is it true or spurious?

On the basis of aggregate data for the early 1990s, we analyse the determinants of unemployment duration for laid‐off male workers in Wallonia (Belgium). Our results indicate that if ranking in recruitment occurs, the standard mixed proportional hazard specification can be too restrictive, leading to an overstatement of the extent of true negative duration dependence. We conclude that negative duration dependence is largely spurious. We also decompose the time variation of the hazard in (unobserved) compositional and direct cyclical and seasonal effects. We find counter‐cyclical variation in the quality of young workers, but none for the prime aged. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information shocks and the empirical evaluation of training programs during unemployment spells

We study the role of notifications in the evaluation of training programs for unemployed workers. Using a unique administrative data set containing the dates when information is exchanged between job seekers and caseworkers, we address three questions: Do information shocks, such as notification of future training, have an effect on unemployment duration? What is the joint effect of notification and training programs on unemployment? Can ignoring information shocks lead to a large bias in the estimation of the effect of training programs? We discuss these issues through the lens of a job search model and then conduct an empirical analysis following a “random effects” approach to deal with selectivity. We find that notification has a strong positive effect on the training probability but a negative one on the probability of leaving unemployment. This “attraction” effect highlights the importance of accounting for notifications in the evaluation of active labor market policies.     

Unemployment Experiences of Young Men: on the Road to Stable Employment?*

This study examines the unemployment experiences of young men in the United Kingdom over the period 1982.IV–1998.I. The empirical results show that repeated unemployment is a dominant feature of the UK labour market and that individual heterogeneity affects mainly the incidence of unemployment and only to a much lesser extent the duration of unemployment. We estimate that about 73% of the young unemployed find stable employment before the age of 35. The remaining 27%, concentrated among the lower‐skilled, keep returning into unemployment, suggesting structural employment instability. These findings imply that a labour market programme targeted at increasing the employability of the young unemployed would yield long‐term benefits by not only getting them out of unemployment but also keeping them out of unemployment.     

State dependency in youth unemployment: A lost generation?

Utilizing a job search framework and survey data on both completed and uncompleted spells of unemployment we present in this paper maximum likelihood estimates of the determinants of re-employment probabilities of young workers in Britain. The model used allows us to examine the importance of state dependency in youth unemployment as well as ethnicity, educational qualifications, and unemployment income. Results suggest that there is strong evidence of negative duration dependence in the transition from unemployment to employment for young workers in Britain.     

THE THREAT EFFECT OF ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAMS: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

This paper is a systematic review of the threat effect of active labor market programs for unemployed individuals. The threat effect is the induced change in the hazard rate of leaving unemployment prior to program participation. Studies included in the review all estimated a threat effect, with the participants in all cases being unemployed individuals in receipt of benefit of some kind during their tenure of unemployment. Eight of these studies have been included in a meta-analysis: The meta-analysis, which has been carried out using a random effects model to account for heterogeneity, indicated a hazard ratio of 1.25 for the pooled estimate. We conclude that active labor market programs constitute a statistically significant threat effect, although it is modest.     

Potential Unemployment Benefit Duration and Spell Length: Lessons from a Quasi-Experiment in Austria

The paper studies the effect of potential unemployment benefit duration on the length of unemployment spells in Austria. It takes advantage of a quasi-experimental situation, where potential benefit duration was extended in 1988 for elderly workers living in specific regions of the country. The empirical analysis shows that men react significantly to benefit duration whereas women generally do not. The quantitative impact is smaller than in comparable studies for the US and Germany. Furthermore, the impact of extended benefit duration is differentiated for short and long spells. Whereas for long spells higher impacts for men as well as for women are found, no unemployment-prolonging effects for short spells could be detected.     

Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

Guaranteed minimum income and unemployment duration in France

In this article, we use data from the European Community Household Panel to evaluate the impact of a French guaranteed income program, the RMI, on the hazard out of unemployment. Self-selection into the program is corrected using a multivariate duration model developed by [Abbring, J.H., van den Berg, G.J., 2003. The non-parametric identification of treatment effects in duration models. Econometrica 71 (5), 1491–1517]. We find that RMI receipt has a strong negative impact during the first months of program participation, but that this disincentive effect quickly falls to insignificant levels after six months. Household structure also appears to be an important determinant of the importance of the adverse effect of program participation.     

The search for success: do the unemployed find stable employment?

We use discrete time proportional hazards regressions to model the impact of previous unemployment incidence and duration on job tenure. We find that jobs that follow an unemployment spell have shorter mean duration than other jobs. Only one half of jobs that follow unemployment last for 12 months. Multivariate results suggest that an unemployment spell has a severe penalty on subsequent job tenure, and that it is unemployment incidence rather than duration which has the major impact.     

Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

Long-run effects of training programs for the unemployed in East Germany

Public sector sponsored training was implemented at a large scale during the transition process in East Germany. Based on new administrative data, we estimate the differential effects of three different programs for East Germany during the transition process. We apply a dynamic multiple treatment approach using matching based on inflows into unemployment. We find positive medium- and long-run employment effects for the largest program, Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques. In contrast, the programs practice firms and retraining show no consistent positive employment effects. Furthermore, no program results in a reduction of benefit recipiency and the effects are quite similar for females and males.     

How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration? A regression discontinuity approach

This paper studies a targeted program that extends the maximum duration of unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to 209 weeks in Austria. Sharp discontinuities in treatment assignment at age 50 and at the border between eligible regions and control regions identify the effect of extended benefits on unemployment duration. Results indicate that the duration of job search is prolonged by at least 0.09 weeks per additional week of benefits among men, whereas unemployment duration increases by at least 0.32 weeks per additional week of benefits for women. This finding is consistent with a lower early retirement age applying to women.     

Are specific skills an obstacle to labor market adjustment?

This paper shows that specialized education reduces workers’ mobility and hence their ability to cope with economic changes. We illustrate this point using labor force data from two countries having experienced important macroeconomic turbulence; a large economy with rigid labor markets, Poland, and a small open economy with increased flexibility, Estonia. We find that holding a vocational degree is associated with much longer unemployment duration spells and higher likelihood of leaving activity for older workers. We then build a theoretical framework in which young agents’ careers are heavily determined by the type of initial education, and analyze the transition to a new steady-state after a sectoral demand shift. Quantitative exercises suggest that the over-specialization of the labor force in Poland led to much higher and persistent unemployment compared to Estonia during the period of EU enlargement. Traditional labor market institutions (wage rigidity and employment protection) lead to an increase of the unemployment gap, but to a lesser extent.     

Unemployment insurance and job turnover in Spain

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment insurance system and labour market turnover. This study assumes the incentives embedded in the unemployment insurance system have a heterogeneous impact, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job entrances) and on a worker's attachment to the labour market (gender and type of contract). The layoff hazard rate increases as workers qualify for unemployment benefits, whilst the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment inflow increases sharply after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of the exit differ between recalls and new job entry and depend on a worker's attachment to the labour market. The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and both firms' and workers' decisions seem to matter.     

The role of observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the duration of unemployment

This paper studies the degree to which observable and unobservable worker characteristics account for the variation in the aggregate duration of unemployment. I model the distribution of unobserved worker heterogeneity as time varying to capture the interaction of latent attributes with changes in labor-market conditions. Unobserved heterogeneity is the main explanation for the duration dependence of unemployment hazards. Both cyclical and low-frequency variations in the mean duration of unemployment are mainly driven by one subgroup: workers who, for unobserved reasons, stay unemployed for a long time. In contrast, changes in the composition of observable characteristics of workers have negligible effects.     

Does early intervention help the unemployed youth?

This paper evaluates a measure targeted at unemployed individuals aged 20–24. The main purpose of the measure is to prevent long-term unemployment by guaranteeing an assignment to some labor market program within 100 days of unemployment. Municipalities voluntarily agree to offer the guarantee. To identify the effect of the measure, we use three conditions: The guarantee covers individuals aged 24 but not 25, one fifth of the municipalities does not provide the guarantee, and the guarantee existed in 1998 but not in 1997. We find no evidence that the measure did significantly improve the future labor market situation of the youth, which suggests that early intervention in the unemployment spell is not important.